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At least 91 records · Page 5

Flight Systems Integration & Test: Lessons Learned for Future Success

This paper offers a comprehensive view of flight system integration and test (I&T) lessons learned related to mishaps and close calls, focusing on what can be done to improve the I&T process to avoid recurrence. Specific areas within the realm of I&T that are covered in this paper include: I&T team communication and training; design of flight and ground systems for I&T; planning and scheduling; configuration management and process documentation; ground support equipment and tools; cleanrooms and contamination; mechanical integration, handling, and deployments; electrical integration and electrostatic discharge; functional testing and troubleshooting; environmental testing and facilities; and launch site operations. To illustrate "real-world" lessons learned for I&T, examples from throughout the history of the U.S. space program are presented. Also presented are some best practices for I&T that can help mitigate mishaps and close calls on the ground or during flight.

Integration & Test↗

Restricted and Uncontained: Health Care and Public Health Considerations in the Event of Loss of Containment During the Restricted Earth Return of Extraterrestrial Samples

The normal scope of an adequate public health response to released biological material is framed by working with biological vectors with known pathogenicity and virulence. Defining the scope of a response to the release of biological material with unknown pathogenicity and virulence enters into a novel and yet to be framed domain. A current case, the case of returning samples from a location other than Earth, extraterrestrial samples from a location such as Mars, which may harbor life as we know it, requires framing a public health response. An unintentional release of biological material with unknown pathogenicity and virulence may occur when biological containment mechanisms in the Earth-returning transport method are lost. This paper raises initial public health and healthcare response questions during a return of extraterrestrial samples to Earth, in the event of its release from biological containment mechanisms: How does the public health community prepare for a response when there is release of samples that may contain potential extraterrestrial organisms from a planetary body or hardy terrestrial organisms surviving a round trip? If a mishap occurs during the return of these samples, what considerations need to be made to confine, decontaminate, and collect material in regions around the mishap? How will the public health community work with relevant government organizations to prepare the general public? The unknowns of exposure, potential extraterrestrial pathogenicity, and decontamination approaches, underscore gaps in biopreparedness for this novel case from the federal to local levels.

Betsy Pugel↗

Space Launch System Engine Out Capabilities

NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) is being developed with the primary purpose of returning people to the Moon and eventually landing people on Mars. With these lofty goals, ensuring mission completion is paramount even in the event of an in-flight mishap. One possible mishap is the loss of an engine in flight. While SLS was not required to show full engine out capability, the program took an ``assess to'' approach to see when the launch vehicle could complete the mission after an engine failure versus when the launch vehicle targets required a down-mode to an alternate mission target to ensure at least some flight objectives were complete, or at a minimum ensure safe return of Orion and the Crew. While this paper will focus on Artemis I, an uncrewed mission, some comparisons will be made to how the engine out capability will change for the subsequent Crewed flights of SLS and Orion.

Engine Out↗

Space Launch System Engine Out Capabilities

NASA's SLS is being developed with the primary purpose of returning people to the Moon and eventually landing people on Mars. With these lofty goals, ensuring mission completion is paramount even in the event of an in-flight mishap. One possible mishap is the loss of an engine in flight. While SLS was not required to show full engine out capability, the program took an ``assess to'' approach to see when the launch vehicle could complete the mission after an engine failure versus when the launch vehicle targets required a down-mode to an alternate mission target to ensure at least some flight objectives were complete, or at a minimum ensure safe return of Orion and the Crew. While this paper will focus on Artemis I, an uncrewed mission, some comparisons will be made to how the engine out capability will change for the subsequent Crewed flights of SLS and Orion.

Space Launch System↗

Evaluating Faulty State Occurrence in Wildfire UAS Missions Using Markov Chains

As autonomous technology advances, unmanned aircraft systems are increasingly integrated into emergency response missions, such as wildfire response. These systems must be be safe with less risk than non-autonomous counter parts, yet quantifying the risk associated with present-day and future systems conventionally relies solely on expert opinion and little data. Instead, combining narrative mishap reports with probabilistic analysis can provide a method for evolutionary and timely risk analysis. In this paper, we present a framework for a data-driven probabilistic risk assessment style analysis, where hazard events and rates originate from documented UAS mishaps. The framework is applied to a UAS mapping mission in wildfire response, including a fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and probabilistic analysis using Markov Chains. The analysis provides an enumeration of hazards in the system, hazard events that can lead to faults, the probability of a mission experiencing any fault, the probability of experiencing a specific fault, and the expected time spent until faulty states occur in present-day operations.

risk analysis↗

Evaluating Faulty State Occurrence in Wildfire UAS Missions Using Markov Chains

As autonomous technology advances, unmanned aircraft systems are increasingly integrated into emergency response missions, such as wildfire response. These systems must be be safe with less risk than non-autonomous counter parts, yet quantifying the risk associated with present-day and future systems conventionally relies solely on expert opinion and little data. Instead, combining narrative mishap reports with probabilistic analysis can provide a method for evolutionary and timely risk analysis. In this paper, we present a framework for a data-driven probabilistic risk assessment style analysis, where hazard events and rates originate from documented UAS mishaps. The framework is applied to a UAS mapping mission in wildfire response, including a fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and probabilistic analysis using Markov Chains. The analysis provides an enumeration of hazards in the system, hazard events that can lead to faults, the probability of a mission experiencing any fault, the probability of experiencing a specific fault, and the expected time spent until faulty states occur in present-day operations.

risk analysis↗

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned

On February 25, 2026, two NASA Talks were held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery, Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes & Key Takeaways). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring these talks to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talks. NASA Mishap Program Specialist David Erickson and retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented these talks. Mr. Erickson supports NASA mishap investigations and assists with the development of NASA's new Columbia Learning Center at KSC. Mr. Thurston brought a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. These talks were timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team.

Space Shuttle Columbia↗

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned: Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes and Key Takeaways

On February 25, 2026, this NASA Talk was held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery, Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes & Key Takeaways). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring these talks to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talks. NASA Mishap Program Specialist David Erickson presented this talk. Mr. Erickson supports NASA mishap investigations and assists with the development of NASA's new Columbia Learning Center at KSC. This talk was timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team. This record includes an mp4 video with a run time of 32 min. 31 sec.; in color; with sound.

NASA Talks↗

Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)

Research results have shown that more than half of aviation, aerospace and aeronautics mishaps/incidents are attributed to human error. As a part of Safety within space exploration ground processing operations, the identification and/or classification of underlying contributors and causes of human error must be identified, in order to manage human error. This research provides a framework and methodology using the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), as an analysis tool to identify contributing factors, their impact on human error events, and predict the Human Error probabilities (HEPs) of future occurrences. This research methodology was applied (retrospectively) to six (6) NASA ground processing operations scenarios and thirty (30) years of Launch Vehicle related mishap data. This modifiable framework can be used and followed by other space and similar complex operations.

human error↗

Manned space programs accident/incident summaries (1963 - 1969)

This summary is a compilation of 508 mishaps assembled from company and NASA records which cover several years of manned space flight activity. The purpose is to provide information to be applied towards accident prevention. The accident/incident summaries are categorized by the following ten systems: cryogenic; electrical; facility/GSE; fuel and propellant; life support; ordnance; pressure; propulsion; structural; and transport/handling. Each accident/incident summary has been summarized by description, cause and recommended preventive action.

Source record↗

GRAN experiment

A global system for search and rescue was studied to reduce the time lost between a mishap and rescue efforts. The sequence of the GRAN concept proceeds as follows: (1) A distress call is initiated by a survivor and consists of the retransmission of Omega tones and a unique identifying code. (2) Signals are frequency translated through the satellite from UHF to SHF. (3) The received signals are processed in real-time using improved skywave correction and lane ambiguity techniques. The results are processed in geographical coordinates, time of day, and unique ID. This information is then relayed to the closest rescue agent. The Omega system is described, and the satellite/GRAN compatibility is discussed. The program plan and schedule are included.

Morakis, J. C.↗

Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations

Safety, as a major factor in the development of a power economy based on hydrogen produced by nuclear- or solar-energy operated water electrolysis, is considered in terms of the safety problems involved in the production, handling, transportation, and use of liquid and gaseous hydrogen. These problems are reviewed through the records of accidents and incidents that have occurred in the development and operation of NASA's propulsion and power systems. Areas of research and development are suggested for increased safety and for the development of techniques to reduce the consequences of any mishaps.

Ordin, P. M.↗

Flight to Mercury

The project development and active flight of the Mariner 10 deep-space probe mission is recounted in detail, with sequential blow-by-blow coverage. Early studies and speculation on the planet Mercury are reviewed, and the spin-orbit coupling and near-synchronous rotation of the planet are described. Use of Venus as a slingshot in a gravity-assist maneuver is described, and Mariner 10 records of Venus are shown. The three encounters of Mariner 10 with Mercury (March 1974, Aug. 1974, March 1975) are described in detail, with purposes, problems, mishaps, and glossy photographs recovered from Mariner 10 data. Information on the planet's magnetosphere, surface topography, inferred internal structure, and IR signature is provided, and the end-of-mission improvised solar-sail experiment is outlined.

Murray, B.↗

Lightning hazards to aircraft

Lightning hazards and, more generally, aircraft static electricity are discussed by a representative for the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory. An overview of these atmospheric electricity hazards to aircraft and their systems is presented with emphasis on electrical and electronic subsystems. The discussion includes reviewing some of the characteristics of lightning and static electrification, trends in weather and lightning-related mishaps, some specific threat mechanisms and susceptible aircraft subsystems and some of the present technology gaps. A roadmap (flow chart) is presented to show the direction needed to address these problems.

Corn, P. B.↗

Feasibility study of a procedure to detect and warn of low-level wind shear

The wind shear program is directed toward investigating the effects of wind shear on aerodynamic performance. Combining the Joint Airport Weather Studies wind shear data with the B-57B gust gradient data, the transient scales of motion involved in wind shear aircraft accidents or mishaps are being identified. The effect of variable winds having these time scales on the aerodynamic coefficients of moist airfoils were fully investigated. Transient and spatial variation of flow over the airfoil may cause premature stall or hysteresis effects which significantly impact the lift and drag (i.e., aerodynamic coefficients). Analysis of airfoil performance subject to 4-D variable flows will be carried out.

Frost, W.↗

Skylab: Its anguish and triumph - A memoir

During its ascent to earth orbit, Skylab, launched May 14, 1973, sustained severe damage due to the premature deployment of its micrometeoroid shield. In this paper, a participating engineer describes how a thermal shield repair concept was developed and appropriate hardware was built and tested within 11 days of the mishap, and how the repair concept was sucessfully implemented in space to rescue Skylab.

Von Puttkamer, J.↗

Cleared for the visual approach: Human factor problems in air carrier operations

The study described herein, a set of 353 ASRS reports of unique aviation occurrences significantly involving visual approaches was examined to identify hazards and pitfalls embedded in the visual approach procedure and to consider operational practices that might help avoid future mishaps. Analysis of the report set identified nine aspects of the visual approach procedure that appeared to be predisposing conditions for inducing or exacerbating the effects of operational errors by flight crew members or controllers. Predisposing conditions, errors, and operational consequences of the errors are discussed. In a summary, operational policies that might mitigate the problems are examined.

Monan, W. P.↗