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At least 1,009 records · Page 56

Verification of a Configuration Space Method for Evaluating the All-Orders Linear Kinetic Plasma Response to RF Power

Progress towards verification of a configuration space algorithm for evaluating the linear kinetic plasma current response to applied radio-frequency power is presented. This follows a previously published [1] verification of the parallel-only response, by verifying the perpendicular response required for much of the ion-and electron-cyclotron range of frequencies. In particular, we use the Colestock-Kashuba fast-wave to ion-Bernstein-wave benchmark [2] where we show that the Kinetic-J computational kernel is able to reproduce a known reference solution calculated via the AORSA full-wave code [3]. We also discuss the computational and scaling aspects of this novel approach, as well as the difficulties presented by the temporal scales in this multi-species problem.

Green, David↗

Verification of a Numerical Model of the Offshore Wind Turbine from the Alpha Ventus Wind Farm Within OC5 Phase III: Preprint

The main objective of the Offshore Code Comparison Collaboration Continuation, with Correlation (OC5) project, is validation of aero-hydro-servo-elastic simulation tools for offshore wind turbines (OWTs) through comparison of simulated results to the response data of physical systems. Phase III of the OC5 project analyzes the Senvion 5M wind turbine supported by the OWEC Quattropod from the alpha ventus offshore wind farm. This paper shows results of the verification of the OWT models (code-to-code comparison). A subsequent publication will focus on their validation (comparison of simulated results to measured physical system response data). Based on the available data, the participants of Phase III set up numerical models of the OWT in their simulation tools. It was necessary to verify and to tune these models. The verification and tuning were performed against an OWT model available at the University of Stuttgart - Stuttgart Wind Energy (SWE) and documentation provided by Senvion and OWEC Tower. A very good match was achieved between the results from the reference SWE model and models set up by OC5 Phase III participants.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Field programmable gate array bitstream verification

Described herein are various technologies pertaining to confirming an integrity of a FPGA. A verifier circuit is placed into an FPGA bitstream to enable external verification of the FPGA configuration in real time without requiring readout of the FPGA configuration itself. Number generators are utilized to generate a key which is shared between the FPGA and an external verification component (VC). The key is utilized to configure an initial state of sequence registers respectively located on both the FPGA and the VC. When the FPGA is operating with an approved configuration, output from the sequence registers at the FPGA and the VC are the same.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Verification and Validation of Systems in which AI is a Key Element

Many systems are being considered in which artificial intelligence (AI) will be a key element. Failure of an AI element can lead to system failure, hence the need for AI verification and validation (V&V). This article addresses V&V of such a system, focusing on the issues created by characteristics of AI that make V&V challenging. The element(s) containing AI capabilities is treated as a subsystem and V&V is conducted on that subsystem and its interfaces with other elements of the system under study, just as V&V would be conducted on other subsystems. That is, the high-level definitions of verification and of validation do not change for systems containing one or more AI elements. However, AI V&V challenges require approaches and solutions beyond those for conventional or traditional (those without AI elements) systems. This article provides an overview of how machine learning components/subsystems “fit” in the systems engineering framework (Section 1), identifies characteristics of AI subsystems that create challenges in their V&V (Section 2), describes those challenges (Section 3) and provides some potential solutions (Section 4).

Pullum, Laura↗

(Paper) TRIPWIRE: Multi-modal Distributed Sensing For Repository Verification

Underground geological repositories for storing used nuclear fuel are being planned and developed around the world. Research is being performed to understand technical aspects of sealing entombed materials and underground repositories to ensure the radiological and nuclear materials remain contained. To support safeguards verification for these facilities research at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is underway to develop and demonstrate a multi-modal sensor system, TRIPWIRE, for containment verification in inaccessible radiological and nuclear waste repositories. The TRIPWIRE system will continuously monitor ionizing radiation and electromagnetic fields in the vicinity of emplaced nuclear materials buried in a repository, reporting on disturbances with a real-time alarm control station. The system will use long-length scintillating fiber bundles (SFBs) to perform area radiation monitoring; these will be coupled to kilometer-scale multimodal optical communication fibers – all light sensors and electronic components used with this system will be located above ground. Electromagnetic fields, and changes in local dielectric conditions caused by intrusion and soil movement, will be monitored using commercial grade, ported "leaky" coaxial cables (PCCs), with control electronics also located above ground. Tamper-indicating self-diagnostic assessments will be done using optical and electronic time domain reflectometry in the SFBs and PCCs, respectively. The result will be a long, kilometer-scale multi-modal SFB-PCC system. Simulation and modeling are being used to inform the work and a demonstration of the system's utility is planned at a nuclear storage facility in the future.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Demonstration and Verification of Thermo-Mechanical Bowing in a Limited Free-Bow SFR Concept Using MOOSE

Core bowing due to thermal gradients and irradiation induced swelling and creep introduces significant reactivity feedback effects in liquid metal-cooled fast spectrum reactors. During startup, normal operations, and transient events, differential thermal and flux gradients cause expansion, creep, and swelling, which results in bowing in preferential directions depending on local material properties and load-pad and restraint-ring design. The bowing phenomenon produces negative reactivity during accident conditions provided the restraint system has been properly designed to optimally guide the deformation outwards in the active core region. Under the Department of Energy Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation program, a Multiphysics Object Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE)-based multiphysics approach to model core bowing is being developed. The present work expands on previous modeling of simpler International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification problems with these tools by modeling IAEA Verification Problem 4, which involves a symmetric sector of a reactor core with ducted assemblies undergoing differential thermal expansion due to thermal gradients bowing outward with duct-to-duct contact. This model is available on the National Reactor Innovation Center Virtual Test Bed repository. This example was verified against benchmark participant results, which includes bowing deformation evaluation and duct-to-duct interactions at load pads with mechanical contact.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Simulated Verification of Fuel Element Inventory in a Small Reactor Core Using the Nuclear Materials Identification System (NMIS)

The International Panel on Climate Change projects that by 2050 the world energy demand may double. Although the primary focus for new nuclear power plants in industrialized nations is on large plants in the 1000-1600 MWe range, there is an increasing demand for small and medium reactors (SMRs). About half of the innovative SMR concepts are for small (< 300 MWe) reactors with a 5–30-year life without on-site refueling. This type of reactor is also known as a battery-type reactor. These reactors are particularly attractive to countries with small power grids and for non-electrical purposes such as heating, hydrogen production, and seawater desalination. Traditionally, this type of reactor has been used in a nautical propulsion role. This type of reactor is designed as a permanently sealed unit to prevent the diversion of the uranium in the core by the user. However, after initial fabrication it will be necessary to verify that the newly fabricated reactor core contains the quantity of uranium that initially entered the fuel fabrication plant. In most instances, traditional inspection techniques can be used to perform this verification, but in certain situations the core design will be considered sensitive. Non-intrusive verification techniques must be utilized in these situations. The Nuclear Materials Identification System (NMIS) with imaging uses active interrogation and a fast time correlation processor to characterize fissile material. The MCNP-PoliMi computer code was used to simulate NMIS measurements of a small, sealed reactor core. Because most battery-type reactor designs are still in the early design phase, a more traditional design based on a Russian icebreaker core was used in the simulations. These simulations show how the radiography capabilities of the NMIS could be used to detect the diversion of fissile material by detecting void areas in the assembled core where fuel elements have been removed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Imaging for dismantlement verification: information management and analysis algorithms

The level of detail discernible in imaging techniques has generally excluded them from consideration as verification tools in inspection regimes. An image will almost certainly contain highly sensitive information, and storing a comparison image will almost certainly violate a cardinal principle of information barriers: that no sensitive information be stored in the system. To overcome this problem, some features of the image might be reduced to a few parameters suitable for definition as an attribute. However, this process must be performed with care. Computing the perimeter, area, and intensity of an object, for example, might reveal sensitive information relating to shape, size, and material composition. This paper presents three analysis algorithms that reduce full image information to non-sensitive feature information. Ultimately, the algorithms are intended to provide only a yes/no response verifying the presence of features in the image. We evaluate the algorithms on both their technical performance in image analysis, and their application with and without an explicitly constructed information barrier. The underlying images can be highly detailed, since they are dynamically generated behind the information barrier. We consider the use of active (conventional) radiography alone and in tandem with passive (auto) radiography.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

VERIFICATION SURVEY ACTIVITIES IN FS SURVEY UNITS 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 & 14 AT THE SEPARATIONS PROCESS RESEARCH UNIT

FINAL INTERIM REPORT VERIFICATION SURVEY ACTIVITIES IN FINAL STATUS SURVEY UNITS 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 AND 14 AT THE SEPARATIONS PROCESS RESEARCH UNIT, Niskayuna, New York 0496-SR-03-0. The Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU) facilities were constructed in the late 1940s to research the chemical separation of plutonium and uranium. SPRU operated between February 1950 and October 1953. The research activities ceased following the successful development of the reduction/oxidation and plutonium/uranium extraction processes that were subsequently used by the Hanford and the Savannah River sites.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗