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The purpose of this test was to perform the radiation lot acceptance test (RLAT) for the OP484 (5962R0051701VDA). The quad op-amp was tested for low dose rate response. Device parameters such as input offset voltage, output voltages, supply current and gain were investigated.
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Shapes of single event transients (SETs) in a linear bipolar circuit (LM124) change with exposure to total ionizing dose (TID) radiation. SETs shape changes are a direct consequence of TID-induced degradation of bipolar transistor gain. A reduction in transistor gain causes a reduction in the drive current of the current sources in the circuit, and it is the lower drive current that most affects the shapes of large amplitude SETs.
A general overview on the space environment and its effects on materials is presented. The topics include: 1) Impact of Space Effects on Spacecraft Costs; 2) Space Environment Effects on Spacecraft by Source; 3) Primary Source of Space Effects: The Sun; 4) The Earth's Environment; 5) Trapped Radiation Belts; 6) Aurora Are Everywhere; 7) Spacecraft Interactions; 8) Atmospheric Effects; 9) Contaminant Effects on Materials; 10) Meteoroid/Debris Effects on Materials; 11) Spacecraft Surface Charging; 12) Surface Discharge Effects; 13) Internal Electrostatic Discharge--Satellite Killer; 14) Plasma Interactions DS-1 Ion Engines; 15) Radiation Effects on Spacecraft Systems and Materials; 16) Total Ionizing Dose Effects Total Ionizing Dose Effects; 17) Man-Made Sources of Space Effects Man-Made Sources of Space Effects; and 18) Space Environments Versus Interactions.
Based on the need to develop and adopt timely and up-to-date guidance to ensure that natural space radiation environment threats do not compromise mission success, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was solicited to develop and publish guidance for deriving radiation hardness assurance (RHA) requirements and for evaluating avionics hardware elements with respect to total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single event effects. This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.
This tutorial presentation will give an overview of radiation effects in electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) components as it applies to civilian space systems of varying size and complexity. The natural space environment presents many unique threats to electronic systems regardless of where the systems operate from low-Earth orbit to interplanetary space. The presentation will cover several topics, including: an overview and introduction to the applicable space radiation environments common to a broad range of mission designs; definitions and impacts of effects due to impinging particles in the space environment e.g., total ionizing dose (TID), total non-ionizing dose (TNID), and single-event effects (SEE); and, testing for and evaluation of TID, TNID, and SEE in EEE components.
Since most Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts are intended for terrestrial applications, they are susceptible to a range of radiation threats in the space environment if the resulting effects are not properly characterized and mitigated. Even specially designed radiation-hardened parts may not be tolerant to all types of radiation effects. Radiation hardness is a multi-dimensional property of any part that describes intrinsic abilities to tolerate various radiation environments [1,2]. Effects to be concerned with include total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single-event effects (SEE) – all of which depend on the mission, environment, application, and lifetime. Radiation effects concerns may be the same whether a EEE part is Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), MIL-SPEC, or some other variant, all of which are susceptible to the same radiation threats [3]. SEE consequences range from recoverable faults to catastrophic failure. Like other random faults, SEE can be mitigated with informed circuit design practices at the device, card, and/or system level.
This presentation covers the basis and challenges for radiation effects in electronic systems. The three main types of radiation effects in electronics are: 1) total ionizing dose (TID), 2) total non-ionizing dose (TNID) / displacement damage dose (DDD), and 3) single-event effect (SEE). Some content on relevant examples of effects, current concerns, and possible environmental model-driven solutions are also included.
Naturally occurring space radiation particles can produce transient and permanent changes in the electrical properties of electronic devices and systems. In this work, the transient radiation effects on DRAM and CMOS SRAM were considered. In addition, the effect of total ionizing dose radiation of the switching times of CMOS logic gates were investigated. Effects of transient radiation on the column and cell of MOS dynamic memory cell was simulated using SPICE. It was found that the critical charge of the bitline was higher than that of the cell. In addition, the critical charge of the combined cell-bitline was found to be dependent on the gate voltage of the access transistor. In addition, the effect of total ionizing dose radiation on the switching times of CMOS logic gate was obtained. The results of this work indicate that, the rise time of CMOS logic gates increases, while the fall time decreases with an increase in total ionizing dose radiation. Also, by increasing the size of the P-channel transistor with respect to that of the N-channel transistor, the propagation delay of CMOS logic gate can be made to decrease with, or be independent of an increase in total ionizing dose radiation. Furthermore, a method was developed for replacing polysilicon feedback resistance of SRAMs with a switched capacitor network. A switched capacitor SRAM was implemented using MOS Technology. The critical change of the switched capacitor SRAM has a very large critical charge. The results of this work indicate that switched capacitor SRAM is a viable alternative to SRAM with polysilicon feedback resistance.
An experimental program was conducted in which the optical transmission of several transparent materials was measured during high energy electron irradiation. These experiments were conducted using the Dynamitron electron accelerator as a continuous source of 1.5 MeV electrons and the LINAC electron accelerator as a pulsed source of 5-7 MeV electrons. The experimental program consisted of three major portions. The first portion, the optical transmission of fused silica, BeO, MgF2, and LiF was measured at vacuum ultraviolet wavelengths in the range 1550-2000 A during ambient temperature, 1.5 MeV electron irradiation at ionizing dose rates to 0.5 Mrad/sec. In the second portion of the program, the optical transmission of fused silica and BeO was measured in the range 2000-3000 A during high dose rate, elevated temperature 1.5 MeV electron irradiation. In particular, accurate measurements of the optical transmission were made at ionizing dose rates as high as 10 Mrad/sec. In the final portion of the program, the optical transmission of fused silica and BeO was measured in the wavelength range 2000-3000 A during pulsed 5 and 7 MeV electron irradiation from the LINAC accelerator. The maximum time averaged ionizing dose rate was limited to 0.75 Mrad/sec due to accelerator limitations.
We present results and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to heavy ion and proton induced single event effects (SEE), proton-induced displacement damage dose (DDD), and total ionizing dose (TID).
Ionizing radiation induces clusters of DNA damages--oxidized bases, abasic sites and strand breaks--on opposing strands within a few helical turns. Such damages have been postulated to be difficult to repair, as are double strand breaks (one type of cluster). We have shown that low doses of low and high linear energy transfer (LET) radiation induce such damage clusters in human cells. In human cells, DSB are about 30% of the total of complex damages, and the levels of DSBs and oxidized pyrimidine clusters are similar. The dose responses for cluster induction in cells can be described by a linear relationship, implying that even low doses of ionizing radiation can produce clustered damages. Studies are in progress to determine whether clusters can be produced by mechanisms other than ionizing radiation, as well as the levels of various cluster types formed by low and high LET radiation.
The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), the successor to the Hubble Space Telescope, is due to be launched in 2013 with the goal of searching the very distant Universe for stars that formed shortly after the Big Bang. Because this occurred so far back in time, the available light is strongly red-shifted, requiring the use of detectors sensitive to the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. HgCdTe infrared focal plane arrays, cooled to below 30 K to minimize noise, will be used to detect the faint signals. One of the instruments on JWST is the Near Infrared Spectrometer (NIRSPEC) designed to measure the infrared spectra of up to 100 separate galaxies simultaneously. A key component in NIRSPEC is a Micro-Electromechanical System (MEMS), a two-dimensional micro-shutter array (MSA) developed by NASA/GSFC. The MSA is inserted in front of the detector to allow only the light from the galaxies of interest to reach the detector and to block the light from all other sources. The MSA will have to operate at 30 K to minimize the amount of thermal radiation emitted by the optical components from reaching the detector array. It will also have to operate in the space radiation environment that is dominated by the MSA will be exposed to a large total ionizing dose of approximately 200 krad(Si). Following exposure to ionizing radiation, a variety of MEMS have exhibited performance degradation. MEMS contain moving parts that are either controlled or sensed by changes in electric fields. Radiation degradation can be expected for those devices where there is an electric field applied across an insulating layer that is part of the sensing or controlling structure. Ionizing radiation will liberate charge (electrons and holes) in the insulating layers, some of which may be trapped within the insulating layer. Trapped charge will partially cancel the externally applied electric field and lead to changes in the operation of the MEMS. This appears to be a general principle for MEMS. Knowledge of the above principle has raised the concern at NASA that the MSA might also exhibit degraded performance because, i) each shutter flap is a multilayer structure consisting of metallic and insulating layers and ii) the movement of the shutter flaps is partially controlled by the application of an electric field between the shutter flap and the substrate (vertical support grid). The whole mission would be compromised if radiation exposure were to prevent the shutters from opening and closing properly. energetic ionizing particles. Because it is located A unique feature of the MSA is that, as outside the spacecraft and has very little shielding, previously mentioned, it will have to operate at temperatures near 30 K. To date, there are no published reports on how very low temperatures (- 30K) affect the response of MEMS devices to total ionizing dose. Experiments on SiO2 structures at low temperatures (80 K) indicate that the electrons generated by the ionizing radiation are mobile and will move rapidly under the application of an external electric field. Holes, on the other hand, that would normally move in the opposite direction through the SiO2 via a "thermal hopping" process, are effectively immobile at low electric fields as they are trapped close to their generation sites. However, for sufficiently large electric fields (greater than 3 MV/cm) holes are able to move through the SiO2. The larger the field, the more rapidly the holes move. The separation of the electrons and holes leads to a reduced electric field within the insulating layer. To overcome this reduction in electric field, a greater external voltage will have to be applied that alters the normal operation of the device. This report presents the results of radiation testing of the MSA at 60 K. The temperature was higher than the targeted temperature because of a faulty electrical interconnect on the test board. Specifically, our goal was to determine whether the MSA would function propey after a TID of 200 krad(Si).
Clustered DNA damages-two or more closely spaced damages (strand breaks, abasic sites, or oxidized bases) on opposing strands-are suspects as critical lesions producing lethal and mutagenic effects of ionizing radiation. However, as a result of the lack of methods for measuring damage clusters induced by ionizing radiation in genomic DNA, neither the frequencies of their production by physiological doses of radiation, nor their repairability, nor their biological effects are known. On the basis of methods that we developed for quantitating damages in large DNAs, we have devised and validated a way of measuring ionizing radiation-induced clustered lesions in genomic DNA, including DNA from human cells. DNA is treated with an endonuclease that induces a single-strand cleavage at an oxidized base or abasic site. If there are two closely spaced damages on opposing strands, such cleavage will reduce the size of the DNA on a nondenaturing gel. We show that ionizing radiation does induce clustered DNA damages containing abasic sites, oxidized purines, or oxidized pyrimidines. Further, the frequency of each of these cluster classes is comparable to that of frank double-strand breaks; among all complex damages induced by ionizing radiation, double-strand breaks are only about 20%, with other clustered damage constituting some 80%. We also show that even low doses (0.1-1 Gy) of high linear energy transfer ionizing radiation induce clustered damages in human cells.
Shields-1, NORAD ID 43850,has been operating in polar low earth orbit since December 2018. The shielding has resulted in a lower total ionizing dose over time than typical aluminum thin-walled CubeSat structures. The reduced ionizing dosage caused by Shields-1 increases the reliability of commercial parts and reduces internal charging. Furthermore, the Shields-1 shielding reduces the ionizing particle fluence inside the spacecraft that contributes to the ionizing dose. NOVICE Sigma shielding software, using the (Aerospace Proton) AP8 –(Aerospace Electron) AE8 solar minimum trapped belt environment for a 1-year mission, estimates a 21.3 g/cm2 aluminum effective shielding for the Shields-1 electronics enclosure. This high areal density reduces not only the total number of energetic protons, but also reduces the number of ionizing particles over all modeled energies from the estimated shielded fluence for a 1-year mission. NOVICE Adjoint CAD modeling of the Shields-1 structure, with the detector located within the electronics enclosure, estimates that the total number of particles is reduced from 2.20x 10exp9 protons/cm2 to 1.52x 10exp8 protons/cm2, which represents 6.90% of the remaining particles(figure 1). By slowing down approximations of the integral proton fluence, a minimum proton threshold is estimated at 151 MeV. In comparison, a 0.204-cm aluminum thin-walled 3-unit (U) structure, with a 0.907 g/cm2 effective shielding, has 25.0% remaining particles and a minimum proton threshold of 36.2 MeV(figure 1). Proton energies that contribute to single event effects in radiation tolerant or higher semiconductor hardness are typically 100 MeV and higher. The Shields-1 electronics enclosure is estimated to attenuate energies: 100 MeV by 76.5%, 200 MeV by 61.7%, and 500 MeV by 63.0%(figure 2), when comparing the space environment proton differential fluence with the shielded differential fluence. The aluminum thin-walled structure is estimated to attenuate proton energies: 100 MeV by 13.7%, 200 MeV by 12.4%, and 500 MeV by 12.6%(figure 2), which are lower than for the Shields-1 electronics enclosure. The significant differences in attenuation between the Shields-1 electronics enclosure and aluminum thin-walled 3U structure show the additional utility of increasing shielding effectiveness for reducing the numbers of energetic protons that contribute to single event effects.
Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.