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At least 991 records · Page 55

Electronic Medical Record Integration for Streamlined DXA Reporting

Dual-energy X-ray absorptiometry (DXA) is the most frequently performed examination to assess bone mineral density in clinical practice. Aside from images and graphical displays, many numerical values are part of DXA reports. These values are typically manually entered into the formal report through the electronic medical record or PACS workstation. The process takes time and is prone to errors. Exporting the DXA numerical data via HL7 engine to the electronic medical record was proposed to improve reporting efficiency and accuracy. The output from the DXA unit computer was reconfigured to export the report content via the HL7 interface engine into the electronic medical record. Radiology interpretive reporting was subsequently done directly in the electronic medical record. In the evaluation of errors, 100 preliminary DXA reports before the change and 100 after the change were examined. These reports were analyzed for errors that included decimal change, number transposition, negative number issue, other incorrect number error, and failure to include prior exam for comparison. In addition, report turnaround times were evaluated before and after the changes were made. Reporting time evaluations included 1-year volume prior to change (3915 reports) and 1 month post-change (206 reports). Of 100 DEXA exams before the change, 15 final reports contained 25 numerical errors. After the change, no numerical errors in the reports were identified. Exam end to final report time decreased from 2159 to 625 min on average. Automating data transmittal from the DXA modality for report generation improves accuracy and turnaround time. This approach did not require any third party software, and healthcare information security concerns were negated since we are using our standard workstations. Secondary to the affordability and applicability to the large percentage of the population using electronic medical record systems, this type of automated workflow is recommended.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Adapting Secure MultiParty Computation to Support Machine Learning in Radio Frequency Sensor Networks

In this project we developed and validated algorithms for privacy-preserving linear regression using a new variant of Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) we call "Hybrid MPC" (hMPC). Our variant is intended to support low-power, unreliable networks of sensors with low-communication, fault-tolerant algorithms. In hMPC we do not share training data, even via secret sharing. Thus, agents are responsible for protecting their own local data. Only the machine learning (ML) model is protected with information-theoretic security guarantees against honest-but-curious agents. There are three primary advantages to this approach: (1) after setup, hMPC supports a communication-efficient matrix multiplication primitive, (2) organizations prevented by policy or technology from sharing any of their data can participate as agents in hMPC, and (3) large numbers of low-power agents can participate in hMPC. We have also created an open-source software library named "Cicada" to support hMPC applications with fault-tolerance. The fault-tolerance is important in our applications because the agents are vulnerable to failure or capture. We have demonstrated this capability at Sandia's Autonomy New Mexico laboratory through a simple machine-learning exercise with Raspberry Pi devices capturing and classifying images while flying on four drones.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Automated Data Review of Analytical Laboratory Results at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 20299

Newport News Nuclear BWXT-Los Alamos, LLC (N3B) collects samples in support of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) Los Alamos Legacy Cleanup Contract (LLCC). N3B receives and reviews over 1.6 million sample data points annually in support of various ongoing environmental monitoring and remediation projects of the LLCC. N3B must demonstrate and document that reported external analytical laboratory data produced for the LLCC are of sufficient quality to fulfill their intended purpose and to support defensible decision making as described in EPA QA/G4 Guidance for the Data Quality Objectives Process 1994. In 2018, N3B assumed management of the LLCC along with the Environmental Information Management (EIM) database that contains all historical and current environmental data associated with the LLCC. The entire EIM database is shared between N3B, Triad National Security, LLC (Triad), and New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). These three parties jointly manage the database, its configuration, and changes / updates. All environmental data that are entered into EIM are updated and available, on a daily basis, in the linked public database Intellus New Mexico (Intellus). The quality and defensibility of the environmental data generated from sampling activities is a key component of an effective remediation process. Providing quality data is accomplished through a data assessment process that includes examination, verification, and validation. Examination is the assessment of completeness of the deliverables, identification of any reporting errors, and determining the usability of the data based on the laboratory's evaluation of its data as described in the case narrative received with the data. Verification consists of an evaluation of the Electronic Data Deliverables (EDD) data report to determine the extent to which the external analytical laboratories met method and contract-specific quality control and reporting requirements. Validation consists of determining the data quality and the extent to which the external analytical laboratories accurately and completely reported all sample and quality control results and satisfied all contract requirements. EIM contains an automatic Data Validation Module which performs automated data review (DVM ADR). DVM ADR is a tool to assist in the validation process. When DVM ADR is used in conjunction with manual examination of sample data packages, the combination of the two will meet and exceed the requirements of verification. N3B recognized an opportunity for process improvement, focusing on DVM ADR configuration and enhancements in EIM. Testing EIM's configuration provided proof of the DVM ADR's capabilities and flexibility to accurately perform routine data checks based on analytical methods and regulatory requirements. In addition, the DVM ADR module was improved through enhancements for all analytes, particularly upgrades for radiochemistry data. Extensive testing of the DVM ADR module occurred using EDDs from actual laboratory analyses on the EIM testing site. During this process, N3B manipulated EDD information to verify that the actual outcomes matched the expected outcomes. The results of this testing were shared with the database architects, and configuration improvements were identified to address these results. During this process, N3B identified that the radiochemical DVM ADR capabilities were underutilized, and so enhanced the DVM ADR functionality with respect to radioanalytical assessment. N3B environmental data uploads to Intellus on a daily basis from EIM, once the analytical data undergoes examination and verification. As such, it is important to have a high level of confidence in the quality and defensibility of the data. The process of manual examination, along with the DVM ADR, in conjunction with full validation of a percentage the data specified through the Data Quality Objectives greatly increases efficiency of data review and confidence level of the quality of the data, and gives the project managers, governmental offices, and the public expedited access to high-quality data. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Open Power System Datasets and Open Simulation Engines: A Survey Toward Machine Learning Applications

A major factor behind the success of machine learning (ML) models in multiple domains is the availability and accessibility of large, labeled, and well-organized datasets for training and benchmarking. In comparison, power grid datasets face three major challenges: (i) real-world data is often restricted by regulatory constraints, privacy reasons, or security concerns, making it difficult to obtain and work with; (ii) synthetic datasets, which are created to address these limitations, often have incomplete information and are released using specialized tools, making them inaccessible to the broader community; and, (iii) input-output datasets are difficult to generate through simulation for non-experts because open-source simulators are not known outside the power system community. This survey addresses these challenges by serving as an entry point to publicly available datasets and simulators for researchers venturing in this area. We review the current landscape of open-source power network data, machine models, consumer demand profiles, renewable generation data, and inverter models. We also examine open-source power system simulators, which are crucial for generating high-quality, high-fidelity power grid datasets. We aim to provide a foundation for overcoming data scarcity and advance towards a structured web of datasets and simulators to support the development of ML for power systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Hypothetical Case and Scenario Description for International Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel.

To support more rigorous analysis on global security issues at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), there is a need to develop realistic data sets without using "real" data or identifying "real" vulnerabilities, hazards or geopolitically embarrassing shortcomings. In response, an interdisciplinary team led by subject matter experts in SNL's Center for Global Security and Cooperation (CGSC) developed a hypothetical case description. This hypothetical case description assigns various attributes related to international SNF transportation that are representative, illustrative and indicative of "real" characteristics of "real" countries. There is no intent to identify any particular country and any similarity with specific real-world events is purely coincidental. To support the goal of this report to provide a case description (and set of scenarios of concern) for international SNF transportation inclusive of as much "real-world" complexity as possible -- without crossing over into politically sensitive or classified information -- this SAND report provides a subject matter expert-validated (and detailed) description of both technical and political influences on the international transportation of spent nuclear fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Area 25 and Area 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539, Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, as identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). A modification to the FFACOwas approved in May 2010 to transfer the two Railroad Tracks corrective action sites (CASs) from CAU 114 into CAU539. The two CASs are located in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site: • 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracks • 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing the two CASs. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of the CAU 539 Railroad Tracks CASs using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation should support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. If it is determined that complete clean closure cannot be accomplished during the SAFER, then a hold point will have been reached and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine whether the remaining contamination will be closed under the alternative corrective action of closure in place with use restrictions. This will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to the NDEP for review and approval. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on December 14, 2009, by representatives of U.S.Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Navarro Nevada Environmental Services, LLC (NNES); and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process has been used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for each Railroad Tracks CAS in CAU 539. The following text summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 539: • Perform site preparation activities (e.g., utilities clearances, radiological surveys). • Collect in situ dose measurements. • Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., lead bricks) to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information. • If no COCs are present at a CAS, establish no further action as the corrective action. • If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of COC contamination. If a COC is present at a CAS, NNES will consult NDEP to determine the path forward, then either: • Establish clean closure as the corrective action. The material to be remediated will be removed, disposed of as waste, and verification samples will be collected from remaining soil, or • Establish closure in place as the corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Decision Science for Machine Learning (DeSciML)

The increasing use of machine learning (ML) models to support high-consequence decision making drives a need to increase the rigor of ML-based decision making. Critical problems ranging from climate change to nonproliferation monitoring rely on machine learning for aspects of their analyses. Likewise, future technologies, such as incorporation of data-driven methods into the stockpile surveillance and predictive failure analysis for weapons components, will all rely on decision-making that incorporates the output of machine learning models. In this project, our main focus was the development of decision scientific methods that combine uncertainty estimates for machine learning predictions, with a domain-specific model of error costs. Other focus areas include uncertainty measurement in ML predictions, designing decision rules using multiobjecive optimization, the value of uncertainty reduction, and decision-tailored uncertainty quantification for probability estimates. By laying foundations for rigorous decision making based on the predictions of machine learning models, these approaches are directly relevant to every national security mission that applies, or will apply, machine learning to data, most of which entail some decision context.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Applied ML Needs in Uncrewed Aerial Systems [Slides]

We have an urgent need to optimize data analyses and UAS operations to better position its use in sensitive and high-consequence national security applications. LANL has a mature, robust, and multidisciplinary UAS deployment capability with proficiency in single and multi-modal data acquisition for signature detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Implementing and Evaluating Multithreaded Triad Census Algorithms on the Cray XMT

Commonly represented as directed graphs, social networks depict relationships and behaviors among social entities such as people, groups, and organizations. Social network analysis denotes a class of mathematical and statistical methods designed to study and measure social networks. Beyond sociolo-gy, social network analysis methods are being applied to other types of data in other domains such as bioinformatics, computer networks, national security, and economics. For particular problems, the size of a social network can grow to millions of nodes and tens of millions of edges or more. In such cases, researchers could benefit from the application of social network analysis algorithms on high-performance architectures and systems. The Cray XMT is a third generation multithreaded system based on the Cray XT-3/4 platform. Like most other multithreaded architectures, the Cray XMT is designed to tolerate memory access latencies by switching context between threads. The processors maintain multiple threads of execution and util-ize hardware-based context switching to overlap the memory latency incurred by any thread with the computations from other threads. Due to its memory latency tolerance, the Cray XMT has the poten-tial of significantly improving the execution speed of irregular data-intensive applications such as those found in social network analysis. In this paper, we describe our experiences in developing and optimizing three implementations of a social network analysis method known as triadic analysis to execute on the Cray XMT. The three im-plementations possess different execution complexities, qualities, and characteristics. We evaluate how the various attributes of the codes affect their performance on the Cray XMT. We also explore the effects of different compiler options and execution strategies on the different triadic analysis im-plementations and identify general XMT programming issues and lessons learned.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

2011.2 Revision of the Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (ENDL2011.2)

LLNL's Computational Nuclear Physics Group and Nuclear Theory and Modeling Group have col- laborated to create the 2011.2 revised release of the Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (ENDL2011.2). ENDL2011.2 is designed to support LLNL's current and future nuclear data needs and will be em- ployed in nuclear reactor, nuclear security and stockpile stewardship simulations with ASC codes. This database is currently the most complete nuclear database for Monte Carlo and deterministic transport of neutrons and charged particles. This library was assembled with strong support from the ASC PEM and Attribution programs, leveraged with support from Campaign 4 and the DOE/O ce of Science's US Nuclear Data Program. This document lists the revisions made in ENDL2011.2 compared with the data existing in the original ENDL2011.0 release and the ENDL2011.1-rc4 re- lease candidate of April 2015. These changes are made in parallel with some similar revisions for ENDL2009.2.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Resilient Transmission Hardening Planning in a High Renewable Penetration Erra

Hardening components in transmission systems is a practice to improve system resilience against possible disturbances caused by natural disasters. In a power system with a very high penetration of renewable energy, the system hardening will be further complicated by the uncertainty and variability of renewable energy. In this paper, we study the transmission line hardening planing problem in the context of probabilistic power flows injected by the high penetration of renewable energy. We assume that the probabilistic information of renewable energy is incomplete and ambiguous and propose a data-driven approach to approximate the renewable uncertainty sets. We then extend the N - 1 security criteria to multiple simultaneous contingencies and seek to prepare a hardening plan for the worst-case scenarios. A two-stage data-driven stochastic model is formulated by considering the joint worst-case wind output distribution and transmission line contingencies. Then, we apply the Column-and-Constraints generation method to solve the proposed model. To test the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we conduct experiments on 24-bus and 118-bus test systems. We numerically show that the data-driven approach can effectively address the uncertainty ambiguity and the proposed approach can produce effective hardening plans that improve the system resilience.

Column-and-Constraint generation↗

Revisiting Current Paradigms: Subject Matter Expert Views on High Consequence Facility Security Assessments

Security assessments support decision-makers' ability to evaluate current capabilities of high consequence facilities (HCF) to respond to possible attacks. However, increasing complexity of today's operational environment requires a critical review of traditional approaches to ensure that implemented assessments are providing relevant and timely insights into security of HCFs. Using interviews and focus groups with diverse subject matter experts (SMEs), this study evaluated the current state of security assessments and identified opportunities to achieve a more "ideal" state. The SME-based data underscored the value of a systems approach for understanding the impacts of changing operational designs and contexts (as well as cultural influences) on security to address methodological shortcomings of traditional assessment processes. These findings can be used to inform the development of new approaches to HCF security assessments that are able to more accurately reflect changing operational environments and effectively mitigate concerns arising from new adversary capabilities.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Joint Analysis of Surface Deformation Data for Reservoir Management (CRADA Final Report)

This was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Chevron North America Exploration and Production Company, a division of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (Chevron), to develop an operational tool to carry out joint inversion of global positioning system (GPS), Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR) and tilt, temperature, and electrical resistivity data to monitor the temporal and spatial evolution of fluid volume and temperature in a thermal diatomite oilfield. The original goal of the research and development carried out under the CRADA was to conduct joint inversion of GPS, InSAR and tilt data sets from Chevron’s McKittrick field. Temperature and electrical resistivity data were added to the joint inversion scheme at later stages of the project. The overall objective of the joint inversion was to provide improved mapping over time of changes in the spatial distributions of reservoir fluid volume and temperature within the reservoir in response to injection and production. This CRADA was originally designated as a three (3) year project, and was to be carried out in four phases. Each task was numbered according to the project phase it fell under. The four phases are identified below. Phases 3 and 4 were developed based on the results obtained in Phase 2, and the detailed work plan and refined budget were added by amendment.

Foxall, William↗

Security analysis of RSA cryptosystem algorithm and it’s properties

The information technology rapidly development and dramatically changed the life style people, in addition to shortening the distance of communication, but also promote the smooth exchange of information flows. However, derivatives to facilitate the relative safety of these issues, since into the digital information age, the majority of the practitioners of engineering and technical personnel and technical workers in terms of technology, information security is increasingly becoming an important issue. The RSA algorithm was published in 1978. It is a kind of very popular and widely application modem cryptosystem in the world. Even though there are lots of articles to discuss about how to break the RSA, but it is still secure today. In this paper, the authors would like to introduce a variant attack to RSA.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

2015 HPC Annual Report

Center 9300 is very proud to provide a wide range of computing and networking resources ranging from desktop support to high performance computing that enable Sandia’s national security mission needs. Our goal is to provide these services in the most efficient, secure, user friendly, and agile means necessary. High performance computing is one example of how we are delivering on this goal. Thanks to investments from NNSA’s Advanced Simulation and Computing program, coupled with Sandia’s Institutional Computing program, a wide variety of computing resources are available and used to support national security needs. This year we are expanding our high performance computing infrastructure with the procurement of institutional resources for information computing or analytics. Big data analytics has been the buzzword in the computing industry for over a decade now and industries in finance, food and drug, business, and security organizations have been leading the charge. Much like how scientific computing has changed the way science and engineering are performed, data analytics is changing just about every aspect of our lives and more especially our ability to contribute to the national security mission of Sandia. This third edition of our HPC Annual Report continues our commitment to communicate the details and impact of Sandia’s large-scale computing resources that support missions work across Sandia. The Laboratories’ and NNSA’s strategic investments in high performance computing demonstrate our commitment to keeping mission-related research on the cutting edge of science, at pace with technology advances, and at a scale that meets the toughest demands of the nation we so proudly serve.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Next Generation Trusted Radiation Identification System (NG-TRIS).

The original Trusted Radiation Identification System (TRIS) was developed from 1999-2001, featuring information barrier technology to collect gamma radiation template measurements useful for arms control regime operations. The first TRIS design relied upon a multichannel analyzer (MCA) that was external to the protected volume of the system enclosure, undesirable from a system security perspective. An internal complex programmable logic device (CPLD) contained data which was not subject to software authentication. Physical authentication of the TRIS instrument case was performed by a sensitive but slow eddy-current inspection method. This paper describes progress to date for the Next Generation TRIS (NG-TRIS), which improves the TRIS design. We have incorporated the MCA internal to the trusted system volume, achieved full authentication of CPLD data, and have devised rapid methods to authenticate the system enclosure and weld seals of the NG-TRIS enclosure. For a complete discussion of the TRIS system and components upon which NG-TRIS is based, the reader is directed to the comprehensive user's manual and system reference of Seager, et al.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗