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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2014

Defining Reliability and Robustness from a Human Factors Perspective

A human factors team was tasked with assessing best practices for developing a crewed space vehicle that is both reliable and robust. The team identified two broad dimensions of human factors are relevant to system design. Namely, the attributes of the product, and the processes used to develop the product. The “product” includes hardware, software, documentation, training systems, and procedures throughout all phases of the system life, including construction, testing, operation and maintenance. Three product attributes relevant to robustness are the extent to which task demands are within human capabilities, the capacity of the system to cope with unanticipated human actions, and the ability of the system to make use of unique human capabilities during non-routine situations. The “process” dimension of human factors relates to the activities that start in the early stages of design, and continue throughout the life of the system. There are, of course, no guarantees that a formal consideration of human factors throughout the design process will identify all the relevant human issues. In the absence of such a consideration, however, problems are virtually assured.

Hobbs, Alan↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Threat of Uncertainty: Why Using Traditional Approaches for Evaluating Spacecraft Reliability are Insufficient for Future Human Mars Missions

Through the Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) study, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to evaluate potential approaches for sending humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). A key aspect of these missions is the strategy that is employed to maintain and repair the spacecraft systems, ensuring that they continue to function and support the crew. Long duration missions beyond LEO present unique and severe maintainability challenges due to a variety of factors, including: limited to no opportunities for resupply, the distance from Earth, mass and volume constraints of spacecraft, high sensitivity of transportation element designs to variation in mass, the lack of abort opportunities to Earth, limited hardware heritage information, and the operation of human-rated systems in a radiation environment with little to no experience. The current approach to maintainability, as implemented on ISS, which includes a large number of spares pre-positioned on ISS, a larger supply sitting on Earth waiting to be flown to ISS, and an on demand delivery of logistics from Earth, is not feasible for future deep space human missions. For missions beyond LEO, significant modifications to the maintainability approach will be required.Through the EMC evaluations, several key findings related to the reliability and safety of the Mars spacecraft have been made. The nature of random and induced failures presents significant issues for deep space missions. Because spare parts cannot be flown as needed for Mars missions, all required spares must be flown with the mission or pre-positioned. These spares must cover all anticipated failure modes and provide a level of overall reliability and safety that is satisfactory for human missions. This will require a large amount of mass and volume be dedicated to storage and transport of spares for the mission. Further, there is, and will continue to be, a significant amount of uncertainty regarding failure rates for spacecraft components. This uncertainty makes it much more difficult to anticipate failures and will potentially require an even larger amount of spares to provide an acceptable level of safety. Ultimately, the approach to maintenance and repair applied to ISS, focusing on the supply of spare parts, may not be tenable for deep space missions. Other approaches, such as commonality of components, simplification of systems, and in-situ manufacturing will be required.

Stromgren, Chel↗
NASA NTRS2004

Lunar precursor missions for human exploration of Mars--III: studies of system reliability and maintenance

Discussions of future human expeditions into the solar system generally focus on whether the next explorers ought to go to the Moon or to Mars. The only mission scenario developed in any detail within NASA is an expedition to Mars with a 500-day stay at the surface. The technological capabilities and the operational experience base required for such a mission do not now exist nor has any self-consistent program plan been proposed to acquire them. In particular, the lack of an Abort-to-Earth capability implies that critical mission systems must perform reliably for 3 years or must be maintainable and repairable by the crew. As has been previously argued, a well-planned program of human exploration of the Moon would provide a context within which to develop the appropriate technologies because a lunar expedition incorporates many of the operational elements of a Mars expedition. Initial lunar expeditions can be carried out at scales consistent with the current experience base but can be expanded in any or all operational phases to produce an experience base necessary to successfully and safely conduct human exploration of Mars. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Moon↗
NASA NTRS2017

EVA Human Health and Performance Benchmarking Study Overview and Development of a Microgravity Protocol

The primary objective of this study is to develop a protocol to reliably characterize human health and performance metrics for individuals working inside various EVA suits under realistic spaceflight conditions. Expected results and methodologies developed during this study will provide the baseline benchmarking data and protocols with which future EVA suits and suit configurations (e.g., varied pressure, mass, center of gravity [CG]) and different test subject populations (e.g., deconditioned crewmembers) may be reliably assessed and compared. Results may also be used, in conjunction with subsequent testing, to inform fitness-for-duty standards, as well as design requirements and operations concepts for future EVA suits and other exploration systems.

Norcross, Jason↗
NASA NTRS2004

Human-Robot Planetary Exploration Teams

The EVA Robotic Assistant (ERA) project at NASA Johnson Space Center studies human-robot interaction and robotic assistance for future human planetary exploration. Over the past four years, the ERA project has been performing field tests with one or more four-wheeled robotic platforms and one or more space-suited humans. These tests have provided experience in how robots can assist humans, how robots and humans can communicate in remote environments, and what combination of humans and robots works best for different scenarios. The most efficient way to understand what tasks human explorers will actually perform, and how robots can best assist them, is to have human explorers and scientists go and explore in an outdoor, planetary-relevant environment, with robots to demonstrate what they are capable of, and roboticists to observe the results. It can be difficult to have a human expert itemize all the needed tasks required for exploration while sitting in a lab: humans do not always remember all the details, and experts in one arena may not even recognize that the lower level tasks they take for granted may be essential for a roboticist to know about. Field tests thus create conditions that more accurately reveal missing components and invalid assumptions, as well as allow tests and comparisons of new approaches and demonstrations of working systems. We have performed field tests in our local rock yard, in several locations in the Arizona desert, and in the Utah desert. We have tested multiple exploration scenarios, such as geological traverses, cable or solar panel deployments, and science instrument deployments. The configuration of our robot can be changed, based on what equipment is needed for a given scenario, and the sensor mast can even be placed on one of two robot bases, each with different motion capabilities. The software architecture of our robot is also designed to be as modular as possible, to allow for hardware and configuration changes. Two focus areas of our research are safety and crew time efficiency. For safety, our work involves enabling humans to reliably communicate with a robot while moving in the same workspace, and enabling robots to monitor and advise humans of potential problems. Voice, gesture, remote computer control, and enhanced robot intelligence are methods we are studying. For crew time efficiency, we are investigating the effects of assigning different roles to humans and robots in collaborative exploration scenarios.

Tyree, Kimberly↗
NASA NTRS2008

Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C): Best Practices for Human-Rated Spacecraft Systems

In 2007 the NESC completed an in-depth assessment to identify, define and document engineering considerations for the Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) of human-rated spacecraft systems. This study had been requested by the Astronaut Office at JSC to help them to better understand what is required to ensure safe, robust, and reliable human-rated spacecraft systems. The 22 GN&C engineering Best Practices described in this paper are a condensed version of what appears in the NESC Technical Report. These Best Practices cover a broad range from fundamental system architectural considerations to more specific aspects (e.g., stability margin recommendations) of GN&C system design and development. 15 of the Best Practices address the early phases of a GN&C System development project and the remaining 7 deal with the later phases. Some of these Best Practices will cross-over between both phases. We recognize that this set of GN&C Best Practices will not be universally applicable to all projects and mission applications.

Lebsock, Ken↗
NASA NTRS2001

Thermal Design of a Collapsible Cryogenic Vessel

Strategic planning for human exploration missions to Mars has conclusively identified in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) as an enabling technology. Most mission scenarios include an ISRU plant to produce propellants for ascent from Mars as well as the production of backup reserves of water, oxygen, and process gases. Current mission scenarios call for an ISRU plant to be deployed and then produce and store the required propellants and life support reserves before the arrival of the first human mission. Reliable cryogenic propellant liquefaction and storage technologies for extended period missions are especially critical. This report examines the cryogenic storage problem for liquid oxygen produced by an ISRU plant for a human mission scenario. The analysis examines various hardware configurations including insulation types, packaging techniques, and required cryocoolers to minimize the initial launch mass to low Earth orbit. Results of the analyses indicate that high vacuum insulation systems requiring vacuum pressures below one millitorr will be required to minimize the 'initial launch mass into low Earth orbit even though the temperature on the surface of Mars is much lower than Earth.

Hegab, Hisham E.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Limitations of Reliability for Long-Endurance Human Spaceflight

Long-endurance human spaceflight - such as missions to Mars or its moons - will present a never-before-seen maintenance logistics challenge. Crews will be in space for longer and be farther way from Earth than ever before. Resupply and abort options will be heavily constrained, and will have timescales much longer than current and past experience. Spare parts and/or redundant systems will have to be included to reduce risk. However, the high cost of transportation means that this risk reduction must be achieved while also minimizing mass. The concept of increasing system and component reliability is commonly discussed as a means to reduce risk and mass by reducing the probability that components will fail during a mission. While increased reliability can reduce maintenance logistics mass requirements, the rate of mass reduction decreases over time. In addition, reliability growth requires increased test time and cost. This paper assesses trends in test time requirements, cost, and maintenance logistics mass savings as a function of increase in Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) for some or all of the components in a system. In general, reliability growth results in superlinear growth in test time requirements, exponential growth in cost, and sublinear benefits (in terms of logistics mass saved). These trends indicate that it is unlikely that reliability growth alone will be a cost-effective approach to maintenance logistics mass reduction and risk mitigation for long-endurance missions. This paper discusses these trends as well as other options to reduce logistics mass such as direct reduction of part mass, commonality, or In-Space Manufacturing (ISM). Overall, it is likely that some combination of all available options - including reliability growth - will be required to reduce mass and mitigate risk for future deep space missions.

Owens, Andrew C.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Multilateral Research Opportunities in Ground Analogs

The global economy forces many nations to consider their national investments and make difficult decisions regarding their investment in future exploration. International collaboration provides an opportunity to leverage other nations' investments to meet common goals. The Humans In Space Community shares a common goal to enable safe, reliable, and productive human space exploration within and beyond Low Earth Orbit. Meeting this goal requires efficient use of limited resources and International capabilities. The International Space Station (ISS) is our primary platform to conduct microgravity research targeted at reducing human health and performance risks for exploration missions. Access to ISS resources, however, is becoming more and more constrained and will only be available through 2020 or 2024. NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) is actively pursuing methods to effectively utilize the ISS and appropriate ground analogs to understand and mitigate human health and performance risks prior to embarking on human exploration of deep space destinations. HRP developed a plan to use ground analogs of increasing fidelity to address questions related to exploration missions and is inviting International participation in these planned campaigns. Using established working groups and multilateral panels, the HRP is working with multiple Space Agencies to invite International participation in a series of 30- day missions that HRP will conduct in the US owned and operated Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) during 2016. In addition, the HRP is negotiating access to Antarctic stations (both US and non-US), the German :envihab and Russian NEK facilities. These facilities provide unique capabilities to address critical research questions requiring longer duration simulation or isolation. We are negotiating release of international research opportunities to ensure a multilateral approach to future analog research campaigns, hoping to begin multilateral campaigns in the latter facilities by 2017. Collaborative use of analog facilities and shared investment in the development of spaceflight countermeasures through multilateral campaigns or missions that leverage the global scientific community will focus high quality research and provide sufficient power to accelerate the development of countermeasures and drive sound recommendations for exploration missions. This panel will provide an overview of efforts to encourage and facilitate multilateral collaboration in analog missions or campaigns and describe the facilities currently under consideration to reach the common goal of enabling safe, reliable, and productive human space exploration.

Corbin, Barbara J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

What Happened, and Why: Toward an Understanding of Human Error Based on Automated Analyses of Incident Reports

The objective of the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling project of NASA's Aviation Safety and Security Program was to develop technologies to enable proactive management of safety risk, which entails identifying the precursor events and conditions that foreshadow most accidents. Information about what happened can be extracted from quantitative data sources, but the experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source of information about why an incident happened. In Volume I, the concept of the Scenario was introduced as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities of what happened based on the objective parameters that define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario. In this Volume II, that study continues into the analyses of the free narratives to gain understanding as to why the incident occurred from the reporter s perspective. While this is just the first experiment, the results of our approach are encouraging and indicate that it will be possible to design an automated analysis process guided by the structure of the Scenario that can achieve the level of consistency and reliability of human analysis of narrative reports.

Ferryman, Thomas A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
NASA NTRS2005

In-situ Resources In Space

This tutorial is a primer on the motivational and materials science basis for utilizing space resources to lower the cost and increase the safety and reliability of human systems beyond Earth's orbit. Past research in materials processing in orbit will be briefly reviewed to emphasize the challenges and advantages inherent in processing materials in space. Data on resource availability from human Lunar and robotic/sensor missions beyond the Moon will be overviewed for resource relevance to human exploration and development of space. Specific scenarios such as propellant production on the Moon and Mars, and lunar photovoltaic power production from in-situ materials will be discussed in relation to exploration and commercialization of space. A conclusion will cover some of the visionary proposals for the use of space resources to extend human society and prosperity beyond Earth.

Curreri, Peter A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Space Launch System (SLS) Safety, Mission Assurance, and Risk Mitigation

SLS Driving Objectives: I. Safe: a) Human-rated to provide safe and reliable systems for human missions. b) Protecting the public, NASA workforce, high-value equipment and property, and the environment from potential harm. II. Affordable: a) Maximum use of common elements and existing assets, infrastructure, and workforce. b) Constrained budget environment. c) Competitive opportunities for affordability on-ramps. III. Sustainable: a) Initial capability: 70 metric tons (t), 2017-2021. 1) Serves as primary transportation for Orion and exploration missions. 2) Provides back-up capability for crew/cargo to ISS. b) Evolved capability: 105 t and 130 t, post-2021. 1) Offers large volume for science missions and payloads. 2) Modular and flexible, right-sized for mission requirements.

May, Todd↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Affordable Development Strategy for NEP Nuclear Systems

One nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) reactor systems under consideration is a hydride moderated thermal spectrum reactor fueled by high assay low enriched uranium (HALEU). While such a reactor is expected to yield the lightest HALEU reactor design, its development challenges grow exponentially with increasing mission demands, most notably power output, specific weight of the overall system (which may require operation at temperatures exceeding 1200 K), service lifetime, and human-rated reliability. Two of the greatest cost drivers are full-powered nuclear demonstrations and extensive material development campaigns, so it is important to consider options that can minimize the need for or complexity of such tasks. This paper discusses a structured framework being developed for assessing how NEP design choices, such as materials selection, neutronic features, and heat-removal technologies, can translate into project risk and how project performance goals can be traded with development cost.Reactors operating at high temperatures often require cutting-edge heat transfer technologies and creep-resistant materials. Use of new materials in high temperature reactors brings additional complication beyond those common to any new space materials development campaign. For example, such materials may not possess necessary neutronic cross-sectional or neutronic irradiation data. Similarly, use of new materials may significantly influence core neutronics; in some extreme cases, neutronic reactivity feed-back of certain new materials can vary during their service life as radiation damage impacts the scattering cross-section. In an affordable development approach, high fidelity modeling and simulation tools are used to identify and characterize potential ‘knees-in-the-curves’ in the relationship that exists between the mission characteristics and the project risk. Of particular significance is use of modern uncertainty management and variance reduction methods to perform gap analyses that feed into phenomena identification and ranking tables (PIRT) commonly used to communicate nuclear readiness levels. Model-based measurements techniques are used to design sub-scale experiments as a substitute to minimize orcompletely eliminate the need for nuclear demonstrations.This paper will describe the approach and present preliminary results. It will lay the groundwork for developing a set of metrics that can be broadly characterized as system nuclear readiness levels and advancement degree of difficulty for nuclear systems. Equally importantly, a goal of this paper is to initiate a dialogue among stakeholders on what is the sufficient level of maturity that is required for launching a demonstration unit.

Dasari V Rao↗
NASA NTRS2014

An Integrated Reliability and Physics-Based Risk Modeling Approach for Assessing Human Spaceflight Systems

This paper presents an integrated reliability and physics-based risk modeling approach for assessing human spaceflight systems. The approach is demonstrated using an example, end-to-end risk assessment of a generic-crewed space transportation system during a reference mission to the International Space Station. The behavior of the system is modeled using analysis techniques from multiple disciplines in order to properly capture the dynamic time- and state- dependent consequences of failures encountered in different mission phases. We discuss how to combine traditional reliability analyses with Monte Carlo simulation methods and physics-based engineering models to produce loss-of- mission and loss-of-crew risk estimates supporting risk-based decision-making and requirement verification. This approach facilitates risk-informed design by providing more realistic representation of system failures and interactions; identifying key risk-driving sensitivities, dependencies, and assumptions; and tracking multiple figures of merit within a single, responsive assessment framework that can readily incorporate evolving design information throughout system development.

Risk assessment↗
NASA NTRS2017

Thermal Protection for Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle: A Grand Challenge for Design Methodology and Reliability Verification

Mars Sample Return is our Grand Challenge for the coming decade. TPS (Thermal Protection System) nominal performance is not the key challenge. The main difficulty for designers is the need to verify unprecedented reliability for the entry system: current guidelines for prevention of backward contamination require that the probability of spores larger than 1 micron diameter escaping into the Earth environment be lower than 1 million for the entire system, and the allocation to TPS would be more stringent than that. For reference, the reliability allocation for Orion TPS is closer to 11000, and the demonstrated reliability for previous human Earth return systems was closer to 1100. Improving reliability by more than 3 orders of magnitude is a grand challenge indeed. The TPS community must embrace the possibility of new architectures that are focused on reliability above thermal performance and mass efficiency. MSR (Mars Sample Return) EEV (Earth Entry Vehicle) will be hit with MMOD (Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris) prior to reentry. A chute-less aero-shell design which allows for self-righting shape was baselined in prior MSR studies, with the assumption that a passive system will maximize EEV robustness. Hence the aero-shell along with the TPS has to take ground impact and not break apart. System verification will require testing to establish ablative performance and thermal failure but also testing of damage from MMOD, and structural performance at ground impact. Mission requirements will demand analysis, testing and verification that are focused on establishing reliability of the design. In this proposed talk, we will focus on the grand challenge of MSR EEV TPS and the need for innovative approaches to address challenges in modeling, testing, manufacturing and verification.

Design and Verification for Reliability↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗