Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “human error”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 541 records · Page 30

Crystal Structure And Mutagenisis of the Metallochaperone MeaB: Insight Into the Causes of the Methylmalonic Aciduria

MeaB is an auxiliary protein that plays a crucial role in the protection and assembly of the B{sub 12}-dependent enzyme methylmalonyl-CoA mutase. Impairments in the human homologue of MeaB, MMAA, lead to methylmalonic aciduria, an inborn error of metabolism. To explore the role of this metallochaperone, its structure was solved in the nucleotide-free form, as well as in the presence of product, GDP. MeaB is a homodimer, with each subunit containing a central {alpha}/{beta}-core G domain that is typical of the GTPase family, as well as a-helical extensions at the N and C termini that are not found in other metalloenzyme chaperone GTPases. The C-terminal extension appears to be essential for nucleotide-independent dimerization, and the N-terminal region is implicated in protein-protein interaction with its partner protein, methylmalonyl-CoA mutase. The structure of MeaB confirms that it is a member of the G3E family of P-loop GTPases, which contains other putative metallochaperones HypB, CooC, and UreG. Interestingly, the so-called switch regions, responsible for signal transduction following GTP hydrolysis, are found at the dimer interface of MeaB instead of being positioned at the surface of the protein where its partner protein methylmalonyl-CoA mutase should bind. This observation suggests a large conformation change of MeaB must occur between the GDP- and GTP-bound forms of this protein. Because of their high sequence homology, the missense mutations in MMAA that result in methylmalonic aciduria have been mapped onto MeaB and, in conjunction with mutagenesis data, provide possible explanations for the pathology of this disease.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

A Task-Optimized Neural Network Replicates Human Auditory Behavior, Predicts Brain Responses, and Reveals a Cortical Processing Hierarchy

A core goal of auditory neuroscience is to build quantitative models that predict cortical responses to natural sounds. Reasoning that a complete model of auditory cortex must solve ecologically relevant tasks, we optimized hierarchical neural networks for speech and music recognition. The best-performing network contained separate music and speech pathways following early shared processing, potentially replicating human cortical organization. The network performed both tasks as well as humans and exhibited human-like errors despite not being optimized to do so, suggesting common constraints on network and human performance. The network predicted fMRI voxel responses substantially better than traditional spectrotemporal filter models throughout auditory cortex. It also provided a quantitative signature of cortical representational hierarchy—primary and non-primary responses were best predicted by intermediate and late network layers, respectively. Here the results suggest that task optimization provides a powerful set of tools for modeling sensory systems.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Pendulum Shifts, Context, Error, and Personal Accountability

This paper describes a series of tools that were developed to achieve a balance in under-standing LOWs and the human component of events (including accountability) as the INL continues its shift to a learning culture where people report, are accountable and interested in making a positive difference - and want to report because information is handled correctly and the result benefits both the reporting individual and the organization. We present our model for understanding these interrelationships; the initiatives that were undertaken to improve overall performance.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗

Development and Characterization of a Low-Pressure Calibration System for Hypersonic Wind Tunnels

Minimization of uncertainty is essential for accurate ESP measurements at very low free-stream static pressures found in hypersonic wind tunnels. Statistical characterization of environmental error sources requires a well defined and controlled calibration method. A calibration system has been constructed and environmental control software developed to control experimentation to eliminate human induced error sources. The initial stability study of the calibration system shows a high degree of measurement accuracy and precision in temperature and pressure control. Control manometer drift and reference pressure instabilities induce uncertainty into the repeatability of voltage responses measured from the PSI System 8400 between calibrations. Methods of improving repeatability are possible through software programming and further experimentation.

Green, Del L.↗

Incidents at nuclear power plants caused by the human factor

Psychological analysis of the causes of incorrect actions by personnel is discussed as presented in the report 'Methodological guidelines for analyzing the causes of incidents in the operation of nuclear power plants.' The types of incorrect actions and classification of the root causes of errors by personnel are analyzed. Recommendations are made for improvements in the psychological analysis of causes of incorrect actions by personnel.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Statistical Characterization of Environmental Error Sources Affecting Electronically Scanned Pressure Transducers

Minimization of uncertainty is essential to extend the usable range of the 15-psid Electronically Scanned Pressure (ESP) transducer measurements to the low free-stream static pressures found in hypersonic wind tunnels. Statistical characterization of environmental error sources inducing much of this uncertainty requires a well defined and controlled calibration method. Employing such a controlled calibration system, several studies were conducted that provide quantitative information detailing the required controls needed to minimize environmental and human induced error sources. Results of temperature, environmental pressure, over-pressurization, and set point randomization studies for the 15-psid transducers are presented along with a comparison of two regression methods using data acquired with both 0.36-psid and 15-psid transducers. Together these results provide insight into procedural and environmental controls required for long term high-accuracy pressure measurements near 0.01 psia in the hypersonic testing environment using 15-psid ESP transducers.

Green, Del L.↗

Statistical Characterization of Environmental Error Sources Affecting Electronically Scanned Pressure Transducers

Minimization of uncertainty is essential to extend the usable range of the 15-psid Electronically Scanned Pressure [ESP) transducer measurements to the low free-stream static pressures found in hypersonic wind tunnels. Statistical characterization of environmental error sources inducing much of this uncertainty requires a well defined and controlled calibration method. Employing such a controlled calibration system, several studies were conducted that provide quantitative information detailing the required controls needed to minimize environmental and human induced error sources. Results of temperature, environmental pressure, over-pressurization, and set point randomization studies for the 15-psid transducers are presented along with a comparison of two regression methods using data acquired with both 0.36-psid and 15-psid transducers. Together these results provide insight into procedural and environmental controls required for long term high-accuracy pressure measurements near 0.01 psia in the hypersonic testing environment using 15-psid ESP transducers.

Green, Del L.↗

Review of Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight from a Human Factors Perspective

This project aims to identify poor human factors design decisions that led to error-prone systems, or did not facilitate the flight crew making the right choices; and to verify that NASA is effectively preventing similar incidents from occurring again. This analysis was performed by reviewing significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight identified by the NASA Johnson Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance Flight Safety Office. The review of incidents shows whether the identified human errors were due to the operational phase (flight crew and ground control) or if they initiated at the design phase (includes manufacturing and test). This classification was performed with the aid of the NASA Human Systems Integration domains. This in-depth analysis resulted in a tool that helps with the human factors classification of significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight, which can be used to identify human errors at the operational level, and how they were or should be minimized. Current governing documents on human systems integration for both government and commercial crew were reviewed to see if current requirements, processes, training, and standard operating procedures protect the crew and ground control against these issues occurring in the future. Based on the findings, recommendations to target those areas are provided.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗

Errors in Aviation Decision Making: Bad Decisions or Bad Luck?

Despite efforts to design systems and procedures to support 'correct' and safe operations in aviation, errors in human judgment still occur and contribute to accidents. In this paper we examine how an NDM (naturalistic decision making) approach might help us to understand the role of decision processes in negative outcomes. Our strategy was to examine a collection of identified decision errors through the lens of an aviation decision process model and to search for common patterns. The second, and more difficult, task was to determine what might account for those patterns. The corpus we analyzed consisted of tactical decision errors identified by the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) from a set of accidents in which crew behavior contributed to the accident. A common pattern emerged: about three quarters of the errors represented plan-continuation errors, that is, a decision to continue with the original plan despite cues that suggested changing the course of action. Features in the context that might contribute to these errors were identified: (a) ambiguous dynamic conditions and (b) organizational and socially-induced goal conflicts. We hypothesize that 'errors' are mediated by underestimation of risk and failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing with the initial plan. Stressors may further contribute to these effects. Suggestions for improving performance in these error-inducing contexts are discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Simulation-Based Recovery Action Analysis Using the EMRALD Dynamic Risk Assessment Tool

Recovery human action is defined as the action that prevents deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects. Analyzing recovery actions has been a critical part in human reliability analysis (HRA). However, there are a couple of limitations to treating recovery actions using only the current HRA methods available. Representatively, the existing recovery analysis does not specifically consider recovery actions as they have occurred in actual nuclear power plants (NPPs). To handle the challenges in the existing recovery analyses, this study suggests a way to analyze recovery actions under a dynamic HRA method, the Procedure-based Risk Investigation MEthod-Human Reliability Analysis (PRIME-HRA) method. The PRIME-HRA method suggests a way on how to develop dynamic simulation models using dynamic risk assessment tools such as the Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagram (EMRALD) [1] and the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) [2]. EMRALD and HUNTER are the dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and HRA tools developed at Idaho National Laboratory. In this paper, differences on analyzing recovery actions in the Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP), the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) and the Korean Standard HRA (K-HRA) and challenges of these approaches are introduced. How we have developed the PRIME-HRA is also introduced in this paper. Then, the proposed approach to analyzing recovery human actions in dynamic context is partially discussed with an example.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Evaluation of Multiple Flow Constrained Area Capacity Setting Methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program

The purpose of this study was to compare flow constrained area (FCA) capacity setting methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP) as they pertain to the Integrated Demand Management (IDM) concept. IDM uses flow balancing to manage air traffic across multiple FCAs with a common downstream constraint, as well as constraints at the respective FCA locations. FCA capacity rates can be set manually, but generating capacities for multiple, interdependent FCAs could potentially over-burden a user. A new enhancement to CTOP called the FCA Balance Algorithm (FBA) was developed at NASA Ames Research Center to improve the process of allocating capacity across multiple flow constrained segments in the airspace. The FBA evaluates the predicted demand and capacity across multiple FCAs and dynamically generates capacity settings for the FCAs that best meet capacity limits for all identified constraints. In a human-in-the-loop simulation study, both manual and automated capacity setting methods were evaluated in terms of their overall feasibility using measures of system performance, human performance, and qualitative feedback. Subject matter experts were asked to use three different methods to allocate capacity to three FCAs, either (1) by manually setting capacity for every 60-minute time window, (2) by manually setting capacity for every 15-minute time window, or (3) by using the FBA capability to automatically generate capacity settings. Results showed no significant differences in terms of overall system performance, indicated by similar ground delay and airport throughput numbers between methods. However, differences in individual strategies afforded by the manual methods allowed some participants to achieve system-wide delay that was much lower than the average. The FBA was the fastest method of capacity setting, and it received the lowest subjective rating scores on physical task load, mental task load, task difficulty and task complexity out of the three methods. Finally, participants explained through qualitative feedback that there were many benefits to using the FBA, such as ease of use, accuracy, and low risk of human input error. Participants did not experience the same limitations with the FBA that they did with the manual methods, such as reduced accuracy in the 60-minute manual condition, or high complexity in the 15-minute/manual condition. These results suggest that the FBA automation enhancement to CTOP maintains system performance while improving human performance. Therefore, the FBA could be introduced as a way to mitigate operator workload while planning a CTOP.

NextGen↗

Evaluation of Multiple Flow Constrained Area Capacity Setting Methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program

The purpose of this study was to compare flow constrained area (FCA) capacity setting methods for Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP) as they pertain to the Integrated Demand Management (IDM) concept. IDM uses flow balancing to manage air traffic across multiple FCAs with a common downstream constraint, as well as constraints at the respective FCA locations. FCA capacity rates can be set manually, but generating capacities for multiple, interdependent FCAs could potentially over-burden a user. A new enhancement to CTOP called the FCA Balance Algorithm (FBA) was developed at NASA Ames Research Center to improve the process of allocating capacity across multiple flow constrained segments in the airspace. The FBA evaluates the predicted demand and capacity across multiple FCAs and dynamically generates capacity settings for the FCAs that best meet capacity limits for all identified constraints. In a human-in-the-loop simulation study, both manual and automated capacity setting methods were evaluated in terms of their overall feasibility using measures of system performance, human performance, and qualitative feedback. Subject matter experts were asked to use three different methods to allocate capacity to three FCAs, either (1) by manually setting capacity for every 60-minute time window, (2) by manually setting capacity for every 15-minute time window, or (3) by using the FBA capability to automatically generate capacity settings. Results showed no significant differences in terms of overall system performance, indicated by similar ground delay and airport throughput numbers between methods. However, differences in individual strategies afforded by the manual methods allowed some participants to achieve system-wide delay that was much lower than the average. The FBA was the fastest method of capacity setting, and it received the lowest subjective rating scores on physical task load, mental task load, task difficulty and task complexity out of the three methods. Finally, participants explained through qualitative feedback that there were many benefits to using the FBA, such as ease of use, accuracy, and low risk of human input error. Participants did not experience the same limitations with the FBA that they did with the manual methods, such as reduced accuracy in the 60-minute manual condition, or high complexity in the 15-minute/manual condition. These results suggest that the FBA automation enhancement to CTOP maintains system performance while improving human performance. Therefore, the FBA could be introduced as a way to mitigate operator workload while planning a CTOP.

NextGen↗

Correction techniques for depth errors with stereo three-dimensional graphic displays

Three-dimensional (3-D), 'real-world' pictorial displays that incorporate 'true' depth cues via stereopsis techniques have proved effective for displaying complex information in a natural way to enhance situational awareness and to improve pilot/vehicle performance. In such displays, the display designer must map the depths in the real world to the depths available with the stereo display system. However, empirical data have shown that the human subject does not perceive the information at exactly the depth at which it is mathematically placed. Head movements can also seriously distort the depth information that is embedded in stereo 3-D displays because the transformations used in mapping the visual scene to the depth-viewing volume (DVV) depend intrinsically on the viewer location. The goal of this research was to provide two correction techniques; the first technique corrects the original visual scene to the DVV mapping based on human perception errors, and the second (which is based on head-positioning sensor input data) corrects for errors induced by head movements. Empirical data are presented to validate both correction techniques. A combination of the two correction techniques effectively eliminates the distortions of depth information embedded in stereo 3-D displays.

Parrish, Russell V.↗

A psychologist's view of validating aviation systems

All systems, no matter what they are designed to do, have shortcomings that may make them less productive than was hoped during the initial development. Such shortcomings can arise at any stage of development: from conception to the end of the implementation life cycle. While systems failure and errors of a lesser magnitude can occur as a function of mechanical or software breakdown, the majority of such problems, in aviation are usually laid on the shoulders of the human operator and, to a lesser extent, on human factors. The operator bears the responsibility and blame even though, from a human factors perspective, error may have been designed into the system. Human factors is not a new concept in aviation. The name may be new, but the issues related to operators in the loop date back to the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and certainly to the aviation build-up for World War I. During this first global confrontation, military services from all sides discovered rather quickly that poor selection and training led to drastically increased personnel losses. While hardware design became an issue later, the early efforts were primarily focused on increased care in pilot selection and on their training. This actually involved early labor-intensive simulation, using such devices as sticks and chairs mounted on rope networks which could be manually moved in response to control input. The use of selection criteria and improved training led to more viable person-machine systems. More pilots survived training and their first ten missions in the air, a rule of thumb arrived at by experience which predicted ultimate survival better than any other. This rule was to hold through World War II. At that time, personnel selection and training became very sophisticated based on previous standards. Also, many psychologists were drafted into Army Air Corps programs which were geared towards refining the human factor. However, despite the talent involved in these programs and the tremendous build-up of aviation during the war, there were still aircraft designs that were man killers (no sexism implied since all combat pilots were men). One classic design error that was identified fifty years ago was the multipointer altimeter, which could easily be misread especially by a pilot under considerable task load. It has led to flying fully operational aircraft into the terrain. The authors of the research which formally identified this problem put 'Human Errors' in quotes to express their dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to accident investigation. It traditionally places the burden of guilt on the operator. Some of these altimeters still exist in older aircraft to this day.

Stein, Earl S.↗

Investigation of a “Sharps” Incident

Special nuclear material research, process development, technology demonstration, and manufacturing capabilities are provided at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility. Engineered barriers provide the most effective protection from radioactive and hazardous materials. The Worker Safety Security Team augments these passive safety feature by investigating incidents to identify appropriate prevention and mitigation measures. “Learning Teams” facilitate employee feedback loop and integration toward process improvement. Here, this article reports an investigation of a “Sharps” incident and reviews a case study of a technician that cuts his left thumb while making a gasket. Causal analysis of the sharps incident uncovered contributing factors that created the environment in which the incident occurred. Finally, latent organizational conditions that created error-likely situations or weakened defenses were identified and controlled. Effective improvements that reduce the probability or consequence of similar sharps incidents were implemented.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Asthenia--does it exist in space?

OBJECTIVE: First popularized as neurasthenia in the late 1800s by American George Beard, asthenia has been viewed by Russian psychologists and flight surgeons as a major problem that affects cosmonauts participating in long-duration space missions. However, there is some controversy about whether this syndrome exists in space; this controversy is attributable in part to the fact that it is not recognized in the current American psychiatric diagnostic system. METHODS: To address this issue empirically, we retrospectively examined the data from our 4 1/2-year, NASA-funded study of crew member and mission control interactions during the Shuttle/Mir space program. Three of the authors identified eight items of stage 1 asthenia from one of our measures, the Profile of Mood States (POMS). Scores on these items from 13 Russian and American crew members were compared with scores derived from the opinions of six Russian space experts. RESULTS: Crew members' scores in space were significantly lower than the experts' scores on seven of the eight items, and they generally were in the "not at all" to "a little" range of the item scales. There were no differences in mean scores before and after launch or across the four quarters of the missions. There were no differences in response between Russian and American crew members. CONCLUSIONS: We could not demonstrate the presence of asthenia in space as operationally defined using the POMS. However, the POMS addresses only emotional and not physiological aspects of the syndrome, and the subject responses in our study generally were skewed toward the positive end of the scales. Further research on this syndrome needs to be done and should include physiological measures and measures that are specific to asthenia.

Non-NASA Center↗