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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1996

Thermochemical Degradation Mechanisms for Reinforced Carbon/Carbon Panels on the Space Shuttle

The wing leading edge and nose cone of the space shuttle are fabricated from a reinforced carbon/carbon material (RCC). This material attains its durability from a diffusion coating of silicon carbide (SiC) and a glass sealant (ref. 1). During reentry, this material is subjected to an oxidizing high-temperature environment. Joint work between the Ohio State University and the NASA Lewis Research Center led to a survey of potential degradation mechanisms of the reinforced carbon/carbon (RCC) material at high temperatures

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2004

High Temperature Chemistry in the Columbia Accident Investigation

Initial estimates on the temperature and conditions of the breach in Columbia's wing focused on analyses of the slag deposits. These deposits are complex mixtures of the reinforced carbon/carbon (RCC) constituents, insulation material, and wing structural materials. However it was possible to clearly discern melted/solidified Cerachrome(R) insulation, indicating the temperatures had exceeded 1760 C. Current research focuses on the carbon/carbon in the path from the breach. Carbon morphology indicates heavy oxidation and erosion. Raman spectroscopy yielded further temperature estimates. A technique developed at Sandia National Laboratories is based on crystallite size in carbon chars. Lower temperatures yield nanocrystalline graphite; whereas higher temperatures yield larger graphite crystals. By comparison to standards the temperatures on the recovered RCC fragments were estimated to have been greater than 2700 C.

Jacobson, Nathan↗
NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Discovery Day 5 Post MMT Briefing

Wayne Hill, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager, and Chair of the Mission Management Team, reports the following: the testing of the thermal protection system in space, on orbit was successful; the MMT meeting formally approved the mission extension for one day; image analysis from the launch phase has been completed; tile and blankets had been formally cleared by the Engineering team; additional inspection of the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC); gap filler, heat shield and small black spot phenomenon are carefully inspected and evaluated to prepare the safe return of the Discovery. Bill Gerstenmaier, ISS Program Manager reports on the extra vehicular activities (EVA): replaced the GPS antenna; prepared the airlock to attach the ESP2; re-powered CMG2; transfer of CWCs; and the MISSE packages were wrapped around thru at the end of the air lock. He mentioned the high currents problem seen on CMG3, which they will have to take off line to check and understand the problem. Consumables, engineering performance of the three sensors (LCS, LDRI, ITVC), CMG removal and replacement, EVA2 and EVA3, gap fillers, RCC, hydrogen tank pre-press cycles, thermal protection system, inspection, ISS supply maintenance, and projection of next flight are topics covered with the News Media.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2004

As-Fabricated Reinforced Carbon/Carbon Characterized

Reinforced carbon/carbon (RCC) is a critical material for the space shuttle orbiter. It is used on the wing leading edge and the nose cap, where maximum temperatures are reached on reentry. The existing leading-edge system is a single-plate RCC composite construction with a wall thickness of approximately 1/4 in., making it a prime reliant protection scheme for vehicle operation.

Jacobson, Nathan S.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Analysis of Carbon/Carbon Fragments From the Columbia Tragedy

The extensive investigation following the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia accident of February 1, 2003 determined that hot gases entered the wing through a breach in the protective reinforced carbon/carbon (RCC) leading edge. In the current study, the exposed edges of the recovered RCC from the vicinity of the breach are examined with scanning electron microscopy and Raman spectroscopy. Electron microscopy of the exposed edges revealed regions of pointed carbon fibers, characteristic of exposure to high temperature oxidizing gases. The Raman technique relates the observed 1350 and 1580 to 1600 cm(-1) bands to graphitic dom ains and their corresponding temperatures of formation. Some of the regions showed evidence of exposure temperatures beyond 2700 ?C during the accident.

Tallant, David R.↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Mesh Refinement Study on the Impact Response of a Shuttle Leading-Edge Panel Finite Element Simulation

A study was performed to examine the influence of varying mesh density on an LS-DYNA simulation of a rectangular-shaped foam projectile impacting the space shuttle leading edge Panel 6. The shuttle leading-edge panels are fabricated of reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) material. During the study, nine cases were executed with all possible combinations of coarse, baseline, and fine meshes of the foam and panel. For each simulation, the same material properties and impact conditions were specified and only the mesh density was varied. In the baseline model, the shell elements representing the RCC panel are approximately 0.2-in. on edge, whereas the foam elements are about 0.5-in. on edge. The element nominal edge-length for the baseline panel was halved to create a fine panel (0.1-in. edge length) mesh and doubled to create a coarse panel (0.4-in. edge length) mesh. In addition, the element nominal edge-length of the baseline foam projectile was halved (0.25-in. edge length) to create a fine foam mesh and doubled (1.0-in. edge length) to create a coarse foam mesh. The initial impact velocity of the foam was 775 ft/s. The simulations were executed in LS-DYNA for 6 ms of simulation time. Contour plots of resultant panel displacement and effective stress in the foam were compared at four discrete time intervals. Also, time-history responses of internal and kinetic energy of the panel, kinetic and hourglass energy of the foam, and resultant contact force were plotted to determine the influence of mesh density.

Fasanella, Edwin L.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Behavior-based multi-robot collaboration for autonomous construction tasks

The Robot Construction Crew (RCC) is a heterogeneous multi-robot system for autonomous construction of a structure through assembly of Long components. The two robot team demonstrates component placement into an existing structure in a realistic environment. The task requires component acquisition, cooperative transport, and cooperative precision manipulation. A behavior-based architecture provides adaptability. The RCC approach minimizes computation, power, communication, and sensing for applicability to space-related construction efforts, but the techniques are applicable to terrestrial construction tasks.

autonomous construction↗
NASA NTRS2007

The Columbia Accident Investigation and The NASA Glenn Ballistic Impact Laboratory Contributions Supporting NASA's Return to Flight

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart during reentry, resulting in loss of the vehicle and its seven crewmembers. For the next several months, an extensive investigation of the accident ensued involving a nationwide team of experts from NASA, industry, and academia, spanning dozens of technical disciplines. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), a group of experts assembled to conduct an investigation independent of NASA, concluded in August, 2003 that the most likely cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the left wing leading edge Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) thermal protection system initiated by the impact of thermal insulating foam that had separated from the orbiters external fuel tank 81 seconds into the mission's launch. During reentry, this breach allowed superheated air to penetrate behind the leading edge and erode the aluminum structure of left wing, which ultimately led to the breakup of the orbiter. The findings of the CAIB were supported by ballistic impact tests, which simulated the physics of External Tank Foam impact on the RCC wing leading edge material. These tests ranged from fundamental material characterization tests to full-scale Orbiter Wing Leading Edge tests. Following the accident investigation, NASA spent the next 18 months focused on returning the shuttle safely to flight. In order to fully evaluate all potential impact threats from the many debris sources on the Space Shuttle during ascent, NASA instituted a significant impact testing program. The results from these tests led to the validation of high-fidelity computer models, capable of predicting actual or potential Shuttle impact events, were used in the certification of STS-114, NASA s Return to Flight Mission, as safe to fly. This presentation will provide a look into the inner workings of the Space Shuttle and a behind the scenes perspective on the impact analysis and testing done for the Columbia Accident Investigation and NASA's Return to Flight programs. In addition, highlights from recent Shuttle missions are presented.

Melis, Matthew E.↗
NASA NTRS2005

SAFER Inspection of Space Shuttle Thermal Protection System

In the aftermath of the space shuttle Columbia accident, it quickly became clear that new methods would need to be developed that would provide the capability to inspect and repair the shuttle's thermal protection system (TPS). A boom extension to the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) with a laser topography sensor package was identified as the primary means for measuring the damage depth in acreage tile as well as scanning Reinforced Carbon- Carbon (RCC) surfaces. However, concern over the system's fault tolerance made it prudent to investigate alternate means of acquiring close range photographs and contour depth measurements in the event of a failure. One method that was identified early was to use the Simplified Aid For EVA Rescue (SAFER) propulsion system to allow EVA access to damaged areas of concern. Several issues were identified as potential hazards to SAFER use for this operation. First, the ability of an astronaut to maintain controlled flight depends upon efficient technique and hardware reliability. If either of these is insufficient during flight operations, a safety tether must be used to rescue the crewmember. This operation can jeopardize the integrity of the Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) or delicate TPS materials. Controls were developed to prevent the likelihood of requiring a tether rescue, and procedures were written to maximize the chances for success if it cannot be avoided. Crewmember ability to manage tether cable tension during nominal flight also had to be evaluated to ensure it would not negatively affect propellant consumption. Second, although propellant consumption, flight control, orbital dynamics, and flight complexity can all be accurately evaluated in Virtual Reality (VR) Laboratory at Johnson Space Center, there are some shortcomings. As a crewmember's hand is extended to simulate measurement of tile damage, it will pass through the vehicle without resistance. In reality, this force will push the crewmember away from the vehicle, and could induce a moment which, if strong enough, could saturate the attitude control system in SAFER. This raises the concern that additional propellant will be consumed to maintain controlled flight. To account for this, the fidelity of the Virtual Reality simulation was improved to include the effect of crewmember contact with the vehicle during SAFER flight. In addition, while participating in VR simulations, the subject is in shirt sleeves and sits in a chair. This does not provide a flight-like representation of body position awareness. To prevent inadvertent contact with tile or RCC, other facilities were utilized to establish crew preferences for body attitude and tool configuration. Finally, a study was performed to determine if attitude constraints are needed for the Space shuttle and International Space Station to reduce SAFER flight difficulty.

Scoville, Zebulon C.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Hypervelocity Impact (HVI): WLE Small-Scale Fiberglass Panel Flat Target C-1 - Volume 3

During 2003 and 2004, the Johnson Space Center's White Sands Testing Facility in Las Cruces, New Mexico conducted hypervelocity impact tests on the space shuttle wing leading edge. Hypervelocity impact tests were conducted to determine if Micro-Meteoroid/Orbital Debris impacts could be reliably detected and located using simple passive ultrasonic methods. The objective of Target C-1 was to study hypervelocity impacts on the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panels of the Wing Leading Edge. Fiberglass was used in place of RCC in the initial tests. Impact damage was detected using lightweight, low power instrumentation capable of being used in flight.

Gorman, Michael R.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Hypervelocity Impact (HVI): WLE Small-Scale Fiberglass Panel Flat Target C-2 - Volume 4

During 2003 and 2004, the Johnson Space Center's White Sands Testing Facility in Las Cruces, New Mexico conducted hypervelocity impact tests on the space shuttle wing leading edge. Hypervelocity impact tests were conducted to determine if Micro-Meteoroid/Orbital Debris impacts could be reliably detected and located using simple passive ultrasonic methods. The objective of Target C-2 was to study impacts through the reinforced carboncarbon (RCC) panels of the Wing Leading Edge. Fiberglass was used in place of RCC in the initial tests. Impact damage was detected using lightweight, low power instrumentation capable of being used in flight.

Gorman, Michael R.↗
NASA NTRS2007

A Return to Innovative Engineering Design, Critical Thinking and Systems Engineering

I believe we are facing a critical time where innovative engineering design is of paramount importance to the success of our aerospace industry. However, the very qualities and attributes necessary for enhancing, educating, and mentoring a creative spirit are in decline in important areas. The importance of creativity and innovation in this country was emphasized by a special edition of the Harvard Business Review OnPoint entitled: "The Creative Company" which compiled a series of past and present articles on the subject of creativity and innovation and stressed its importance to our national economy. There is also a recognition of a lack of engineering, critical thinking and problem-solving skills in our education systems and a trend toward trying to enhance those skills by developing K-12 educational programs such as Project Lead the Way, "Science for All Americans", Benchmarks 2061 , etc. In addition, with respect to spacecraft development, we have a growing need for young to mid-level engineers with appropriate experience and skills in spacecraft design, development, analysis, testing, and systems engineering. As the Director of Engineering at NASA's Johnson Space Center, I realized that sustaining engineering support of an operational human spacecraft such as the Space Shuttle is decidedly different than engineering design and development skills necessary for designing a new spacecraft such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle of the Constellation Program. We learned a very important lesson post Columbia in that the Space Shuttle is truly an experimental and not an operational vehicle and the strict adherence to developed rules and processes and chains of command of an inherently bureaucratic organizational structure will not protect us from a host of known unknowns let alone unknown unknowns. There are no strict rules, processes, or procedures for understanding anomalous results of an experiment, anomalies with an experimental spacecraft like Shuttle, or in the conceptual design of a spacecraft. Engineering design is as much an art as it is a science. The critical thinking skills necessary to uncover lurking problems in an experimental design and creatively develop solutions are some of the same skills necessary to design a new spacecraft. Thus, I believe engineers unfamiliar with or removed from design and development need time to transition and develop the required skill set to be effective spacecraft designers. I believe the creative process necessary in design can be enhanced and even taught as early as grades K-12 and should continue to be nurtured and developed at the university level and beyond. I am going to present a strategy for developing learning teams to address complex multidisciplinary problems and to creatively develop solutions to those problems rapidly at minimal cost. I will frame a real problem, the development of on-orbit thermal protection system repair of the Space Shuttle, and step through the series of skills necessary to enhance the creative process. The case study I will illustrate is based on a real project, the R&D Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) Repair Team's development of on-orbit repair concepts for damaged Space Shuttle RCC nose cap and/or leading edges.

Camarda, Charles J.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Results of On-Orbit Testing of an Extra-Vehicular Infrared Camera Inspection System

This paper will discuss an infrared camera inspection system that has been developed to allow astronauts to demonstrate the ability to inspect reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) components on the space shuttle as part of extra-vehicular activities (EVA) while in orbit. Presented will be the performance of the EVA camera system coupled with solar heating for inspection of damaged RCC specimens and NDE standards. The data presented was acquired during space shuttle flights STS-121 and STS-115 as well during a staged EVA from the ISS. The EVA camera system was able to detect flatbottom holes as small as 2.54cm in diameter with 25% material loss. Results obtained are shown to be comparable to ground-based thermal inspections performed in the laboratory using the same camera and simulated solar heating. Data on both the time history of the specimen temperature and the ability of the inspection system to image defects due to impact will likewise be presented.

Howell, Patricia A.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Investigation of MMOD Impact on STS-115 Shuttle Payload Bay Door Radiator

The Orbiter radiator system consists of eight individual 4.6 m x 3.2 m panels located with four on each payload bay door. Forward panels #1 and #2 are 2.3 cm thick while the aft panels #3 and #4 have a smaller overall thickness of 1.3 cm. The honeycomb radiator panels consist of 0.028 cm thick Aluminum 2024-T81 facesheets and Al5056-H39 cores. The face-sheets are topped with 0.005 in. (0.127 mm) silver-Teflon tape. The radiators are located on the inside of the shuttle payload bay doors, which are closed during ascent and reentry, limiting damage to the on-orbit portion of the mission. Post-flight inspections at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) following the STS-115 mission revealed a large micrometeoroid/orbital debris (MMOD) impact near the hinge line on the #4 starboard payload bay door radiator panel. The features of this impact make it the largest ever recorded on an orbiter payload bay door radiator. The general location of the damage site and the adjacent radiator panels can be seen in Figure 2. Initial measurements of the defect indicated that the hole in the facesheet was 0.108 in. (2.74 mm) in diameter. Figure 3 shows an image of the front side damage. Subsequent observations revealed exit damage on the rear facesheet. Impact damage features on the rear facesheet included a 0.03 in. diameter hole (0.76 mm), a approx.0.05 in. tall bulge (approx.1.3 mm), and a larger approx.0.2 in. tall bulge (approx.5.1 mm) that exhibited a crack over 0.27 in. (6.8 mm) long. A large approx.1 in. (25 mm) diameter region of the honeycomb core was also damaged. Refer to Figure 4 for an image of the backside damage to the panel. No damage was found on thermal blankets or payload bay door structure under the radiator panel. Figure 5 shows the front facesheet with the thermal tape removed. Ultrasound examination indicated a maximum facesheet debond extent of approximately 1 in. (25 mm) from the entry hole. X-ray examinations revealed damage to an estimated 31 honeycomb cells with an extent of 0.85 in. x 1.1 in. (21.6 x 27.9 mm). Pieces of the radiator at and surrounding the impact site were recovered during the repair procedures at KSC. They included the thermal tape, front facesheet, honeycomb core, and rear facesheet. These articles were examined at JSC using a scanning electron microscope (SEM) with an energy dispersive x-ray spectrometer (EDS). Figure 6 shows SEM images of the entry hole in the facesheet. The asymmetric height of the lip may be attributed to projectile shape and impact angle. Numerous instances of a glass-fiber organic matrix composite were observed in the facesheet tape sample. The fibers were approximately 10 micrometers in diameter and variable lengths. EDS analysis indicated a composition of Mg, Ca, Al, Si, and O. Figures 7 and 8 present images of the fiber bundles, which were believed to be circuit board material based on similarity in fiber diameter, orientation, consistency, and composition. A test program was initiated in an attempt to simulate the observed damage to the radiator facesheet and honeycomb. Twelve test shots were performed using projectiles cut from a 1.6 mm thick fiberglass circuit board substrate panel. Results from test HITF07017, shown in figures 9 and 10, correlates with the observed impact features reasonably well. The test was performed at 4.14 km/sec with an impact angle of 45 degrees using a cylindrical projectile with a diameter and length of 1.25 mm. The fiberglass circuit board material had a density of 1.65 g/cu cm, giving a projectile mass of 2.53 mg. An analysis was performed using the Bumper code to estimate the probability of impact to the shuttle from a 1.25 mm diameter particle. Table 1 shows a 1.6% chance (impact odds = 1 in 62) of a 1.25 mm or larger MMOD impact on the radiators of the vehicle during a typical ISS mission. There is a 0.4% chance (impact odds = 1 in 260) that a 1.25 mm or larger MMOD particle would impact the RCC wing leading edge and nose cap during a typical miion. Figure 11 illustrates the vulnerable areas of the wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC), an area of the vehicle that is very sensitive to impact damage. The highlighted red, orange, yellow, and light green areas would be expected to experience critical damage if impacted by an OD particle such as the one that hit the RH4 radiator panel on STS-115.

Hyde, J.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. An overview of significant MMOD impacts on the Payload Bay Door radiators, wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panels and crew module windows will be presented, along with a discussion of the techniques NASA has implemented to reduce the risk from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the RCC regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it s role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space Shuttle Thermal Protection System Repair Flight Experiment Induced Contamination Impacts

NASA s activities to prepare for Flight LF1 (STS-114) included development of a method to repair the Thermal Protection System (TPS) of the Orbiter s leading edge should it be damaged during ascent by impacts from foam, ice, etc . Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) is used for the leading edge TPS. The repair material that was developed is named Non- Oxide Adhesive eXperimental (NOAX). NOAX is an uncured adhesive material that acts as an ablative repair material. NOAX completes curing during the Orbiter s descent. The Thermal Protection System (TPS) Detailed Test Objective 848 (DTO 848) performed on Flight LF1 (STS-114) characterized the working life, porosity void size in a micro-gravity environment, and the on-orbit performance of the repairs to pre-damaged samples. DTO 848 is also scheduled for Flight ULF1.1 (STS-121) for further characterization of NOAX on-orbit performance. Due to the high material outgassing rates of the NOAX material and concerns with contamination impacts to optically sensitive surfaces, ASTM E 1559 outgassing tests were performed to determine NOAX condensable outgassing rates as a function of time and temperature. Sensitive surfaces of concern include the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) visor, cameras, and other sensors in proximity to the experiment during the initial time after application. This paper discusses NOAX outgassing characteristics, how the amount of deposition on optically sensitive surfaces while the NOAX is being manipulated on the pre-damaged RCC samples was determined by analysis, and how flight rules were developed to protect those optically sensitive surfaces from excessive contamination where necessary.

Smith, Kendall A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

On-orbit Passive Thermography

On July 12, 2006, British-born astronaut Piers Sellers became the first person to conduct thermal nondestructive evaluation experiments in space, demonstrating the feasibility of a new tool for detecting damage to the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) structures of the Shuttle. This new tool was an EVA (Extravehicular Activity, or spacewalk) compatible infrared camera developed by NASA engineers. Data was collected both on the wing leading edge of the Orbiter and on pre-damaged samples mounted in the Shuttle s cargo bay. A total of 10 infrared movies were collected during the EVA totaling over 250 megabytes of data. Images were downloaded from the orbiting Shuttle to Johnson Space Center for analysis and processing. Results are shown to be comparable to ground-based thermal inspections performed in the laboratory with the same type of camera and simulated solar heating. The EVA camera system detected flat-bottom holes as small as 2.54cm in diameter with 50% material loss from the back (hidden) surface in RCC during this first test of the EVA IR Camera. Data for the time history of the specimen temperature and the capability of the inspection system for imaging impact damage are presented.

Howell, Patricia A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Simulated Reentry Heating by Torching

The two first order reentry heating parameters are peak heating flux (W/cm2) and peak heat load (kJ/cm2). Peak heating flux (and deceleration, gs) is higher for a ballistic reentry and peak heat load is higher for a lifting reentry. Manned vehicle reentries are generally lifting reentries at nominal 1-5 gs so that personnel will not be crushed by high deceleration force. A few off-nominal manned reentries have experienced 8 or more gs with corresponding high heating flux (but below nominal heat load). The Shuttle Orbiter reentries provide about an order of magnitude difference in peak heating flux at mid-bottom (TPS tiles, approximately 6 W/cm2 or 5 BTU/ft2- sec) and leading edge (RCC, approximately 60 W/cm2 or 50 BTU/ft2- sec). Orion lunar return and Mars sample lander are of the same order of magnitude as orbiter leading edge peak heat loads. Flight temperature measurements are available for some orbiter TPS tile and RCC locations. Return-to-Flight on-orbit tile-repair-candidate-material-heating performance was evaluated by matching propane torch heating of candidate-materials temperatures at several depths to orbiter TPS tile flight-temperatures. Char and ash characteristics, heat expansion, and temperature histories at several depths of the cure-in-place ablator were some of the TPS repair material performance characteristics measured. The final char surface was above the initial surface for the primary candidate (silicone based) material, in contrast to a receded surface for the Apollo-type ablative heat shield material. Candidate TPS materials for Orion CEV (LEO and lunar return), and for Mars sample lander are now being evaluated. Torching of a candidate ablator material, PICA, was performed to match the ablation experienced by the STARDUST PICA heat shield. Torching showed that the carbon fiberform skeleton in a sample of PICA was inhomogeneous in that sample, and allowed measurements (of the clumps and voids) of the inhomogeneity. Additional reentry heating-performance characterizations of high temperature insulation materials were performed.

Harvey, Gale A.↗