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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

MASTODON: An Open-Source Software for Seismic Analysis and Risk Assessment of Critical Infrastructure

Seismic analysis and risk assessment of safety-critical infrastructure like hospitals, nuclear power plants, dams, and facilities handling radioactive materials involve computationally intensive numerical models and coupled multiphysics scenarios. They are also performed in a strict regulatory environment that requires high software quality assurance standards, and in the case of safety-related nuclear facilities, a conformance to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA-1) standard. This paper introduces the open-source finite-element software, MASTODON (Multi-hazard Analysis of Stochastic Time-Domain Phenomena), which implements state-of-the-art seismic analysis and risk assessment tools in a quality-controlled environment. MASTODON is built on MOOSE (Multi-physics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment), which is a highly parallelizable, NQA-1 conforming, coupled multiphysics, finite-element framework developed at Idaho National Laboratory. MASTODON is capable of fault rupture and source-to-site wave propagation using the domain reduction method, nonlinear site response, and soil-structure interaction analysis, implicit and explicit time integration, automated stochastic simulations, and seismic probabilistic risk assessment. When coupled with other MOOSE applications, MASTODON can also solve strongly and weakly coupled multiphysics problems. This paper presents a summary of the capabilities of MASTODON and some demonstrative examples.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Monte Carlo simulation of shielding designs for a cabinet form factor preclinical MV–energy photon FLASH radiotherapy system

Purpose: A preclinical MV-energy photon FLASH radiotherapy system is being designed at Stanford and SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory. Because of the higher energy and dose rate compared to conventional kV-energy photon laboratory-scale irradiators, adequate shielding in a stand-alone cabinet form factor is more challenging to achieve. We present a Monte Carlo simulation of multilayered shielding for a compact self-shielding system without the need for a radiation therapy vault. Methods: A multilayered shielding approach using multiple alternating layers of high-Z and low-Z materials is applied to the self-shielded cabinet to effectively mitigate the secondary radiation produced and to allow the device to be housed in a Controlled Radiation Area outside of a radiation vault. The multilayered shielding approach takes advantage of the properties of high-Z and low-Z radiation shielding materials such as density, cross-section, atomic number of the shielding elements, and products of radiation interactions within each layer. The Monte Carlo radiation transport code, FLUKA, is used to simulate the total effective dose produced by the operation. Results: The multilayered shielding designs proposed and simulated produced effective dose rates significantly lower than monolayer designs with the same total material thickness at the regulatory boundary; this is accomplished through the manipulation of the locations where secondary radiation is produced and reactions due to material properties such as neutron back reflection in hydrogen. Borated polyethylene at 5 wt% significantly increased the shielding performance as compared to regular polyethylene, with the magnitude of the reduction depending upon the order of the shielding material. Conclusions: The multilayered shielding provides a path for shielding preclinical FLASH systems that deliver MV-energy bremsstrahlung photons. Furthermore, this approach promises to be more efficient with respect to the shielding material mass and space claim as compared to shielded vaults typically required for clinical radiation therapy with MV photons.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Photonuclear Physics in SCALE

Radiation shielding modeling involves a wide range of applications, such as power reactors, critical experiments, portable sources, linear accelerators, and fusion systems. Particle energy ranges vary from thermal energies to fast energy spectra. MAVRIC, as the radiation shielding sequence of the SCALE code system [1] developed and maintained by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, is capable of modeling both neutron and photon interactions in matter and is widely used by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and radiation shielding practitioners all around the world. Although most applications don’t involve highly energetic photons that can cause photonuclear reactions and create coupled chains of high energy, ionized electrons and bremsstrahlung radiation within a material medium, when present, these reactions can have a significant impact upon the downstream particle fluxes from incident photons above 20 MeV. For example, linear accelerators used for medical isotope production are examples of applications in which high-energetic photons are generated and used for driving or controlling other components of a complex facility. Radiation shielding analyses of such a facility would require accounting for any and all significant sources of radiation. Unfortunately, MAVRIC included no data and methods to model either photonuclear reactions or the bremsstrahlung photons until this work, which enabled accounting for both. Photonuclear reaction cross sections were imported from the Evaluated Nuclear Data File libraries, and corresponding methods were implemented in the SCALE code system; see Section 2 for how the nuclear data are imported and used. Bremsstrahlung photons were modeled by assuming thick-target approximation whereby all generated electrons and positrons due to photon interactions are assumed to be absorbed within the same material in which they were born, yielding a quick particle transport simulation method by using fast lookup tables for generating subsequent gammas; see Section 4 for details. A suite of verification models was used to test implemented methods and associated data. Tests yielded satisfactory results for the new features. Enhancements will be released as part of the next major SCALE release (v7.0), which is anticipated to be deployed in 2025, with beta releases available in the interim.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cement and concrete as carbon sinks: Transforming a climate challenge into a carbon storage opportunity

Cement and concrete, while traditionally recognized as the main contributors to anthropogenic CO 2 emissions, also have untapped capacity to serve as substantial and scalable carbon sinks. This perspective examines how engineered mineral carbonation can transform cement-based materials into functional carbon storage systems, generating both environmental and economic value. We review the fundamental mechanisms of CO 2 uptake in cementitious systems, highlighting current limitations in reaction kinetics, phase control, and durability under varying environmental conditions. Emphasis is placed on the utilization of alkaline industrial residues and emerging magnesium-based cements, which offer synergistic pathways for carbon sequestration and circular resource use. We further assess the performance trade-offs associated with CO 2 uptake and the feasibility of deploying these technologies on industrial scales. A strategic roadmap is proposed that integrates scientific innovation, regulatory alignment, and carbon accounting in the life cycle to accelerate the adoption of carbon-storing concrete. This perspective provides a comprehensive framework to advance cement and concrete as engineered carbon sinks and supports the transition to a climate-positive construction industry.

Carbon storage↗
DOE OSTI2023

Xe-100 Pebble Bed Small Modular Reactor: Solving Critical Challenges to Enable the Xe-100 Pebble Bed Advanced Reactor Concept (ARC) (Final Scientific and Technical Report)

This is the final progress report for the Department of Energy (DOE) – X Energy, LLC cooperative agreement DENE0008472. This report provides a high-level summary of the work performed during the entire period of performance, running from July 1, 2016 – June 30, 2022. This span of time covers the original 5-year award and a one year no-cost extension. There were four tasks within this project: (1) project management, (2) reactor design furtherance, (3) fuel development, and (4) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) engagement. Detailed reporting during execution of the project was provided by a total of 23 quarterly reports, 42 X-energy technical reports, and voluntary monthly update presentations. Other technical work products include 2 white papers and 2 Topical Report submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 15 Potential Inventions documented, 4 patents issued, 3 patents pending, 8 peer reviewed journal articles, and 2 Oak Ridge National Laboratory Technical Manuscripts. All the X Energy milestones/deliverables were met early or on time and are archived in the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy’s Program Information Control System: Nuclear Energy under Fiscal Year 2016, Work Breakdown Structure 2.07 – X-Energy. All other work products are available to DOE upon request.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safety-Related Instrumentation & Control Pilot Upgrade Initiation Phase Implementation Report

This research report (1) describes the process followed and products developed during the SR I&C Pilot Project Initial Scoping Phase, and (2) captures lessons learned. Exelon Generation and LWRS collaborated to develop a Digital Transformation Strategy as part of a larger Advanced Concept of Operations. The proposed SR I&C Pilot Upgrade provides a foundation stone for this Digital Transformation that will improve plant safety, reliability, and operational performance while lowering plant Total Cost of Ownership (TCO). Initial Scoping Phase activities for this Pilot Project have been performed in accordance with industry processes that have been adapted to better support digital upgrades. These processes include IP-ENG-001, Standard Design Process (SDP) [Reference 2], NISP-EN-04, Standard Digital Engineering Process (SDEP) [Reference 3], and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report 3002011816, Digital Engineering Guide (DEG). Completing Initial Scoping Phase Engineering and Operations, Licensing, and Project Management Activities was necessary to sufficiently bound the scope, schedule, and estimated cost of the Project to enable utility management to authorize moving into the Conceptual Design Phase. A significant finding of the Business Case Analysis (BCA) methodology developed and applied as part of this effort was that the growth rate of material costs for sustaining the operation of obsolete SR I&C equipment is accelerating. This directly contributed to the Project Economic Analysis created to justify continuing the Project. Project Initial Scoping Phase lessons learned have also been captured to assist the larger industry in understanding the Digital Transformation Strategy and SR I&C Pilot Project Initial Scoping Phase efforts. This is in keeping with the public/private partnership that has been established between the Department of Energy (DOE) and Exelon for this effort with engagement from the NRC. By addressing first-of-a-kind (FOAK) risks and capturing lessons learned, the SR I&C Pilot Upgrade Project addresses technical, regulatory, and business risks to enable subsequent implementers of similar upgrades.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nomenclatural issues concerning cultured yeasts and other fungi: why it is important to avoid unneeded name changes

The unambiguous application of fungal names is important to communicate scientific findings. Names are critical for (clinical) diagnostics, legal compliance, and regulatory controls, such as biosafety, food security, quarantine regulations, and industrial applications. Consequently, the stability of the taxonomic system and the traceability of nomenclatural changes is crucial for a broad range of users and taxonomists. The unambiguous application of names is assured by the preservation of nomenclatural history and the physical organisms representing a name. Fungi are extremely diverse in terms of ecology, lifestyle, and methods of study. Predominantly unicellular fungi known as yeasts are usually investigated as living cultures. Methods to characterize yeasts include physiological (growth) tests and experiments to induce a sexual morph; both methods require viable cultures. Thus, the preservation and availability of viable reference cultures are important, and cultures representing reference material are cited in species descriptions. Historical surveys revealed drawbacks and inconsistencies between past practices and modern requirements as stated in the International Code of Nomenclature for Algae, Fungi, and Plants (ICNafp). Improper typification of yeasts is a common problem, resulting in a large number invalid yeast species names. With this opinion letter, we address the problem that culturable microorganisms, notably some fungi and algae, require specific provisions under the ICNafp. We use yeasts as a prominent example of fungi known from cultures. But viable type material is important not only for yeasts, but also for other cultivable Fungi that are characterized by particular morphological structures (a specific type of spores), growth properties, and secondary metabolites. We summarize potential proposals which, in our opinion, will improve the stability of fungal names, in particular by protecting those names for which the reference material can be traced back to the original isolate.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Pilot Upgrade (Initial Scoping Phase Implementation Report)

This research report (1) describes the process followed and products developed during the SR I&C Pilot Project Initial Scoping Phase, and (2) captures lessons learned. Exelon Generation and LWRS collaborated to develop a Digital Transformation Strategy as part of a larger Advanced Concept of Operations. The proposed SR I&C Pilot Upgrade provides a foundation stone for this Digital Transformation that will improve plant safety, reliability, and operational performance while lowering plant Total Cost of Ownership (TCO). Initial Scoping Phase activities for this Pilot Project have been performed in accordance with industry processes that have been adapted to better support digital upgrades. These processes include IP-ENG-001, Standard Design Process (SDP), NISP-EN-04, Standard Digital Engineering Process (SDEP), and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report 3002011816, Digital Engineering Guide (DEG). Completing Initial Scoping Phase Engineering and Operations, Licensing, and Project Management Activities was necessary to sufficiently bound the scope, schedule, and estimated cost of the Project to enable utility management to authorize moving into the Conceptual Design Phase. A significant finding of the Business Case Analysis (BCA) methodology developed and applied as part of this effort was that the growth rate of material costs for sustaining the operation of obsolete SR I&C equipment is accelerating. This directly contributed to the Project Economic Analysis created to justify continuing the Project. Project Initial Scoping Phase lessons learned have also been captured to assist the larger industry in understanding the Digital Transformation Strategy and SR I&C Pilot Project Initial Scoping Phase efforts. This is in keeping with the public/private partnership that has been established between the Department of Energy (DOE) and Exelon for this effort with engagement from the NRC. By addressing first-of-a-kind (FOAK) risks and capturing lessons learned, the SR I&C Pilot Upgrade Project addresses technical, regulatory, and business risks to enable subsequent implementers of similar upgrade.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Hybrid AI/ML and Computational Mechanics Based Approach for Time-Series State and Fatigue Life Estimation of Nuclear Reactor Components

Environmental fatigue modeling is a complex problem due to multiple failure modes and their intermixing. The failure modes are function of various underlying causes in addition to the corrosive effect of reactor coolant environment. Some of the major causes are time-dependence of material associated with cyclic loading, load sequence effect associated with random/variable amplitude loading, effect of strain amplitude and rates, effect of varying temperature (along both temporal and spatial directions) and the effect of mean strain and stress. The nonlinear intermixing of failure modes associated with above mentioned causing parameters makes the environmental fatigue modeling is a challenging task. Because of this challenge, fatigue is traditionally being modeled based on experimental data. However, test based empirical approach often requires hundreds of fatigue tests to model the above-mentioned intermixing failure causes even for a single material system. The problem is further exaggerated for reactor component made from multi-material systems such as made from both carbon and stainless-steel base metals and their similar and dissimilar metal welds. With the difficulty of conducting hundreds of fatigue tests to capture the above-mentioned intermixing failure causes, fatigue modeling approaches often depends on empirical models based on limited available test data such as available through ASME code and NUREG 6909. However, these limited test-data-based models may not be enough to accurately predict the life of reactor components. Accurate prediction of life of reactor component would become a necessity, particularly when the license of the reactors to be extended for long-term-operation (LTO) that is for well beyond its original design life of 40 years. The requirement of extending the license of reactor under LTO requires hundreds of fatigue tests to be conducted to understand the mechanism associated with the above-mentioned interdependent failure causes. However, conducting large number of fatigue tests is not a feasibility due to the cost involved. To address this issues Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) with the sponsorship of DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program trying to develop a hybrid predictive modeling approach. This is based on limited experiment-data, Artificial-intelligence (AI) – Machine-Learning (ML) - Deep-Learning (DL) based techniques and Multiphysics-computational-mechanics based modeling tools. The hybrid approach not-only can improve the accuracy of the existing stress analysis and fatigue modeling approach but also can reduce the over-dependency on test-based approach. Towards this goal following are some of the major contributions based on ANL’s FY-20 environmental fatigue modeling activities: 1) A cyclic plasticity material model database for 82/182 dissimilar metal weld, which can be readily shared with US nuclear industry and regulatory agency on request. 2) A well validated analytical modeling methodology to perform cycle-by-cycle stress prediction under both constant amplitude fatigue loading and variable amplitude fatigue loading (with load-sequence effect). 3) An AI/ML/DL based methodology to predict unmeasurable cyclic strain based on other available sensor signals. This type of approach can be used for estimating strain in real reactor components from other sensor readings. 4) An AI/ML based approach to improve the US capability on environmental fatigue testing. This is by improving ANL’s existing environmental fatigue testing capacity to conduct ASME required strain-controlled tests (by controlling strain amplitudes and its rate), while not measuring the strain (due to the difficulty of placing an extensometer in a narrow autoclave in a PWR-water-test system). 5) A simulation and experiment based probabilistic modeling methodology for time-series fatigue state and life estimation of reactor metal such as dissimilar metal weld.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advanced Reactor Safeguards: 2022 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A and PPS designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Material Control & Accountancy for Molten Salt Reactors (FY2021 Report)

There is significant domestic and international interest, investment, and research and development momentum to pursue advanced nuclear reactor technologies. Molten salt reactor (MSR) concepts display the largest variability in fuel type and design features among the current advanced concepts. MSRs have been proposed with various core designs, sizes (power), and fuel cycles. Salt-fueled molten salt systems represent the only advanced reactor type with fuel that is not in a solid form during operation. These “liquid-fueled” MSRs are unique from perspectives of fuel fabrication, spent irradiated fuel and waste components, licensing, and material control and accountability (MC&A) including the potential of fissile material holdup. The liquid fuel salt is the defining distinction in comparison to other advanced reactors that propose TRI-structural ISOtropic particle fuel pebbles, various coolant options (e.g., molten salts or metals, high temperature gas), or small modular alternatives using solid fuel variants including both light water reactors and non-light water reactors. MSRs are appealing to the nuclear energy industry because of the diverse reactor characteristics they can support including various neutron energy spectra, fueling requirements, fuel cycles, and/or fuel utilization. However, because of the significant deviation and diversity of a salt-fueled system compared to traditional solid fuel light water-cooled reactors (LWRs), the history, regulatory licensing framework, modeling capabilities, and supporting engineering technology are either lacking or, in some cases, nonexistent. Therefore, the research community is actively supporting advanced MSR development on many of these fronts in particular to assist MSR vendors with licensing requirements. ORNL is leading the research and development of respective MC&A approaches for salt-fueled MSRs. This report summarizes the research performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) under the US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program to investigate safeguards and security by design concepts, licensing and regulatory considerations, and dynamic system-level modeling to understand radioisotope concentrations for salt-fueled MSRs. The report builds upon the previous research and literature, identifies the MC&A challenges inherent to a salt-fueled MSR, reviews current regulatory frameworks for LWRs and their applicability towards salt-fueled MSRs, summarizes the status and progress of an MSR dynamic modeling tool, and discusses a prospective MC&A approach based on the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR) model.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Nine Canyon Long-Duration Energy Storage: A Feasibility Study

The Nine Canyon Long Duration Energy Storage (LDES) Feasibility Study explores the technical and economic viability of deploying advanced energy storage technologies at Energy Northwest's (EN) Nine Canyon (9C) Wind Project site in Benton County, Washington. Supported by the Washington State Department of Commerce and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity under its LDES Voucher Program, the study represents a collaborative effort between EN, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and ARES North America. At the core of this effort is the development of a generalized techno-economic modeling framework and evaluation tool designed to assess the value proposition of LDES projects across a variety of contexts. The modeling tool is technology-agnostic and accommodates user-defined parameters such as rated power, energy duration, round-trip efficiency, capital and operational costs, and dispatch constraints. It also integrates economic inputs, including market prices, energy revenue structures, and financing parameters to evaluate performance through key metrics. The tool provides utilities with a transparent, adaptable platform to support decision-making, investment prioritization, and portfolio planning for various storage technologies. To guide scenario design and interpretation, the study first surveyed the LDES technology landscape, including lithium-ion batteries, flow batteries, non-hydro gravity storage, and thermo-mechanical systems, comparing cost trajectories, technical performance, safety and hazards, materials sourcing and recyclability, and spatial/siting considerations. This literature-grounded review highlights technology trade-offs and reinforces the need to align technology choice with site characteristics, use cases, and project objectives. A companion chapter examines ownership structures (EN ownership, third-party ownership, shared models) and offtake options (energy marketing, capacity/energy PPAs, time-of-use PPAs, block-delivery PPAs, and tolling), where PPAs (power purchase agreements) represent contractual arrangements for buying and selling electricity. The chapter also highlights implications for risk allocation, capital access, operational control, and revenue certainty. The study also evaluates supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and transmission interconnection pathways, options include upgrading the existing SCADA or deploying a dedicated LDES controller, with attention to protection schemes, data telemetry, cybersecurity, and regulatory coordination with BPA. In addition, an ARES-specific geotechnical and hydrology assessment presented in the appendix screens multiple corridors for slope stability, bearing capacity, cut-and-fill magnitude, and stormwater behavior.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI1975

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 1, January-February 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 AEC Working Paper on Population Density Around Nuclear Power-Plant Sites Adapted by J. Ft. Buchanan, 8 Water-Reactor Safety-Research Information Meeting by Wm. B. Cottrell, D. O. Hobson, and G. D. Whitman; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Burnout in Boiling Heat Transfer. Part I: Pool-Boiling Systems by A. E. Bergles; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 43 Radionuclide Behavior During Normal Operation of Liquid-Metal-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors. Part 1: Production by C. A. Erdman and A. B. Reynolds; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 60 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 1: AEC-Owned Facilities by M. B. Biles and F. E. Coffman, 71 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 2: AEC-Licensed Facilities by L. B. Higginbotham and J. T. Collins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 76 Incident at the Lucens Reactor by J. M. Miller, 79 IAEA Symposium on Experience from Operating and Fueling of Nuclear Power Reactors by William A. Pryor, 87 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto, 98 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Nov. 1. 1974, 101 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in September and October 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 104 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 110 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 119 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 121 Proposed Rule Changes as of Oct. 31, 1974; MISCELLANY: 97 ASTM—Euratom Symposium on Radiation Dosimetry: Developments and Standardization (Announcement), 118 Workshops on In-Pile Filter Testing (Announcement), 119 IAEA Symposium on Radiological Impacts from Releases from Nuclear Facilities into Aquatic Environments (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

GPS-Based Gamma Survey for Characterizing and Decommissioning NORM Sites - 20389

Gamma survey techniques are an especially powerful decommissioning tool at naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) sites due to both the low cost to obtain data over a large spatial scale and the abundance of gamma emitters in the uranium and thorium decay series. Gamma surveys are executed by coupling a detector - most often a sodium iodide crystal - to a global positioning system (GPS), then reporting a location and gross gamma reading coincidentally to a data logger. Systems may be carried by workers or mounted to a car, all-terrain vehicle, or unmanned aerial system (UAS). The resulting data set provides a high-resolution but low precision map of the gamma radiation field over the area surveyed. Frequently this map is also correlated to soil concentrations of NORM radionuclides (most often, Ra-226) and/or exposure rate. Gamma survey parameters such as movement speed, transect spacing, and data logging frequency define the spatial resolution of the resulting surface, and can be optimized depending on the desired survey sensitivity. This paper examines gamma survey as a tool for decommissioning NORM sites and provides an overview of current gamma survey technology designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the decommissioning process. Topics to be discussed in the paper include: - An overview of gamma survey systems, and the utility of different delivery vehicles depending on desired cost, desired spatial resolution, and site topography. - The influence of physical detector characteristics on detection sensitivity and survey planning. - The tradeoff between high-resolution and large spatial extent, but inherently uncertain data, and low-resolution, low spatial extent, but highly certain data, as well as the specific utility of each of these types of data during NORM facility decommissioning. - Confounding variables that may limit the utility of gamma survey at some sites (e.g., radon gas and spatial heterogeneity / hot spots), and methods to plan for and control these conditions. Results show that the confounding variables, such as radon and data output can greatly influence the overall data quality associated with the decommissioning process. In addition, the use of real-time and aerial survey platforms provides a method for ensuring proper spatial extent of the data. When applied thoughtfully, gamma survey is a powerful tool for detecting NORM radionuclides in the environment and a cost-effective technique for identifying areas requiring remediation. However, entities performing or using gamma survey as a decommissioning tool must be aware of both its advantages and its limitations before basing remediation or regulatory action on gamma survey results. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Fuel performance evaluation of two high burnup PWR core designs during normal operation, control rod withdrawal, and control rod ejection scenarios

There is interest among utilities to extend the current, 18-month operating cycle to 24 months. Economically, this extension would require greater than 5 % enrichment and peak rod average discharge burnup levels above 62 GWd/MTU. A notable challenge of increasing enrichment is the resulting additional excess reactivity encountered during the early stages of fuel life. To accommodate, burnable absorbers beyond soluble boron are introduced into the fuel system. In high burnup fuels, the possibilities of cladding lift-off and fuel melting increase due, in part, to increased rod internal pressures and limited fuel thermal conductivity, respectively. This work collaboratively employs PARCS, RELAP5-3D, and BISON to compare the fuel performance of two high burnup fuel candidates with higher than 5 % enrichment. Here, the fuel performance parameters were compared to current NRC guidance. The results demonstrate an annular fuel design with homogenously blended gadolinium as a burnable absorber operates with greater safety margins during normal operation, allowing for additional operational flexibility. During normal operation, the core design utilizing Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber pins contained fuel pins which reached plenum pressures above 15.5 MPa by the end of the first fuel cycle and fuel pins experienced cladding hoop strains above 1 %. In the Gd core design, only two observed pins experienced plenum pressures above 15.5 MPa and no pins exceeded 1 % cladding hoop strain. During the control rod withdrawal scenario, plenum pressures for pins in both designs marginally exceeded system pressure, however neither experienced excessive hoop strain. The Gd core design experienced a maximum fuel temperature of 2418 K, which is significantly higher than the Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber design at 2157 K, but still within regulatory guidance. We predicted that the fuel in both could return to service after the CRW event. We also predicted that cladding would not fail during the Control Rod Ejection in either core design. Generally, the Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber core design performed with greater safety margin with regards to temperature during normal operation and the transient events. However, the Gd core design performed with greater safety margin regarding plenum pressure and hoop strain limits during normal operation and both transient events.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗