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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) and Powered Air-Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Cartridge Performance Testing on a Hanford AP Tank Farm Exhauster Slipstream: Volume 2 Raw Analytical Data

As the Tank Operations Contractor for U.S. Department of Energy operations at the Hanford site in Washington State, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) is responsible for managing highly radioactive wastes stored in tanks at Hanford. WRPS tests air-purifying respirator (APR) and powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) chemical cartridges commonly used at Hanford Tank Farms to determine the period of time that the cartridges would provide adequate performance for APRs and PAPRs used to protect workers when exposed to a mixture of Chemicals of Potential Concern (COPC) from any vapors exiting headspaces in the storage tanks. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Standard promulgated in Title 29 of the Code of the Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.134(d)(3)(iii)(b)(2) specifies that for protection against gases and vapors, employers shall implement a schedule for cartridges to ensure that change-outs occur before the end of service life. The change schedule can be based on objective information or data that ensures cartridge change-outs occur before the end of their service life.[2-5] The primary function of the WRPS Cartridge Test Program is to obtain objective data to determine service lives for the APR and PAPR cartridges used at Hanford Tank Farms. WRPS contracted with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to analyze the test data and offer an independent analysis and any recommendations. Volume 1 of this report summarizes data analysis of APR and PAPR cartridge testing on vapors from the AP tank farm exhauster. Previous testing of APR cartridges was conducted on the AP exhauster in June 2016. However, an AP exhauster upgrade was completed in September 2016. Two different APR cartridges from SCOTT Safety (Monroe, North Carolina) were assessed for the new AP exhauster source, along with two different PAPR cartridges—one from MSA Safety Inc. (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) and another from 3M (Maplewood, Minnesota). Volume 2 provides an introduction to the raw data, including analytical laboratory analysis results that supported the analysis and conclusions documented in Volume 1.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Fuel Behavior Implications of Reactor Design Choices in Pressurized Water SMRs

Small pressurized water reactors (PWRs) can feature boron free operation, natural circulation mode, reduced height assemblies and/or long refueling cycles. This paper attempts to explore core design optimization for each of these design evolutions. In consequence, five core design layouts are developed incorporating boron free operation with continuous control rods insertion, natural circulation with low burnup/low power density design, natural circulation with high burnup/low power density design, forced circulation with standard core power density design, and forced circulation with high power density design. These cores’ performance is compared to a standard 4-loop PWR. The design process aims to improve the fuel cycle cost under safety constraints through core design optimization using CASMO4E/SIMULATE3 reactor physics codes and FRAPCON4.1 fuel performance assessment tool. Core modeling assumes standard 17x17 PWR fuel assemblies loaded with low enriched uranium (LEU) up to 5wt% or LEU+ (i.e., below 10wt% enrichment) pellets with gadolinium oxide (Gd2O3) as the burnable poison. Satisfactory core and fuel performances are obtained for all the designed cores under steady state and considered overpower transients. For low power density operation, long cycle lengths are achieved reaching a 2.5- and a 5-year cycles and peak rod-average burnup is pushed to 83 MWd/kgU. Other cycle lengths are maintained at 18 months. Boron free operation exhibits the ability to achieve longer cycle lengths at the cost of higher peaking factors leading to high local power and fuel temperatures which prevents sizable power uprates and is deemed uneconomical. Fuel assembly height reduction allows coolant velocity retrofit which enables higher core power density without violating structural integrity of the fuel assembly. As a result, a core power density of 123 kW/l is reached where total cladding hoop strain becomes the limiting parameter.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

NREL Hydrogen Sensor Testing Laboratory

Relevance: Detection is recognized as a critical element for hydrogen facility safety design and supports risk mitigation. Detection methodologies will support validation of H2 behavior research. Hydrogen point sensors play a critical role for safety and process monitoring, but other methodologies can be developed. Approach: NREL Sensor Laboratory tests and verifies sensor performance for manufacturers, developers, end-users, regulatory agencies and SDOs/CDOs NREL deployment activity supports regulatory requirement verification, hydrogen behavior models, and method development for use by stakeholders. Accomplishments and Progress: NREL's R&D accomplishments have supported developers, industry, and SDOs by providing sensor performance and deployment expertise not otherwise available. Development of alternative detection strategies for hydrogen applications have been initiated. HyWAM and advanced detection methodologies deployments at H2@Scale Facilities are being implemented. Collaborations: Collaboration with government laboratories, universities, private organizations and regulatory agencies has leveraged the NREL Sensor Laboratory's success in advancing hydrogen safety sensors and process control. Proposed Future Work: NREL will support hydrogen deployment by the proper implementation of hydrogen sensors and advanced detection strategies. NREL will continue to support science-based codes and standards. This effort will be guided by the needs of the hydrogen community.

codes and standards↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Initial Efforts Organizing WPNCS SG-8: Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks

The Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) under the guidance of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has over 20 years of experience addressing concerns related to static and transient configurations encountered within the nuclear fuel cycle: fuel fabrication, transportation, reprocessing, storage, and geological disposal. One of the cornerstone activities of the WPNCS is the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP), which was established to identify a comprehensive set of criticality benchmark data, evaluate the data, including quantification of overall uncertainties; compile the data into a standardized format, perform sample calculations utilizing modern nuclear data sets and codes utilized in nuclear criticality safety, and formally document the work into a single source of verified benchmark data. Annually, members of the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) contribute evaluated benchmark data that undergoes comprehensive technical review prior to publication in the ICSBEP Handbook. In the years since the ICSBEP was established, there has been much work to prepare benchmark data to support validation activities in nuclear criticality safety. The 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook contains acceptable benchmark specifications for 5,053 critical, subcritical, or near-critical configurations in 582 benchmark evaluations. Modern benchmark development benefits from decades of experienced international participants, a well-established handbook format, supplementary guides to deal with uncertainty quantification, and a comprehensive review process based upon independent reviews from international experts. The ICSBEP Handbook also contains 838 configurations deemed unacceptable to support criticality safety efforts. They are recorded, with the reasoning for their rejection, to preserve the experimental data, prevent reevaluation of data that are incomplete or contain known errors, and/or to potentially allow future reevaluation of the experiment pending the identification of sufficient data to resolve identified inconsistencies and errors. Users of the ICSBEP Handbook today might notice that the rigor and quality of modern criticality safety benchmarks is much greater than those prepared within the initial decade of the project. Benchmarks with 1s uncertainties in k eff greater than 1% were traditionally rejected unless they were identified as unique experiment types that encompassed materials, fuels, or designs not available from other benchmark experiments. However, benchmarks developed using modern experimental techniques and practices typically have uncertainties on the order of a few tenths of a percent. There have been ongoing efforts to improve the overall quality of previously published benchmark evaluations. Seventy-eight evaluations, containing approximately 600 configurations, have been revised just within the past decade. An additional eleven benchmarks are under revision for updated release in the 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. If some of the historic benchmarks were resubmitted in their current form to the TRG today, they would be rejected due to lack of data, missing components in the uncertainty analysis, or incomplete benchmark model development. The use of historic criticality safety benchmarks that underestimate the total uncertainty, lack properly quantified biases, or provide inadequate benchmark specifications do not sufficiently support modern criticality safety and nuclear data efforts. Although the ICSBEP Handbook is recognized by regulating bodies to support criticality safety, users are required to justify their reasons to ignore historic benchmark data and include additional safety margins within their designs. Discussions were held at the WPNCS 23rd Annual Meeting in September 2019 regarding the aforementioned issues. The resultant decision was to establish Subgroup 8 (SG-8): Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks. The current activities of SG-8 are discussed herein.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Equivalent Safety Evaluation of the 2021 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code to Editions Incorporated by Reference in 49 CFR 192, 193, and 195

Federal safety standards for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines and liquid natural gas facilities incorporate rules and requirements for boiler and pressure vessel design and fabrication into 49 CFR Parts 192, 193, and 195 through the IBR process. The equivalent safety evaluations documented in this report demonstrate that boilers and pressure vessels in pipeline facilities that are designed and fabricated in accordance with rules and requirements specified in the 2021 edition do not violate the fundamental safety assumptions stated or implied in the 2007 edition of the ASME BPVC and therefore provide equivalent safety.

03 NATURAL GAS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Hydrogen Component Leak Rate Quantification for System Risk and Reliability Assessment through QRA and PHM Frameworks: Preprint

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL) Hydrogen Safety Research and Development (HSR&D) program in collaboration with the University of Maryland's Systems Risk and Reliability Analysis Laboratory (SyRRA) are working to improve reliability and reduce risk in hydrogen systems. This approach strives to use quantitative data on component leaks and failures, together with Prognosis and Health Management (PHM), and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to identify at-risk components, reduce component failures and downtime, and predict when components require maintenance. Hydrogen component failures increase facility maintenance cost, facility downtime, and reduce public acceptance of hydrogen technologies, ultimately increasing facility size and cost because of potentially overly conservative requirements. Leaks are a predominant failure mode for hydrogen components. However, uncertainties in the amount of hydrogen emitted from leaking components and the frequency of those failure events limit the understanding of the risks that they present under real-world operational conditions. NREL has deployed a test fixture, the Leak Rate Quantification Apparatus (LRQA), to quantify the mass flow rate of leaking gases from medium and high-pressure components that have failed while in service. Quantitative hydrogen leak rate data from this system could ultimately be used to better inform risk assessment and Regulation Codes and Standards (RCS). Parallel activity explores the use of PHM and QRA techniques to assess and reduce risk, thereby improving safety and reliability of hydrogen systems. The results of QRAs could further provide a systematic and science-based foundation for the design and implementation of RCS, as in the latest versions of the NFPA 2 code for gaseous hydrogen stations. Alternatively, data-driven techniques of PHM could provide new damage diagnosis and health-state prognosis tools. This research will help end users, station owners and operators, and regulatory bodies move towards risk-informed preventative maintenance versus emergency corrective maintenance, reducing cost and improving reliability. Predictive modelling of failures could improve safety and affect RCS requirements such as setback distances at liquid refuelling sites. The combination of leak rate quantification research, PHM, and QRA can lead to better informed models enabling data-based decision to be made for hydrogen system safety improvements.

codes and standards↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment of Potential Failure Modes and Effects for On-Board Components for Hydrogen-Powered Locomotives

Hydrogen fuel sources offer alternatives to conventional fuels in the rail transportation industry. Hydrogen powered locomotive designs utilizing either a fuel cell or an internal combustion engine can make migration to alternative fuels possible for rail transportation. Codes and standards are still in development for rail application of hydrogen and safety risks must be assessed for hydrogen locomotive applications. This report utilizes a failure mode & effects analysis framework to help qualitatively understand possible risks from a hydrogen locomotive system. Findings illustrate how a combination of three mitigations greatly reduces the risks from a hydrogen locomotive system.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2025

A Review of Regulations, Codes, and Standards for Hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric Bus Use on Airports

This report reviews regulations, codes, and standards to be considered for FCEB operations on airports governing vehicle safety, hydrogen infrastructure, and airport operations. Overall, the review found the existing regulatory framework largely suitable for FCEB operations on airports, with only minor gaps identified pertaining to heavy-duty vehicle fueling, operation and fire safety on airport aprons, and authorization for emergency power use.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2021

Electrifying Transit: A Guidebook for Implementing Battery Electric Buses

This guidebook is organized to give transit decision-makers and relevant stakeholders an overview of BEB facts, data, and considerations important for planning their implementation in a variety of jurisdictions. First, the benefits and barriers for BEB are identified. Second, BEB basics in terms of the major components, including a) the bus, b) the battery, and c) the numerous charging options. BEB introduces new, high demand loads as the buses are charging and thus have a number of interactions with the electricity grid and the utility, which are explored third. Operation and maintenance of BEBs are considered fourth as BEBs should not be operated and maintained in the same approach as diesel buses. Fifth, the costs of BEB prices are summarized – and the choices of bus and battery are explored in how they impact BEB prices. Funding and financing options that support BEBs and their charging stations are also explored. Safety is a key consideration for BEBs and the guidebook touches upon codes and standards, hazards, and emergencies. The final section examines project execution, bringing together information from all the other sections so that long-term planning, route analysis, and fleet and infrastructure planning can be considered in the preparation of BEB deployment, and then deployment can be evaluated on a regular basis. A final conclusion revisits the information covered in the guidebook.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗
DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Recent advances in combustion science related to hydrogen safety

Hydrogen is a key pillar in the global Net Zero strategy. Rapid scaling up of hydrogen production, transport, distribution and utilization is expected. This entails that hydrogen, which is traditionally an industrial gas, will come into proximity of populated urban areas and in some situations handled by the untrained public. To realize all their benefits, hydrogen and its technologies must be safely developed and deployed. The specific properties of hydrogen involving wide flammability range, low ignition energy and fast flame speed implies that any accidental release of hydrogen can be easily ignited. Comparing with conventional fuels, combustion systems fueled by hydrogen are also more prone to flame instability and abnormal combustion. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive review about combustion research related to hydrogen safety. It starts with a brief introduction which includes some overview about risk analysis, codes and standards. The core content covers ignition, fire, explosions and deflagration to detonation transition (DDT). Considering that DDT leads to detonation, and that detonation may also be induced directly under special circumstances, the subject of detonation is also included for completeness. The review covers laboratory, medium and large-scale experiments, as well as theoretical analysis and numerical simulation results. While highlights are provided at the end of each section, the paper closes with some concluding remarks highlighting the achievements and key knowledge gaps.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2023

MARVEL 90% Final Design Report

This document provides documentation of the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation Project’s (MARVEL) 90% Final Design, as required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard-1189, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process." Per DOE-STD-1189-2016, the 90% Final Design documentation focuses on design completion, at a level capable of supporting procurement, construction, testing, and operation. At this phase, the design organization finalizes the hazards and accident analyses, Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), security vulnerability assessments, and other supporting analyses for design completion. The objective of this report is to provide a high-level summary of the design thus far and provide references including, but not limited to, the following design deliverables: • Complete final drawings, specifications and commercial grade dedications that may be released for bid and/or construction. • Clearly defined testing plans for the safety and functionality of all subsystems. • Quality Assurance Program for Design, Testing and Procurement. • Software Quality Assurance Plan. • Code of Record (COR), applicable design requirements including codes and standards. • Final design that meets all the requirements stipulated in the COR. • Final design review, consisting of final validation of comment resolution from previous reviews, and a review of any additional developments since the last review. • Updated Safety Design Strategy. • Hazard Analysis. • Fire Hazard Analysis. • Accident analysis. • Security vulnerability assessment. • Current and detailed cost estimate. • Current construction schedule, and • Risk & Opportunities Assessment.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of Hydrogen Storage Quantity Limits for Safety Requirements

As hydrogen storage facilities increase in size and capacity, it may be necessary to evaluate codes and standards that regulate hydrogen, especially in relation to allowable aggregate quantities. Existing regulations for other substances with comparable hazards such as oxygen, natural gas, and petroleum were reviewed; most fuels do not have aggregate quantity limits despite sometimes having individual tank capacity restrictions or limits for certain non-industrial, indoor, or small-scale applications. This precedent suggests that specifying a hydrogen quantity limit may not be necessary. Several possible methods for identifying an appropriate limit are presented to illustrate different approaches for a limit basis. These methods are based on overall risk, or the specific consequences inflicted by a jet fire or an explosion on people and infrastructure. However, these example metrics tend to require assumptions about potential leak sizes, suggesting that a general aggregate quantity limit would be difficult to justify without more system-specific requirements.

08 HYDROGEN↗
NASA NTRS1994

Lidar performance analysis

Section 1 details the theory used to build the lidar model, provides results of using the model to evaluate AEOLUS design instrument designs, and provides snapshots of the visual appearance of the coded model. Appendix A contains a Fortran program to calculate various forms of the refractive index structure function. This program was used to determine the refractive index structure function used in the main lidar simulation code. Appendix B contains a memo on the optimization of the lidar telescope geometry for a line-scan geometry. Appendix C contains the code for the main lidar simulation and brief instruction on running the code. Appendix D contains a Fortran code to calculate the maximum permissible exposure for the eye from the ANSI Z136.1-1992 eye safety standards. Appendix E contains a paper on the eye safety analysis of a space-based coherent lidar presented at the 7th Coherent Laser Radar Applications and Technology Conference, Paris, France, 19-23 July 1993.

Spiers, Gary D.↗
DOE OSTI2023

LPG Component Leak Frequency Estimation

Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is used in heating, cooking, and as a vehicle fuel (called autogas). A safety risk assessment may be needed to assess potential hazard scenarios and inform the regulations, codes, and standards that apply to LPG facilities, such as autogas refueling facilities. The frequency of unintended releases in an LPG system is an important aspect of a system quantitative risk assessment. This report documents estimation of leakage frequencies for individual components of LPG systems. These frequencies are described using uncertainty distributions obtained with Bayesian statistical methods, generic data, and LPG data which were publicly available. There was a lack of LPG data in the literature, so frequencies for most components were developed with generic data and should be used cautiously; without additional information about component leak frequencies in LPG systems, it is not known whether these generic frequencies may be conservative or non-conservative.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2024

Regulations, Codes, and Standards Review for Underground Hydrogen Storage

Hydrogen continues to show promise as a viable contributor to achieving energy storage goals such as energy security and decarbonization in the United States. However, many new and expanded hydrogen use applications will require identifying methods of larger-scale storage than the solutions that currently exist for smaller storage applications. One possibility is to store large quantities of gaseous hydrogen below ground level. Underground storage of other fuels such as natural gas is already currently utilized, so much of the infrastructure and basic technologies can be used as a basis for underground hydrogen storage (UHS). A few commercial UHS facilities currently exist in the United States, including salt caverns owned and operated by Air Liquide, Linde, and Conoco Philips, but UHS is still a relatively new concept that has not been widely deployed. It is necessary to understand the safety risks and hazards associated with UHS before its use can be expanded and accepted more broadly. Many of these risks are addressed through regulations, codes, and standards (RCS) issued by governing bodies and organizations with expertise in certain hazards. This report is a review of RCS documents relevant to UHS, with a particular lens on potential technical gaps in existing guidance. These gaps may be specific to the physical properties of hydrogen or due to the different technologies relevant for hydrogen vs. natural gas storage. This is meant to be a high-level review to identify relevant documents and potential gaps. Formally addressing the individual gaps identified here within the codes and standards themselves would involve a more intensive analysis and differ based on the code or standard revision processes of the various publishing organizations. Therefore, presenting specific recommendations for revising the verbiage of the documents for UHS applications is left for future work and other publications.

08 HYDROGEN↗