SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
This report is a series of slides discussing the MCNP6 code and its status in simulating fission. Applications of interest include global security and nuclear nonproliferation, detection of special nuclear material (SNM), passive and active interrogation techniques, and coincident neutron and photon leakage.
DOE Fellow, Andres Cremisini, completed a 10-week internship with Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Under the management of Kristopher Klingler and the mentorship of Jon Bradley, he was tasked with conceiving and coding a realistic weather model for use in physical security applications. The objective was to make a weather model that could use real data to accurately predict wind and precipitation conditions at any location of interest on the globe at any user-determined time. The intern received guidance on software design, the C++ programming language and clear communication of project goals and ongoing progress. In addition, Mr. Cremisini was given license to structure the program however he best saw fit, an experience that will benefit ongoing research endeavors.
Sandia and Cray Inc. co-developed Red Storm, a distributed memory, massively paralleled highperformance supercomputer modeled on ASCI Redl, to run computer codes used for conducting materials science simulations for national security. Supercomputers have some of the fastest highperformance systems available and are used primarily for scientific and engineering work requiring exceedingly high-speed computations. Unlike conventional computers, supercomputers have large storage capacity; more than one central processing unit to rapidly retrieve stored data and program instructions; and input/output capability.
Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.
SCRUB is a code review tool that supports both large, team-based software development efforts (e.g., for mission software) as well as individual tasks. The tool was developed at JPL to support a new, streamlined code review process that combines human-generated review reports with program-generated review reports from a customizable range of state-of-the-art source code analyzers. The leading commercial tools include Codesonar, Coverity, and Klocwork, each of which can achieve a reasonably low rate of false-positives in the warnings that they generate. The time required to analyze code with these tools can vary greatly. In each case, however, the tools produce results that would be difficult to realize with human code inspections alone. There is little overlap in the results produced by the different analyzers, and each analyzer used generally increases the effectiveness of the overall effort. The SCRUB tool allows all reports to be accessed through a single, uniform interface (see figure) that facilitates brows ing code and reports. Improvements over existing software include significant simplification, and leveraging of a range of commercial, static source code analyzers in a single, uniform framework. The tool runs as a small stand-alone application, avoiding the security problems related to tools based on Web browsers. A developer or reviewer, for instance, must have already obtained access rights to a code base before that code can be browsed and reviewed with the SCRUB tool. The tool cannot open any files or folders to which the user does not already have access. This means that the tool does not need to enforce or administer any additional security policies. The analysis results presented through the SCRUB tool s user interface are always computed off-line, given that, especially for larger projects, this computation can take longer than appropriate for interactive tool use. The recommended code review process that is supported by the SCRUB tool consists of three phases: Code Review, Developer Response, and Closeout Resolution. In the Code Review phase, all tool-based analysis reports are generated, and specific comments from expert code reviewers are entered into the SCRUB tool. In the second phase, Developer Response, the developer is asked to respond to each comment and tool-report that was produced, either agreeing or disagreeing to provide a fix that addresses the issue that was raised. In the third phase, Closeout Resolution, all disagreements are discussed in a meeting of all parties involved, and a resolution is made for all disagreements. The first two phases generally take one week each, and the third phase is concluded in a single closeout meeting.
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is the design authority for a new Type B hazardous materials transportation package designated as the Defense Programs Package 3 (DPP-3) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DPP-3 has been developed using similar materials and fabrication methods employed in previous U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOE, and NNSA certified packages. The DPP-3 design criteria are derived from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), NNSA guidance and NRC regulatory guides in order to safely and securely transport a variety of payloads. Final regulatory approval by the NNSA will require physical testing to demonstrate that the containment vessel (CV) remains leaktight after enduring the entire regulatory testing sequence prescribed in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 (10 CFR 71). In order to gain confidence that the DPP-3 will remain leaktight after testing, the DPP-3 has been structurally analyzed using the Finite Element Analysis (FEA) software LS-DYNA. The FEA analyses serve two general purposes: first, they aid in design and development of the package, and second, they advise as to which drop orientations are expected to cause the most damage during regulatory testing. This paper will discuss how the design criteria are incorporated into analytical techniques needed to evaluate the FEA structural simulation results for 10 CFR 71 conditions to give confidence the DPP-3 testing campaign will be successful.
Garbled Autonomous Bots Leveraging Ethereum (GABLE) uses simple but effective algorithms to permit secure private execution of garbled state machines and garbled circuits on public computing resources. This release consists of two Solidity smart contracts illustrating the GABLE approach. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2022-7215 O
The Inventory of Composable Elements (ICE) is an open source registry software platform for managing information about biological parts. It is capable of recording information about plasmids, microbial host strains and seeds, as well as DNA parts. Includes features such as DNA sequence visualization, editing and annotation, auto-aligning sequencing trace files against reference templates, SBOL XML/RDF support, and web-of-registries functionality. The web of registries functionality provides strong support for distributed interconnected use and enables sharing and transfer of biological parts across various independent ICE instances. ICE adopts modern software development principles, leveraging component-base frameworks, offering a REST API for convenient third-party integration and emphasizing scalability, security, and service integrations for dynamic content availability. The source code is hosted at https://github.com/JBEI/ice. A public instance is available at public-registry.jbei.org, where users can try out features, upload parts or simply use it for their projects.
The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) has been developing data and communications standards since 1982, with the objective of providing interoperability for enabling international collaboration for spaceflight missions. As data and communications technology has advanced, CCSDS has progressed to capitalize on existing products when available and suitable for spaceflight, and to develop innovative new approaches when available products fail. The current scope of the CCSDS architecture spans the end-to-end data architecture of a spaceflight mission, with ongoing efforts to develop and standardize cutting-edge technology. This manuscript describes the overall architecture, the position of CCSDS in the standards and international mission community, and some CCSDS processes. It then highlights in detail several of the most interesting and critical technical areas in work right now, and how they support collaborative missions. Special topics include: Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN), Asynchronous Message Service (AMS), Multispectral/Hyperspectral Data Compression (MHDC), Coding and Synchronization, Onboard Wireless, Spacecraft Monitor and Control, Navigation, Security, and Time Synchronization/Correlation. Broad international participation in development of CCSDS standards is encouraged.
Call graph or caller-callee relationships have been used for various kinds of static program analysis, performance analysis and profiling, and for program safety or security analysis such as detecting anomalies of program execution or code injection attacks. However, different tools generate call graphs in different formats, which prevents efficient reuse of call graph results. In this paper, we present an approach of using ontology and resource description framework (RDF) to create knowledge graphs for specifying call graphs to facilitate the construction of full-fledged and complex call graphs of computer programs, realizing more interoperable and scalable program analyses than conventional approaches. We create a formal ontology-based specification of call graph information to capture concepts and properties of both static and dynamic call graphs so different tools can collaboratively contribute to more comprehensive analysis results. Our experiments show that ontology enables merging of call graphs generated from different tools and flexible queries using a standard query interface. Index Terms—Callgraph, ontology, knowl
Now one of the fastest supercomputers in the United States, the Trinity Supercomputer Phase II project was completed during the summer of 2017, and the computer became fully operational during an unclassified “open science” run. The computer has now transitioned to classified mode. The Trinity supercomputer is designed to provide increased computational capability for the NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise in support of increasing geometric and physics fidelities in nuclear weapons simulation codes, while maintaining expectations for total time to solution. The capabilities of Trinity are required for supporting the NNSA Stockpile Stewardship program’s certification and assessments to ensure that the nation’s nuclear stockpile is safe, secure and effective. With an expected operational lifetime through 2020, Trinity is an approximately 41.5 petaflop (41.5 million billion calculations per second, peak performance) supercomputer based on the Cray XC40 architecture. It consists of 19,420 compute nodes utilizing two processor architectures, Intel Xeon Haswell and Intel Xeon Phi Knights Landing. It is a water-cooled system with a power requirement of about 10 megawatts. The Trinity project is managed and operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories under the Alliance for Computing at Extreme Scale (ACES) partnership. The system is located at the Nicholas Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation at Los Alamos and covers approximately 5,200 square feet of floor space.
The US Department of Energy Office of Science and the National Nuclear Security Administration initiated the Exascale Computing Project (ECP) in 2016 to prepare mission-relevant applications and scientific software for the delivery of the exascale computers starting in 2023. The ECP currently supports 24 efforts directed at specific applications and six supporting co-design projects. These 24 application projects contain 62 application codes that are implemented in three high-level languages—C, C++, and Fortran—and use 22 combinations of graphical processing unit programming models. The most common implementation language is C++, which is used in 53 different application codes. The most common programming models across ECP applications are CUDA and Kokkos, which are employed in 15 and 14 applications, respectively. This article provides a survey of the programming languages and models used in the ECP applications codebase that will be used to achieve performance on the future exascale hardware platforms.
Hydrogen-powered locomotives may present an alternative to diesel for achieving transportation-related decarbonization, energy security, and resilience goals. As an emerging technology, hydrogen locomotives may not have adequate representation in current safety codes and standards. NFPA 2 and other appropriate codes and standards were reviewed to identify technical gaps in the code for hydrogen rail defueling, refueling, maintenance, and storage. Several technical gaps pertaining to setback distances, allowable quantities, ventilation rates, and grounding have been identified. Fueling requirements can be informed by road vehicle standards but may need to be revised for larger quantity hydrogen locomotive systems. Since there are no hydrogen-specific locomotive design and safety standards, some aspects of diesel-based locomotive standards may apply. CGA G- 5.5 currently provides the most guidance on height, placement, orientation, and design of vent systems, while other standards emphasize the importance of shielding vent stacks and provide requirements for orientation of their discharge.
This study presents a secure information transmission system compromised of two main parts. The first component makes use of the principle of reciprocity in frequency-selective wireless channels to derive a pair of keys for two legitimate parties. The proposed key generation algorithm allows for two asynchronous transceivers to derive a pair of similar keys. Moreover, we apply a unique augmentation - called strongest path cancellation (SPC) - to the keys and have validated through simulation and real-world measurements that this technique significantly boosts the security level of the overall design. In the second part of the secure information transmission system, we introduce the concept of artificial noise to multi-carrier spread-spectrum (MC-SS) systems. The keys generated in the first part are used as spreading code sequences for MC-SS and artificial noise is added to further enhance the security of this communication setup. Two different attacks on our proposed system are evaluated. First, a passive adversary who follows the exact same steps as the legitimate users to detect confidential information is considered. In the second attack, we evaluate the design in presence of an adversary with significant blind detection capabilities.
DARWIN is a NASA developed, Internet-based system for enabling aerospace researchers to securely and remotely access and collaborate on the analysis of aerospace vehicle design data, primarily the results of wind-tunnel testing and numeric (e.g., computational fluid-dynamics) model executions. DARWIN captures, stores and indexes data; manages derived knowledge (such as visualizations across multiple datasets); and provides an environment for designers to collaborate in the analysis of test results. DARWIN is an interesting application because it supports high-volumes of data. integrates multiple modalities of data display (e.g., images and data visualizations), and provides non-trivial access control mechanisms. DARWIN enables collaboration by allowing not only sharing visualizations of data, but also commentary about and views of data. Here we provide an overview of the architecture of D3, the third generation of DARWIN. Earlier versions of DARWIN were characterized by browser-based interfaces and a hodge-podge of server technologies: CGI scripts, applets, PERL, and so forth. But browsers proved difficult to control, and a proliferation of computational mechanisms proved inefficient and difficult to maintain. D3 substitutes a pure-Java approach for that medley: A Java client communicates (though RMI over HTTPS) with a Java-based application server. Code on the server accesses information from JDBC databases, distributed LDAP security services, and a collaborative information system. D3 is a three tier-architecture, but unlike 'E-commerce' applications, the data usage pattern suggests different strategies than traditional Enterprise Java Beans - we need to move volumes of related data together, considerable processing happens on the client, and the 'business logic' on the server-side is primarily data integration and collaboration. With D3, we are extending DARWIN to handle other data domains and to be a distributed system, where a single login allows a user transparent access to test results from multiple servers and authority domains.
This talk describes the processes and metrics used by Jet Propulsion Laboratory to bring about the required IT infrastructure culture change to update and certify, as Y2K compliant, thousands of computers and millions of lines of code.
The U.S. conducted 210 atmospheric nuclear tests between 1945 and 1962, with multiple cameras capturing each event at around 2,400 frames per second. But in the decades since, around 10,000 of these films sat idle, scattered across the country in high-security vaults. Not only were they gathering dust, the film material itself was slowly decomposing, bringing the data they contained to the brink of being lost forever. For the past five years, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) weapon physicist Greg Spriggs and a crack team of film experts, archivists and software developers have been on a mission to hunt down, scan, reanalyze and declassify these decomposing films. The goals are to preserve the films’ content before it’s lost forever, and provide better data to the post-testing-era scientists who use computer codes to help certify that the aging U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective.