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DOE OSTI2026

Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site

In accordance with DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, requirements, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Field Office (HFO) prepared this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for fiscal year (FY) 2025 for the Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) reported in DOE/RL-2019-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau (FY 2020) (hereinafter referred to as the Hanford Site Composite Analysis). The preparation of this ASR follows the technical specifications provided in DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation.

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DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2024

Evaluating Liquid Waste Transfers and their Impacts to the SRS Tank Farm to Support Operations and Closure

The Liquid Waste (LW) contractor at the Savannah River Site, Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC), supports the storage, processing, and safe disposition of legacy, radioactive liquid waste. The LW Tank Farms contain approximately 127 million liters (33.5 million gallons) of liquid waste within 43 active, underground waste tanks. To meet mission critical milestones for the closure of waste tanks and processing of 34 million liters (9 million gallons) of salt waste per year by the LW Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), an increase in Tank Farm operations, including waste tank transfers, is required. Waste is compiled in salt and sludge batches in the Tank Farms and transferred to SWPF and the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for treatment. All waste tank transfers, such as waste removal and batch compilation transfers, must be pre-evaluated to ensure Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) requirements are met via Evaluated Transfer Approval Forms (ETAFs). Facility conditions and configurations may change as a result of a waste transfer. These changes must be reflected in the Tank Farms Emergency Response Datasheet (ERD), which contains data utilized for operation and emergency situations.

Peterson, Shelby R.↗
DOE OSTI2023

UNF-ST&DARDS Enhancements for RCCA Data in As-loaded Dual Purpose Cask Models

This report summarizes the work performed to enable detailed modeling of rod cluster control assembly (RCCAs) in dual purpose canisters (DPCs) in as-loaded configurations using the Used Nuclear Fuel – Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS). The goal of this project was to evaluate the reactivity impact that RCCAs have on k eff of DPCs with pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel to potentially use the additional margin in future post-closure criticality safety analysis. This preliminary evaluation determined the number of DPCs that currently require compensatory actions prior to emplacement in a repository because of their high reactivity under post-closure criticality scenarios, which could be made acceptable by including the as-loaded RCCAs as specified in the Unified Database (UDB). This report briefly describes the modeling methods currently used within UNF-ST&DARDS and the modifications made to automate inclusion of the as-loaded RCCAs in the DPCs for post-closure criticality calculations for the loss of neutron absorber (NA) scenarios, or NA models. For the Zion site, the loss of basket scenarios, or degraded basket (DB) models, are also included. Discussion is also provided regarding the UDB data compared to available site-specific loading map data for the sites, which are specifically evaluated herein. This report compares the modifications to a similar evaluation for the Zion by site conducted by Walker as an initial validation. After the partial validation, all existing PWR sites with applicable NA models within the UDB were evaluated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Modeling Cost of Offshore Carbon Storage in Saline Reservoirs

Poster presentation to the AAPG-SEG-SPE CCUS 2024 Conference. Offshore saline reservoirs provide a significant and accessible resource for geologic carbon storage (CS). The offshore environment requires distinct approaches to site selection, operations, monitoring, and risk that affect the technoeconomic assessment of offshore CS projects. The National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) has developed a CS cost model for offshore saline reservoirs known as CO2_S_COM_Offshore. Based on NETL’s widely used CO2_S_COM cost model for onshore saline CS, CO2_S_COM_Offshore enables technoeconomic analysis of CS in offshore areas. This model comprehensively incorporates multiple facets of offshore CS projects, from regional evaluation and site selection to permitting, transport, operations, monitoring, site closure, and decommissioning. Developed to model cost for offshore United States (US) Exclusive Economic Zones, aspects of this model can be adapted to international projects. Presented at the SPE/AAPG/SEG Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage Conference in Houston, TX, March 11-13, 2024.

Mark-Moser, Mackenzie K.↗
DOE OSTI2024

DECOVALEX-2023: Task F1 Final Report

DECOVALEX-2023 Task F is a comparison of models and methods for post-closure performance assessment (PA) of a deep geologic repository for radioactive waste. The general aims of Task F are to build confidence in the models, methods, and software used for PA and to stimulate additional research and development in PA methodologies. The task objectives are to motivate development of PA modelling skills and capabilities, to examine the influence of model choices on calculated repository performance, and to compare the uncertainties introduced by model choices to other sources of uncertainty. Task F involves no actual experiment or site. It is a PA modelling exercise that requires the conceptual development of hypothetical repository designs and geologic settings. Because three of the teams were interested in salt and the rest of the teams were interested in crystalline rock, Task F was split into two branches: Task F1 for crystalline rock and Task F2 for salt. This report is for Task F1, crystalline rock. Teams from seven countries (Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and United States) participated in Task F1. The teams worked together to define the features, events, and processes of the reference case repository and established a set of performance measures. In addition, they defined a set of benchmark problems designed to test and compare modelling capabilities for fracture flow and transport at different scales. The repository design and benchmark problems are documented in a Task Specification that evolved over time as the group honed the specifications. The benchmark problems verified that each team can aptly model flow and transport in fractured media in 1-, 2-, and 3-dimensions. Two general approaches were used for the 3-dimensional benchmarks: discrete fracture network (DFN) and equivalent continuous porous medium (ECPM). DFN modelling involves explicit meshing of each fracture while ECPM modelling aims to capture the effective porosity and directional permeability of each cell in a space-filling mesh as affected by intersecting fractures. In some models, a combination of the two is used, i.e., DFN for large known fractures and ECPM for the rest of the domain. Transport is solved by using either the advection-dispersion equation or particle tracking. Although some variation is observed among model breakthrough curves in the benchmark problems, there is strong agreement in breakthrough behaviour up to at least the 75 th percentile for all benchmarks. At the 90 th percentile, breakthrough results show larger differences, suggesting several models retain substantially higher fractions of tracer in regions of slower moving water. In addition to the flow and transport benchmarks, several teams completed the source term benchmark, verifying capabilities for modelling radionuclide decay and ingrowth, waste package breach, instant release fractions, fuel matrix degradation rates, and radionuclide solubility limitations. The reference case is conceptualized as a generic spent fuel repository at a depth of 450 m in fractured crystalline rock. The repository has 50 parallel backfilled drifts, each with 50 deposition holes 6 m apart. Each deposition hole contains a 4-PWR waste package and bentonite buffer. The rock domain is 5 km in length, 2 km in width, and 1 km in depth. It has 6 deterministic fractured deformation zones and a multitude of stochastic fractures. Teams generally used the ECPM approach for the entire rock or a hybrid approach in which the deterministic fracture zones are modelled with a DFN and the rest of the rock is modelled by ECPM. Of the reference case problems specified, only the results of the initial reference case problem are compared in this report. The initial problem focuses on transport from the deposition holes to the surface, i.e., it neglects waste package performance. Tracers are released at all waste package locations at time zero and tracked for their releases to the near field and ground surface. The water fluxes calculated at the ground surface entry and exit regions of the domain are similar for all models except for two that have considerably lower fluxes. For tracer transport, large differences are observed among models in the magnitude of tracer transported. Much of the difference appears to be due to how the repository is implemented and hence the different degrees of repository simplification. Models that exclude the drifts, buffer, and backfill from the domain tend to show greater release of tracers and radionuclides from the repository. The initial study presented here indicates that major differences in modelling important processes within the repository (e.g., diffusion through buffer and backfill) can produce broadly different release and transport results, especially when those processes are excluded. Even for the models that included all specified features, events, and processes, the results show significant differences and demonstrate the importance of examining multiple modelling approaches in performance assessment. The differences in results observed in this study are expected to motivate teams to either increase complexity in future versions of the reference case models or to improve methods to account for the effects of simplified features and processes. Either way, future improvements in these models are expected to produce results that more closely agree.

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DOE OSTI2021

Vadose and Saturated Zone Flow and Transport Calculations for the Active Trenches of the Low-Level Burial Grounds, Hanford Site, Washington

The purpose of the fate and transport modeling described in this environmental calculation file (ECF) is to evaluate the impacts to groundwater associated with waste disposal operations at Mixed Waste Low-Level Burial Ground (LLBG) Trenches 31 and 34 to satisfy requirements in DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. The model integrates the flow and transport in the vadose zone beneath the active trenches with the saturated zone downgradient of the trenches to predict the radionuclide concentration at the point of assessment (POA). DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, defines the POA as the point of highest projected dose or concentration beyond a 100 m (328 ft) buffer zone surrounding the disposed waste. The modeling is conducted in accordance with the DOE G 435.1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE M 435.1-1, performance assessment (PA) guidelines. The modeling involves evaluation of the groundwater concentrations and radionuclide arrival times during the 1,000-year compliance and 10,000-year sensitivity-uncertainty periods per DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1. This analysis does not consider radionuclide release during facility operations, only the post-closure impacts of the radionuclides to the environment. The evaluation of potential radiological dose to groundwater receptors caused by releases from a closed facility containing radioactive waste typically includes the following: (1) Release of radionuclides from that facility (2) Transport of those radionuclides through the environment, and (3) Exposure to humans to environmental concentration levels of those radionuclides The fate and transport three-dimensional (3D) model analysis involves the post-closure impacts to the environment of the technetium-99, iodone-129, and uranium (all isotopes in the waste). The residual inventory estimates include several radionuclides, but technetium-99 is typically responsible for almost all of the beta-gamma dose equivalent associated with groundwater (water resources) protection per 40 CFR 141, “National Primary Drinking Water Regulations” (e.g., see the results in WCH-520, Performance Assessment of Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility, Hanford Site, Washington; hereinafter referred to as the ERDF PA), and iodone-129 can also be a significant dose contributor for some waste (e.g., RPP-RPT-59958, Performance Assessment for the Integrated Disposal Facility, Hanford Site, Washington; hereinafter referred to as the IDF PA). Uranium does not typically factor significantly into the impacts to groundwater, even during the 10,000-year sensitivity-uncertainty period, but always remains of interest as a contaminant. This ECF does not address vadose and saturated zone modeling for Trench 94 of the 200 East Area LLBG. Current information confirms the validity of the low corrosion rate of the naval reactor plant carbon steel (HY-80), and the even lower corrosion rate of the nickel-iron-chromium alloy reactor vessel (Inconel Alloy 600) presented in DOE/EIS-0259, Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Disposal of Decommissioned, Defueled Cruiser, Ohio Class, and Los Angeles Class Naval Reactor Plants. Based on these low corrosion rates, the time to breach the reactor vessel to allow release of radionuclides from the activated metal of the reactor vessel internal structure is at least 10,000 years. This time to breach precludes the need to evaluate the vadose and saturated zone transport of contaminants released from the reactor compartment disposal packages in the 200 East Area LLBGs PA (CP-63826, Waste Release Model Package Report for the Active Trenches of the Low-Level Burial Grounds, Hanford Site, Washington).

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DOE OSTI2021

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) is for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” which is located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). CAU 577 includes five low-level waste cells at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. To resolve issues related to this alleged violation of hazardous waste regulations, a Settlement Agreement was executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019, which identified agreed-upon mitigation measures. The Settlement Agreement required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Carbon storage cost modeling for the offshore Gulf of Mexico

Groundbreaking for geologic carbon storage (GCS) projects in the offshore Gulf of Mexico is imminent, and there is great interest in utilizing this region for GCS projects. Offshore saline reservoirs provide a significant and accessible resource for GCS. However, conducting GCS in the offshore environment will pose distinct challenges pertaining to site selection, operations, infrastructure use, and monitoring compared to operating onshore that ultimately affect technoeconomic assessment of offshore GCS projects. Carbon storage and transport costs are critical to project developers looking to deploy carbon storage in the offshore environment. We present CO2_S_COM_Offshore, a model developed by the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) as a screening-level offshore saline GCS cost modeling tool. Based on NETL’s widely used CO2_S_COM cost model for onshore saline CS, CO2_S_COM_Offshore enables technoeconomic analysis of GCS in offshore areas. This model comprehensively incorporates multiple facets of offshore GCS projects, from regional evaluation and site selection to permitting, transport, operations, monitoring, site closure, and decommissioning. In general, the model can explore the cost implications for potential offshore GCS project(s) by enabling the user to change several project operational and financial attribute configurations. Key inputs include offshore storage formation options, CO2 injection rate and duration, infrastructure types, monitoring intensity, project financing, and post-injection site care duration. Supporting cost algorithms within CO2_S_COM_Offshore were compiled utilizing S&P Global’ s QUE$TORTM cost estimation software alongside a variety of open-source scientific literature. In addition to reviewing key model components, we discuss several sensitivity analyses, input variabilities, and results on analysis of break-even CO2 price required by a project based on different regulation/policy and operational scenarios for the offshore Gulf of Mexico. These results indicate the value of modeling offshore GCS specifically, and the potential of offshore GCS within a decarbonization value chain. Presented at the 41st USAEE/IAEE North American Conference, 3-6 November 2024, Baton Rouge, LA, United States.

Mark-Moser, Mackenzie K.↗
DOE OSTI2024

He Leak Testing of 3013 Inner Container Lids

The 3013-container package is used for the long-term storage of plutonium bearing materials at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. The package consists of three nested stainless-steel containers: outer, inner and convenience, which are made of stainless steel. The requirements of the DOE 3013 Standarda, also entail the development of a surveillance program, tasked to ensure structural integrity of the outer container for at least 50 years. The Materials Identification and Surveillance Working Group (MIS-WG) is specified to be responsible for selecting the containers for the surveillance as well as analyzing results. The MIS-WG determined that corrosion is a potential mechanism for container degradation with the most credible type of failure to be stress corrosion cracking (SCC) through wall breach of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR). A breach of the inner container has the potential of allowing corrosive gases to be released into the safety class outer container.

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DOE OSTI2021

Update of Erosion Conditions and Assessment of Mitigation Options for the L-Bar Site

The L-Bar former uranium milling site was remediated and closed per regulations and is now under the long-term stewardship of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management (DOE/LM). Since assuming stewardship in 2004, DOE/LM has observed erosion and sedimentation processes at the L-Bar Site that will challenge meeting the design closure criteria in the long term, and therefore erosion control structures were installed in several areas. Portions of these structures were subsequently damaged by summer convective storm events and they are being redesigned. At the request of DOE/LM, Desert Research Institute (DRI) reviewed the proposed redesign plans of the erosion control structures. The purpose of this review is to support DOE/LM decisions regarding mitigation of ongoing erosion processes, including assessing possible repair of the existing erosion control structures, as well as plan for effective long-term site management. This design review is performed in reference to the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) standards contained in 40 CFR 192.02 that require containment of residual radioactive material be effective for up to 1,000 years (if achievable, but certainly for 200 years), limit radon release, protect groundwater, and minimize future maintenance. The erosion control structures under review are not subject to the UMTRCA standard directly, but they contribute to the performance of the overall containment system by virtue of their relationship with the large diversion channels bounding the disposal cell. The 11 design drawings included in “Erosion Control Alternatives Analysis, L-Bar, New Mexico, Disposal Site, LTS-111-0043-08-002,” dated January 11, 2019, and listed in Appendix A, and supporting calculations in Weston (2019) are the focus of the review. Additionally, DOE/LM provided supporting data such as a 2018 photogrammetry-based digital elevation model of the site, precipitation records collected from an on-site weather station, and sedimentation records collected at an on-site basin. This assessment includes review of the proposed design to mitigate current site conditions but also addresses site changes between the initial erosion assessment report (Miller et al., 2012) and current conditions. The analysis is at a predesign engineering level and does not include development of hydraulic or sediment transport models. Site precipitation data are included in Miller et al. (2012). The natural conditions of the site, the design of site diversion systems, observed erosion at the site, and predesign engineering analysis are used to develop a holistic view of the challenges to L-Bar Site stability and possible responsive actions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Potential Advantages to Employing an Onsite Laboratory at FUSRAP Sites Contaminated with Radionuclides and Metals - 20353

Various factors that support an evaluation of the relative costs, advantages and disadvantages of utilizing an onsite laboratory or an offsite laboratory for remediation of Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) sites contaminated with radionuclides and metals are presented. In terms of how much more quickly an onsite laboratory provides results versus an offsite laboratory, the results of this study provide tools for calculating the amount of cost savings per day for excavation of contaminated soils for various scenarios including: - State, municipal or local property remediation where the remediation schedule becomes time-critical due to the extra cost and inconvenience to the town or municipality caused by the need for increased security and safety personnel, possible road closures and detours, and the inconvenience to the public due to modified or decreased services of State or municipal facilities; - Residential property where the remediation schedule becomes time-critical due to the inconvenience to the homeowner as well as the importance of maintaining good community relations; - Commercial property where the remediation schedule becomes time-critical due to the hardship and potential loss of revenue endured by the property owner; - Open area where treatment of excavation water is required, and - Open area where treatment of excavation water is not required. For every scenario, the number of matrices, radionuclide and metal contaminants of concern and the project duration are important factors. The costs for the onsite laboratory included the capital costs associated with setting up the lab such as trailer(s) or building(s), power and water hookup, analytical testing equipment, balances, computers, desks and bookcases; support equipment such as hot plates, filtration assemblies, safety equipment, ovens, etc.; and supplies such as glassware, pipettes, filters, etc. and ongoing costs such as labor, chemicals and reagents, standards, cost of the laboratory obtaining certification and maintenance. Offsite laboratory sample testing costs are generally very competitive and typically substantially lower than onsite laboratory costs if only the sample testing costs are considered. The great disadvantage of using an offsite laboratory is that they often cannot guarantee rapid turnaround times for results which creates project delays associated with the remediation process including delays determining the completeness of the characterization and remediation processes, delays in backfilling a property and additional costs for treating wastewater (excavation water, stormwater or both). These costs will vary greatly depending upon the area of the country in which the project is located due to the wide range of labor costs for the onsite laboratory and field workers, as well as the contaminants of interest, matrices and most importantly the size of the impacted area and the number of properties located in that area. This paper provides guidelines for calculating the cost savings that may be realized if an onsite laboratory can generate results more quickly than an offsite laboratory by estimating the costs associated with the remediation process for the various scenarios noted above such as work crew labor costs, excavator and dump truck equipment rentals, wastewater treatment costs (if applicable) and the additional costs incurred by homeowners, commercial property owners and towns/municipalities that are reimbursed by the potentially responsible parties. Key assumptions involve the typical quickest turnaround time provided by the onsite and offsite laboratories. Costs for the operation of a wastewater treatment system and the remediation of a site area or property were provided by personnel who have been involved in the operation of a large FUSRAP site in New Jersey for many years. This study provides valuable information for determining the most cost-effective approach for analysis of project samples and therefore may be used on upcoming FUSRAP projects. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2021

Soil Sampling Results for Closure of a Portion of Solid Waste Management Unit #16

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/ NNSA) and National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS), the management and operating contractor for Sandia National Laboratories/California (SNL/CA), has prepared this soil sampling results report for closure of a portion of Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) #16. The entire network of SNL/CA sanitary sewer lines, including building laterals, was identified as SWMU #16 under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Assessment conducted for SNL/CA in April 1991 (DOE 1992). Along with the previous SWMU #16 investigation results (SNL/CA 2019), the results of this investigation are intended to support closure decisions by the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB), as discussed below. SNL/CA personnel completed upgrading its sanitary sewer discharge network in 2019. These upgrades included installing new sections of underground lines and decommissioning certain sections of the old piping system by capping in place. To date, several sections of the sewer line have been abandoned-in-place by capping as new sewer lines were installed or flow was rerouted to other existing lines. To formally close these abandoned sections of the sewer line, the RWQCB required that SNL/CA personnel collect soil samples to be analyzed for contaminants potentially released from the sewer lines. SNL/CA personnel hired Weiss Associates (Weiss) of Emeryville, California to prepare a sampling and analysis plan, implement the sampling plan and report the results of the investigation under Purchase Order #2166257. The Sampling and Analysis Plan for Partial Closure of Solid Waste Management Unit #16 (SAP) was submitted to the RWQCB on August 14, 2020 by Weiss on behalf of SNL/CA. The RWQCB approved the SAP on September 30, 2020 after Weiss updated the method detection limit and reporting limits for total polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and individual aroclors. Soil sampling was conducted in accordance with the SAP except that fewer locations were sampled due to site constraints, as discussed below. This report presents the results of the sampling effort and documents all associated field activities including borehole clearing, soil sample collection, storage and transportation to the analytical laboratories, borehole backfilling and surface restoration, and storage of investigation-derived waste (IDW) for future profiling and disposal by SNL/CA waste management personnel.

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DOE OSTI2021

Joint Work Plan for DPC Filler Testing

The US generates approximately 2,000 Metric Tons of Heavy Metal (MTHM) of commercial spent fuel (SNF) each year and currently stores ~ 85,000 MTHM of commercial SNF at 70+ reactor sites, the disposal of which is the responsibility of the US Department of Energy (DOE). SNF is initially stored in spent nuclear fueld pools (SFPs). SFPs were initially constructed by US utilities for temporary fuel storage, but with no final disposal pathway available, SFPs are reaching capacity. To allow continued operation of the nation's commercial nuclear reactor fleet, utilities started transferring SNF from SFPs (wet storage) to dry cask storage systems, typically using dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs). And while DPCs were designed, licensed and loaded to meet Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements that preclude the possibility of a critical event during SNF storage and transport, they were not designed or loaded to preclude the possibility of a criticality event during the regulated post-closure period following disposal, which could be up to 1,000,000 years (Price, 2019). DPC filler option criteria are detailed and materials that exhibit these attributes are explored. This document is an update of the SNL Joint Workplan on Filler Investigations for DPCs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

High Solids Performance Testing in a Scaled TSCR System

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) project is a technology demonstration that will pretreat Hanford tank waste supernatant in support of the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) mission. The TSCR system employs two key separation technologies: dead-end filtration (DEF) and ion exchange (IX) using crystalline silicotitanate (CST) media. DEF will be used to remove undissolved solids from tank waste to protect the functionality of the IX columns and the IX system will remove Cs-137 from tank waste. The separation technologies (DEF and IX) used in TSCR are technically mature and have also been successfully deployed at the Savannah River site in a similar facility known as the Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) system. While testing with simulants and real waste has been successfully performed under conditions expected during the initial operation of TSCR, test data is absent for assessing off normal high solids loading that may be in the TSCR waste feed. Normal TSCR treatment operations are expected to handle wastes with solids content on the order of 200 ppm, and off normal solids loading could be much larger than the nominal level. The testing program described in this report was conducted to understand the consequence of operating the TSCR system at elevated solids loadings up to the high-solids limit of 15,000 ppm [i.e., 1.5-wt%] identified in the TSCR design basis. Although the system is not required to make throughput above the nominal solids loading, the testing was intended to provide important information related to potential off normal operations. At off normal levels near the high-solids limit, there are potential implications for TSCR performance in the areas of throughput, DEF pressure drop, filter backflush frequency, and IX column pressure drop. In addition, intrusion of solids into the IX column was postulated to impact the Cs-137 loading behavior by promoting channeling or flow maldistribution in the column; since the magnitude of the postulated effect was unknown, assessing it was also of interest. The testing was performed using representative waste simulants and a prototypic, integrated TSCR system designed and assembled specifically to conduct the high solids performance assessment. Overall, the scaled TSCR testing demonstrated that full-scale unit operations can succeed in fulfilling their processing objectives in the presence of solids up to 3,000 ppm, but there are potential performance challenges to filtration operations at solids loadings as low as ~500 ppm. The severity of the challenge is likely to be dependent on the type and size distribution of solids, of which the current testing only examined a single type and size distribution. To provide some flexibility for future full-scale operations, the results of the testing suggest two possible risk reduction strategies that can be implemented without any changes in TSCR design or configuration. One option would be to enact an administrative limit on the solids loading to protect TSCR from feeds that are likely to require a high DEF swap frequency. Another option is to permit operation of the DEFs at differential pressures greater than 2 psid before swapping filters. The selection of a higher differential pressure target is not anticipated to adversely impact DEF backflushing efficacy and would reduce both swap frequency and the amount of waste sent to AP-108.

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DOE OSTI2020

Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2025

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) requires the performance assessment (PA) (Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office [DOE-ID] 2018a), composite analysis (CA) (DOE-ID 2012), and CA addendum (DOE-ID 2018b) for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site shall be maintained to evaluate changes that could affect the performance, design, and operating basis for the facility (DOE Manual 435.1-1 Change 3, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Section IV.P. [4]). The RHLLW Disposal Facility became operational in September 2018 after the completion of operational readiness activities required by DOE Order 425.1D, “Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities,” and the issuance of the startup authorization by the Startup Approval Authority (Boston 2018). The first waste disposals at the RHLLW Disposal Facility began in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2025, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. This FY 2025 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the PA, CA, operating disposal authorization statement (ODAS) (ODAS 2018), ODAS technical-basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis (RWMB) (INL 2024a) to meet DOE Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” performance objectives for the RHLLW Disposal Facility. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA at the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of DOE Order 435.1.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Examining the Ice Nucleating Particles from Southern Great Plains Part II (ExINP-SGP). Field Campaign Report

Knowledge of airborne particulate matter (PM), especially the particles that have supermicron diameters, is key for understanding ice-nucleating particles (INPs). Supported by the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) user facility, recent INP measurements at the Southern Great Plains observatory (SGP; 36'' 36' 18→ N, 97° 29' 6'' W) during multiple campaigns, such as SINCE-2014 (DeMott et al. 2015), Examining the Ice-Nucleating Particles from SGP (ExINP-2019; Hiranuma and Vepuri 2020), and Aerosol-Ice Formation Closure Pilot Study (AEROICESTUDY; Knopf et al. 2021a), strongly suggested the contribution of supermicron aerosol particles to observed INP abundance at SGP. However, verification of this hypothesis was hampered since additional offline laboratory analyses require sufficient amounts of collected airborne PM, which was lacking. Therefore, the principal investigators (PIs) conducted a field campaign, named ExINP-SGP II, to collect airborne PM at SGP for complementary laboratory characterization of the particles’ physicochemical properties (including ice nucleation properties). We used a passive particle sampler, which is a 4’ x 4’ x 2” (L x W x D) aluminum pan inside the 12”-high wooden windshield wall at the rooftop deck of the ARM Aerosol Observing System (AOS) trailer to collect dry PM deposits from January to April 2021. Figure 1 shows images of our experimental setup at the site. Additionally, we also collected surface soil near the ARM AOS trailer on 20 November 2020 (Figure 1b) to examine the ground soil dust particles (< 63 µm sieved) for their propensities to initiate immersion freezing compared to collected ambient PM. Surface soil and airborne samples were stored in the chemically inert container separately and kept in a dry, cool place until analyzed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗