NASA Human Spaceflight Overview
Current Human Space Flight Programs: a) Space Shuttle Program (SSP); b) International Space Station (ISS) Program; c) Constellation Program (CxP).
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Current Human Space Flight Programs: a) Space Shuttle Program (SSP); b) International Space Station (ISS) Program; c) Constellation Program (CxP).
With the increasing demands placed on extravehicular activity (EVA) for the International Space Station (ISS) assembly and maintenance, along with planned lunar and Martian missions, the need for increased human productivity and capability becomes ever more critical. This is most readily achieved by reduction in space suit weight and volume, and increased hardware reliability, durability, and operating lifetime. Considerable progress has been made with each successive generation of space suit design; from the Apollo A7L suit, to the current Shuttle Extravehicular Mobile Unit (EMU) suit, and the next generation Constellation Space Suit Element (CSSE). However, one area of space suit design which has continued to lag is the fluid pump used to drive the water cooling loop of the Primary Life Support System (PLSS). The two main types of fluid pumps typically used in space applications are rotodynamic pumps (pumping is achieved through a rotary vaned impeller) and displacement pumps (which includes rotary and diaphragm pumps). The rotating and moving parts found in the pumps and electric motor add significantly to the susceptibility to wear and friction, thermal mismatch, and complexity of the pumps. Electric motor-driven pumps capable of achieving high operational reliability are necessarily large, heavy, and energy inefficient. This report describes a development effort conducted for NASA by Lynntech, Inc., who recently demonstrated the feasibility of an electrochemically-driven fluid cooling pump. With no electric motor and minimal lightweight components, an electrochemically-driven pump is expected to be significantly smaller, lighter and achieve a longer life time than conventional rotodynamic and displacement pumps. By employing sulfonated polystyrene-based proton exchange membranes, rather than conventional Nafion membranes, a significant reduction in the actuator power consumption was demonstrated. It was also demonstrated that these membranes possess the necessary mechanical strength, durability, and temperature range for long life space operation. The preliminary design for a Phase II prototype pump compares very favorably to the fluid cooling pumps currently used in space suit portable life support systems (PLSS). Characteristics of the electrochemically-driven pump are described and the benefits of the technology as a replacement for electric motor pumps in mechanically pumped single-phase fluid loops (MPFLs) is discussed.
A review has been performed of exploration science and payload operations during the Apollo and Space Shuttle programs to extract information of potential usefulness to the Constellation program. That work has resulted in creation of the concept for a unique type of flight controller: the exploration science officer. The controller s primary responsibility is to integrate the tasks and goals of the spacecraft flight control team and the science team in order to maximize science return while maximizing crew safety. Far from being just a mouthpiece for either team, this individual must be fluent in the knowledge and language of two communities: spacecraft operations and planetary science. Responsibilities begin during the requirements phase of vehicle and lunar surface systems development and continue through development, training, planning, mission execution, and post-flight mission phases.
The Vehicle Assembly building at NASAs Kennedy Space Center has been used since 1966 to vertically assemble every launch vehicle, since the Apollo Program, launched from Launch Complex 39 (LC-39). After the cancellation of the Constellation Program in 2010 and the retirement of the Space Shuttle Program in 2011, the VAB faced an uncertain future. As the Space Launch System (SLS) gained a foothold as the future of American spaceflight to deep space, NASA was only using a portion of the VABs initial potential. With three high bays connected to the Crawler Way transportation system, the potential exists for up to three rockets to be simultaneously processed for launch. The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Master plan, supported by the Center Planning and Development (CPD) Directorate, is guiding Kennedy toward a 21st century multi-user spaceport. This concept will maintain Kennedy as the United States premier gateway to space and provide multi-user operations through partnerships with the commercial aerospace industry. Commercial aerospace companies, now tasked with transporting cargo and, in the future, astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) via the Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) and Commercial Crew Program (CCP), are a rapidly growing industry with increasing capabilities to make launch operations more economical for both private companies and the government. Commercial operations to Low Earth Orbit allow the government to focus on travel to farther destinations through the SLS Program. With LC-39B designated as a multi-use launch pad, companies seeking to use it will require an integration facility to assemble, integrate, and test their launch vehicle. An Announcement for Proposals (AFP) was released in June, beginning the process of finding a non-NASA user for High Bay 2 (HB2) and the Mobile Launcher Platforms (MLPs). An Industry Day, a business meeting and tour for interested companies and organizations, was also arranged to identify and answer any additional questions posed by potential proposers. After amending the AFP and posting additional material for potential users to consider, proposals are being accepted until July 31, at which point they will be evaluated to determine the proposer which best meets the objectives of the government. By identifying VAB HB2 as available and seeking proposals from the commercial sector for VAB HB2 and MLP use, Center Planning and Development is ensuring Kennedy Space Centers relevance in the evolving launch industry of the 21st century.
The idea of satellite-to-satellite tracking in the high-low mode has received renewed attention in light of the uncertain future of NASA's proposed low-low mission, Geopotential Research Mission (GRM). The principal disadvantage with a high-low system is the increased time interval required to obtain global coverage since the intersatellite visibility is often obscured by Earth. The U.S. Air Force has begun to investigate high-low satellite-to-satellite tracking between the Global Positioning System (GPS) of satellites (high component) and NASA's Space Transportation System (STS), the shuttle (low component). Because the GPS satellites form, or will form, a constellation enabling continuous three-dimensional tracking of a low-altitude orbiter, there will be no data gaps due to lack of intervisibility. Furthermore, all three components of the gravitation vector are estimable at altitude, a given grid of which gives a stronger estimate of gravity on Earth's surface than a similar grid of line-of-sight gravitation components. The proposed Air Force mission is STAGE (Shuttle-GPS Tracking for Anomalous Gravitation Estimation) and is designed for local gravity field determinations since the shuttle will likely not achieve polar orbits. The motivation for STAGE was the feasibility to obtain reasonable accuracies with absolutely minimal cost. Instead of simulating drag-free orbits, STAGE uses direct measurements of the nongravitational forces obtained by an inertial package onboard the shuttle. The sort of accuracies that would be achievable from STAGE vis-a-vis other satellite tracking missions such as GRM and European Space Agency's POPSAT-GRM are analyzed.
As part of the FDIR (Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery) Project for the Constellation Program, a task was designed within the context of the Constellation Program FDIR project called the Legacy Benchmarking Task to document as accurately as possible the FDIR processes and resources that were used by the Space Shuttle ground support equipment (GSE) during the Shuttle flight program. These results served as a comparison with results obtained from the new FDIR capability. The task team assessed Shuttle and EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) historical data for GSE-related launch delays to identify expected benefits and impact. This analysis included a study of complex fault isolation situations that required a lengthy troubleshooting process. Specifically, four elements of that system were considered: LH2 (liquid hydrogen), LO2 (liquid oxygen), hydraulic test, and ground special power.
TDRS-1 was decommissioned on October 28th 2009 following more than 26 years of operation. The Grand Old Dame of the TDRSS constellation wa s launched aboard the maiden voyage of the Space Shuttle Challenger ( STS-6) in April 1983. TDRS-1 survived a malfunction of the Inertial Upper Stage eventually utilizing its own propulsion system to success fully reach its assigned station in geosynchronous orbit. The anomalo us beginning of the TDRS-1 mission was not without lasting consequenc es as the primary reaction control system (A-side) was completely di sabled with an apparent propellant leak and the secondary system (B-s ide) suffered damage to its negative roll thruster rendering the thru ster inoperable. Following decommissioning the challenge to completin g a successful TDRS-1 end-of-mission (EOM) was the implementation of the stringent orbital debris requirements of NPR 8715.6 with a parti ally functioning spacecraft not originally designed to meet those req uirements. The TDRS-1 EOM had three key goals: 1) removal of the spac ecraft from geosynchronous orbit; 2) depletion of the remaining prope llant; and 3) passivation of all other sources of energy storage or generation. The TDRS-1 EOM approach was one of minimizing risks while accomplishing the goals above. The orbit raising portion of EOM was accomplished using deltavelocity operations already proven during pre vious stationchanging maneuvers. The propellant depletion approach wa s necessarily more aggressive as over 20 hours of burn time was requ ired to deplete the remaining fuel. A novel approach utilizing a spin ning, thrusting, passively controlled spacecraft configuration was ut ilized to achieve reasonable burn durations that met schedule constra ints. This nonstandard configuration required careful analysis of ele ctrical, thermal, and communication subsystems. The configuration wa s thoroughly simulated prior to the start of operations and carefully characterized during the initial spin period and first burn. Passiva tion was by definition a unique operation not previously performed wi thin the TDRS 1-7 constellation. Use was made of a TDRS spacecraft si mulator to verify the operational procedure to mitigate risks and pro vide crew training. TDRS-1 orbit raising maneuvers commenced on June 5th 2010 and completed on June 14th with an apogee 370 km and a peri gee 352 km above geosynchronous altitude. 127 kg of propellant were e stimated to be remaining in the tanks at the completion of orbit rais ing. TDRS-1 was placed in its spinning orientation on June 16th and the first fuel depletion burn was performed the following day. A seri es of 10 depletion burns were performed ending on June 26th when both propellant tank pressures experienced dramatic drops. Final passivat ion was performed on June 27 th deactivating electronics, removing t he batteries from the bus and solar arrays, and disabling the space-t o-ground communications equipment. The Second TDRS Ground Terminal (S TGT) continued to open loop track TDRS-1 for several days attempting command reacquisition several times a day. All attempts were unsucce ssful confirming passivation was achieved. The TDRS-1 orbit at passiv ation was an orbital debris compliant 36,319 x 36,128 km in height. W hile differing spacecraft designs may preclude mimicking the exact TD RS-1 EOM approach, the TDRS-1 campaign serves to demonstrate that pr e-NPR 8715.6 designs can be made to meet the requirements resulting i n a reduced orbit debris environment for future missions
Throughout 2006, Range Safety was involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities and events, from developing, implementing, and supporting Range Safety policies and procedures-such as the Space Shuttle Launch and Landing Plans, the Range Safety Variance Process, and the Expendable Launch Vehicle Safety Program procedures-to evaluating new technologies. Range Safety training development is almost complete with the last course scheduled to go on line in mid-2007. Range Safety representatives took part in a number of panels and councils, including the newly formed Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel, the Range Commanders Council and its subgroups, the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel, and the unmanned aircraft systems working group. Space based range safety demonstration and certification (formerly STARS) and the autonomous flight safety system were successfully tested. The enhanced flight termination system will be tested in early 2007 and the joint advanced range safety system mission analysis software tool is nearing operational status. New technologies being evaluated included a processor for real-time compensation in long range imaging, automated range surveillance using radio interferometry, and a space based range command and telemetry processor. Next year holds great promise as we continue ensuring safety while pursuing our quest beyond the Moon to Mars.
The paper presents launch vehicle and upper-stage options for application to lunar and interplanetary microspacecraft missions. Particular attention is given to the capabilities of Piggyback, small launch vehicles, and large launch vehicles. It is noted that Piggyback options on the Shuttle and expendable launch vehicles enable near-term earth-orbital missions and the potential for lunar and planetary missions if an electric-propulsion upper-stage is developed. Launch systems like the Space Shuttle could be used to launch large members of microspacecraft in 'constellation deployment' and 'shotgun' class missions to a variety of solar-system targets such as the sun, asteroids, comets, the moon, Mars, and Saturn.
The U. S., Russia, and, China have each addressed the question of human-rating spacecraft. NASA's operational experience with human-rating primarily resides with Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station. NASA s latest developmental experience includes Constellation, X38, X33, and the Orbital Space Plane. If domestic commercial crew vehicles are used to transport astronauts to and from space, Soyuz is another example of methods that could be used to human-rate a spacecraft and to work with commercial spacecraft providers. For Soyuz, NASA's normal assurance practices were adapted. Building on NASA's Soyuz experience, this report contends all past, present, and future vehicles rely on a range of methods and techniques for human-rating assurance, the components of which include: requirements, conceptual development, prototype evaluations, configuration management, formal development reviews (safety, design, operations), component/system ground-testing, integrated flight tests, independent assessments, and launch readiness reviews. When constraints (cost, schedule, international) limit the depth/breadth of one or more preferred assurance means, ways are found to bolster the remaining areas. This report provides information exemplifying the above safety assurance model for consideration with commercial or foreign-government-designed spacecraft. Topics addressed include: U.S./Soviet-Russian government/agency agreements and engineering/safety assessments performed with lessons learned in historic U.S./Russian joint space ventures
Many good ideas received based on industry experience: a) Shuttle operations; b) Commercial aircraft production; c) NASA's historical way of doing business; d) Military and commercial programs. Aerospace performed preliminary analysis: a) Potential savings; b) Cost of implementation; c) Performance or other impact/penalties; d) Roadblocks; e) Unintended consequences; f) Bottom line. Significant work ahead for a "Stretch Goal"to become a good, documented requirement: 1) As a group, the relative "value" of goals are uneven; 2) Focused analysis on each goal is required: a) Need to ensure that a new requirement produces the desired consequence; b) It is not certain that some goals will not create problems elsewhere. 3) Individual implementation path needs to be studied: a) Best place to insert requirement (what level, which document); b) Appropriate wording for the requirement. Many goals reflect "best practices" based on lessons learned and may have value beyond near-term CxP requirements process.
Numerous studies since the Apollo Program of the 1960s have highlighted the benefits of - and the need for - a national heavy lift launch capability to support human exploration, science, national security, and commercial development of space. NASA's most recent and most refined effort to develop that heavy lift capability is the Ares V. Ares V is a key element of NASA's Constellation Program. It s overall goal s part of approved national space policy is to retire the Space Shuttle and develop its successor, complete the International Space Station, and resume human exploration beyond low Earth orbit (LEO), beginning with exploration of the Moon as a step to other destinations in the Solar System. Ares V s first role is that of cargo vehicle to carry a lunar lander into Earth orbit, rendezvous with astronauts launched on the smaller Ares I crew launch vehicle, and perform the trans lunar injection (TLI) mission to send the mated crew and lander vehicles to the Moon. The design reference missions (DRMs) envisioned for it also include direct lunar cargo flights and a human Mars mission. Although NASA's priority from the start of the Constellation Program to the present has been development of the Ares I and Orion crew vehicle to replace the retiring Shuttle fleet, the Ares team has made significant progress in understanding the performance, design trades, technology needs, mission scenarios, ground and flight operations, cost, and other factors associated with heavy lift development. The current reference configuration was selected during the Lunar Capabilities Concept Review (LCCR) in fall 2008. That design has served since then as a point of departure for further refinements and trades among five participating NASA field centers. Ares V development to date has benefited from progress on the Ares I due to commonality between the vehicles. The Ares I first stage completed a successful firing of a 5-segment solid rocket motor. The Ares I-X launch Numerous studies since the Apollo Program of the 1960s have highlighted the benefits of and the need for - a national heavy lift launch capability to support human exploration, science, national security, and commercial development of space. NASA s most recent and most refined effort to develop that heavy lift capability is the Ares V. Ares V is a key element of NASA s Constellation Program. It s overall goal s part of approved national space policy is to retire the Space Shuttle and develop its successor, complete the International Space Station, and resume human exploration beyond low Earth orbit (LEO), beginning with exploration of the Moon as a step to other destinations in the Solar System. Ares V s first role is that of cargo vehicle to carry a lunar lander into Earth orbit, rendezvous with astronauts launched on the smaller Ares I crew launch vehicle, and perform the trans lunar injection (TLI) mission to send the mated crew and lander vehicles to the Moon. The design reference missions (DRMs) envisioned for it also include direct lunar cargo flights and a human Mars mission. Although NASA s priority from the start of the Constellation Program to the present has been development of the Ares I and Orion crew vehicle to replace the retiring Shuttle fleet, the Ares team has made significant progress in understanding the performance, design trades, technology needs, mission scenarios, ground and flight operations, cost, and other factors associated with heavy lift development. The current reference configuration was selected during the Lunar Capabilities Concept Review (LCCR) in fall 2008. That design has served since then as a point of departure for further refinements and trades among five participating NASA field centers. Ares V development to date has benefited from progress on the Ares I due to commonality between the vehicles. The Ares I first stage completed a successful firing of a 5-segment solid rocket motor. The Ares I-X launch successfully demonstrated in suborbital flighhe ability to assemble, prepare, launch, control and recover the Ares I configuration and compare performance to computer models. Component tests continue on the J-2X engine, which will put both the Ares I and Ares V upper stages into orbit. In addition, more than 100,000 parts have been manufactured or on the assembly line for the first J-2X powerpack and the first two development engines, with hot fire tests to begin in 2011. This paper will further detail the progress to date on the Ares V and planned activities for the remainder of 2010. In addition, the Ares V team has continued its outreach to potential user communities in science and national security. Through the Constellation Program, NASA has amassed an enormous knowledge base in the design, technologies, and operations of heavy lift launch vehicles that will be a national asset for any future launch vehicle decision. This early phase of the design presents the best opportunity to incorporate where possible the insights and needs of other users.
In January 2004, the President of the United States established the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) to complete the International Space Station, retire the Space Shuttle and develop its replacement, and expand the human presence on the Moon as a stepping stone to human exploration of Mars and worlds beyond. In response, NASA developed the Constellation Program, consisting of the components shown in Figure 1. This paper will summarize the manned spaceflight liquid propulsion system needs in support of the Constellation Program over the next 10 years. It will address all liquid engine needs to support human exploration from low Earth orbit (LEO) to the lunar surface, including an overview of engines currently under contract, those baselined but not yet under contract, and those propulsion needs that have yet to be initiated. There may be additional engine needs for early demonstrators, but those will not be addressed as part of this paper. Also, other portions of the VSE architecture, including the planned Orion abort test boosters and the Lunar Precursor Robotic Program, are not addressed here as they either use solid motors or are focused on unmanned elements of returning humans to the Moon.
NASA's Constellation Program has plans to return to the Moon within the next 10 years. Although reaching the Moon during the Apollo Program was a remarkable human engineering achievement, fewer than 20 extravehicular activities (EVAs) were performed. Current projections indicate that the next lunar exploration program will require thousands of EVAs, which will require spacesuits that are better optimized for human performance. Limited mobility and dexterity, and the position of the center of gravity (CG) are a few of many features of the Apollo suit that required significant crew compensation to accomplish the objectives. Development of a new EVA suit system will ideally result in performance close to or better than that in shirtsleeves at 1 G, i.e., in "a suit that is a pleasure to work in, one that you would want to go out and explore in on your day off." Unlike the Shuttle program, in which only a fraction of the crew perform EVA, the Constellation program will require that all crewmembers be able to perform EVA. As a result, suits must be built to accommodate and optimize performance for a larger range of crew anthropometry, strength, and endurance. To address these concerns, NASA has begun a series of tests to better understand the factors affecting human performance and how to utilize various lunar gravity simulation environments available for testing.
The Transferable, Adaptable, Modular and Upgradeable (TAMU) Flight Production Process (FPP) is a System of System (SOS) framework which cuts across multiple organizations and their associated facilities, that are, in the most general case, in geographically disperse locations, to develop the architecture and associated workflow processes of products for a broad range of flight projects. Further, TAMU FPP provides for the automatic execution and re-planning of the workflow processes as they become operational. This paper provides the blueprint for the TAMU FPP paradigm. This blueprint presents a complete, coherent technique, process and tool set that results in an infrastructure that can be used for full lifecycle design and decision making during the flight production process. Based on the many years of experience with the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and the International Space Station (ISS), the currently cancelled Constellation Program which aimed on returning humans to the moon as a starting point, has been building a modern model-based Systems Engineering infrastructure to Re-engineer the FPP. This infrastructure uses a structured modeling and architecture development approach to optimize the system design thereby reducing the sustaining costs and increasing system efficiency, reliability, robustness and maintainability metrics. With the advent of the new vision for human space exploration, it is now necessary to further generalize this framework to take into consideration a broad range of missions and the participation of multiple organizations outside of the MOD; hence the Transferable, Adaptable, Modular and Upgradeable (TAMU) concept.
As part of NASA s Constellation Program to resume exploration beyond low Earth orbit (LEO), the Ares V heavy-lift cargo launch vehicle as currently conceived will be able to send more crew and cargo to more places on the Moon than the Apollo Program Saturn V. (Figure 1) It also has unprecedented cargo mass and volume capabilities that will be a national asset for science, commerce, and national defense applications. Compared to current systems, it will offer approximately five times the mass and volume to most orbits and locations. The Columbia space shuttle accident, the resulting investigation, the Vision for Space Exploration, and the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) broadly shaped the Constellation architecture. Out of those events and initiatives emerged an architecture intended to replace the space shuttle, complete the International Space Station (ISS), resume a much more ambitious plan to explore the moon as a stepping stone to other destinations in the solar system. The Ares I was NASA s main priority because of the goal to retire the Shuttle. Ares V remains in a concept development phase, evolving through hundreds of configurations. The current reference design was approved during the Lunar Capabilities Concept Review/Ares V Mission Concept Review (LCCR/MCR) in June 2008. This reference concept serves as a starting point for a renewed set of design trades and detailed analysis into its interaction with the other components of the Constellation architecture and existing launch infrastructure. In 2009, the Ares V team was heavily involved in supporting the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee. Several alternative designs for Ares V have been supplied to the committee. This paper will discuss the origins of the Ares V design, the evolution to the current reference configuration, and the options provided to the review committee.
Exploration Life Support (ELS) is one of NASA's Exploration Technology Development Projects. ELS plans, coordinates and implements the development of new life support technologies for human exploration missions as outlined in NASA's Vision for Space Exploration. ELS technology development currently supports three major projects of the Constellation Program - the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), the Altair Lunar Lander and Lunar Surface Systems. ELS content includes Air Revitalization Systems (ARS), Water Recovery Systems (WRS), Waste Management Systems (WMS), Habitation Engineering, Systems Integration, Modeling and Analysis (SIMA), and Validation and Testing. The primary goal of the ELS project is to provide different technology options to Constellation which fill gaps or provide substantial improvements over the state-of-the-art in life support systems. Since the Constellation missions are so challenging, mass, power, and volume must be reduced from Space Shuttle and Space Station technologies. Systems engineering analysis also optimizes the overall architecture by considering all interfaces with the life support system and potential for reduction or reuse of resources. For long duration missions, technologies which aid in closure of air and water loops with increased reliability are essential as well as techniques to minimize or deal with waste. The ELS project utilizes in-house efforts at five NASA centers, aerospace industry contracts, Small Business Innovative Research contracts and other means to develop advanced life support technologies. Testing, analysis and reduced gravity flight experiments are also conducted at the NASA field centers. This paper gives a current status of technologies under development by ELS and relates them to the Constellation customers who will eventually use them.
This paper discusses the fundamentals of architecting a major human spaceflight program and the lessons that can be learned from Constellation. Constellation is/was NASA's program to implement a new generation of human exploration missions to the moon and beyond. It is/was a tightly-coupled program where a unique set of architectural challenges can be seen and evaluated to better understand how architecting of such systems can be improved upon in the future. While the specific issues discussed in this paper derive from the current Constellation architecture they share threads with previously-crewed systems including Apollo and Shuttle and are likely to be common to any human exploration system or system of significant technical and programmatic complexity.