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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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68 records · Page 4

Calibration of the Falcon Solid-state Energetic Electron Detector (SEED)

The Falcon Solid-state Energetic Electron Detector (FalconSEED) is an energetic charged particle sensor that has been developed and tested at the United States Air Force Academy in an effort to monitor electron flux across the energy range of 14 to 145 keV in geosynchronous orbit. This sensor has been developed to complement ongoing efforts by the Air Force Research Laboratory to advance a comprehensive space environment sensor suite, Compact Environmental Anomaly Sensor (CEASE3), for anomaly resolution. In addition, FalconSEED is intended to demonstrate the ability to operate a radiation sensor based on predominantly commercial off the shelf components in the geosynchronous environment. This paper describes the design, development, and calibration of FalconSEED. The electron energy spectrum of interest for the FalconSEED sensor is 14 to 145 keV, and is intended to supplement data acquired from the CEASE3 instrument for anomaly resolution. The calibrations at the Space Atmospheric Research Center at the United States Air Force Academy and Kirtland Air Force Base were used to first establish the conversion between histogram bin number and deposited energy in the sensor, and second have been used to determine the geometric factor as a function of energy. The FalconSEED will be integrated as a science payload on the Space Test Program Satellite-6 which also includes the first flight of the CEASE3 instrument and is scheduled to launch in 2021.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Dual-precipitates enhance fatigue resistance in an additively manufactured high-entropy alloy

To accomplish the intense desire of high-strength materials for enhanced energy-efficiency, recent research applies a combined strategy of additive-manufacturing and precipitation-strengthening in high entropy alloys. In a context, Al 0.2 Co 1.5 CrFeNi 1.5 Ti 0.3 nanoprecipitation-strengthened system was developed, demonstrating very convincing strength and toughness. Moreover, additive-manufacturing facilitated additional strength by well-decorated cell-boundaries with blocky L2 1 precipitates and homogeneously distributed L1 2 precipitates. However, fatigue research of this alloy remained unexplored despite being the main precursor for structural applications. In this study low-cycle fatigue behavior of this alloy in both as-built and precipitation-strengthened (aged) conditions has been explored, combined with in-situ neutron diffraction investigation. Findings revealed a substantial cyclic-stress profile and a notable fatigue-life below ±0.50% strain-amplitude, exceeding 10 5 cycles at ±0.30% strain-amplitude. These demonstrate the potential to carry higher payloads with marked engineering-reliability. Residual-stress estimation revealed strain-compatibility between the matrix and L1 2 precipitate, indicating a crack-initiation immune interface. A comparative examination of dislocation character revealed shifting towards pure edge-character in aged alloy indicates precipitates promoted planar-slip during deformation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Design of the Electromagnetic Particle Injector (EPI) for Tokamak Deployment

Both predicting and controlling disruptions are critical and urgent issues for ITER as some disruptions with a short warning time may be unavoidable. For these cases, a rapid response disruption mitigation system (DMS) referred to as the electromagnetic particle injector (EPI) is being developed. The primary advantages of the EPI are its fast response time and high velocity, which have been demonstrated in offline experiments (Raman et al., 2021). The EPI is capable of accelerating a metallic sabot electromagnetically using a rail gun to the required velocities ( > 2 km/s) within 2 ms. Two high-field racetrack magnets able to generate fields over 2 T are positioned above and below the rails to permit high velocity at low rail currents, a requirement to minimize electrode erosion. At the end of the acceleration phase, a sabot capture mechanism retains the spent sabot inside the vacuum chamber that houses the EPI. At this point, it releases well-defined microspheres, or a shell pellet, of a radiative payload into the disrupting plasma. A remotely operated sabot loading system positioned behind the injector contains several pre-equipped sabots that can be loaded by an operator from the tokamak control room. The injector is interfaced to the tokamak through a guide tube attached to the front of the EPI vacuum chamber. Finally, the advantages of the EPI system over other DMSs under consideration are described in conjunction with the details of an EPI system designed for near-term test on an existing large tokamak.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

PacWave South SeaRAY k2 Risk Registers

The SeaRAY is a deployable power system for maritime sensors, monitoring equipment, communications, unmanned underwater vehicles, and other similar payloads. This project is to design, deliver, and test a prototype low-power WEC that lowers the total cost of ownership and provides robust, new capabilities for customers in the maritime environment. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is conducted to systematically identify all potential failure modes and their effects on the system, and to analyze the criticality of each risk based on the likelihood of the event and the severity of the impact. Actions may then be recommended to mitigate the criticality of a risk, either by reducing the likelihood of the risk or the severity of its impact. Risk assessment is executed iteratively as an integral part of the design process. By incorporating risk assessment early in the development cycle, mitigation of risk can be achieved cost effectively. The actions recommended to mitigate risk may be subsequently executed, and as the design progresses the risk assessment is reviewed and revised. Review of the risk assessment is integrated into structured design reviews, ensuring that critical risks are comprehended and that the Project will not progress to e.g. fabrication while intolerable risks remain. The risk assessment process results in the population and maintenance of Risk Registers (RRs). Each major system (and as needed, subsystem) will have a distinct RR. This allows each system or subsystem to be assessed individually, rendering the RRs to a manageable size for review.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

CubeSats for Gamma-Ray Astronomy [Book Chapter]

After many years of flying in space primarily for educational purposes, CubeSats – tiny satellites with form factors corresponding to arrangements of “1U” units, or cubes, each 10 cm on a side – have come into their own as valuable platforms for technology advancement and scientific investigations. CubeSats offer comparatively rapid, low-cost access to space for payloads that can be built, tested, and operated by relatively small teams, with substantial contributions from students and early career researchers. Continuing advances in compact, low-power detectors, readout electronics, and flight computers have now enabled X-ray and gamma-ray sensing payloads that can fit within the constraints of CubeSat missions, permitting in-orbit demonstrations of new techniques and innovative high-energy astronomy observations. Gamma-ray-sensing CubeSats are certain to make an important contribution in the new era of multi-messenger, time-domain astronomy by detecting and localizing bright transients such as gamma-ray bursts, solar flares, and terrestrial gamma-ray flashes; however, other astrophysical science areas requiring long observations in a low-background environment, including gamma-ray polarimetry, studies of nuclear lines, and measurement of diffuse backgrounds, will likely benefit as well. Here we present the primary benefits of CubeSats for high-energy astronomy, highlight the scientific areas currently or soon to be studied, and review the missions that are currently operating, under development, or proposed. A rich portfolio of CubeSats for gamma-ray astronomy already exists, and the potential for a broad range of creative and scientifically productive missions in the near future is very high.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Searay Autonomous Offshore Power System AOPS: Results of Sea Trials and Payload Support Demonstration

As the offshore energy sector looks to fully implement resident, autonomous, robotic, digital systems offshore, one missing piece of the puzzle is remote power generation. Further complicating these efforts are the owner/operators’ move towards net zero operations. Here, the combination represents a significant dilemma for the offshore energy industry: if gensets and topside vessels are not appropriate or practical power sources for future resident systems, how will these needed cost and carbon-saving innovations come to market and get deployed in the field?

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

The SuperCam Instrument Suite on the Mars 2020 Rover: Science Objectives and Mast-Unit Description

On the NASA 2020 rover mission to Jezero crater, the remote determination of the texture, mineralogy and chemistry of rocks is essential to quickly and thoroughly characterize an area and to optimize the selection of samples for return to Earth. As part of the Perseverance payload, SuperCam is a suite of five techniques that provide critical and complementary observations via Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS), Time-Resolved Raman and Luminescence (TRR/L), visible and near-infrared spectroscopy (VISIR), high-resolution color imaging (RMI), and acoustic recording (MIC). SuperCam operates at remote distances, primarily 2–7 m, while providing data at sub-mm to mm scales. We report on SuperCam’s science objectives in the context of the Mars 2020 mission goals and ways the different techniques can address these questions. The instrument is made up of three separate subsystems: the Mast Unit is designed and built in France; the Body Unit is provided by the United States; the calibration target holder is contributed by Spain, and the targets themselves by the entire science team. This publication focuses on the design, development, and tests of the Mast Unit; companion papers describe the other units. The goal of this work is to provide an understanding of the technical choices made, the constraints that were imposed, and ultimately the validated performance of the flight model as it leaves Earth, and it will serve as the foundation for Mars operations and future processing of the data.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Cable-Driven Parallel Robot (CDPR) for Panelized Envelope Retrofits: Feasible Workspace Analysis

Recent decades have seen remarkable progress in the field of robotic-assisted construction. Cable-driven parallel robots (CDPRs) emerge as promising tools for automating construction processes, due to their advantageous features such as scalability, reconfigurability, compact design, and high payload-to-weight ratio. This paper uses a simple static model to determine the feasibility of a CDPR for overclad panel installation in building envelope retrofits. Given that the building facade needs to be a subset of the CDPR’s wrench-feasible workspace, we focus on the sensitivity of the workspace concerning various cable arrangements and CDPR frame sizes (e.g., height and width extensions). Our analysis indicates that no cable arrangement satisfies the requirement of complete facade coverage and avoids cable-to-panel collisions. Thus, frame extension is needed to enhance coverage. However, in densely populated areas where width extension is limited by space constraints, height extension alone is insufficient to guarantee full facade coverage. This paper pioneers the investigation of CDPRs for panelized envelope retrofits, showcasing their advantages and limitations and paving the way for further research and development.

Liu, Yifang↗

Flash NanoPrecipitation as an Agrochemical Nanocarrier Formulation Platform: Phloem Uptake and Translocation after Foliar Administration

The increasing severity of pathogenic and environmental stressors that negatively affect plant health has led to interest in developing next-generation agrochemical delivery systems capable of precisely transporting active agents to specific sites within plants. In this work, we adapt Flash NanoPrecipitation (FNP), a scalable nanocarrier (NC) formulation technology used in the pharmaceutical industry, to prepare organic core–shell NCs and study their efficacy as foliar or root delivery vehicles. NCs ranging in diameter from 55 to 200 nm, with surface zeta potentials from -40 to +40 mV, and with seven different shell material properties were prepared and studied. Shell materials included synthetic polymers poly(acrylic acid), poly(ethylene glycol), and poly(2-(dimethylamino)ethyl methacrylate), naturally occurring compounds fish gelatin and soybean lecithin, and semisynthetic hydroxypropyl methylcellulose acetate succinate (HPMCAS). NC cores contained a gadolinium tracer for tracking by mass spectrometry, a fluorescent dye for tracking by confocal microscopy, and model hydrophobic compounds (alpha tocopherol acetate and polystyrene) that could be replaced by agrochemical payloads in subsequent applications. After foliar application onto tomato plants with Silwet L-77 surfactant, internalization efficiencies of up to 85% and NC translocation efficiencies of up to 32% were observed. Significant NC trafficking to the stem and roots suggests a high degree of phloem loading for some of these formulations. Results were corroborated by confocal microscopy and synchrotron X-ray fluorescence mapping. NCs stabilized by cellulosic HPMCAS exhibited the highest degree of translocation, followed by formulations with a significant surface charge. The results from this work indicate that biocompatible materials like HPMCAS are promising agrochemical delivery vehicles in an industrially viable pharmaceutical nanoformulation process (FNP) and shed light on the optimal properties of organic NCs for efficient foliar uptake, translocation, and delivery.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Emulation and Adversarial Analysis of EV Charging Networks

In the effort of decarbonization and evolution of the modern electrical grid, electric vehicles (EVs) play a key part to transform the grid. However, due to the rapid adoption of EVs and the demand of the charging infrastructure required to power said EVs, risk of a cyber-attack may impose serious consequences. There is a need to analyze and protect the charging ecosystem infrastructure from cyber threats before it reaches wide-scale deployment. In an effort to secure vehicle to grid (V2G) communications, standardization is necessary for continued reliable system operation. The protocol ISO 15118 outlines controls and practices that should be implemented for secure vehicle to grid (V2G) communications. The standard is gaining momentum for American markets as the demand for EV infrastructure grows. The adoption of ISO 15118 in American markets poses several challenges: the deployment of a public key infrastructure (PKI) as outlined within the standard, interoperability of charging different EVs with chargers from different manufactures using the PKI, and scaling the ecosystem to meet the demand while managing risks. This project was created to understand potential cyber and scaling challenges of PKI for EV infrastructure through utilizing a series of emulated components mapping to what exists in the EV ecosystem today, and the components of the PKI that are under development. The key nodes within the emulation that are under development are: electric vehicle (EV), electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), charge network operator (CNO), certificate authority (CA), and online certificate status protocol (OCSP) that must all interact using secure and trusted communications. With these emulated components and utilizing orchestration methods to rapidly deploy and scale the components, the ability to analyze risks of the ecosystem and address gaps before the PKI ecosystem is fully deployed to production should yield a more robust and mature production charging infrastructure. Our approach will use a modular architecture of virtual machines within an orchestration platform and will target scales of 100s, 1000s, and 10,000s of entities interacting. The core research questions trying to be answered with this scope of work are: what are the impacts of a rogue CA, what are the risks of certificate revocation list (CRL) management, what is the value of OCSP stapling, what components are vulnerable to DOS attacks, and what test effective payloads may impact the components.

charging ecosystem↗

Commercialization of the Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR)

The Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR) was developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-21, Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for detection and tracking during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material. Few off-the-shelf systems for conveyance tracking offer detection of a cargo compartment breach or a removal of the cargo. Systems that do offer this capability often require permanent installation through modifying of the conveyance itself. This is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building use, storage, and transport security capacity. The development of T-STAR has moved from fielding robust prototypes deployed in countries ranging from North America, Latin America and Central Asia to a commercially produced product that can now be deployed to provide enhanced security during transit. Each prototype deployment resulted in important lessons learned, which informed the requirements for the final commercial product. T-STAR uses both cellular and Iridium satellite modems to provide redundant communications to provide the configuration, status, and alerts to a server monitoring the shipment, which is accessible using a multilanguage browser-based user interface. A wireless security system employing using Z-wave sensors for intrusion detection located in the conveyance provide low cost but effective solution for a wide range of conveyance types. Additional capabilities include the ability to monitor a vehicles’ CANBUS (Controller Area Network) system, an ethernet port for high throughput sensor information such as video cameras, and the ability to power and use advanced external sensor payloads. These features make the T-STAR a capable and expandable security gateway that can be deployed on a variety of conveyances from box trucks to open trailers. The ability to provide tracking, monitoring, and detection provide a key component in overall best practices designed to protect shipments of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗

System Analysis Modeling and Intermodal Transportation for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has long term goals to develop solutions for managing the nation’s spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) inventory. The Integrated Waste Management (IWM) program under the DOE office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is employing system-level engineering and analysis principles to inform potential future waste management system architectures. Managing the spent nuclear waste requires the use of system-level analysis software that takes various aspects of the fuel cycle into account like waste generation, on-site/centralized storage, transportation infrastructure, and long-term disposal. The Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) is an agent-based model that was developed to simulate the transportation and storage of SNF and HLW. As an agent-based model, NGSAM has the capability to detail the interaction and movement of individual components and groups, such as rail cars and casks. The SNF inventory from commercial nuclear reactors is currently in temporary storage at multiple locations spread across the United States. Shipping of SNF from these locations relies on one of three transportation modes: rail, heavy-haul truck, or barge. Out of the three modes identified, rail is generally the most preferred due to the size of the canisters and casks the SNF would be shipped in. However, under some scenarios, a direct rail route might not be readily available to a reactor site or improving the rail infrastructure at shutdown sites might be too cost-prohibitive for utilities to opt for a direct rail transfer. Under such scenarios, using a barge or heavy haul truck to de-inventory the site and transfer the SNF to a nearby intermodal transfer site with adequate rail infrastructure where the payload could be transferred to a rail car might prove to be an attractive option. This work initially presents the various intermodal transportation options that could be used to transfer SNF from reactor sites to rail cars. This is followed by exploring the operational steps in each of these modes to move the SNF from a reactor site and transfer it to a rail car. This work also presents the procedure of implementing the intermodal transfer methodology in NGSAM using various Java methods. Finally, the process times for accomplishing each of the individual steps are furnished. The implementation ideology, assumptions, and future steps are presented in this work.

Gadey, Harish Reddy↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗