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US Perspectives on the Conventional/Nuclear Interactions and the Impacts on Nuclear Escalation Risks and Future Arms Control Prospects

This short paper is organized around a few discrete questions. How have U.S. perspectives on conventional and nuclear interactions evolved in recent years? How have these changing perspectives shaped U.S. thinking on perceived nuclear escalation risks with Russia, both long standing and newly emerged? And finally, what do these U.S. perceptions of interactions and risks mean for future potential arms control either in the conventional or nuclear arena? The answers to these questions appear to show some promise for future work in this area. Conventional and nuclear interactions are increasing, and thus the two domains cannot be kept as deliberately or artificially separated as in the past. There is a growing mutual recognition regarding the interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities in the strategic stability equation. There is also an increasingly shared recognition in the United States and Russia that nuclear escalation risks are likely to originate in conventional crises or conflict, placing an imperative on some form of conflict prevention procedures at the lower end of the spectrum. This requirement suggests some potential areas for risk reduction measures outside of those traditionally considered in conventional and nuclear arms control over the past several decades.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Perspectives on Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

On Theories of Change: Rethinking the Ban Treaty and Disarmament Strategies

A week before Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi had lunch with the Financial Times. In the interview, Grossi expressed both optimism and pessimism about the nuclear landscape: he was hopeful about prospects for diplomacy, including with Iran. But he also expressed longer-term concerns about a proliferation cascade and rising nuclear risks, in particular, Russia’s nuclear threats amidst the war in Ukraine. “In the past, this was quite taboo,” he said, “but now people talk about tactical nuclear weapons like something which could be contained or permissible.” Given subsequent events in Iran, along with the expiration of New START in 2026 and expanding nuclear arsenals in Russia and China, pessimism would seem to trump hope for prospects for nuclear disarmament.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment (Workshop Summary)

On December 9-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment.” The discussion was guided by the following key questions: • By what metrics should the strategic balance be assessed? • How dynamic is the balance? How fragile? • Is the United States gaining strategic advantage, losing it, or holding steady, overall? • In order to gain new advantages or re-gain advantages lost, can or should the United States prioritize some domains and accept more risk in others? If so, which ones?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

In Search of Strategic Advantage: Understanding the Landscape of Technology Competition

In an era of seemingly ever-increasing global tensions, technology competition is often mentioned as a pathway for U.S. and allied success. The opening arguments are often very simple. “This is the most important struggle of the 21st century.” “We cannot afford to lose this competition.” “The United States must not fall behind in this race.” “We must be faster, more agile, more committed, more thoughtful than our competitors.” Competition around a particular technology is described as a once in a generational struggle with immense stakes. “This is a Sputnik moment” is a common analogy. The solutions proposed are fairly straightforward – more of everything. We should spend more money. We should build more widgets or more factories. We should innovate more. We should focus more. We should attract more talent. We should file more patents. We should produce more PhDs. If we do more of everything, we will have more technology than our opponents, they will see our technological advantage, they will not challenge us, and therefore we will win. If we fail to do these things, we will lose. To paraphrase Homer Simpson, in national security policy discussions technology competition has become the cause of, and solution to, all of life’s problems. And yet, beyond doing more across the board technology competition is not at all simple. First, it is a concept increasingly muddled together with other big issues such as innovation policy, national defense strategy, great power competition, allied cooperation, public-private partnerships, and a host of other issues. Certain policies, systems, coalitions, and so on may be excellent for tackling one challenge, but far less optional for others. Second, it is inherently dynamic, an action-reaction cycle between multiple players. A brilliant opening move can be squandered or successfully countered in subsequent moves. Third, there are limits to what you can do - limited time, limited financial resources, limited human capital, and limited knowledge of what lies ahead. One is forced to choose.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Presidential Leadership in the Development of the U.S. Space Program

Papers presented at a historical symposium on Presidential leadership in the space program include the following: 'The Imperial Presidency in the History of Space Exploration'; 'The Reluctant Racer: Dwight D. Eisenhower and United States Space Policy'; 'Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon'; 'Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning'; 'The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the U.S. Space Program in the 1970s'; 'Politics not Science: The U.S. Space Program in the Reagan and Bush Years'; 'Presidential Leadership and International Aspects of the Space Program'; 'National Leadership and Presidential Power'; and 'Epilogue: Beyond NASA Exceptionalism'.

Launius, Roger D.↗

How Data Privacy Laws Fight Fake News

Governments from Russia to Iran have exploited social media’s connectivity, openness, and polarization to influence elections, sow discord, and drown out dissent. While responses have also begun to proliferate, more still are needed to reduce the inherent vulnerability of democracies to such tactics. Recent data privacy laws may offer one such answer in limiting how social media uses personal information to micro-target content: Fake news becomes a lot less scary if it can’t choose its readers.

Political science↗

The Future of Arms Control in a Multilateral and Multi-Domain Environment

The crisis of arms control is obvious and broadly discussed among states, within the world’s expert community and to a lesser extent the media. This crisis has at least three building blocks: Russia continues to violate or undermine key arms control treaties and commitments; China rejects to join the existing arms control architecture; and both countries heavily invest in the modernization of their armed forces, including development of the nuclear arsenals. In the current highly competitive environment, arms control is more difficult to achieve and is likely to accomplish less than what was optimistically anticipated a generation ago. The growing pressure to “save arms control at all cost”, often expressed by the Western expert community, further complicates the situation. The excessively aspirational and ideological approach to arms control – in which arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation (ADN) become a silver bullet solution – is as dangerous as security and defence policies which entirely exclude ADN. As James Cameron rightly points out, “history should teach policy-makers to look beyond formulae for strategic stability to other ways in which arms control can help to contain disruptive challenges to the balance of power and minimize the chances of war”.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Beyond New START: Two Forecasts for Future Russian-US Arms Control

A world without the New START Treaty (NST) or treaty-based strategic arms control cannot simply be categorised as ‘unacceptable’.1 That world is possible. It has been increasing in likelihood for some time and thus it must be both understood and anticipated. Furthermore, the NST will expire on 5 February 2026 and it could disappear much sooner, depending on the actions of either Russia or the United States. No amount of positive thinking on the value of strategic arms control or talking points about the importance of the treaty can change its status as a hostage in the broader bilateral relationship.

Political science↗