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At least 91 records · Page 5

Recommended Functionalities for Improving Cybersecurity of Distributed Energy Resources

The current electric grid is transitioning through increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), which include intermittent renewable generation resources on the distribution side. Both the monitoring and control of DERs require extensive data-exchange and communication networks. These networks lead to cyber vulnerabilities and risks of new kinds of cyberattacks that may be extremely destructive for power system operations. Although current standards, such as IEEE Std. 1547-2018, do not discuss cybersecurity measures for DERs, cybersecurity controls should be developed for securing DER systems at the device level, communications level, and applications level. This paper discusses the current industry's best practices related to DER cybersecurity and proposes recommended functionalities for improving the cybersecurity posture of DERs, specifically at the device/distribution level. These practical recommendations have been discussed and verified with the industry through a DER cybersecurity working group.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Module-OT: A Hardware Security Module for Operational Technology

Increased penetration levels of renewable energy and other types of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the modern electric grid-combined with technological advancements for electric system monitoring and control-introduce new cyberattack vectors and increase the cyberattack surface of energy systems. According to the IEEE Std. 1547-2018, DERs must use Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), or Smart Energy Profile 2.0 (SEP2) as their communication protocol. Previous research identified several vulnerabilities and security breaches in each one of these communication protocols; despite this, existing standards for DERs do not recommend cybersecurity measures. In order to reduce vulnerabilities in power distribution systems, this paper presents a novel open-source hardware security module that improves both information and operational security to better protect data and communications on the distribution grid. The security hardware is called “module for operational technology,” or simply Module-OT, and it has been validated and tested in an emulated distribution system application. Module-OT is integrated within a communication system in the transport layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. It improves system security through encryption, authentication, authorization, certificate management, and user access control. The main advancement of Module-OT is the addition of hardware cryptographic acceleration that improves the overall communication performance in terms of end-to-end latency.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

HPDM-STD205

ASHRAE Standard 205 - Heat Pump Design Model supply; This package helps OEMs to convert HPDM output files to STD 205 format; it also provides some RS sample tables.

Wan, Hanlong [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak ↗

Design of a Transport System for the PIP-II HB650 Cryomodule

The PIP-II Project at FNAL requires the assembly of 3 high-beta 650MHz cryomodules at STFC Daresbury (DL) in the UK. These modules must be safely transported from DL to FNAL in the USA. Previous experience with cryomodule transport was leveraged at both labs to design a transport system to protect the cryomodules during transit. Requirements for the system included mitigation of shocks, drops, and vibrations, and acting as a lifting fixture. It is comprised of a tessellated steel frame which encompasses the module with a wire rope isolator arrangement which the module mounts to. The frame was designed to withstand the weight of the 12.5 tonne cryomodule in various load cases. Details of shock and vibration profiles were obtained from MIL-STD-810H and were used to guide the sizing of the isolators. The frame and the isolation system were analysed via FEA using the shock and vibration profiles as an input. The transport system was found to be suitable for the given isolation, frame stiffness, and lifting code requirements. The frame has been fabricated and successfully load tested at FNAL. It will now be road tested with a dummy cryomodule before undergoing a trial run to DL.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Double exponential approximation and inverse double exponential fit for Bell Labs and International-Military Standard EMP waveforms

We summarize here the double exponential and inverse double exponential approximations for two common EMP waveforms, the Bell Laboratories (Bell Labs) and the International- military standard (IEC-MIL-STD). Both models have been used frequently due to their relatively easy analytical expressions for both the time domain waveforms and their associated frequency domain spectra.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low Level Waste in the 200 East Area Burial Grounds (FY2019 Annual Status Report)

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the 200 East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-SD-WM-TI-730) and are compared with U.S. Department of Energy requirements (DOE O 435.1 and performance objectives defined in companion documents DOE M 435.1 and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations, indicating that potential impacts are well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 is expected. A new PA study has been initiated in this fiscal year (FY) 2019 for evaluation of active disposal sites within the 200 West and East Areas (Trenches 31 and 34 in 200 West; Trench 94 in 200 East) because extended time has elapsed between the current annual status report and the original PA (WHC-SD-WM-TI-370) for the active disposal sites. The new PA for the active disposal sites is expected to be completed in FY 2021.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low Level Waste in the 200 West Area Burial Grounds (FY2019 Annual Statius Report)

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the active 200 West Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-EP-0645) and are compared with performance objectives defined in U.S. Department of Energy requirements (DOE O 435.1 and its companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations, indicating that potential impacts are well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 is expected.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of the 2018 Version of the Integrated Surveillance Program Database Pressure Equation

The Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Database Pressure Equation was developed to determine with reasonable certainty the total maximum pressure of hydrogen and other gases in packaged 3013 containers stored at Savannah River Site (SRS) in support of the destructive evaluation (DE) process. The pressure equation in the Department of Energy (DOE) 3013 Standard, “Standard for Stabilization, Packaging and Storage of Plutonium- Bearing Materials” (DOE-STD-3013-2004) used a bounding assumption that all the water is decomposed to form hydrogen. However, the results of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) shelf-life experiments showed that hydrogen is consumed, and that the maximum pressures would not approach the design pressure of the 3013 container. Therefore, the ISP Database Pressure Equation was revised in 2008 to include terms for the generation of helium and hydrogen as a function of time, as well as the consumption of water and destruction of hydrogen based on shelf-life results. The 2008 ISP Database Pressure Equation provided a more reasonable estimate of the total maximum pressure in packaged 3013 containers than the pressure equation in versions of the 3013 Standard issued prior to 2018.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Transfer and Flushing Evaluation for Potential Precipitated Solids in the 241-AP-106 to EMF Transfer Pipeline for DFLAW

Waste transfer pipeline flushing is necessary to maintain pipeline performance, but added flush fluid increases the nuclear waste inventory. During the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) mission, waste transfer lines from the Interim Low-Activity Waste Storage Tank (i.e., 241-AP-106) to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility must have the capability of being flushed to prevent accumulation of solids and to mitigate corrosion concerns. Operational experience at Hanford has shown that the solids precipitation occurs during processing operations from dilute Hanford liquids. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was requested to evaluate the potential precipitated solid particle transport and flushing operational capabilities of the AP-106 through the Effluent Management Facility (EMF) low-point drain LAW feed pipeline. The evaluation results do not provide operational requirements, but rather provide a scoping basis for understanding the potential operational significance of solids precipitation in the pipeline. The salt and aluminum phase solids most likely to precipitate from the LAW feeds during cooling, evaporation, or mixing have particle densities that are estimated to range from 1.62 to 2.78 g/mL and a spherical particle size range of 8 to 2100 μm, depending on the solid phase considered. Application of the method to calculate the critical deposition velocity required by TFC-ENG-STD-26 at conservatively bounding estimates for the solids concentrations demonstrates that potentially precipitated solids may deposit on the bottom of the transfer pipe invert at the lower LAW feed pipeline flow rate, but the upper LAW feed pipeline flow rate will likely prevent deposition. The system pressure limit for the AP-106 through the EMF low-point drain LAW feed pipeline likely exceeds any pressure loss at a calculated critical deposition velocity even for the most adverse potential precipitated solid. However, should solids settle as a result of no-flow conditions, the flow capabilities of the AP-106 through the EMF low-point drain LAW feed pipeline are shown, based on the available literature, to be potentially inadequate for effective flushing operations to remove solids, even at solids concentrations below the maximum specified for LAW feed. Thus, stepwise solids accumulations over multiple transfers may be an issue, and eventual line plugging may occur. Further inadequacies may potentially be realized should the cohesive nature of certain precipitates be accounted for.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nimble Feedthrough Qualification - 125% High Explosive Overpressure Test Plan RevA

The primary purpose of this High Explosive (HE) Over-Pressure Test (OPT) is to qualify top cover diagnostic feedthroughs that will be used on LLNL Nimble Subcritical Experiment (SCE) Series designs per experimental design verification requirements specified in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Case 2564, Impulsively-Loaded Pressure Vessels, Section VIII, Division 3; and to satisfy the over-test requirement of DOE-STD-1212. The diagnostic feedthroughs are part of the Vessel Confinement System (VCS), which is credited as a Safety Significant Design Feature per the U1a Facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). The OPT will be conducted at the LANL Area 1, R306 Firing Site (TA-15-R306) in a 3-foot diameter VCS depicted in Figure 1.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

TCR Postulated Accident and MHA Dose Assessment

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is engaged in regulatory activities to gain US Department of Energy (DOE) approval to build and operate a small high-temperature gas reactor, the Transformational Challenge Reactor (TCR). ORNL uses advanced manufacturing techniques to produce select reactor components. The TCR is unique in its mission: the reactor’s at-power operating lifetime will be less than one effective full-power day to limit the radiological source term to very low values, thus facilitating approval to operate. The primary regulatory documents governing construction and operation of the facility are NUREG-1537, “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors” and DOE-STD-3009, “Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis.” Although this document is not a safety basis document, it provides a conservative indication of the magnitude of onsite and offsite radiological doses for specific scenarios, thus informing future design and regulatory activities. As required by NUREG-1537, scenarios included in this analysis are (1) a worstcase depressurized loss-of-forced-circulation accident, and (2) a maximum hypothetical accident. Details on the analysis of dose consequences with various system configurations are also provided.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Radiological Monitoring Plan for the Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex: Surface Water

DOE Order 458.1 requires that dose estimates consider contributions from all facilities. In the Y-12 Radiological Monitoring Plan (RMP), surface water is monitored at points that reflect individual facilities, as well as at points that reflect the combined contributions of all facilities. This monitoring plan does not consider other potential routes (i.e., airborne releases and food chains). Thus, a complete determination of total effective dose (TED) cannot be made based on this plan alone. The other routes from Y-12, and all routes from other DOE facilities on the Oak Ridge Reservation (e.g., Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and The Heritage Center), must be considered in order to satisfy DOE Order 458.1 requirements. Determination of TED from all sites and pathways is done through the use of dose-assessment models and is documented in the Annual Site Environmental Report. This monitoring plan provides adequate monitoring goals for Y-12 surface water releases to provide input of sufficient sensitivity and accuracy to reliably determine the Y-12 surface water component of the TED. The routine radiological monitoring program is designed to monitor effluents at four types of locations: (1) treatment facilities, (2) other point and area source discharges, (3) instream locations, and (4) production building roof run-off. With this sampling and analysis program, data will be obtained on primary point sources as well as on locations that represent the composite of other potential sources. This plan will be reviewed periodically to determine necessary modifications to the sampling frequencies, parameters, and locations. Modifications, if any, will be based on the analysis of the previous data and its effectiveness in satisfying the objectives of this plan. Appendix A contains graphs of the sum of the DCS fractions for locations and frequencies contained in a previous version of this plan. The data was collected from January 2009 through December 2019. Each sample was analyzed, and each result was divided by the appropriate DCS to compute a DCS fraction. These fractions were summed for all isotopes. According to DOE –STD-1196-2011, the annual average of these sums should be below 1.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Recommendations for Data-in-Transit Requirements for Securing DER Communications

With the adoption of Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interoperability standards, common communication protocols are now being deployed between power system operators and DER devices. In 2018, a revision to the US interconnection and interoperability standard, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 1547, required DER equipment to have an IEEE 2030.5, IEEE 1815, or SunSpec Modbus communication exchange interface. This change supports the future transition to secure connection and exchange of information between the DER equipment and implementing parties, such as grid operators. Adoption of standardized communication protocols and associated information models is a critical step toward interoperability between power system operators and DER, such as photovoltaic (PV) and energy storage systems. However, security requirements for these standardized communication protocols are not comprehensive, resulting in non-standard and vendor-specific implementation that may leave DER equipment susceptible to cyberattacks. This paper examines the data-in-flight security requirements for standardized DER communication protocols, per IEEE 1547-2018 revision, as it relates to device authentication, key management, and encryption. The state of the art for these security features is also explored, addressing their impact on communication and performance of low-cost single board computers, which are typical of DER devices. In conclusion, a recommendation is provided to adopt a common set of communication requirements, which are intended to achieve interoperability and implement data security over DER network pathways, while ensuring reliable, secure, and real-time information delivery.

42 ENGINEERING↗

High Dose and Dose Rate 60 Co γ-Irradiation of High-Density Polyethylene

We have irradiated high-density polyethylene ribbons and cylinders to ~200 kGy at a dose rate of ~5 kGy day -1 , using a 60 Co source. The radiolytically-generated gas consists almost entirely of H 2 . Based on the time- and dose-dependence of the outgassing, we have determined the radiation- chemical yield for the evolved H 2 , as well as the diffusion coefficient of H 2 in HDPE. We find that the evolved gas yield G evolved depends on the interplay of sample geometry, experimental timescale, and the diffusion coefficient of H 2 in HDPE. When these factors facilitate completion of diffusion prior to gas quantification, such as for sub-mm-thickness ribbons, we measure a time- and dose-invariant value of G evolved = 0.0076 cm 3 std. H 2 J -1 that is in agreement with literature reports. When sample geometry and experiment timescale do not permit completion of diffusion, we measure a time- and dose-dependent value of G evolved . We have developed a model for the transient outgassing behavior of the cylinders, and fitted it to the experimental data. Based on these fits, we estimate a room-temperature diffusivity of D H 2 /HDPE ≈ 1.67 ± 0.12 x 10 -6 cm 2 s -1 for H 2 in HDPE, in good agreement with literature values. At present, the effects of dose rate and γ-photon energy on HDPE gas yield are not known and require further investigation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

A Guide to Updating Interconnection Rules and Incorporating IEEE Standard 1547

The intent of this paper is to support local authorities in adopting the most current technical requirements for interconnecting distributed energy resources (DERs) to the electric distribution system as specified in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard for Interconnection and Interoperability of Distributed Energy Resources with Associated Electric Power Systems Interfaces (IEEE Std 1547-2018). To create interconnection rules that successfully address policy goals, market trends, and technical requirements, state regulators need to be well informed of DER integration considerations. Interconnection processes and technical issues often overlap; the two are not easily segregated, and they are often considered and evaluated concurrently within the context of interconnection rulemaking. Accordingly, this paper addresses both the technical issues and related process considerations. A lack of uniform and transparent procedures for addressing interconnection rule changes can result in implementation issues or inefficiencies, such as unclear, lengthy, and complicated interconnection rules that can increase distributed generation "soft costs" (i.e., non-hardware costs). This can further delay the deployment of DERs and jeopardize time-constrained national and state policy goals, such as renewable energy targets, or limit participation in emerging techno-economic trends. Additionally, misconstructed interconnection rules are at risk of becoming mired in stakeholder conflicts. This guide addresses the concerns of electric service regulators from both the process and technical standpoints by presenting a structured, step-by-step approach to developing and updating existing interconnection rules. In this document, the process of developing and updating interconnection rules is subdivided into three steps: (1) determining the context (stakeholders and major drivers); (2) developing the rule, including updating technical requirements; and (3) maintaining and revising the rule over time.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

WSF PISA example for SAFER pilot

On October 15, 2021, the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management Facility Manager declared a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis (PISA) due to a new information relating to an error discovered in calculation AB-WSF-20-002. Calculation AB-WSF-20-002 is used to determine source terms and heat release rates for vehicle and aircraft impacts with fuel fires involving TRU waste containers. The source term for an aircraft’s impact has different source terms factors (i.e., DR, ARF, RF, LPF) that are applied to multiple categories of drums impacted in the accident scenario based on the physical stresses of the aircraft impact and involvement in the subsequent fuel pool fire. The source terms of the multiple categories of affected drums are summed to determine the final source term for the accident scenario. Certain categories of affected drums are modeled to lose their lid, causing material to eject and burn unconfined on the ground. For these specific categories, a lower ARF value was incorrectly applied in AB-WSF-20-002 (i.e., an ARF value of 1E-3 was used instead of the DOE-STD-5506-2007 directed ARF value of 1E-2). For these categories, the ARF is applied to a relatively small number of low-activity drums (i.e., 17 drums at 2.9 PE-Ci each) compared to the total number of drums affected (i.e., 166 drums totaling 621.8 PE-Ci). Therefore, this error is not expected to significantly increase final dose for the accident scenario. No immediate actions or compensatory measures are required to maintain the facility in a safe condition.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Status Report (FY 2020): Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low Level Waste in the 200 East Area Burial Grounds

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the 200 East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-SD-WM-TI-730). The estimates are compared with requirements of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and performance objectives defined in companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 Chg 1and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 is expected. A new PA study was initiated in fiscal year (FY) 2019 for evaluation of active disposal sites within the 200 East and 200 West Areas (Trench 94 in 200 East; Trenches 31 and 34 in 200 West) due to extended time elapsing between the current annual status report and the original PA for the active disposal sites. The new PA for the active disposal sites is expected to be completed in FY 2021. Within the active burial grounds in the 200 East Area, low-level waste and mixed low-level waste will continue to be disposed of in the dedicated U.S. Navy reactor compartment trench at the 218-E-12B Burial Ground (Trench 94). During this reporting period (FY 2020, from October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020), two reactor compartments were disposed in Trench 94. Results from sorption experiments are summarized for this reporting period to quantify the efficacy of concrete waste forms in retaining key radionuclides (e.g., technetium-99 and iodine-129). The test durations ranged from 1 to 3 months. Continued groundwater monitoring of the 200 East Area LLBGs indicates no groundwater contamination due to LLBG waste. Current assumptions about future land use at the Hanford Site are consistent with PA analysis1 assumptions of a post-closure facility that will not be degraded by human activity. The LLBGs are located in an area identified for waste management and containment of residual contamination. This area will remain after final environmental remediation and the proposed shrinkage of Hanford Site boundaries to small sections within the 200 East and 200 West Areas in the Central Plateau (DOE/EIS-0391). The current closure plan for the LLBGs (DOE/RL-2000-707) estimates that the 200 East LLBGs will be closed in the 2050 timeframe. The Disposal Authorization Statement, other technical basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis are of continued adequacy to meet the performance objectives of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions nor the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and the Disposal Authorization Statement is maintained.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Seismic Loading for Short-Term Duration Exposures and Temporary Structures

The purpose of this document is to determine the appropriate seismic demand forces associated with a short-term and temporary seismic exposure for protecting structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from hazards associated with Seismic Design Category 1 (SDC-1), SDC-2, and SDC-3 seismic events based on data provided in the Probabilistic Seismic Hazards Update for LLNL prepared by Fugro Consultants, Inc. in accordance with DOE-STD-1020.

42 ENGINEERING↗