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Oxygen stable isotopes in the nuclear fuel cycle: Assessment of the potential for determining the fabrication and provenance history of anhydrous and hydrous uranium oxides

Determining the origin and history of interdicted nuclear materials is a central challenge in nuclear forensics. The oxygen stable isotope composition of uranium oxide compounds has emerged as a promising forensic signature, attracting increasing attention since the early 2000s. This review examines analytical techniques for measuring oxygen isotope compositions in uranium oxides and evaluates how the nuclear fuel production cycle introduces or modifies these isotopic signatures. The potential for forensic geolocation is explored through workflows that calibrate the relationship between environmental water oxygen isotopes and those found in uranium oxides. Key strengths and limitations of this approach are assessed, including gaps in knowledge related to isotope fractionation during specific stages of the fuel cycle, and processing facility water inputs. The importance of proper sample handling and storage under inert atmospheres, as well as a deeper understanding of both intra-sample oxygen isotope heterogeneity, and hydrous uranium oxide phase formation, is highlighted for improving the reliability of forensic interpretations. In conclusion, the development of uranium oxide standards with well-characterized δ 18 O values and international collaboration toward consensus on their use are identified as essential steps for advancing the field.

Attribution↗

Statistical Methods Applied to Gamma-ray Spectroscopy Algorithms in Nuclear Security Missions

In a wide range of nuclear security missions, gamma-ray spectroscopy is a critical research and development priority. One particularly relevant challenge is the interdiction of special nuclear material for which gamma-ray spectroscopy supports the goals of detecting and identifying gamma-ray sources. This manuscript examines the existing set of spectroscopy methods, attempts to categorize them by the statistical methods on which they rely, and identifies methods that have yet to be considered. Our examination shows that current methods effectively estimate the effect of counting uncertainty but in many cases do not address larger sources of decision uncertainty—ones that are significantly more complex. We thus explore the premise that significantly improving algorithm performance requires greater coupling between the problem physics that drives data acquisition and statistical methods that analyze such data. Untapped statistical methods, such as Bayes Modeling Averaging and hierarchical and empirical Bayes methods have the potential to reduce decision uncertainty by more rigorously and comprehensively incorporating all sources of uncertainty. We expect that application of such methods will demonstrate progress in meeting the needs of nuclear security missions by improving on the existing numerical infrastructure for which these analyses have not been conducted.

detection algorithm.↗

Review of multi-faceted morphologic signatures of actinide process materials for nuclear forensic science

Particle morphology is an emerging signature that has the potential to identify the processing history of unknown nuclear materials. Using readily available scanning electron microscopes (SEM), the morphology of nearly any solid material can be measured within hours. Coupled with robust image analysis and classification methods, the morphological features can be quantified and support identification of the processing history of unknown nuclear materials. The viability of this signature depends on developing databases of morphological features, coupled with a rapid data analysis and accurate classification process. With developed reference methods, datasets, and throughputs, morphological analysis can be applied within days to (i) interdicted bulk nuclear materials (gram to kilogram quantities), and (ii) trace amounts of nuclear materials detected on swipes or environmental samples. In conclusion, this review aims to develop validated and verified analytical strategies for morphological analysis relevant to nuclear forensics.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Impact of Point-Source Injection Methodologies on Injection Studies

Effective interdiction of illicit radioactive material requires detection algorithms that are sensitive to material of interest while insensitive to material of no interest. Injection studies are used to assess the detection sensitivities to threat scenarios by various detection algorithms. In injection studies, gamma-ray spectra for varying source strengths representing particular radioisotopes and shielding configurations are added to archived vehicle count time-profiles. Observed alarm rates are calculated and analyzed to address experimental questions. Numerous decisions need to be made about configuring injection studies, including two important methodological factors that emulate actual field conditions: point-source position and temporal shape. Understanding the relative impact of different methods on outcome measures is vital for comparing results of injection studies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Neutron Sensors and Their Role in Nuclear Nonproliferation

Perhaps the most familiar application of neutron detection technology to nonproliferation resides in materials accounting, where the quantification of plutonium has a rich history. With a changing dynamic in nuclear security, the application of sensor technology to further other nonproliferation objectives has received considerable attention. This fact, amplified by a dwindling supply of 3He, has stimulated considerable interest in neutron detection technology development for applications ranging from interdicting smuggled nuclear material to the verification of stockpile reductions. This manuscript briefly overviews the application of neutron sensors to nonproliferation and examines three specific examples that highlight the constraints applied to field-deployed technology.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Rattling Nucleons: New Developments in Active Interrogation of Special Nuclear Material

Active interrogation is a vigorous area of research and development due to its promise of offering detection and characterization capabilities of special nuclear material in environments where passive detection fails. The primary value added by active methods is the capability to penetrate shielding - special nuclear material itself, incidental materials, or intentional shielding - and advocates hope that active interrogation will provide a solution to the problem of detecting shielded uranium, which is at present the greatest obstacle to interdiction efforts. The technique also provides a unique benefit for quantifying nuclear material in high background-radiation environments, an area important for nuclear material safeguards and material accountancy. Progress has been made in the field of active interrogation on several fronts, most notably in the arenas of source development, systems integration, and the integration and exploitation of multiple fission and non-fission signatures. But penetration of interrogating radiation often comes at a cost, not only in terms of finance and dose but also in terms of induced backgrounds, system complexity, and extended measurement times (including set up and acquisition). These costs make the calculus for deciding to implement active interrogation more subtle than may be apparent. The purpose of this review is thus to examine existing interrogation methods, compare and contrast their attributes and limitations, and identify missions where active interrogation may hold the most promise.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Optimizing moderation of He-3 neutron detectors for shielded fission sources

Abstract: The response of 3-He neutron detectors is highly dependent on the amount of moderator incorporated into the detector system. If there is too little moderation, neutrons will not react with the 3-He. If there is too much moderation, neutrons will not reach the 3-He. In applications for portal or border monitors where 3He detectors are used to interdict illicit Importation of plutonium, the fission source is always shielded to some extent. Since the energy distribution of neutrons emitted from the source depends on the amount and type of shielding present, the optimum placement of moderating material around 3-He tubes is a function of shielding. In this paper, we use Monte Carlo techniques to model the response of 3-He tubes placed in polyethylene boxes for moderation. To model the shielded fission neutron source, we use a 252-Cf source placed in the center of spheres of water of varying radius. Detector efficiency as a function of box geometry and shielding are explored. We find that increasing the amount of moderator behind and to the sides of the detector generally improves the detector response, but that benefits are limited if the thickness of the polyethylene moderator is greater than about 5-7 cm. The thickness of the moderator in front of the 3He tubes, however, is very important. For bare sources, about 5-6 cm of moderator is optimum, but as the shielding increases, the optimum thickness of this moderator decreases to 0-1 cm. A two-tube box with a moderator thickness of 5 cm in front of the first tube and a thickness of 1 cm in front of the second tube is proposed to improve the detector's sensitivity to lower-energy neutrons.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

High-fidelity photoneutron detection via neutron activation analysis

To interdict illicit radioactive sources and prevent nuclear terror, governments have deployed portal monitor systems at ports of entry. Such portal monitors rely upon the detection of spontaneously-emitted radiation signatures, however, detection scenarios become more challenging for highly enriched uranium, which emits relatively few spontaneous radiation signatures. Photon active interrogation techniques can augment current cargo inspection scenarios and improve detection capabilities for illicit nuclear material. A high-energy photon interrogation source can induce photofission in nuclear material, producing strong radiation signatures for detection. Prompt fission signals are of specific interest because prompt neutrons are greater than 99% of the fission signal. When using detectors capable of spectroscopy, e.g., pulse shape discrimination-capable organic scintillators, the intense interrogating source often will cause pulse pile-up, degrading particle classification. In this work, we demonstrate photoneutron detection via neutron activation of aluminum and iron. The experiments rely upon nuclear reactions that can only be induced by neutrons, and are robust against pile-up, thereby providing high-confidence neutron rates. In this work, we apply neutron activation analysis for the detection of high-energy neutrons produced by high-energy photon irradiation; the depleted uranium sample was irradiated with a 9-MeV bremsstrahlung beam. We find that the irradiated depleted uranium produced an aluminum activation flux of 1.77 × 10 5 n cm –2 s –1 and an iron-56 activation flux of 1.05 × 10 5 n cm –2 s –1 . Furthermore, the ability to detect radioactivity induced by neutrons created in (, n) and photofission reactions demonstrates a new approach for photon active interrogation to identify nuclear materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear forensic analysis of a non-traditional actinide sample

Nuclear forensic publications, performance tests, and research and development efforts typically target the bulk global inventory of intentionally safeguarded materials, such as plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U). Other materials, such as neptunium (Np), pose a nuclear security risk as well. Trafficking leading to recovery of an interdicted Np sample is a realistic concern especially for materials originating in countries that reprocesses fuel. Using complementary forensic methods, potential signatures for an unknown Np oxide sample were investigated. Measurement results were assessed against published Np processes to present hypotheses as to the original intended use, method of production, and origin for this Np oxide.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Trace Impurities Identified as Forensic Signatures in CMX-5 Fuel Pellets Using X-ray Spectroscopic Techniques

We report that small-particle analysis is a highly promising emerging forensic tool for analysis of interdicted special nuclear materials. Integration of microstructural, morphological, compositional, and molecular impurity signatures could provide significant advancements in forensic capabilities. We have applied rapid, high-sensitivity, hard X-ray synchrotron chemical imaging to analyze impurity signatures in two differently fabricated fuel pellets from the 5th Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX5) of the IAEA Nuclear Forensics International Working Group. The spatial distributions, chemical compositions, and morphological and molecular characteristics of impurities were evaluated using X-ray absorption near-edge structure (XANES) and X-ray fluorescence chemical imaging to discover principal impurities, their granularity, particle sizes, modes of occurrence (distinct grains vs incorporation in the UO 2 lattice), and sources and mechanisms of incorporation. Differences in UO 2+x stoichiometry were detected at the microscale in nominally identical UO 2 ceramics (CMX5-A and CMX5-B), implying the presence of multiple UO 2 host phases with characteristic microstructures and feedstock compositions. Al, Fe, Ni, W, and Zr impurities and integrated impurity signature analysis identified distinctly different pellet synthesis and processing methods. For example, two different Al, W, and Zr populations in the CMX5-B sample indicated a more complex processing history than the CMX5-A sample. K-edge XANES measurements reveal both metallic and oxide forms of Fe and Ni but with different proportions between each sample. Altogether, these observations suggest multiple sources of impurities, including fabrication (e.g., force-sieving) and feedstock (mineral oxides). This study demonstrates the potential of synchrotron techniques to integrate different signatures across length scales (angstrom to micrometer) to detect and differentiate between contrasting UO 2 fuel fabrication techniques.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Trace Actinide Signatures of a Bulk Neptunium Sample

In nuclear forensic analyses, measurements of actinide elements in a sample can assist with identifying interdicted or unknown materials. While these radiochemical signatures have been extensively investigated in uranium materials, less is known about bulk neptunium samples. This paper describes the measurement of trace actinide concentrations and isotopic profiles in a 237 Np oxide sample. Uranium, plutonium, americium, and curium concentrations and isotopic profiles in the sample were determined and deemed potentially useful for distinguishing different sources of 237 Np. Furthermore, several different potential radiochronometry systems were also investigated; discordant results indicate that the Np sample was never completely purified of other actinide elements, or that subsequent contamination of the sample occurred. Few prior studies of neptunium materials have been reported, and these data suggest that trace actinide constituents could provide unique signatures to identify material out of regulatory control.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Non-Contact Vapor Detection of Illicit Drugs via Atmospheric Flow Tube-Mass Spectrometry

Real-time, non-contact detection of illicit drugs is a desirable goal for the interdiction of these controlled substances, but the relatively low vapor pressures of such species present a challenge for trace vapor detection technologies. The introduction of atmospheric flow tube-mass spectrometry (AFT-MS), which has previously been demonstrated to detect gas-phase analytes at low parts-per-quadrillion levels for explosives and organophosphorus compounds, also enables the potential for non-contact drug detection. With AFT-MS, direct vapor detection of cocaine and methamphetamine from ~5 µg residues at room temperature is demonstrated herein. Furthermore, thermal desorption of low- to sub-picogram levels of cocaine, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin is observed via AFT-MS using a carrier flow rate of several L/min of air. These low levels can permit non-contact sampling through collection of vapor, effectively preconcentrating the analyte before desorption and analysis. Quantitative evaluation of the thermal desorption approach has yielded limits of detection (LODs) on order of 10 fg for cocaine and fentanyl, 100 fg for methamphetamine, and 1.6 pg for heroin. The LOD for heroin was lowered to 200 fg by using tributyl phosphate as a dopant to form a proton-bound heterodimer with heroin. When used with AFT-MS, the intentional formation of specific drug-dopant adducts has the potential to enhance detection limits and selectivity of additional drug species. Species that are prone to form adducts present a challenge to analysis, but that difficulty can be overcome by the intentional addition of a dopant. Molecules unlikely to form adducts will remain essentially unimpacted, but the adduct-forming species will interact with the dopant to compress the analyte signal into a single peak. This approach would be valuable in the application of non-contact screening for illicit substances via vapor collection followed by thermal desorption for analysis.

methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, atmosp↗

Conventional and Non-Conventional Nuclear Material Signatures

The detection and interdiction of concealed special nuclear material (SNM) in all modes of transport is one of the most critical security issues facing the United States and the rest of the world. In principle, detection of nuclear materials is relatively easy because of their unique properties: all of them are radioactive and all emit some characteristic gamma rays. A few emit neutrons as well. These signatures are the basis for passive non-intrusive detection of nuclear materials. The low energy of the radiations necessitates additional means of detection and validation. These are provided by high-energy x-ray radiography and by active inspection based on inducing nuclear reactions in the nuclear materials. Positive confirmation that a nuclear material is present or absent can be provided by interrogation of the inspected object with penetrating probing radiation, such as neutrons and photons. The radiation induces specific reactions in the nuclear material yielding, in turn, penetrating signatures which can be detected outside the inspected object. The 'conventional' signatures are first and foremost fission signatures: prompt and delayed neutrons and gamma rays. Their intensity (number per fission) and the fact that they have broad energy (non-discrete, though unique) distributions and certain temporal behaviors are key to their use. The 'non-conventional' signatures are not related to the fission process but to the unique nuclear structure of each element or isotope in nature. This can be accessed through the excitation of isotopic nuclear levels (discrete and continuum) by neutron inelastic scattering or gamma resonance fluorescence. Finally there is an atomic signature, namely the high atomic number (Z>74), which obviously includes all the nuclear materials and their possible shielding. The presence of such high-Z elements can be inferred by techniques using high-energy x rays. The conventional signatures have been addressed in another article. Non-conventional signatures and some of their current or potential uses will be discussed here.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Fissile Material Detection by Differential Die Away Analysis

Detection and interdiction of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in transportation is one of the most critical security issues facing the United States. Active inspection by inducing fission in fissile nuclear materials, such as {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu, provides several strong and unique signatures that make the detection of concealed nuclear materials technically very feasible. Differential Die-Away Analysis (DDAA) is a very efficient, active neutron-based technique that uses the abundant prompt fission neutrons signature. It benefits from high penetrability of the probing and signature neutrons, high fission cross section, high detection sensitivity, ease of deployment and relatively low cost. DDAA can use any neutron source or energy as long as it can be suitably pulsed. The neutron generator produces pulses of neutrons that are directed into a cargo. As each pulse passes through the cargo, the neutrons are thermalized and absorbed. If SNM is present, the thermalized neutrons create a new source of (fission) neutrons with a distinctive time profile. An efficient laboratory system was designed, fabricated and tested under a US Government DHS DNDO contract. It was shown that a small uranium sample can be detected in a large variety of cargo types and configurations within practical measurement times using commercial compact (d,T) sources. Using stronger sources and wider detector distribution will further cut inspection time. The system can validate or clear alarms from a primary inspection system such as an automated x-ray system.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Securing Special Nuclear Material: Recent Advances in Neutron Detection and Their Role in Nonproliferation

Neutron detection is an integral part of the global effort to prevent the proliferation of special nuclear material (SNM). Applications relying on neutron-detection technology range from traditional nuclear non-proliferation objectives, such as safeguarding nuclear material and verifying stockpile reductions, to the interdiction of SNM—a goal that has recently risen in priority to a level on par with traditional applications. Large multi-national programs targeting detection and safeguards have deployed radiation-detection assets across the globe. Alongside these deployments of commercially available technology, significant research and development efforts have been directed towards the creation of next-generation assets. While much of this development has focused on gamma-ray spectrometers, neutron-detection technology remains an important component of the global strategy because of the capability of neutrons to penetrate materials that readily absorb gamma rays and the unique multiplicity signatures offered by neutrons. One particularly acute technology-development challenge results from dwindling supplies of 3He, partially triggered by widespread deployment of high-efficiency systems for portal monitoring. Other emerging missions, such as the desire to detect SNM at greater standoff distances, have also stimulated neutron-detection technology development. In light of these needs for novel neutron-detection technologies, this manuscript reviews the signatures of neutrons emitted by SNM, the principles of neutron detection, and various strategies under investigation for detection in the context of nonproliferation.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Revolution in nuclear detection affairs

The detection of nuclear or radioactive materials for homeland or national security purposes is inherently difficult. This is one reason detection efforts must be seen as just one part of an overall nuclear defense strategy which includes, inter alia, material security, detection, interdiction, consequence management and recovery. Nevertheless, one could argue that there has been a revolution in detection affairs in the past several decades as the innovative application of new technology has changed the character and conduct of detection operations. This revolution will likely be most effectively reinforced in the coming decades with the networking of detectors and innovative application of anomaly detection algorithms.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear security policy in the context of counter-terrorism in Cambodia

The risk of nuclear or dirty bomb attack by terrorists is one of the most urgent and threatening danger. The Cambodian national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) depicts a layered system of preventive measures ranging from securing materials at foreign sources to interdicting weapons or nuclear or other radioactive materials at ports, border crossings, and within the Cambodian institutions dealing with the nuclear security to manage the preventive programs. The aim of this study is to formulate guidance, to identify scenario of threat and risk, and to pinpoint necessary legal frameworks on nuclear security in the context of counterterrorism based on the International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear security series. The analysis of this study is guided by theoretical review, the review of international laws and politics, by identifying and interpreting applicable rules and norms establishing the nuclear security regime and how well enforcement of the regime is carried out and, what is the likelihood of the future reform might be. This study will examine the existing national legal frameworks of Cambodia in the context of counterterrorism to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack within the Cambodia territory. It will shed light on departmental lanes of national nuclear security responsibility, and provide a holistic perspective on the needs of additional resources and emphasis regarding nuclear security policy in the context of counterterrorism in Cambodia.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗