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At least 595 records · Page 33

Overview of Nondestructive Evaluation Capabilities at NASA MSFC

Nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods examine material integrity without impairing its usefulness. The NDE team at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama is responsible for applying existing methods to new hardware designs and material systems, probability of detection studies to quantify detection capabilities, overseeing NDE requirements for flight hardware, inspecting development articles and flight hardware, engineering support for failure investigations, and investigating emerging NDE methods. NASA MSFC has been on the cutting edge of developing new NDE techniques, first for the space shuttle, then for composite structures, and most recently for additive manufacturing (AM). Standard in-house inspection capabilities include eddy current, magnetic particle, liquid penetrant, ultrasonic, and radiographic testing (including computed tomography). Other advanced inspection capabilities include infrared flash thermography, shearography, acoustic emission, and microwave/millimeter wave testing. Some recent research studies include AM probability of detection testing, investigating in-situ process monitoring methods for AM, and correlating the NDE response of true fatigue cracks with artificial notches.

nondestructive evaluation↗

Molecular Accumulation during JWST’s Optical Telescope Cryogenic Thermal Vacuum Testing

Maintaining molecular cleanliness during the JWST’s Optical Telescope/Instrument Module (OTIS) Cryogenic Thermal Vacuum (TV) test campaign was critical to the success of its optical mission on orbit. In the thermal vacuum tests leading up to the final cryogenic test to validate the OTIS flight hardware, NASA Johnson Space Center’s (JSC’s) TV Chamber A was fully characterized for molecular contamination. It was found to contain common volatile condensable materials (VCM), including hydrocarbons, plasticizers, and silicones, all of which absorb in JWST’s infrared wavelength region. Due to the risks involved, cleaning molecular contamination from the OTIS mirrors was not an option and heating the Primary Mirror (PM) segments would have also been a risky and expensive endeavor. As a result, a monitoring process was developed and implemented during four different Pathfinder or risk reduction tests that were scheduled to occur prior to the flight hardware test. The goal was to quantify and assess the risk of molecular contamination depositing on the PM resulting from relatively warm chamber shrouds “leading” colder PM mirrors during warmup, by a margin of 10-50 Kelvin (K). This was accomplished using Cryogenic Quartz Crystal Microbalances (CQCMs), held at temperatures slightly cooler than the segments to signal the onset of contamination events. Per the JWST Contamination Control Plan (CCP)1, the total Primary Mirror molecular allocation requirement was 50 angstroms. In all tests, the results showed an average accumulated molecular contamination of <10 angstroms.

optics↗

Molecular Accumulation during JWST’s Optical Telescope Cryogenic Thermal Vacuum Testing

Maintaining molecular cleanliness during the JWST’s Optical Telescope/Instrument Module (OTIS) Cryogenic Thermal Vacuum (TV) test campaign was critical to the success of its optical mission on orbit. In the thermal vacuum tests leading up to the final cryogenic test to validate the OTIS flight hardware, NASA Johnson Space Center’s (JSC’s) TV Chamber A was fully characterized for molecular contamination. It was found to contain common volatile condensable materials (VCM), including hydrocarbons, plasticizers, and silicones, all of which absorb in JWST’s infrared wavelength region. Due to the risks involved, cleaning molecular contamination from the OTIS mirrors was not an option and heating the Primary Mirror (PM) segments would have also been a risky and expensive endeavor. As a result, a monitoring process was developed and implemented during four different Pathfinder or risk reduction tests that were scheduled to occur prior to the flight hardware test. The goal was to quantify and assess the risk of molecular contamination depositing on the PM resulting from relatively warm chamber shrouds “leading” colder PM mirrors during warmup, by a margin of 10-50 Kelvin (K). This was accomplished using Cryogenic Quartz Crystal Microbalances (CQCMs), held at temperatures slightly cooler than the segments to signal the onset of contamination events. Per the JWST Contamination Control Plan (CCP)1, the total Primary Mirror molecular allocation requirement was 50 angstroms. In all tests, the results showed an average accumulated molecular contamination of <10 angstroms.

molecular, contamination, thermal vacuum, cryogeni↗

NASA's Certification and Qualification Challenges for Additively Manufactured Hardware: What Is Next?

In 2021, NASA released NASA-STD-6030 “Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems” to create qualification and certification strategies for mature metallic and non-metallic AM materials and technologies. While these standards have had an immediate impact on the additive manufacturing (AM) industry, there remain many challenges that have yet to be overcome. NASA and its partners in academia and industry are working together to proactively address these issues. One of the most critical needs is a Probabilistic Damage Tolerance Assessment (PDTA) approach, which includes the development of computational modeling, understanding the “effect of defects”, and the implementation of in-situ process monitoring and inspection techniques.

Will Tilson↗

Cross-Cutting Flight Infrastructure Improvements on M2020

Mars2020 (M2020) was formulated as a mission that leveraged as much Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) heritage as possible, while focusing major new development efforts on the original and unique elements needed to accomplish the different mission objectives. Well publicized examples of high profile new developments include precision landing, the sampling and caching system, the specific instrument suite, improved mobility via Autonomous Navigation, and later the addition of the Ingenuity helicopter. Less well known are the refinements to the core flight infrastructure, primarily in the cross-cutting functions of Telecom, Avionics, Data Management, Communications Behaviors, and Parameter Management. These enhancements are introduced predominately via flight software, and represent increases in capability that justified their inclusion in an otherwise heritage-focused project environment.Perseverance’s cross-cutting flight infrastructure improvements fall into and across the following five categories. First is a trimming of the software footprint of infrastructure modules, in order to make room for memory demands elsewhere in the system. Second is the minimization of data volume to be downlinked, through various methods such as the incorporation of new compression options. Third is the maximization of the available downlink bandwidth for data, by curtailing content-less data (fill) and introducing an improved UHF proximity link protocol. Fourth is a reduction in vulnerabilities, through increased file system redundancy, robustness, and software process monitoring. Fifth is an increase in operations efficiency by lowering file system mount times, improving parallelism between simultaneous events, minimizing the time to recover from file system errors, streamlining the purging of obsolete data, and reducing the number of commands to service parameters by a factor of 100.Individually, none of the cross-cutting infrastructure improvements are likely to garner headlines, but collectively they appreciably improve the safety and operability of Perseverance over its predecessor. This paper will describe the improvements, their promise, and where applicable, their actual impact in operations.

Bohannon, Emily↗

Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Analysis of the effectiveness of gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235U enrichment of declared UF6 containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive assay (DA) of samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements. These improvements could reduce the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also explore how a few advanced safeguards systems could be assembled for unattended operation. The analysis will focus on how unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections (IDS) can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear materials when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Optimizing near real time accountability for reprocessing.

Near Real Time Accountability (NRTA) of actinides at high precision in reprocessing plants has been a long sought-after goal in the safeguards community. Achieving this goal is hampered by the difficulty of making precision measurements in the reprocessing environment, equipment cost, and impact to plant operations. Thus the design of future reprocessing plants requires an optimization of different approaches. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model, developed at Sandia National Laboratories, was used to evaluate a number of NRTA strategies in a UREX+ reprocessing plant. Strategies examined include the incorporation of additional actinide measurements of internal plant vessels, more use of process monitoring data, and the option of periodic draining of inventory to key tanks. Preliminary results show that the addition of measurement technologies can increase the overall measurement uncertainty due to additional error propagation, so care must be taken when designing an advanced system. Initial results also show that relying on a combination of different NRTA techniques will likely be the best option. The model provides a platform for integrating all the data. The modeling results for the different NRTA options under various material loss conditions will be presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Active-Interrogation Measurements of Induced-Fission Neutrons from Low-Enriched Uranium

Protection and control of nuclear fuels is paramount for nuclear security and safeguards; therefore, it is important to develop fast and robust controlling mechanisms to ensure the safety of nuclear fuels. Through both passive- and active-interrogation methods we can use fast-neutron detection to perform real-time measurements of fission neutrons for process monitoring. Active interrogation allows us to use different ranges of incident neutron energy to probe for different isotopes of uranium. With fast-neutron detectors, such as organic liquid scintillation detectors, we can detect the induced-fission neutrons and photons and work towards quantifying a sample’s mass and enrichment. Using MCNPX-PoliMi, a system was designed to measure induced-fission neutrons from U-235 and U-238. Measurements were then performed in the summer of 2010 at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy. Fissions were induced with an associated particle D-T generator and an isotopic Am-Li source. The fission neutrons, as well as neutrons from (n, 2n) and (n, 3n) reactions, were measured with five 5” by 5” EJ-309 organic liquid scintillators. The D-T neutron generator was available as part of a measurement campaign in place by Padova University. The measurement and data-acquisition systems were developed at the University of Michigan utilizing a CAEN V1720 digitizer and pulse-shape discrimination algorithms to differentiate neutron and photon detections. Low-enriched uranium samples of varying mass and enrichment were interrogated. Acquired time-of-flight curves and cross-correlation curves are currently analyzed to draw relationships between detected neutrons and sample mass and enrichment. In the full paper, the promise of active-interrogation measurements and fast-neutron detection will be assessed through the example of this proof-of-concept measurement campaign. Additionally, MCNPX-PoliMi simulation results will be compared to the measured data to validate the MCNPX-PoliMi code when used for active-interrogation simulations.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Unattended Multiplicity Shift Register

The Unattended Multiplicity Shift Register (UMSR) is a specialized pulse counter used primarily to count neutron events originating in neutron detection instruments. While the counter can be used to count any TTL input pulses, its unique ability to record time correlated events and the multiplicity distributions of these events makes it an ideal instrument for counting neutron events in the nuclear fields of material safeguards, waste assay and process monitoring and control. The UMSR combines the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) simple and robust shift register design with a Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) processor and Ethernet communications. The UMSR is fully compatible with existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) neutron data acquisition instruments such as the Advance Multiplicity Shift Register (AMSR) and JSR-15. The UMSR has three input channels: a multiplicity shift register input and two auxiliary inputs. The UMSR provides 0V to 2kV of programmable High Voltage (HV) bias and both a 12V and a 5V detector power supply output. A serial over USB communication line to the UMSR allows the use of existing versions of INCC or MIC software while the Ethernet port is compatible with the new IAEA RAINSTORM communication protocol.

Newell, Matt↗

High-sensitivity gas-mapping 3D imager and method of operation

Measurement apparatuses and methods are disclosed for generating high-precision and -accuracy gas concentration maps that can be overlaid with 3D topographic images by rapidly scanning one or several modulated laser beams with a spatially-encoded transmitter over a scene to build-up imagery. Independent measurements of the topographic target distance and path-integrated gas concentration are combined to yield a map of the path-averaged concentration between the sensor and each point in the image. This type of image is particularly useful for finding localized regions of elevated (or anomalous) gas concentration making it ideal for large-area leak detection and quantification applications including: oil and gas pipeline monitoring, chemical processing facility monitoring, and environmental monitoring.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

High-sensitivity gas-mapping 3D imager and method of operation

Measurement apparatuses and methods are disclosed for generating high-precision and -accuracy gas concentration maps that can be overlaid with 3D topographic images by rapidly scanning one or several modulated laser beams with a spatially-encoded transmitter over a scene to build-up imagery. Independent measurements of the topographic target distance and path-integrated gas concentration are combined to yield a map of the path-averaged concentration between the sensor and each point in the image. This type of image is particularly useful for finding localized regions of elevated (or anomalous) gas concentration making it ideal for large-area leak detection and quantification applications including: oil and gas pipeline monitoring, chemical processing facility monitoring, and environmental monitoring.

Kreitinger, Aaron↗

LASER-BASED MEASUREMENT TOOLS FOR FUTURE ENRICHMENT PLANT SAFEGUARDS

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a long history of testing and using laser-based technologies for a variety of safeguards applications. Notable laser-based on-site applications include: 3-dimensional laser range (3DLR) instruments, used for facility design information and verification (DIV); laser measurements to verify unique labels and detect signs of tampering; and laser spectroscopy, for non-contact process monitoring. The IAEA is also evaluating analytical laboratory instruments, such as laser-ablation inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS) for interrogating individual particles to determine uranium isotopic ratios in collected environment samples. Recent laser technology advancements will likely continue to fuel future IAEA adoption of new and novel laser-based safeguards tools. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is currently developing one such tool, called laser ablation, absorption ratio spectrometry (LAARS), for quantitative measurements of uranium material. LAARS uses three tunable diode lasers to simultaneously measure atomic 235U and 238U absorption in an ablation plume created by a fourth pulsed laser. Commercial availability of compact pulsed ablation lasers and the extreme wavelength accuracy and stability of PNNL’s tunable diode laser architecture play a pivotal role in achieving high fidelity LAARS assay measurements. The LAARS method is ultimately targeted for either on-site or laboratory-based 235U relative abundance measurements of destructive assay (DA) samples in support of uranium enrichment plant safeguards. DA samples are currently collected on-site, and then shipped to an analytical laboratory for mass spectrometric assay, because the measurement uncertainty requirements for this application are quite challenging. This paper will present the key elements of the LAARS laser system design, recent assay results on collected uranium hexafluoride (UF6) DA samples, and future operational configurations that may provide immediate on-site DA inspection results or rapid laboratory DA sample screening to prioritize further analysis by mass spectrometry.

IAEA, Safeguards, Uranium Enrichment Plants↗

University Research to Support the MPACT 2020 Milestone

University research is a strong focus of the Office of Nuclear Energy within the Department of Energy. This research complements existing work in the various program areas and provides support and training for students entering the field. Four university projects have provided support to the Material Protection Accounting and Controls Technologies (MPACT) 2020 milestone focused on safeguards for electrochemical processing facilities. The University of Tennessee Knoxville has examined data fusion of NDA measurements such as Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry and Cyclic Voltammetry. Oregon State University and Virginia Polytechnic Institute have examined the integration of accountancy data with process monitoring data for safeguards. The Ohio State University and the University of Utah have developed a Ni-Pt SiC Schottky diode capable of high temperature alpha spectroscopy for actinide detection of molten salts. Finally, the University of Colorado has developed a key enabling technology for the use of Microcalorimetry.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

High-sensitivity gas-mapping 3D imager and method of operation

Measurement apparatuses and methods are disclosed for generating high-precision and -accuracy gas concentration maps that can be overlaid with 3D topographic images by rapidly scanning one or several modulated laser beams with a spatially-encoded transmitter over a scene to build-up imagery. Independent measurements of the topographic target distance and path-integrated gas concentration are combined to yield a map of the path-averaged concentration between the sensor and each point in the image. This type of image is particularly useful for finding localized regions of elevated (or anomalous) gas concentration making it ideal for large-area leak detection and quantification applications including: oil and gas pipeline monitoring, chemical processing facility monitoring, and environmental monitoring.

Kreitinger, Aaron Thomas↗

Safeguards Material Control And Accountancy Considerations For Molten Salt Reactors

Molten salt reactors are a class of nuclear reactor designs with features and operational characteristics that vary significantly. Variations in design features include the physical, chemical, and isotopic composition of fresh and irradiated fuel, neutron energy spectrums, breeding ratios, and the design’s plans for chemical processing. Specific designs within these variations affect the material control and accountancy approaches implemented by both domestic and international nuclear safeguards. This paper identifies safeguards-relevant design features for molten salt reactors and describes how each feature might influence both domestic and international nuclear safeguards implementation. Additionally, this paper describes two potential general categories of material control and accountancy approaches that may be appropriate for molten salt reactors: a black box material-balance approach with measurements on the feed and waste streams combined with robust containment and surveillance on the nuclear material within the reactor or an approach that aims to quantify the nuclear material throughout the reactor (i.e., a process monitoring approach). This paper describes the benefits and challenges of these approaches to meet technical safeguards objectives and identifies gaps in current technologies.

Hogue, Karen↗

High-sensitivity gas-mapping 3D imager and method of operation

Measurement apparatuses and methods are disclosed for generating high-precision and -accuracy gas concentration maps that can be overlaid with 3D topographic images by rapidly scanning one or several modulated laser beams with a spatially-encoded transmitter over a scene to build-up imagery. Independent measurements of the topographic target distance and path-integrated gas concentration are combined to yield a map of the path-averaged concentration between the sensor and each point in the image. This type of image is particularly useful for finding localized regions of elevated (or anomalous) gas concentration making it ideal for large-area leak detection and quantification applications including: oil and gas pipeline monitoring, chemical processing facility monitoring, and environmental monitoring.

Kreitinger, Aaron Thomas↗