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DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity for Grid Connected eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) Station (CyberX) (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

This report summarizes the activities conducted under the DOE VTO funded project DE- EE0008451, where ABB Inc. (ABB), in collaboration with Idaho National Laboratory (INL), APS Global (APS), and XOS Trucks (XOS) pursued the development of a cyber-resilient extreme fast charging (XFC) management system. This project entitled Cybersecurity for Grid Connected eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) Station (CyberX) focuses on a resilient architecture for smart charging EV Supply Equipment (EVSE) device control and Coordinated Anomaly Detection System (CADS) features that can be added at the charging site depot level to increase cybersecurity. The project was split into two budget periods focused first on developing the threat model and resilient control concepts and second on testing, improving, and validating those developed resilient control algorithms and features with a focus on key vulnerabilities identified during the threat assessment portion of the project. During the first budget period of the CyberX project, the ABB led team focused on activities to identify, model, and quantitatively prioritize high-impact attack scenarios with potential cyber-physical effects while also modeling and developing concepts for a resilient control system that could securely address integration of DERs and other resources with EV charging. Development of the security focused XFC management system (XMS) was accomplished first by offline simulation using a developed XFC station or depot with 480V input level and simulating measurement inputs to monitoring and control systems in concept development. A representative distribution grid model was developed supporting an EV charging site model with BESS and 6 general EV charging models. These EV charging models allowed multiple configurations of charging level, multiple connected protection and measurement devices, and simulation function to show general compromise of EV, BESS, and protection features based on parallel threat analysis. During the second budget period, the EV site and supporting systems model was developed in more detail and converted from offline model to real-time to real-time with EV charging hardware in the loop (HIL). The resilient control architecture developed as concept in the first part of the project was further tested and validated for integration of local energy resources and XFC charging station site equipment while maintaining cybersecure operating principles. The proposed resilient architecture for smart charging and cybersecurity features consists of two main concepts developed and tested within the project. The first concept is an XFC management system (XMS) consisting of a hardware gateway, software platform, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) or Distribution Management System integration components. The second concept is a Coordinated Anomaly Detection System (CADS) which forms a primarily software-related subsystem of the total CyberX solution focused on monitoring system measurements, estimation of measurement states, and predicting current at the utility point of interaction based on machine learning for anomaly detection.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Beyond DERMS: Demonstration of Automated Grid Services, Mode Transition, and Resilience

This report describes the results of more advanced use cases including Ancillary Services, Black-sky-day operation, and Mode Switching from Phase 3 of the “Beyond DERMS” project aiming to build, deploy, and demonstrate a holistic platform that supports the integrated operation and planning of future power distribution networks with bi-directional power flows, many diverse distributed energy resources (DERs), and inverter-based resources. These test results demonstrated how a Beyond DERMS platform can fuse together AMI, SCADA, and DER data to provide a utility with deep insights into distribution network operations and planning, extending the value of DERMS and BTM DER resources.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Consolidated Hydropower Data Repository: Value and Opportunities

Hydropower is one of several types of generating assets that provides energy, capacity, and services to electric power systems. It does so under rubrics and objectives—market driven and regulated, internal and external to asset and fleet owners—that address reliability, cost, price, and, increasingly, flexibility of output. The aggregation of data from multiple hydropower units can provide insights into asset operations and maintenance practices and needs and assist in meeting hydropower objectives. This paper examines the concept and potential benefits of aggregating hydropower asset data—primarily supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) information—with examples of insights developed from data aggregated by the Hydropower Research Institute (HRI). Data aggregation as discussed herein, and as implemented by the HRI, extends beyond multiple units in a powerhouse and beyond multiple hydropower facilities in an electric utility fleet or river system. Examples of research and analytics from such aggregated datasets range from unit load dependency analyses to modeling sensor measurements to detect and diagnose anomalies in assets. These examples showed the benefits of utilizing the entire dataset for insights into how the sensor layout of a single unit or set of units compares to the hydropower industry overall. Such insights include whether additional sensors are needed to complete analyses or to make decisions. In addition, utilizing multiple sensors of the same kind within a unit can provide an indication of possible current or upcoming problems with equipment. Although other analyses are possible, their use requires the development of complex models and, potentially, access to types of data that are currently not included with the example dataset used in this study. However, the examples studied herein confirmed the value of data aggregation in the fleet and unit contexts, and the value extends beyond multiple units in a powerhouse and beyond multiple hydropower facilities in an electric utility fleet or river system. The assessments also provided insights into potential extensions to the data aggregation concept that could further add to their value to the hydropower community, and these are included in this document as a set of recommendations.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Pilot Demonstration of an Attestation and Anomaly Detection Framework using Distributed Ledger Technology for Power Grid Infrastructure

This report summarizes the design and pilot demonstration of a framework called Grid Guard that was created to provide increased data and device trustworthiness to electric grid devices by leveraging distributed ledger technology (DLT), specifically blockchain. Grid Guard contains a combination of core cryptographic methods such as the secure hash algorithm (SHA), and asymmetric cryptography, private permissioned blockchain, baselining configuration data, consensus algorithm (Raft) and the Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) framework. The system implements a low energy, fast, and robust enhancement to system trustworthiness within and across electric grid systems such as substations, control centers and metering infrastructures. Blockchain is a distributed database structured that provides a practically unalterable (immutable) timeline of stored transactions. By relying on hashing and the Raft consensus algorithm, if an entity tries to illegitimately alter a record at one instance of the database the other ledger nodes are not altered. They work to cross-reference each other and easily locate any incorrectly added data and remove it. The bulk raw data is stored in an off-chain storage (outside of the blockchain ledger) and a hash of this baseline data is stored in the Blockchain ledger via hashing windows of time-series and configuration data, after aggregation and filtering. The bulk off-chain data repository is then considered to be trust-anchored using the hashes stored in the blockchain. To secure the electric grid testbed devices and data, device configuration baselines were compared to those baselines that had been previously stored in the ledger. Statistical baselines for device configurations, network communication patterns, and high-speed sensor data are calculated and then stored off-chain and hashes stored in the ledger. Measurements such as three-phase voltage and current, frequency, breaker status, protection scheme settings, network configuration settings (and other device configuration artifacts) and network traffic features (packet interarrival times) are compared every minute or other selected time windows. During phase 1 of the Grid Guard DLT project different DLT technologies were studies, and an assessment was performed on DLT technology vulnerabilities, uses, and key characteristics. DLT consensus protocols were studies (e.g., RAFT, named after Reliable, Replicated, Redundant, And Fault-Tolerant). Also, cryptography, public, private and permissioned or permissionless systems were assessed. Grid Guard implements a permissioned private DLT. Consensus algorithm selection and choice of DLT implementation depended heavily on the use-case. For this use-case, parameters were selected to measure performance and existing tools for assessment. Benchmarking was performed theoretically and practically. During phase 2 hashed transactions/blocks were inserted into the ledger every second. During phase 2 of the Grid Guard DLT project, a prototype framework was developed and demonstrated for attestation of critical substation devices and data using precision timing systems that use PTP and IRIG-B protocols) on a testbed of operational devices that emulated a distribution substation, control center, and power metering infrastructure using real Operational Technology (OT). The testbed includes OT devices such as protective relays, human machine interfaces (HMI), and power meters. To determine when to collect and compare system and network baselines, an initial examination of an anomaly detection capability to identify malicious manipulation of data streams was conducted. The resulting anomaly detection was demonstrated in a set of experiments and leveraged to trigger device artifact attestation checks. Attestation checks occur against device configuration baselines when compared with the immutable blockchain-stored baselines, which provided a cryptographically supported means by which to store baselines. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to test the Grid Guard framework. The testbed emulates the operations of a portion of a power grid and SCADA systems as closely as possible. The testbed integrates real protocols, mainly IEC 61850 standard protocols, such as the Sampled Value (SV) and the GOOSE protocols. The testbed also supports DNP3 and other layer 2 and layer 3 protocols such as Telnet, SSH, SFTP/FTP and other proprietary protocols needed to connect to industrial control system equipment. The testbed emulates real power conditions using the OpalRT hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) device which can create fault situations that cannot be easily tested on real systems. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created using real measurement, communication, and protection devices that electrical utilities commonly use.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Grid Operational Technology Edge-Level Threat Detection

This report presents a deployable solution to improve the cybersecurity situational awareness of the legacy SCADA system infrastructure in power grids. The main goal of this project is to provide system owners and operators a highly trusted, intelligent alarm system and comprehensive situational awareness of ongoing or potential cybersecurity threats on the grid network. The key contributions of this project include: (1) the development of software, the Intrusion Detection Visualizer for the Operational Technology Network (IViz-OT), to visualize and locate intrusions on the grid network; (2) testing the signature-based Hybrid Intrusion Detection for Energy Systems (HIDES) for different types of intrusions; (3) the integration of HIDES and IViz-OT into the visualization dashboard; and (4) real-time testing using a hardware-in-the-loop test bed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Digital Twin for Hydropower System Object Modeling: Alder Dam (FY2023)

Hydropower is the world's largest source of renewable electricity, and hydropower plants are distributed all over the world. Typical major components of a hydropower plant are the governor, excitation, generator, thrust bearing, hydraulic turbine, transformer, the main lead, metering and control, tailwater depression, and dissolved oxygen. For each component, various measures are taken. The measurements are acquired by various heterogeneous systems, including standalone sensors, programmable logic controllers (PLC), Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), Internet of Things (IoT), and data acquisition and integration platforms such as OSI/PI. The measured data are often archived within the plant by a data management platform, and many institutions have cloud-based archive systems, such as Hydropower Research Institution (HRI), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and Columbia River Data Access in Real Time (DART). Object Modeling is a general framework for designing information systems. It focuses on objects, the actions they perform, and the messages they send to one another to cause those actions to be taken. The major differences among object modeling, network modeling, data modeling, and process modeling are that in the first we focus on the actions in response to information, objects which form the system, the actions they perform, and how they pass information to one another, while in the second we concentrate on where, when and how much information is moved, while in the third we focus on what information is moved and where it is moved, while in the last we focus on how it is moved and when it is moved. Object modeling was developed basically as a method to develop object-oriented systems and to support object-oriented programming. It describes the static structure of the system. The object Modeling Technique is easy to draw and use. That is why we choose object modeling to connect physical hydropower plants to Digital Twin. It recognizes the objects and the relationship between them. It identifies the attributes and functions of each class. Dynamic Modeling: It explains how objects respond to events. Functional Modeling indicates the processes executed in an object and how data changes when it moves to objects. It has been used in many applications like telecommunication, transportation, etc.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Creating a Digital Twin for a Hydropower System through 3D Object Modeling: Alder Dam FY23

Hydropower stands as the world's leading source of renewable electricity, with hydropower plants spanning the globe. A typical hydropower plant comprises essential components including the governor, excitation system, generator, thrust bearing, hydraulic turbine, transformer, main lead, metering and control devices, tailwater depression system, and dissolved oxygen monitoring. Each of these components undergoes various measures and monitoring procedures. These measurements are collected through a diverse array of systems, encompassing standalone sensors, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and data acquisition and integration platforms like OSI/PI.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Distributed Wind Monitoring Best Practices

Accessible performance and operational data have been identified as a key enabler for distributed wind energy industry advancement. While utility-scale wind turbines benefit from reliable and continuous supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)-based monitoring platforms, monitoring of the U.S. fleet of distributed wind (DW) turbines has been more inconsistent, unreliable, and sometime difficult to access. Without fleet monitoring data, the industry will never understand and thus work to improve turbine under-performance and reliability issues. For the DW industry to scale up, attract investors, and boost credibility, fleetwide monitoring must be robust and reliable, select data must be made accessible to stakeholders, and the data must be in a format useful to users. To help move the industry toward a more standardized, accessible stream of monitoring data, this distributed wind monitoring best practices report attempts to cover topics including key monitoring channels, hardware, communication strategies, and accessibility. Strategic engagement with DW original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), service providers, lab and university researchers, testing organization, certification bodies, end users and solar photovoltaic (PV) monitoring experts has enabled a better understanding of the current state-of-the-art of monitoring and aided in articulating this set of best practices that will guide OEMs toward harmonized monitoring strategies, aimed at a future goal of achieving accessible performance and operational data for the entire fleet of U.S. distributed wind turbines.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Graph-Learning-Assisted State and Event Tracking for Solar-Penetrated Power Grids with Heterogeneous Data Sources

Unlike transmission systems, distribution systems do not typically contain sufficient metering to enable real-time state estimation. The lack of sufficient real-time measurements prohibits accurate and timely monitoring of the state of distribution systems. As a result, control and optimal operation of distribution systems, especially those containing large numbers of renewable generation units are not possible without proper data and information about the current state of the system. The main motivation of this project is to address this shortcoming by developing an approach which provides “predicted” real-time measurements so that they can be used to execute a distribution system state estimator. Thus, the objective of the project is to make the distribution systems fully observable, such that the hosting capacity for solar generation can be accurately estimated, and unnecessary solar curtailments can be avoided. In order to accomplish this goal, the project investigated the use of a grid-model-informed machine learning (ML) tool which integrates heterogeneous data streams obtained from AMI meters, SCADA as well as PMU measurements and created synchronous measurement snapshots for the state estimator (SE); and developed a hybrid robust SE which provides not only accurate state estimates but also real-time feedback for the ML model refinement.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Fermilab PIP-II CDS & CM Cryogenic Controls System

Details on Final design for Cryogenic Electrical & Controls System for Fermilab' s next-gen particle accelerator PIP-II. Electrical Controls System includes instrumentation and controls of Cryogenics Distribution System and Cryomodules. Design includes Siemens PCS7 Controls System with 26 Remote IO Rittal Cabinets and 48 Relay Racks for Temperature Readouts, Valve Positioners, Level, Heater Controls etc. Electrical Drawings and Design have been completed with focus now on fabrication of the 26 Rittal Cabinets and 48 Relay Racks. All materials have been procured. EPICS will be used as a SCADA system communicating to S7 Controllers via OPC UA.

Patel, Pratik [Fermilab]↗
DOE OSTI2025

DER Inverter Control Fault Ride Through Model in Accordance with IEEE 1547-2018 Std

Distributed Energy Resources (DER) with smart inverters are becoming more prevalent as the need for renewable energy and grid stability increases. An important challenge arises when considering that inverterbased generation methods contribute less current during faults, rendering traditional overcurrent protection unsatisfactory. DERs have fault ride-through requirements when operating in high or low voltage, outlined by IEEE Std. 1547-2018. Faults cause the voltage to reach abnormal steady state magnitudes, depending on the fault resistance and fault type. There are several high voltage and low voltage ride-through zones defined by IEEE Std. 1547-2018. Each zone’s ride through duration decreases as the applicable voltage measurement, i.e., the phase RMS voltage, deviates from its nominal value. This presentation demonstrates the implementation of IEEE Std. 1547-2018 high and low voltage ridethrough grid support functions using a preexisting RSCAD model, discussing the challenges presented during this process. The implemented controls monitor the filtered phase voltages to have a more accurate reading of the applicable voltages. The controls sense the duration that the applicable voltage remains in a specific zone. The breaker trips and ceases energization to the grid when the duration is exceeded. The standard allows the operator to adjust the ride-through times and voltage zones from the default settings. These ranges are implemented into the runtime, which acts as the operator’s SCADA. The results show the accuracy of the voltage measurements, which remain within the IEEE Std. 1547-2018 for all cases.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Real-time evaluation of cybersecurity threats to DER inverter grid-support functions

In this project we aim to contribute to the understanding of the type and severity of potential cybersecurity attacks to the grid-support functionalities of DER systems interconnected to the AC distribution grid via inverters. Our preliminary work focused on developing a small-scale testbed allowing to study cybersecurity threats to an isolated photovoltaic-battery system using a real-time simulator (Typhoon HIL602+) with a real DNP3 communication connection over TCP/IP, allowing for safe and efficient monitoring and manipulation of data traffic between the simulated hardware and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. In this project we propose to expand upon this development by utilizing a) a recently acquired NovaCor RTDS (Real Rime digital Simulator) to emulate the DER-inverter-grid topology including main grid-support functions as defined by IEEE Std. 1547-2018, and b) an industrial control and automation device to enable realistic evaluation of control functions and utilization of communication protocols for real-time data transmission.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Essence2.0 Development and Deployment (Final Report)

The objective of the project was to take two core technologies that have been developed under the Recipient’s solid laboratory products and integrate them into a single CyberPhysical awareness platform and complete development on current field-tested prototypes that will extend the integrated capability of the platform. During the final development phase, the Recipient development team and its selected industry partners tested and hardened the platform to ensure resilient and secure operation of the integrated platform. The team also executed substantial field testing and established the framework for defining the organization and/or commercial infrastructure needed to sustain operations and provide readiness for a national scale deployment. The focus of the project was (1) the improvement, refinement, and deployment of technology for the detection of cyber-attacks on utility operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) networks and assets, including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) systems; and (2) support for containment and remediation of adversarial threats and actions against those systems and environments.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2025

Grid Modernization of Cooperatives and Municipal Utilities via Breakthrough System Monitoring, Control and Optimization (CRADA Final Report)

This project aims at developing and demonstrating successful implementation of breakthrough approaches in real-time data visualization as well as real-time distributed DER control and optimization to provide ample benefits to both utilities and end users. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Holy Cross Energy (HCE), National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) and Survalent are collaborating to enable Cooperative and Municipal utilities to fully leverage DERs as part of their strategies for providing safe, reliable, and affordable electric services to their customers and help meet DOE Grid modernization goal of achieving at least 10% active devices to provide grid flexibility by 2035. This project will use novel real-time control algorithms and approaches for distributed control recently developed under DOE-funded projects, using the date from the Survalent’s basic SCADA engine, GIS and AMI engines deployed at HCE combined with NRECA’s globally-used MultiSpeak(R) software interoperability specification for seamless and real-time communications between electric utility enterprise software to embrace DER as part of their strategies for providing safe, reliable and affordable electric service to their customers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Electric Utility Communications Standards Landscape 2025 Edition

Historically, challenges to managing electric utility data exchange have been addressed through dedicated communication solutions, enabling the transmission of data with both speed and security. Protocols have been deployed in a relatively uniform fashion; for example, field communications for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) are commonly implemented using IEEE 1815 (DNP3).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗