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At least 73 records · Page 4

Control of Technology Transfer at JPL

Controlled Technology: 1) Design: preliminary or critical design data, schematics, technical flow charts, SNV code/diagnostics, logic flow diagrams, wirelist, ICDs, detailed specifications or requirements. 2) Development: constraints, computations, configurations, technical analyses, acceptance criteria, anomaly resolution, detailed test plans, detailed technical proposals. 3) Production: process or how-to: assemble, operated, repair, maintain, modify. 4) Manufacturing: technical instructions, specific parts, specific materials, specific qualities, specific processes, specific flow. 5) Operations: how-to operate, contingency or standard operating plans, Ops handbooks. 6) Repair: repair instructions, troubleshooting schemes, detailed schematics. 7) Test: specific procedures, data, analysis, detailed test plan and retest plans, detailed anomaly resolutions, detailed failure causes and corrective actions, troubleshooting, trended test data, flight readiness data. 8) Maintenance: maintenance schedules and plans, methods for regular upkeep, overhaul instructions. 9) Modification: modification instructions, upgrades kit parts, including software

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)↗

Radioastron flight operations

Radioastron is a space-based very-long-baseline interferometry (VLBI) mission to be operational in the mid-90's. The spacecraft and space radio telescope (SRT) will be designed, manufactured, and launched by the Russians. The United States is constructing a DSN subnet to be used in conjunction with a Russian subnet for Radioastron SRT science data acquisition, phase link, and spacecraft and science payload health monitoring. Command and control will be performed from a Russian tracking facility. In addition to the flight element, the network of ground radio telescopes which will be performing co-observations with the space telescope are essential to the mission. Observatories in 39 locations around the world are expected to participate in the mission. Some aspects of the mission that have helped shaped the flight operations concept are: separate radio channels will be provided for spacecraft operations and for phase link and science data acquisition; 80-90 percent of the spacecraft operational time will be spent in an autonomous mode; and, mission scheduling must take into account not only spacecraft and science payload constraints, but tracking station and ground observatory availability as well. This paper will describe the flight operations system design for translating the Radioastron science program into spacecraft executed events. Planning for in-orbit checkout and contingency response will also be discussed.

Altunin, V. I.↗

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a five-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASA's safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are 'one deep.' The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting 'brain drain' could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. The major NASA programs are also limited in their ability to plan property for the future. This is of particular concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS because these programs are scheduled to operate well into the next century. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning. For example, the section on computer hardware and software contains specific findings related to required longer range safety-related actions. NASA can be proud of its accomplishments this past year, but must remain ever vigilant, particularly as ISS assembly begins to accelerate. The Panel will continue to focus on both the short- and long-term aspects of risk management and safety planning. This task continues to be made manageable and productive by the excellent cooperation the Panel receives from both NASA and its contractors. Particular emphasis will continue to be directed to longer term workforce and program planning issues as well as the immediate risks associated with ISS assembly and the initial flights of the X-33 and X-34. Section 2 of this report presents specific findings and recommendations generated by ASAP activities during 1998. Section 3 contains more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendix A is a current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1997 ASAP Annual Report. Appendix C details the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1998. During the year, Mr. Richard D. Blomberg was elected chair of the Panel and Vice Admiral (VADM) Robert F Dunn was elected deputy chair. VADM Bernard M. Kauderer moved from consultant to member. Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired from the Panel after many years of meritorious service. Ms. Shirley C. McCarty and Mr. Robert L. ('Hoot') Gibson joined the Panel as consultants.

Source record↗

Performance Impacts to the NASA Artemis II Trajectory Correction Burn Placement

As NASA embarks to return humans to the lunar vicinity with the upcoming Artemis II mission, the selected free return trajectory taking the crew to the Moon in the Orion spacecraft is impacted by the execution of small trajectory correction burns to ensure the spacecraft stays on course for a successful return to Earth. The placement of these nominally zero translational maneuvers must account for the crew schedule, navigation tracking constraints, spacecraft venting, thermal and communication requirements, and a host of other programmatic factors. Understanding the influence the placement of these periodic burn corrections have on the integrated GN\&C performance can provide valuable insight to mission controllers and trajectory planning processes to untangle the complex trade space considered for both baseline and contingency scenarios. This sensitivity information can also be utilized to facilitate the optimized placement of these burns. This paper utilizes several techniques to systematically generate the performance impacts to the NASA Artemis II trajectory correction burn placement and demonstrate how to derive optimized locations that make the system robust to crew activity, maneuver execution errors, navigation uncertainty, orbit insertion errors, disturbance accelerations, and other system limitations.

GN&C↗

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-37, postflight edition

STS-37/Atlantis was launched on April 5, 1991 from Kennedy Space Center launch complex 39B at 9:23 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). Launch was delayed 4 minutes 45 seconds because of safety concerns about the low cloud ceiling and the wind direction in the potential blast area. Based on the limited number and type of inflight anomalies encountered, the Space Shuttle operated satisfactorily throughout the STS-37 mission. A contingency EVA was performed by the crew on Flight Day (FD) 3 to free a sticky Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) high gain antenna, after which the GRO primary payload was successfully deployed by the Orbiter's Remote Manipulator System. The GRO, which weighed just over 35,000 lbs, was the heaviest NASA science satellite ever deployed by the Space Shuttle into low Earth orbit. The scheduled entry/landing on FD 6 was waved off for one day due to high wind conditions at Edwards Air Force Base. Atlantis landed on FD 7, 11 April 1991 on Edwards AFB lakebed runway 33 at 9:55 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.

Hill, William C.↗

Results of the International Space Station Interim Resistance Exercise Device Man-in-the-Loop Test

The Interim Resistance Exercise Device (iRED), developed for the International Space Station (ISS), was evaluated using human subjects for a Man-In-The-Loop Test (MILT). Thirty-two human subjects exercised using the iRED in a test that was conducted over a 63-working-day period. The subjects performed the same exercises will be used on board ISS, and the iRED operating constraints that are to be used on ISS were followed. In addition, eight of the subjects were astronauts who volunteered to be in the evaluation in order to become familiar with the iRED and provide a critique of the device. The MILT was scheduled to last for 57,000 exercise repetitions on the iRED. This number of repetitions was agreed to as a number typical of that expected during a 3-person, 17-week ISS Increment. One of the canisters of the iRED failed at the 49,683- repetition mark (87.1% of targeted goal). The remaining canister was operated using the plan for operations if one canister fails during flight (contingency operations). This canister remained functional past the 57,000-repetition mark. This report details the results of the iRED MILT, and lists specific recommendations regarding both operation of the iRED and future resistance exercise device development.

Moore, A. D., Jr.↗

Hypervelocity Impact Initiation of Explosive Transfer Lines

The Gemini, Apollo and Space Shuttle spacecraft utilized explosive transfer lines (ETL) in a number of applications. In each case the ETL was located behind substantial structure and the risk of impact initiation by micrometeoroids and orbital debris was negligible. A current NASA program is considering an ETL to synchronize the actuation of pyrobolts to release 12 capture latches in a contingency. The space constraints require placing the ETL 50 mm below the 1 mm thick 2024-T72 Whipple shield. The proximity of the ETL to the thin shield prompted analysts at NASA to perform a scoping analysis with a finite-difference hydrocode to calculate impact parameters that would initiate the ETL. The results suggest testing is required and a 12 shot test program with surplused Shuttle ETL is scheduled for February 2012 at the NASA White Sands Test Facility. Explosive initiation models are essential to the analysis and one exists in the CTH library for HNS I, but not the HNS II used in the Shuttle 2.5 gr/ft rigid shielded mild detonating cord (SMDC). HNS II is less sensitive than HNS I so it is anticipated that these results using the HNS I model are conservative. Until the hypervelocity impact test results are available, the only check on the analysis was comparison with the Shuttle qualification test result that a 22 long bullet would not initiate the SMDC. This result was reproduced by the hydrocode simulation. Simulations of the direct impact of a 7 km/s aluminum ball, impacting at 0 degree angle of incidence, onto the SMDC resulted in a 1.5 mm diameter ball initiating the SMDC and 1.0 mm ball failing to initiate it. Where one 1.0 mm ball could not initiate the SMDC, a cluster of six 1.0 mm diameter aluminum balls striking simultaneously could. Thus the impact parameters that will result in initiating SMDC located behind a Whipple shield will depend on how well the shield fragments the projectile and spreads the fragments. An end-to-end simulation of the impact of an aluminum ball onto a Whipple shield covering SMDC is problematic due to the hydrocode fracture models. Regardless, two simulations were performed resulting in a 5 mm ball initiating the SMDC and a 4 mm ball failing to initiate the SMDC.

Bjorkman, Michael D.↗

Lunar prospector mission design and trajectory support

The Lunar Prospector mission is the first dedicated NASA lunar mapping mission since the Apollo Orbiter program which was flown over 25 years ago. Competitively selected under the NASA Discovery Program, Lunar Prospector was launched on January 7, 1998 on the new Lockheed Martin Athena 2 launch vehicle. The mission design of Lunar Prospector is characterized by a direct minimum energy transfer trajectory to the moon with three scheduled orbit correction maneuvers to remove launch and cislunar injection errors prior to lunar insertion. At lunar encounter, a series of three lunar orbit insertion maneuvers and a small circularization burn were executed to achieve a 100 km altitude polar mapping orbit. This paper will present the design of the Lunar Prospector transfer, lunar insertion and mapping orbits, including maneuver and orbit determination strategies in the context of mission goals and constraints. Contingency plans for handling transfer orbit injection and lunar orbit insertion anomalies are also summarized. Actual flight operations results are discussed and compared to pre-launch support analysis.

Lozier, David↗

Effectiveness of Redundant Communications Systems in Maintaining Operational Control of Small Unmanned Aircraft

NASA has been researching prototype technologies for an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) system to facilitate enabling of safe and efficient civilian low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, in a series of Technical Capability Levels (TCL) activities that are increasingly complex. In TCL1, completed in 2015, visual line-of-sight operations such as agriculture, firefighting and infrastructure monitoring were addressed with a focus on geofencing and operations scheduling. Technologies and requirements needed for beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS) operations in sparsely populated areas were examined in TCL2 in 2016, and those for operations over moderately populated areas in TCL3 in 2017 and 2018. TCL4 will build on the earlier TCLs and focus on technologies and requirements for operations in higher-density urban areas for tasks such as news gathering, package delivery and for managing large-scale contingencies. This paper describes a communications test conducted in TCL3 and discusses insights gained from the test. In the test, operators were directed to equip UAS with redundant Command and Control (C2) communications systems, send a maneuver command to Unmanned Aircraft (UA) via the primary system, then verify execution of the sent command. This exercise was repeated with each redundant system. The test was designed to assess effectiveness of redundant C2 systems in maintaining operational control of UA. Several UAS were configured with varying arrangements to achieve redundancy, including two identical radio modems using the same frequency band, WiFi and Long-Term Evolution (LTE) cellular modems, etc. From the test, digital data such as time maneuver command sent, time maneuver verified, etc., were collected. Descriptions of methods to detect loss of C2 communications and contingency steps for such event were collected and assessed. The final paper will include a detailed analysis of the collected data leading to the following insights. First, effectiveness of redundant C2 systems depends on several factors, such as operational environment and communications service availability. For example, use of two identical point-to-point radio to connect operator and UA on the same frequency band can be effective in mitigating radio malfunction when operating in an environment where possibility of Radio Frequency (RF) interference is low, such as over open plains. However, the same arrangement may not be effective where high level of RF transmissions in broad spectrum ranges can be expected, such as over or near urban areas. For redundant systems that consist of external communications services, such as cellular and satellite communications network, redundancy is maintained only in the areas where more than one services are available. Therefore, UAS operators should have the means to plan for and monitor the performance of external communications services they are relying on to control UA. Second, communications performance needs, such as the minimum data transfer rate and the maximum tolerable latency, should be assessed to reflect the potential hazard that can come from loss of UA control. For example, UA operations over desolate area pose less hazard to people than operations over densely populated area and performance need for the former would be less than the latter.

Jung, Jaewoo↗

Managing temporal relations

Various temporal constraints on the execution of activities are described, and their representation in the scheduling system MAESTRO is discussed. Initial examples are presented using a sample activity described. Those examples are expanded to include a second activity, and the types of temporal constraints that can obtain between two activities are explored. Soft constraints, or preferences, in activity placement are discussed. Multiple performances of activities are considered, with respect to both hard and soft constraints. The primary methods used in MAESTRO to handle temporal constraints are described as are certain aspects of contingency handling with respect to temporal constraints. A discussion of the overall approach, with indications of future directions for this research, concludes the study.

Britt, Daniel L.↗

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗

An expert system for simulating electric loads aboard Space Station Freedom

Space Station Freedom will provide an infrastructure for space experimentation. This environment will feature regulated access to any resources required by an experiment. Automated systems are being developed to manage the electric power so that researchers can have the flexibility to modify their experiment plan for contingencies or for new opportunities. To define these flexible power management characteristics for Space Station Freedom, a simulation is required that captures the dynamic nature of space experimentation; namely, an investigator is allowed to restructure his experiment and to modify its execution. This changes the energy demands for the investigator's range of options. An expert system competent in the domain of cryogenic fluid management experimentation was developed. It will be used to help design and test automated power scheduling software for Freedom's electric power system. The expert system allows experiment planning and experiment simulation. The former evaluates experimental alternatives and offers advice on the details of the experiment's design. The latter provides a real-time simulation of the experiment replete with appropriate resource consumption.

Kukich, George↗

An expert system for simulating electric loads aboard Space Station Freedom

Space Station Freedom will provide an infrastructure for space experimentation. This environment will feature regulated access to any resources required by an experiment. Automated systems are being developed to manage the electric power so that researchers can have the flexibility to modify their experiment plan for contingencies or for new opportunities. To define these flexible power management characteristics for Space Station Freedom, a simulation is required that captures the dynamic nature of space experimentation; namely, an investigator is allowed to restructure his experiment and to modify its execution. This changes the energy demands for the investigator's range of options. An expert system competent in the domain of cryogenic fluid management experimentation, was developed. It will be used to help design and test automated power scheduling software for Freedom's electric power system. The expert system allows experiment planning and experiment simulation. The former evaluates experimental alternatives and offers advice on the details of the experiment's design. The latter provides a real-time simulation of the experiment replete with appropriate resource consumption.

Kukich, George↗

Using Open Standards and NASA Open Source Simulation Tools to Model Artemis Base Camp Mission Timelines

The United States’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has announced that the Artemis Program will return humans to the Moon, establishing a persistent presence with the Artemis Base Camp (ABC), and extend human exploration to Mars. The NASA Exploration Systems Simulations (NExSyS) team at NASA’s Johnson Space Center is using internationally developed simulation interoperability standards and NASA open source simulation tools to support Artemis concept, analysis, designs, development, training, and ultimately operations. The NExSyS team has been tasked to support early ABC architecture and mission analysis using mission time lines developed by the crew operations mission planning team. The NExSyS team is developing a distributed simulation framework with initial Artemis element implementations to model the ABC mission timelines using the international simulation interoperability standard High Level Architecture (HLA), the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization’s Space Reference Federation Object Model (SpaceFOM), the NASA open source Trick Simulation Environment, and another NASA open source interface package called TrickHLA. The ABC architecture is composed of a number of key surface elements and resources. Some examples of modeled elements (also known as entities) are landers, habitats, rovers, logistics carriers, and astronauts. Some examples of modeled transferable and consumable resources are power, water, oxygen, nitrogen, scientific samples, and food. These entities and resources are modeled in a collection of individual simulations called Federates. A coordinated collection of interoperable federates is called a Federation and when these federates are tied together in a coordinated simulation run, it is referred to as a Federation Execution. The federates communicate through HLA using data exchange formats defined by a collection of machine readable files called Federation Object Models (FOMs). These FOM files are based on extensions to the SpaceFOM. This enables the instantiation and sharing of objects and interactions between federates in the federation. These provide for entity and resource tracking, object transfer, and data collection. Federate interactions are used to trigger events and notify federates of entity or resource transfers. For the initial implementation, the constituent federates are Trick-based simulations that use TrickHLA to provide the required HLA-base interoperability. These Trick-based simulations provide the required modeling for the individual Artemis elements along with the associated element resources. These federates provide a means to explore traverses between surface elements and exploration sites as scheduled in a mission timeline and explore the affects traverse times have on the overall mission timeline. The mission time lines are modeled using a Trick input file event handling capabilities. Each timeline operation is handled as individual simulation events, and triggered based on previous event status, time of operation, and simulated task completions. In addition, the ABC Federation can be used to perform Monte Carlo analysis. The Monte Carlo tool can vary the inputs, timings, and malfunctions to show how various contingencies in the mission can affect the mission timeline.

Keaton Craig Dodd↗

Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission Space Suit and EVA System Architecture Trade Study

The Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission (ARCM) requires a Launch/Entry/Abort (LEA) suit capability and short duration Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) capability for Orion. The EVAs will involve a two-person crew for approximately four hours. Currently, two EVAs are planned with one contingency EVA in reserve. Providing this EVA capability is very challenging due to system level constraints and a new and unknown environment. The goal of the EVA architecture for ARCM is one that builds upon previously developed technologies and lessons learned, and that accomplishes the ARCM mission while providing a stepping stone to future missions and destinations. The primary system level constraints are to 1) minimize system mass and volume and 2) minimize the interfacing impacts to the baseline Orion design. In order to minimize the interfacing impacts and to not perturb the baseline Orion schedule, the concept of adding "kits" to the baseline system is proposed. These kits consist of: an EVA kit (converts LEA suit to EVA suit), EVA Servicing and Recharge Kit (provides suit consumables), the EVA Tools, Translation Aids & Sample Container Kit (the tools and mobility aids to complete the tasks), the EVA Communications Kit (interface between the EVA radio and the MPCV), and the Cabin Repress Kit (represses the MPCV between EVAs). This paper will focus on the trade space, analysis, and testing regarding the space suit (pressure garment and life support system). Historical approaches and lessons learned from all past EVA operations were researched. Previous and current, successfully operated EVA hardware and high technology readiness level (TRL) hardware were evaluated, and a trade study was conducted for all possible pressure garment and life support options. Testing and analysis was conducted and a recommended EVA system architecture was proposed. Pressure garment options that were considered for this mission include the currently in-use ISS EVA Mobility Unit (EMU), all variations of the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES), and the Exploration Z-suit. For this mission, the pressure garment that was selected is the Modified ACES (MACES) with EVA enhancements. Life support options that were considered included short closed-loop umbilicals, long open-loop umbilicals, the currently in-use ISS EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS), and the currently in development Exploration PLSS. For this mission, the life support option that was selected is the Exploration PLSS. The greatest risk in the proposed architecture is viewed to be the comfort and mobility of the baseline MACES and the delicate balance between adding more mobility features while not compromising landing safety. Feasibility testing was accomplished in low fidelity analogs and in the JSC Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL) to validate the concept before a final recommendation on the architecture was made. The proposed architecture was found to meet the mission constraints, but much more work is required to determine the details of the required suit upgrades, the integration with the PLSS, and the rest of the tools and equipment required to accomplish the mission. This work and further definition of the remaining kits will be conducted in government fiscal year 14.

Blanco, Raul A.↗

EVA Design, Verification, and On-Orbit Operations Support Using Worksite Analysis

The International Space Station (ISS) design is a very large and complex orbiting structure with thousands of Extravehicular Activity (EVA) worksites. These worksites are used to assemble and maintain the ISS. The challenge facing EVA designers was how to design, verify, and operationally support such a large number of worksites within cost and schedule. This has been solved through the practical use of computer aided design (CAD) graphical techniques that have been developed and used with a high degree of success over the past decade. The EVA design process allows analysts to work concurrently with hardware designers so that EVA equipment can be incorporated and structures configured to allow for EVA access and manipulation. Compliance with EVA requirements is strictly enforced during the design process. These techniques and procedures, coupled with neutral buoyancy underwater testing, have proven most valuable in the development, verification, and on-orbit support of planned or contingency EVA worksites.

Hagale, Thomas J.↗

Demonstration of Two Extended Visual Line of Sight Methods for Urban UAV Operations

This report describes two extended visual line of sight (EVLOS) methods developed and utilized during two flight campaigns over the campus of NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC): a chase vehicle method and a radio controlled (RC) pilot handoff method. These campaigns were performed to (a) evaluate small unmanned aerial system (sUAS) flight beyond the visual line of sight (BVLOS) of the ground control station operator and (b) test technologies under development to enable a transition from EVLOS to BVLOS operations. While an autonomous waypoint-based operational approach enabled minimal pilot intervention in both methods, range containment was enforced (a) manually via continual pilot visual monitoring and (b) autonomously via on-board contingency landing autonomy triggerable at the boundary of stay-in geofences. In the thirty-nine flights which utilized the chase vehicle, the pilot followed the sUAS flying a 1.2 km path at 40m altitude over urban streets. In the fifteen flights which utilized pilot handoff, a pilot at one end of a 1.5 km path initiated the flight at 120m altitude over buildings and trees, and at the midway point of the path transferred radio control to a pilot at the other end. In comparison, the chase vehicle method requires less ground crew and simpler avionics, while the pilot handoff method avoids schedule risk arising from street traffic congestion but better replicates actual direct routing for BVLOS flights. Collision risk with another aircraft was introduced in both campaigns and mitigated with the same manual and autonomous methods. Results from these campaigns serve as a basis for planned BVLOS operations at NASA LaRC.

Nicholas Rymer↗

Artificial neural network application for space station power system fault diagnosis

This study presents a methodology for fault diagnosis using a Two-Stage Artificial Neural Network Clustering Algorithm. Previously, SPICE models of a 5-bus DC power distribution system with assumed constant output power during contingencies from the DDCU were used to evaluate the ANN's fault diagnosis capabilities. This on-going study uses EMTP models of the components (distribution lines, SPDU, TPDU, loads) and power sources (DDCU) of Space Station Alpha's electrical Power Distribution System as a basis for the ANN fault diagnostic tool. The results from the two studies are contrasted. In the event of a major fault, ground controllers need the ability to identify the type of fault, isolate the fault to the orbital replaceable unit level and provide the necessary information for the power management expert system to optimally determine a degraded-mode load schedule. To accomplish these goals, the electrical power distribution system's architecture can be subdivided into three major classes: DC-DC converter to loads, DC Switching Unit (DCSU) to Main bus Switching Unit (MBSU), and Power Sources to DCSU. Each class which has its own electrical characteristics and operations, requires a unique fault analysis philosophy. This study identifies these philosophies as Riddles 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The results of the on-going study addresses Riddle-1. It is concluded in this study that the combination of the EMTP models of the DDCU, distribution cables and electrical loads yields a more accurate model of the behavior and in addition yielded more accurate fault diagnosis using ANN versus the results obtained with the SPICE models.

Momoh, James A.↗