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Site Suitability and Hazard Assessment Guide for Small Modular Reactors

Commercial nuclear reactor projects in the U.S. have traditionally employed large light water reactors (LWR) to generate regional supplies of electricity. Although large LWRs have consistently dominated commercial nuclear markets both domestically and abroad, the concept of small modular reactors (SMRs) capable of producing between 30 MW(t) and 900 MW(t) to generating steam for electricity is not new. Nor is the idea of locating small nuclear reactors in close proximity to and in physical connection with industrial processes to provide a long-term source of thermal energy. Growing problems associated continued use of fossil fuels and enhancements in efficiency and safety because of recent advancements in reactor technology suggest that the likelihood of near-term SMR technology(s) deployment at multiple locations within the United States is growing. Many different types of SMR technology are viable for siting in the domestic commercial energy market. However, the potential application of a particular proprietary SMR design will vary according to the target heat end-use application and the site upon which it is proposed to be located. Reactor heat applications most commonly referenced in connection with the SMR market include electric power production, district heating, desalinization, and the supply of thermal energy to various processes that require high temperature over long time periods, or a combination thereof. Indeed, the modular construction, reliability and long operational life purported to be associated with some SMR concepts now being discussed may offer flexibility and benefits no other technology can offer. Effective siting is one of the many early challenges that face a proposed SMR installation project. Site-specific factors dealing with support to facility construction and operation, risks to the plant and the surrounding area, and the consequences subsequent to those risks must be fully identified, analyzed, and possibly mitigated before a license will be granted to construct and operate a nuclear facility. Examples of significant site-related concerns include area geotechnical and geological hazard properties, local climatology and meteorology, water resource availability, the vulnerability of surrounding populations and the environmental to adverse effects in the unlikely event of radionuclide release, the socioeconomic impacts of SMR plant installation and the effects it has on aesthetics, proximity to energy use customers, the topography and area infrastructure that affect plant constructability and security, and concerns related to the transport, installation, operation and decommissioning of major plant components.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Disrupting EV Charging Sessions and Gaining Remote Code Execution with DoS, MITM, and Code Injection Exploits using OCPP 1.6

Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 1.6 is widely used in the electric vehicle (EV) charging industry to communicate between Charging System Management Services (CSMSs) and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). Unlike OCPP 2.0.1, OCPP 1.6 uses unencrypted websocket communications to exchange information between EVSE devices and an onpremise or cloud-based CSMS. In this work, we demonstrate two machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on OCPP sessions to terminate charging sessions and gain root access to the EVSE equipment via remote code execution (RCE). Second, we demonstrate a malicious firmware update with a code injection payload to compromise an EVSE. Lastly, we demonstrate two methods to prevent availability of the EVSE or CSMS. One of these, originally reported by SaiFlow, prevents traffic to legitimate EVSE equipment using a DoS-like attack on CSMSs by repeatedly connecting and authenticating several CPs with the same identities as the legitimate CP. These vulnerabilities were demonstrated with proof-of-concept exploits in a virtualized Cyber Range at Wright State University and/or with a 350 kW Direct Current Fast Charger (DCFC) at Idaho National Laboratory. The team found that OCPP 1.6 could be protected from these attacks by adding secure shell (SSH) tunnels to the protocol, if upgrading to OCPP 2.0.1 was not an option. Index Terms—Electric vehicle charging, cybersecurity, OCPP, cyberattack, cyber-resilience. INSPEC Accession Number: 23981565

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Reliable Design Versus Trust

This presentation focuses on reliability and trust for the users portion of the FPGA design flow. It is assumed that the manufacturer prior to hand-off to the user tests FPGA internal components. The objective is to present the challenges of creating reliable and trusted designs. The following will be addressed: What makes a design vulnerable to functional flaws (reliability) or attackers (trust)? What are the challenges for verifying a reliable design versus a trusted design?

Field Programmable Gate Aray (FPGA)↗

LDRD23-0184: Resilience and Hazard Risk Assessment to Prioritize Security Operations for Decisions and Impacts (RHAPSODI)

Recent examples provide a significant concern for the resilience of the U.S. electric grid and represent a need for enhanced decision-making to address an increasingly wide range of complex system interactions and potential consequences. In response, this LDRD project produced a proof-of-concept evaluation called the Resilience and Hazard Assessment to Prioritize Security Operations for Decisions and Impacts (RHAPSODI) methodology as an agile and flexible analytic framework capable of addressing multiple, diverse threats to desired electric grid performance. After empirically grounding needs for the future of U.S. electric grid resilience, this project employed the systems-theoretic process analysis (STPA) to develop a systems engineering risk model. The results of a completed feasibility study of a notional high voltage transmission system demonstrate an improved ability to incorporate both spatial (e.g., geographically distributed) and temporal (e.g., dynamic and time-dependent) elements of security risk to the gird. The success of this LDRD project provides the foundation for further evolution of the systems engineering risk model for the grid; derivation of quantitative approaches to evaluate risk and resilience performance; facilitation of agile experimenting and grid sensitivity to a range of vulnerabilities; and development of tools to assist decision-makers in enhancing U.S. electrical grid resilience.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Achieving American Leadership in Cybersecurity and Digital Components Factsheet

The Biden Administration’s efforts to meet 100% clean electricity by 2035 and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 has created opportunities to rebuild American supply chains create new jobs, strengthen community engagement, and spur U.S. economic growth. DOE’s strategy for success in the transition to a clean energy economy hinges on building and maintaining technology supply chains that are advanced, secure, and resilient to cyber threats. As the energy sector grows increasingly globalized, complex, and digitized, the supply chain for digital components of energy systems – including software, virtual platforms and services, and data – is facing greater threats. Nearly all digital components of U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable to cyber supply chain instability, stemming from a variety of causes and shared among a broad set of interdependent stakeholders. Overall, supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.

CCE↗

Automation, Autonomy & Megacities 2025: A Dark Preview

This paper extrapolates from present trends to describe very plausible – and actually quite likely – future crises playing out in multiple global cities. While predicting the future is fraught with uncertainty, much of what occurs in the scenarios that follow is fully possible today and absent a significant course change, probable in the timeframe discussed. The authors want to caveat that we are not commenting on a specific organization or technology deployment. It is not hard to find tech evangelists touting that ubiquitous and highly interconnected digital technology will bring great advances in productivity and efficiency, as well as new capabilities we cannot foresee. This paper attempts to reveal what is possible when these technologies are applied to critical infrastructure applications en masse without adequate security in densely populated cities that by their nature are less resilient than other environments. Megacities need and will deploy these new technologies to keep up with insatiable demand for energy, communications, transportation and other services, but it is important to recognize that they are also made more vulnerable by following this path .

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Automation, Autonomy & Megacities 2025: A Dark Preview

This paper extrapolates from present trends to describe very plausible – and actually quite likely – future crises playing out in multiple global cities. While predicting the future is fraught with uncertainty, much of what occurs in the scenarios that follow is fully possible today and absent a significant course change, probable in the timeframe discussed. The authors want to caveat that we are not commenting on a specific organization or technology deployment. It is not hard to find tech evangelists touting that ubiquitous and highly interconnected digital technology will bring great advances in productivity and efficiency, as well as new capabilities we cannot foresee. This paper attempts to reveal what is possible when these technologies are applied to critical infrastructure applications en masse without adequate security in densely populated cities that by their nature are less resilient than other environments. Megacities need and will deploy these new technologies to keep up with insatiable demand for energy, communications, transportation and other services, but it is important to recognize that they are also made more vulnerable by following this path .

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Artificial Intelligence for Digital Security and Protections

Proper functioning of nuclear power plants relies on a mix of well-regulated human and machine-driven workflows. This regulation supports nuclear safety through a series of processes and many of the tasks that support these processes have a repetitive nature that make artificial intelligence (AI) informed by machine learning (ML) a potential aid in a variety of tasks. AI is being evaluated for activities that include inspections, fuel processing, monitoring, and other activities. The introduction of any new technology presents a potential new attack vector. In the case of AI/ML, there are many attacks that have already been discovered and over time the attacks can be expected to follow the growth pattern observed in cyber security. While future planning is necessary, current efforts need to be established now to predict the threat emergence over the next year 10 years and mitigate potential threats. Based on these observations, AI/ML will need to become trustworthy, which corresponds to techniques and procedures that emphasize AI explainability along with resilience techniques to data, algorithms, models, and systems. This kind of system robustness is the foundation for defenses against AI/ML-specific attacks. Attempting to look forward and take a broad view of capabilities provides input to research roadmaps and the ability to distill vulnerabilities into specific use cases may provide greater assistance in understanding the technology benefits while introducing new risks. The impact of current and future AI in three areas—capabilities, challenges, and recovery strategies—represents an initial attempt at balancing both.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Vulnerability Research Development Program Guide v.1

SAND2021-15515 O The Vulnerability Research Development Program (VRDP) Guide is a training program developed to help general purpose computer science staff become independently capable vulnerability researchers. VRDP Guide is both a course description and curriculum for the program. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Salim, Nasser↗

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Computational geomechanics & applications at Sandia National Laboratories.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is a multi-program national laboratory in the business of national security, whose primary mission is nuclear weapons (NW). It is a prime contractor to the USDOE, operating under the NNSA and is one of the three NW national laboratories. It has a long history of involvement in the area of geomechanics, starting with the some of the earliest weapons tests at Nevada. Projects in which geomechanics support (in general) and computational geomechanics support (in particular) are at the forefront at Sandia, range from those associated with civilian programs to those in the defense programs. SNL has had significant involvement and participation in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (low-level defense nuclear waste), the Yucca Mountain Project (formerly proposed for commercial spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste), and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (the nation's emergency petroleum store). In addition, numerous industrial partners seek-out our computational/geomechanics expertise, and there are efforts in compressed air and natural gas storage, as well as in CO{sub 2} Sequestration. Likewise, there have also been collaborative past efforts in the areas of compactable reservoir response, the response of salt structures associated with reservoirs, and basin modeling for the Oil & Gas industry. There are also efforts on the defense front, ranging from assessment of vulnerability of infrastructure to defeat of hardened targets, which require an understanding and application of computational geomechanics. Several examples from some of these areas will be described and discussed to give the audience a flavor of the type of work currently being performed at Sandia in the general area of geomechanics.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Nuclear Security: Quantifying Late Detection in MC&A for Item Inventories

This objectives for this presentation are to understand how physical inventories, sampling plans, and other checks of the inventory factor into detection of insider activity; be able to quantify the probability of detection for various scenarios in a single inventory and over several inventories; and understand how physical inventory and sampling procedures relate to the assumptions, analysis, and scenarios in the vulnerability assessment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Measurement and applications: Exploring the challenges and opportunities of hierarchical federated learning in sensor applications

Sensor applications have become ubiquitous in modern society as the digital age continues to advance. AI-based techniques (e.g., machine learning) are effective at extracting actionable information from large amounts of data. An example would be an automated water irrigation system that uses AI-based techniques on soil quality data to decide how to best distribute water. However, these AI-based techniques are costly in terms of hardware resources, and Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors are resource-constrained with respect to processing power, energy, and storage capacity. These limitations can compromise the security, performance, and reliability of sensor-driven applications. To address these concerns, cloud computing services can be used by sensor applications for data storage and processing. Unfortunately, cloud-based sensor applications that require real-time processing, such as medical applications (e.g., fall detection and stroke prediction), are vulnerable to issues such as network latency due to the sparse and unreliable networks between the sensor nodes and the cloud server [1]. As users approach the edge of the communications network, latency issues become more severe and frequent. A promising alternative is edge computing, which provides cloud-like capabilities at the edge of the network by pushing storage and processing capabilities from centralized nodes to edge devices that are closer to where the data are gathered, resulting in reduced network delays [2], [3].

Po-Leen Ooi, Melanie↗

Large-scale inflatable structures for tunnel protection: a review of the Resilient Tunnel Plug project

The protection of underground civil infrastructure continues to be a high priority for transportation and transit security agencies. In particular, rail transit tunnels running under bodies of water are susceptible to disruptions due to flooding caused by extraordinary climatic events such as hurricanes or other events resulting from human activities. Several events have taken place in the past decades that have demonstrated the need to mitigate vulnerabilities or, at least, minimize the consequences of catastrophic events. Although it is impossible to prevent all situations that can lead to flooding, damage can be substantially decreased by reducing the area affected by the event. To minimize the effects of an event, a possible approach is to compartmentalize the tunnel system by creating temporary barriers that can contain the propagation of flooding until a more permanent solution can be implemented. One way to create a temporary barrier is by the deployment of a large-scale inflatable structure, also known as an inflatable plug. In such an application, the inflatable structure is prepared for placement, either permanently or temporally, and maintained ready for deployment, inflation, and pressurization when needed. The internal plug pressure imparts a normal force against the tunnel wall surface with the friction between the plug and tunnel surfaces opposing axial movement of the plug. The sealing effectiveness depends on the ability of the inflatable structure to self-deploy and fit, without human intervention, to the intricacies of the perimeter of the conduit being sealed. Primary design constraints include having the plug stowed away from the dynamic envelope of the trains and being able to withhold the pressure of the flooding water. This work presents a compilation of the main aspects of the activities completed for the development of large-scale inflatable structures as part of the Resilient Tunnel Plug (RTP) Project. The main test results and lessons learned are presented to demonstrate the viability of implementing large-scale inflatable plugs for the containment of flooding in rail tunnels systems. Over 400 coupon and specimen tests, 200 reduced scale tests, and 100 full-scale tests were conducted to demonstrate the efficacy of the design of different prototypes over a 10-year research and development project. The culmination of the work was 12 large-scale flooding demonstrations where the inflatable tunnel plug was shown able to be deployed remotely and withstand a simulated flooding event.

42 ENGINEERING↗

WINS. Market Simulation Tool for Facilitating Wind Energy Integration

Integrating 20% or more wind energy into the system and transmitting large sums of wind energy over long distances will require a decision making capability that can handle very large scale power systems with tens of thousands of buses and lines. There is a need to explore innovative analytical and implementation solutions for continuing reliable operations with the most economical integration of additional wind energy in power systems. A number of wind integration solution paths involve the adoption of new operating policies, dynamic scheduling of wind power across interties, pooling integration services, and adopting new transmission scheduling practices. Such practices can be examined by the decision tool developed by this project. This project developed a very efficient decision tool called Wind INtegration Simulator (WINS) and applied WINS to facilitate wind energy integration studies. WINS focused on augmenting the existing power utility capabilities to support collaborative planning, analysis, and wind integration project implementations. WINS also had the capability of simulating energy storage facilities so that feasibility studies of integrated wind energy system applications can be performed for systems with high wind energy penetrations. The development of WINS represents a major expansion of a very efficient decision tool called POwer Market Simulator (POMS), which was developed by IIT and has been used extensively for power system studies for decades. Specifically, WINS provides the following superiorities; (1) An integrated framework is included in WINS for the comprehensive modeling of DC transmission configurations, including mono-pole, bi-pole, tri-pole, back-to-back, and multi-terminal connection, as well as AC/DC converter models including current source converters (CSC) and voltage source converters (VSC); (2) An existing shortcoming of traditional decision tools for wind integration is the limited availability of user interface, i.e., decision results are often text-based demonstrations. WINS includes a powerful visualization tool and user interface capability for transmission analyses, planning, and assessment, which will be of great interest to power market participants, power system planners and operators, and state and federal regulatory entities; and (3) WINS can handle extended transmission models for wind integration studies. WINS models include limitations on transmission flow as well as bus voltage for analyzing power system states. The existing decision tools often consider transmission flow constraints (dc power flow) alone which could result in the over-utilization of existing resources when analyzing wind integration. WINS can be used to assist power market participants including transmission companies, independent system operators, power system operators in vertically integrated utilities, wind energy developers, and regulatory agencies to analyze economics, security, and reliability of various options for wind integration including transmission upgrades and the planning of new transmission facilities. WINS can also be used by industry for the offline training of reliability and operation personnel when analyzing wind integration uncertainties, identifying critical spots in power system operation, analyzing power system vulnerabilities, and providing credible decisions for examining operation and planning options for wind integration. Researches in this project on wind integration included (1) Development of WINS; (2) Transmission Congestion Analysis in the Eastern Interconnection; (3) Analysis of 2030 Large-Scale Wind Energy Integration in the Eastern Interconnection; (4) Large-scale Analysis of 2018 Wind Energy Integration in the Eastern U.S. Interconnection. The research resulted in 33 papers, 9 presentations, 9 PhD degrees, 4 MS degrees, and 7 awards. The education activities in this project on wind energy included (1) Wind Energy Training Facility Development; (2) Wind Energy Course Development.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗

LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN WORKSHOP ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCE PHYSICAL PROTECTION UPGRADES HOSTED IN GUATEMALA

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) reduces and protects vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide. The GTRI program has worked successfully to remove and protect nuclear and radioactive materials, including orphaned and disused high-activity sources, and is now working to ensure sustainability. Internationally, over 40 countries are cooperating with GTRI to enhance the security of radiological materials. GTRI is now seeking to develop and enhance sustainability by coordinating its resources with those of the partner country, other donor countries, and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Cyber Attack Sequences Generation for Electric Power Grid

Security assessment of cyber-physical energy systems (CPESs) such as the electric power grid is a critical operation to maintain availability, reliability, and quality of service in the presence of persistent threats from malicious cyber actors. Existing security assessment approaches such as penetration testing and red teaming rely on subject matter expert experience and forensic cyber analysis of historical events to perform realistic, threat-informed assessments of CPES defense. CPESs have a large attack surface because of the heterogeneity and complexity of underlying topology, devices, measurements, and vulnerabilities. The aforementioned approaches lead to partial coverage of the attack surface with a large set of unknown but possible exploits. There is a need to automate the CPES attack surface discovery and contextualize it for relevant, highly probable, real-world attack scenarios. We propose a methodology and framework to facilitate the discovery of the CPES attack surface. We present a multilayer attack graph with ranked attack sequences to describe CPES failure scenarios. We present a work-in-progress framework that lists key components to automate the attack modeling and sequence generation. We demonstrate the published National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource CPES failure scenario to highlight the trustworthiness of generated attack sequences.

Dutta, Ashutosh↗