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DOE OSTI2020

Modeling Failure of Electrical Transformers due to Effects of a HEMP Event

Understanding the effect of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) on the equipment in the United States electrical power grid is important to national security. A present challenge to this understanding is evaluating the vulnerability of transformers to a HEMP. Evaluating vulnerability by direct testing is cost-prohibitive, due to the wide variation in transformers, their high cost, and the large number of tests required to establish vulnerability with confidence. Alternatively, material and component testing can be performed to quantify a model for transformer failure, and the model can be used to assess vulnerability of a wide variety of transformers. This project develops a model of the probability of equipment failure due to effects of a HEMP. Potential failure modes are cataloged, and a model structure is presented which can be quantified by the results of small-scale coupon tests.

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DOE OSTI2020

HEMP Transformer Defense Through Power Electronics

High altitude electromagnetic pulses and geo-magnetic disturbances have the potential to severely impact the electric power grid by damaging large power transformers and causing severe power quality issues. This impact comes as a result of a quasi-static bias induced on transmission lines by geomagnetically induced currents which saturate magnetic components in the electric power system. This paper introduces the concept of utilizing a h-bridge inverter on the neutral of a LPT to inject a DC bias equivalent voltage onto the neutral side of the transformer windings. This biasing floats the transformer windings, eliminating the effect of the DC current and keeping the transformer from saturating. Schematic diagrams will be presented, along with simulation model data using Typhoon and PLECS, and finally test results from a benchtop hardware test.

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DOE OSTI2020

HEMP Testing of Substation Yard Circuit Breaker Control and Protective Relay Circuits

There are concerns about the effects of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulses (HEMP) on the electric power grid. Activities to date tested and analyzed vulnerability of digital protective relays (DPRs) used in power substations, but the effect of HEMP on the greater substation environment is not well known. This work establishes a method of testing the vulnerability of circuit breaker control and protective relay circuits to the radiated E1 pulse associated with HEMP based on coupling to the cables in a substation yard. Two DPRs from Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. were independently tested. The test setup also included a typical cable in a substation yard with return plane to emulate the ground grid and other ground conductors near the yard cable, cabinetry housing the installed DPRs, station battery and battery charger, terminal block elements, and a breaker simulator to emulate a substation yard configuration. The DPRs were powered from the station battery and the transformer inputs energized with a three-phase source to maintain typical operating conditions during the tests. Vulnerability testing consisted of a conducted E1 pulse injected into the center of the yard cable of the DPR circuits. Current measurements on the yard cable and DPR inputs indicated significant attenuation of the conducted pulse arriving at the control house equipment from the emulated substation yard. This reduction was quantified with respect to the equivalent open-circuit voltage on the yard cable. No equipment damage or undesired operation occurred on the tested circuits for values below 180 kV, which is significantly higher than the anticipated coupling to a substation yard cable.

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DOE OSTI2020

EMP-Resilient Electric Grid Transformer Analysis

The response of a high - voltage (HV) transformer to fast rise time voltages, such as that from a electromagnetic pulse (EMP) can result in interruption of power distribution and possibly system failure. To help identify these potential occurrences, it is necessary to develop a transformer model that not only captures the input/output response of the transformer but also the internal behavior. The model constructed should cover the frequency band of interest while capturing the internal physical and electrical characteristics. This broad-band, high-fidelity model would enable the prediction of unwanted effects through simulation. A proposed modeling scheme for a HV transformer is described in Part 1 of this report. Part 2 of this report details assessments of internal voltage and electrical field holdoff testing of transformer insulation dielectric breakdown, including comparison of low frequency (DC/60 Hz) holdoff to rise times characteristic of lightning (1 s) and EMP E1 transients (10 - 30 ns). This initial project is a path toward establishing electrical grid transformer failure criteria for EMP voltage transients. We developed modeling methods and measured breakdown electrical field statistical distributions for direct current, 60 Hz, lightning and EMP characteristic voltage rise times. Methods of nanosecond-scale capacitive discharge unit high voltage source development, suggestions for derating of 60 Hz insulation maximum electrical fields for EMP nanosecond pulse voltage withstand rating, and potential methods for increasing transformer resilience to such fast rise time pulses are described.

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DOE OSTI2020

Substation Cable Layouts for EMP Coupling Analysis

Direct coupling of early-time high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) to substation control cables is simulated for cable layouts based on surveys of seven electrical substations in the United States. An analytic transmission line modeling code is used to estimate worst-case coupled current at the terminations of cable segments in or near the control shack. Where applicable, an induced voltage due to cable shield grounding is also estimated. Various configurations are simulated, including cables with different elevations, lengths, radii, and terminations. Plots of the coupled HEMP effects are given, and general relationships between these effects and the substations geometric and material parameters are highlighted and discussed.

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DOE OSTI2021

Modeling Framework for Bulk Electric Grid Impacts from HEMP E1 and E3 Effects (Tasks 3.1 Final Report)

This report presents a framework to evaluate the impact of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) event on a bulk electric power grid. This report limits itself to modeling the impact of EMP E1 and E3 components. The co-simulation of E1 and E3 is presented in detail, and the focus of the paper is on the framework rather than actual results. This approach is highly conservative as E1 and E3 are not maximized with the same event characteristics and may only slightly overlap. The actual results shown in this report are based on a synthetic grid with synthetic data and a limited exemplary EMP model. The framework presented can be leveraged and used to analyze the impact of other threat scenarios, both manmade and natural disasters. This report d escribes a Monte-Carlo based methodology to probabilistically quantify the transient response of the power grid to a HEMP event. The approach uses multiple fundamental steps to characterize the system response to HEMP events, focused on the E1 and E3 components of the event. 1) Obtain component failure data related to HEMP events testing of components and creating component failure models. Use the component failure model to create component failure conditional probability density function (PDF) that is a function of the HEMP induced terminal voltage. 2) Model HEMP scenarios and calculate the E1 coupled voltage profiles seen by all system components. Model the same HEMP scenarios and calculate the transformer reactive power consumption profiles due to E3. 3) Sample each component failure PDF to determine which grid components will fail, due to the E1 voltage spike, for each scenario. 4) Perform dynamic simulations that incorporate the predicted component failures from E1 and reactive power consumption at each transformer affected by E3. These simulations allow for secondary transients to affect the relays/protection remaining in service which can lead to cascading outages. 5) Identify the locations and amount of load lost for each scenario through grid dynamic simulation. This can be an indication of the immediate grid impacts from a HEMP event. In addition, perform more detailed analysis to determine critical nodes and system trends. 6) To help realize the longer-term impacts, a security constrained alternating current optimal power flow (ACOPF) is run to maximize critical load served. This report describes a modeling framework to assess the systemic grid impacts due to a HEMP event. This stochastic simulation framework generates a large amount of data for each Monte Carlo replication, including HEMP location and characteristics, relay and component failures, E3 GIC profiles, cascading dynamics including voltage and frequency over time, and final system state. This data can then be analyzed to identify trends, e.g., unique system behavior modes or critical components whose failure is more likely to cause serious systemic effects. The proposed analysis process is demonstrated on a representative system. In order to draw realistic conclusions of the impact of a HEMP event on the grid, a significant amount of work remains with respect to modeling the impact on various grid components.

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DOE OSTI2020

Estimation of the Attenuation Caused by Power Line Towers on an E1-HEMP Induced Excitation

In a transmission line, the coupling between a line and a tower above ground is evaluated when the excitation is an E1 high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP). The model focuses on capturing correctly the effect of the coupling on the peak of the HEMP induced current that propagates along the line. This assessment is necessary to accurately estimate the effect of the excitation on the systems and components of the power grid. This analysis is a step towards a quantitative evaluation of HEMP excitation on the power grid. The results obtained indicate that the effect can be significant, especially for lines heights of 20 meters or more.

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DOE OSTI2021

High-Altitude Burst Observed at Large Ground Ranges

The rise times computed by the author’s three-dimensional geomagnetic electromagnetic pulse (EMP) code MACSYNC for a high-altitude nuclear burst increase from a fraction of a shake under the burst to tens of shakes at a 1,000 km ground range (one shake equals 10 nanoseconds). Computations for similar geometries with the frequently used one-dimensional spherical EMP codes CHAP and HEMP show similar rise times under the burst, but rise times that are an order-of-magnitude shorter at large ground ranges. This difference is likely due to the inability of these codes to treat the three-dimensional aspect of the slanted EMP incidence on the atmosphere.

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DOE OSTI2022

EMP Testing of UL489 Circuit Breakers

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is performing a test campaign for the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) to address high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) vulnerability of critical components of generation stations, with focus on early-time (E1) HEMP. The campaign seeks to establish response and damage thresholds for these critical elements in response to reasonable HEMP threat levels as a means for determining where vulnerabilities may exist or where mitigations may be needed. This report provides component vulnerability test results that will help to inform site vulnerability assessments and HEMP mitigation planning.

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DOE OSTI2022

Ensuring a Nuclear Power Plant Safe State Following an EMP Event - Task 7 Deliverable: EMP Testing of Secondary Coupling to Instrumentation Cables

Sandia National Laboratories performed tests to address the potential vulnerability concerns of a coupled High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) inducing secondary coupling onto critical instrumentation and control cables in a nuclear power plant, with specific focus on early-time HEMP. Three types of receiving cables in nine configurations were tested to determine transfer functions between two electrically separated cables referenced to the common mode input current on the transmitting cable. One type of transfer function related the input short circuit current and resulting open circuit voltage on the receiving cable. The other transfer function related the input short circuit current and the resulting short circuit current on the receiving cable. A 500 A standard HEMP waveform was input into the transfer functions to calculate peak coupling values on the receiving cables. The highest level of coupling using the standard waveform occurred when cables were in direct contact, with a peak short circuit current of 85 A and open circuit voltage of 9.8 kV, while configurations with separated cables predicted coupling levels of less than 5 A or 500 V.

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DOE OSTI2022

Operation Fishbowl

Fishbowl’s primary objective was to generate data on electromagnetic pulses (EMP), the creation and behavior of auroras, and the impact of a high altitude nuclear burst on radio communications. Previous high altitude tests (Teak, Orange, and Yucca) were not instrumented to provide such data, which was deemed critical to countering any Soviet high altitude bursts. The first test of Fishbowl, Starfish Prime, exploded on July 9th with a yield of 1.4 megatons. Standing on Christmas Island, Austin McGuire witnessed the effects of the event.

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DOE OSTI2022

Industry Requirements for Geomagnetic Disturbance Models

This research project will address the most pressing uncertainties in modeling and measuring the electric power grid effects of geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) and the E3 portion of nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The primary goal is to help decision-makers in the electric power sector have the knowledge and tools they need to most effectively mitigate GMD effects on our nation’s electric grid, with a secondary focus on EMP. Comprehensive modeling, model assessment through sensitivity analysis, and validation with field measurement data will be the primary tasks undertaken. The goal will be a more widespread adoption of these modeling approaches, namely characterizing the uncertainty associated with these models and how that uncertainty will affect decision-making by industry. This document summarizes industry requirements for better decision-making tools, informed by feedback from an industry advisory board. These requirements help guide planning and execution of the project's remaining tasks.

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DOE OSTI2024

EMP Testing of NAE Magnetic Motor Starters

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) performed a high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) critical generation station component vulnerability test campaign with a focus on high-frequency, conducted early-time (E1) HEMP for the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). This report provides vulnerability test results to investigate component response and/or damage thresholds to reasonable HEMP threat levels that will help to inform site vulnerability assessments, mitigation planning, and modeling calibrations. This work details testing of North American Electric (NAE) magnetic motor starters to determine the effects of conducted HEMP environments. Motor starters are the control elements that provide power to motors throughout a generating plant; a starter going offline would cause loss of power to critical pumps and compressors, which could lead to component damage or unplanned plant outages. Additionally, failed starters would be unable to support plant startup. Six industrial motor starters were tested: two 2 horsepower (HP) starters with breaker disconnects and typical protection equipment, two 20 HP starters with breaker disconnects, and two 20 HP starters with fused disconnects. Each starter was placed in a circuit with a generator and inductive motor matching the starter rating. The conducted EMP insult was injected on the power cables passing through the motor starter, with separate tests for the generator and motor sides of the starter.

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DOE OSTI2023

4.5m GTEM RS105 Test Capability Commissioning

This work details the reconfiguration of the 4.5 m Gigahertz Transverse Electromagnetic test facility at Sandia National Laboratories to operate in accordance with the RS105 (radiated susceptibility) test from MIL-STD-461 representing a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse. This reconfiguration involved removal of the existing continuous wave source and connecting both a high voltage feed and a coaxial feed housing the Marx bank pulser. Marx control settings were calibrated for several voltage levels across two pulsers, and position-dependent measurements of the peak electric field were taken throughout the test volume for each pulser. The results showed field uniformity and purity across the test volume comparable to continuous wave operations, and field peaks were measured from 1.63 kV/m to 54.8 kV/m, with maximum capabilities expected to exceed 100 kV/m. Some challenges in consistent pulser operations at lower Marx bank voltages and high frequency reflections in the system were identified for future capability improvements.

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DOE OSTI2025

Electric Grid Security (EGS) FY24 Annual Report

Sandia’s Electric Grid Security program advances a national vision of a secure, resilient, and affordable electric system for all users. Our achievements reflect a strategic approach combining technology development; modeling, simulation, and data analytics; and partnered demonstrations and outreach to further the adoption of advanced grid and storage technologies. Our FY24 efforts leverage the strengths of our partnerships—spanning Sandia’s core science and technology competencies as well as external technology leaders—to develop the solutions today which enable the grid of tomorrow. Key accomplishments in this report that support our strategy span our technical program areas and include: • The advancement of energy storage technologies, including creation of a national Long Duration Energy Storage Consortium; • Applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning to enhanced grid operations and planning; • Development of solid-state power conversion technologies and a new medium-voltage research lab; • New technologies to assess wildfire vulnerabilities and mitigate potential impacts; • Advanced applications of new cybersecurity technologies with industry partners; • Contributions to understanding the impacts of electromagnetic pulses and geomagnetic disturbances on grid components; and • Digital twin development for hybrid microgrids with multiple generators, storage, and loads.

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DOE OSTI2025

Solid State Transformer Architecture and Control Compensation for Common Mode Currents

A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) or similar geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) has the potential to impact the operation of large-scale electric power grids. By introducing low-frequency common-mode (CM) currents, these events can degrade the performance of critical system components, such as large power transformers by introducing CM currents which can lead to magnetic saturation of the transformer core. In this work, a solid-state transformer (SST) is developed to replace susceptible equipment and improve grid resiliency by safely absorbing these CM disturbances. This device will be referred to as a common-mode solid-state transformer (CM-SST). An SST architecture based on a four-legged AC/DC converter is developed. This architecture enables active control of CM signals without disturbing the AC voltages or the real and reactive power delivery capabilities. A system-level model of this architecture is created, and time-domain simulations are performed to evaluate the SST’s performance in response to simulated CM disturbances. A control strategy for mitigating CM current is also investigated. Hamiltonian surface shaping and power flow control (HSSPFC) is used to design a nonlinear controller for the SST’s output inverter. The objectives of the controller are to suppress CM-induced AC current offsets and regulate AC currents to desired setpoints. Nonlinear system analysis is applied to design and validate the controller. Two cases are tested: (a) the proposed four-leg inverter and (b) a standard three-leg inverter. The results show that the proposed controller rapidly mitigates CM disturbances while maintaining high-quality AC current waveforms in the four-leg configuration. Finally, the hardware performance of an SST prototype is evaluated. In particular, the ability of the SST to safely redirect and absorb CM currents is demonstrated, showing how it can protect neighboring conventional transformers in the system. The study confirms that appropriate control laws allow the SST to protect both itself and adjacent transformers during a HEMP or GMD event.

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DOE OSTI2025

Probabilistic Impact Assessment and Software Tool Requirements

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DOE OSTI2026

FY25 Electric Grid Security Annual Report

Sandia’s Electric Grid Security program advances a national vision of energy dominance and accessibility, while applying our national security -emphasis on ensuring of a secure, resilient, and affordable electric system for all users. Our achievements reflect a strategic approach combining technology development; modeling, simulation, and data analytics; and partnered demonstrations and outreach to further the adoption of advanced grid and storage technologies. Our FY25 efforts leverage the strengths of our partnerships—spanning Sandia’s core science and technology competencies as well as external technology leaders—to develop the solutions today which enable the grid of tomorrow. Key accomplishments in this report that support our strategy span our technical program areas and include: • New open-source analytical tools for systems -level planning and optimization, including significant advances to the QuESt analytical environment; • Further advancement of artificial intelligence and machine learning to enhanced grid operations and planning as we rise to the challenge of new large loads; • Development of solid-state power conversion technologies and a new medium-voltage research lab; • New technologies to assess wildfire vulnerabilities and mitigate potential impacts; • Advanced applications of new cybersecurity technologies with industry partners; • Contributions to understanding the impacts of electromagnetic pulses and geomagnetic disturbances on grid components; and • Digital twin development for hybrid microgrids with multiple generators, storage, and loads. This report indicates key areas of research and engagement and summarizes the impact of Sandia’s contributions through notable accomplishments, journal publications, patents, and technical conferences and presentations. It is provided with the hope that readers discover ways we can further team to create our modern grid and apply the outcomes of our efforts. The bulk of work described herein is funded by several offices within the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE), including the Office of Electricity (OE); Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER); former offices such as the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), the Grid Deployment Office (GDO), the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED), and other key programs at USDOE. As we continue to state in these annual reports, the contributors to our successes are too numerous to name here, though our team wishes to express our deep gratitude to the numerous program and project sponsors at the US Department of Energy, who often function equally as technical collaborators; our many partners in industry, academia, utilities, and other national labs; and fellow researchers and business partners at Sandia whose leadership and creativity have enabled the accomplishments described herein.

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