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At least 109 records · Page 6
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DOE OSTI2024

Correlating Power Outage Spread with Infrastructure Interdependencies During Hurricanes

Power outages caused by extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, can significantly disrupt essential services and delay recovery efforts, underscoring the importance of enhancing our infrastructure's resilience. This study investigates the spread of power outages during hurricanes by analyzing the correlation between the network of critical infrastructure and outage propagation. We leveraged datasets from Hurricanemapping.com, the North American Energy Resilience Model Interdependency Analysis (NAERM-IA), and historical power outage data from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)'s EAGLE-I system. Our analysis reveals a consistent positive correlation between the extent of critical infrastructure components accessible within a certain number of steps (k-hop distance) from initial impact areas and the occurrence of power outages in broader regions. This insight suggests that understanding the interconnectedness among critical infrastructure elements is key to identifying areas indirectly affected by extreme weather events.

Bose, Avishek↗
DOE OSTI2024

Dover CoreGuard Ⓡ Cybersecurity Protections for Critical Energy Infrastructure Final Report

This report documents the status of technical objectives and activities for the Department of Energy (DOE) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Phase I project, titled “Dover CoreGuard Ⓡ Cybersecurity Protections for Critical Energy Infrastructure” (Award No. DE-SC0023743), undertaken by Dover Microsystems, Inc., Wayland, MA. The Principal Investigator for this project was Dr. Stephen Papa, Dover’s Chief Technology Officer (CTO). The contract PoP (Period of Performance) is scheduled for completion by February 9, 2024.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Digital-Threat Bias and Psychological Distance: Barriers to Foundational Digital-Security Improvement

Modern life is held together by a web of digital dependencies that enable and provide delivery of critical services and functions—think the provision of utilities such as electricity and water, as well as our dependency on digital services for social and economic services (internet, communication, etc.). As this dependency grows, the complexity related to the delivery of these critical services increases as well. As complexity increases, the understanding of the risk and impact associated with potential disruption, degradation, or destruction—due to either malicious or non-malicious events of those digitally enabled functions—decreases. One potential explanation for the difficulty to 1) understand the risks faced and 2) address them appropriately and effectively is the abstractness and psychological distance assigned to “digital threat.” The complexity of these digitally enabled services creates a perceived complicatedness; as a result, digital threats are treated differently than similarly devasting (but more easily understood) kinetic or physical threats. How we categorize these threats also matters. Acts of cyber-enabled sabotage to critical infrastructure need to be defined as irregular warfare. By inadequately defining the threat, we compound the problem. Acknowledging this digital-threat bias is foundational to improving the ability to protect critical infrastructure. Using construal-level theory and psychological-distance concepts provides an intriguing starting point to address these issues, to reframe the challenges faced, and pursue more effective critical infrastructure security and defense policy.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Urban Energy Systems: Research at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

In the coming decades, our planet will witness unprecedented urban population growth in both established and emerging communities. The development and maintenance of urban infrastructures are highly energy-intensive. Urban areas are dictated by complex intersections among physical, engineered, and human dimensions that have significant implications for traffic congestion, emissions, and energy usage. In this chapter, we highlight recent research and development efforts at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the largest multipurpose science laboratory within the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) national laboratory system, that characterizes the interactions between the human dynamics and critical infrastructures in conjunction with the integration of four distinct components: data, critical infrastructure models, and scalable computation and visualization, all within the context of physical and social systems. Discussions focus on four key topical themes: population and land use, sustainable mobility, the energy-water nexus, and urban resiliency, that are mutually aligned with DOE’s mission and ORNL’s signature science and technology capabilities. Using scalable computing, data visualization, and unique datasets from a variety of sources, the institute fosters innovative interdisciplinary research that integrates ORNL expertise in critical infrastructures including energy, water, transportation, and cyber, and their interactions with the human population.

Bhaduri, Budhu↗
DOE OSTI2025

Center for Alternate Synchronization and Timing (CAST) PTP Network Monitoring Report

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory Center for Alternative Synchronization and Timing (CAST) performs research, development, testing, and evaluation of alternative terrestrial-based timing and synchronization infrastructure for the US power grid and other critical infrastructures. Alternative timing options reduce reliance on GPS and enhance the overall resilience of critical infrastructures. CAST infrastructure uses Precision Time Protocol (PTP) as the primary conduit for delivery of synchronization packets. CAST deploys PTP over long terrestrial links to synchronize a multitude of remote boundary clocks and downstream power grid components with the authoritative grand master clocks. Network traffic issues can severely degrade PTP accuracy. This report focuses on examining network traffic anomalies and their effects on PTP operation as well as the potential implications to CAST’s high-precision remote synchronization operations.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Requirements and Recommendations for a Physical Attack Characterization Framework

This study seeks to identify existing frameworks or develop requirements and recommendations for a new framework that can consistently characterize physical attacks, analogous to MITRE ATT&CK®. MITRE ATT&CK is widely used across government, research organizations, and the cyber security community to characterize cyber attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a consistent and commonly understood manner. While physical attack taxonomies, methodologies, and other tools for evaluating physical security do exist, many are sector and/or facility-type specific—and therefore not able to provide comparable scenarios across sectors—or are more focused on security assessment instead of the characterization of attacks themselves. A MITRE ATT&CK analog for physical attacks on critical infrastructure would provide a common language and structure for analysis of physical attacks. Existing attack characterization methodologies do not robustly address cyber-physical security risks. To fully understand a facility’s security needs, it is important to understand the entire vulnerability landscape from both a physical and a cyber perspective. To underscore this need, organizations such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are calling for a coordinated approach to cyber and physical security, which they refer to as cyber and physical security convergence. A physical attack characterization framework that could be used jointly with MITRE ATT&CK would help support a more robust analysis in support of convergence, enabling the consistent characterization of attacks that utilize both cyber and physical tactics and techniques. This could provide analysts and stakeholders with a clearer understanding of how security mitigations deployed in the physical realm impact security risks in the cyber realm, and vice versa. In this study, the project team evaluates existing physical security taxonomies and methodologies to assess whether an existing method can be used to create a “physical half” of MITRE ATT&CK. This study then provides requirements and recommendations for a framework that can leverage aspects of existing methodologies. The goal of the final framework is for it to be widely adopted and referenced, regardless of critical infrastructure sector, facility type, or facility components. This study also identifies applicable use cases for when and how a framework could be applied across the various critical infrastructure sectors for a variety of attack types or motivations. Through a literature review of existing security-focused methodologies and taxonomies, engagement with relative stakeholders, evaluation of potential physical attack framework use cases, and subsequent identification of requirements, this study identified the following key findings and recommendations: There is a need for a new physical attack characterization framework; A physical attack framework should be interoperable with the MITRE ATT&CK framework; A physical attack framework should be broadly applicable, but with detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures that encompass the entire attack path; A physical attack framework should be based on observed or feasible events; A physical attack framework should adapt features from existing methodologies, frameworks, and taxonomies; A physical attack framework should be owned, overseen, and maintained by one organization.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Hydropower Potential at Non-Powered Dams: A Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Tool based on Grid, Community, Industry, and Environmental Impacts

Non-powered dams (NPDs) are dams that do not include hydraulic turbine (hydropower) equipment. Currently, there are more than 80,000 such dams in the United States, which provide a variety of non-energy benefits, including flood control, water supply, navigation, and recreation. Approximately 500 of these NPDs are identified as having the potential to add hydropower generation (totaling up to a capacity of more than 8200 MW). A large share of investment costs and environmental impacts of dam construction have already been incurred at these NPDs. Hence, adding power to the existing dam structure is hypothesized to be achieved at a lower cost, with less risk, and a shorter timeframe than the development required for new dam construction. The abundance of NPDs, the associated environmental favorability, and cost advantages, combined with the reliability, predictability, and dispatchability of hydropower, make NPDs a strong candidate in the nation’s renewable energy portfolio. To assess the NPD to hydropower conversion potential, in this study, we developed a GIS-based multi-criterial decision analysis tool, which allows users to rank these NPDs based on the grid, community, industry, and environmental impacts (i.e., GCIE impacts). This web-based interactive tool (developed using open-source Python and JavaScript) lets the user choose from a wide range of features to define each of the GCIE impact scores through a user-friendly graphical user interface. These features are related to dam operation, hydropower generation opportunity, power market economy, social vulnerability and risk, proximity to critical infrastructure and energy generating facilities, environmental concerns (air, water, and critical habitat), and exposure to natural hazards. The overall priority score of NPDs is calculated based on user-defined weights for each of the GCIE impact scores. Besides ranking NPDs, the tool can also be used to estimate the energy-storage feasibility (battery, hydrogen, and pump-storage hydropower) at each of the potential sites.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Project: Corbomite - Product: ConsoleWorks REACT

TDi Technologies presents ConsoleWorks REACT, an advanced platform designed to tackle the complexities of cyber and operational risk assessment. This comprehensive solution goes beyond asset-focused approaches by considering the impact of both assets and people have on the security and operation of critical infrastructure, specifically targeting preventing gird mis-operation by evaluating real-time human interaction or commands with critical assets. The hypothesis suggests that by integrating the assessment of user commands into the overall risk assessment process, organizations can make more informed decisions, prioritize resources effectively, and respond promptly to potential threats. This hypothesis forms the basis for the development of a proactive and holistic risk management approach that is more comprehensive and context aware than traditional models which only look at assets, patch levels, configuration and threat intel by collecting that information off the network vs directly from the asset, human, and human interaction all in real-time. ConsoleWorks' unique man-in-the-middle architecture is a key feature that sets it apart in the cybersecurity landscape. This architecture enables the real-time observation, enforcement, and commands or interaction risk transparency of user interaction with critical infrastructure to be risk mitigated and audited as they are aggregated with device and human risk factors for a more comprehensive risk threat score across a device or group of devices. This architecture allows ConsoleWorks to act as a secure intermediary between users and critical assets, monitoring all interactions and ensuring that only authorized commands are sent to the asset to be executed. This not only enhances security but also provides a comprehensive audit trail of all user activities, contributing to compliance efforts and facilitating incident investigation and risk management. By integrating this unique architecture with our comprehensive risk assessment methodology, ConsoleWorks REACT provides a powerful solution for managing cyber and operational risks, enabling organizations to maintain a robust security posture and effectively mitigate potential threats. To that end, the primary objective of this project was to research and develop a robust solution that enables the energy industry to mitigate the risks associated with human actions that can compromise the security or operations of assets critical to energy delivery, generation, transmission and operation. ConsoleWorks REACT plays a pivotal role in achieving this goal by leveraging its unique capabilities to monitor and track all user activity. Through its Zero Trust approach, which emphasizes continuous verification, the platform ensures secure access to assets and serves as the centralized human response and notification platform for addressing cyber and operational issues.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2020

Alaska Transportation & Infrastructure - Identifying Permafrost Subsidence Using NASA Earth Observations to Pinpoint Road & Infrastructure Vulnerability in Fairbanks, Alaska

A rapidly warming Arctic has compromised the structural integrity of critical infrastructure through accelerated permafrost thaw and thermokarst development underlying these areas. Infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and airports across the state of Alaska are particularly at risk, as permafrost underlies ~85% of the state. However, monitoring the impacts of permafrost thaw on infrastructure is largely limited to in situ observations and frequently identified after the damage is evident. In order to assist transportation and infrastructure decision-makers in Alaska, this project identified and quantified areas of surface subsidence near critical infrastructure. Seasonal interferograms were created using Sentinel-1 C-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and L-band Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle SAR (UAVSAR) data to identify areas experiencing surface deformation. Additionally, Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) datasets were used to validate select interferograms created between 2017 and 2019. Validation of subsidence detection across platforms was performed over a 7x8 sq. kilometer field site for 2017. UAVSAR and Sentinel-1 seasonal deformation returns produced consistent spatial deformation patterns with residual root mean squared errors of 13 and 21 millimeters, respectively. These results suggest that both UAVSAR and Sentinel-1 platforms are capable of detecting surface subsidence. The higher resolution of UAVSAR is better able to resolve localized subsidence features of less than 80 meters, but is limited by temporal resolution.In conjunction, UAVSAR and Sentinel-1 can provide complementary spatial and temporal resolutions for subsidence analysis in the absence of in situ data.

Patrick Saylor↗
NASA NTRS2020

Alaska Transportation & Infrastructure Identifying Permafrost Subsidence Using NASA Earth Observations to Pinpoint Road and Infrastructure Vulnerability in Fairbanks, Alaska

A rapidly warming Arctic has compromised the structural integrity of critical infrastructure through accelerated permafrost thaw and thermokarst development underlying these areas. Infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and airports across the state of Alaska are particularly at risk, as permafrost underlies ~85% of the state. However, monitoring the impacts of permafrost thaw on infrastructure is largely limited to in situ observations and frequently identified after the damage is evident. In order to assist transportation and infrastructure decision-makers in Alaska, this project identified and quantified areas of surface subsidence near critical infrastructure. Seasonal interferograms were created using Sentinel-1 C-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and L-band Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle SAR (UAVSAR) data to identify areas experiencing surface deformation. Additionally, Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) datasets were used to validate select interferograms created between 2017 and 2019. Validation of subsidence detection across platforms was performed over a 7x8 sq. kilometer field site for 2017. The strongest relationship in spatial deformation is observed between Sentinel-1 and UAVSAR with a residual root mean square error of 20 mm. These results suggest that both UAVSAR and Sentinel-1 platforms are capable of detecting surface subsidence. The higher resolution of UAVSAR is better able to resolve localized subsidence features of less than 80 meters, but is limited by temporal resolution. In conjunction, UAVSAR and Sentinel-1 can provide complementary spatial and temporal resolutions for subsidence analysis in the absence of in situ data.

DEVELOP Tech Paper↗
DOE OSTI2022

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

RePOWERD: Restoration of Power Outage from Wide-area Severe Weather Disruptions

The purpose of the RePOWERD project is to develop a probabilistic and a simulation based power restoration forecasting model for tropical storms based on geographic utility service areas, impacts to energy infrastructures and transportation networks, time-varying customer outage number, crew information (i.e., crew size, crew staging requirements), and utility restoration plans. Energy infrastructure is a critical lifeline essential for the United States’ national and economic security. Like other critical infrastructures, this infrastructure is aging and is at a high risk of damages from extreme weather events. Based on the number of reported outages in EAGLE-I during 2020 and 2021, it is evident that the current energy infrastructure is not equipped to handle extreme event impacts and will contribute to significant outages. From a resilience perspective, it is essential to forecast restoration time in the event of a severe weather induced power outage to assist the US Department of Energy, emergency managers, and first responders with resource planning. This project contributes to this crucial need. This report details the models, that were developed in this pilot study, to determine the rate of restoration and estimated time of restoration (ETR) during tropical storm events within counties and utility service areas based on damage to energy infrastructures and total number of customers experiencing outages.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Human Factors Considerations in Artificial Intelligence Applications for Nuclear Power Plants

In recent years, there has been a wave of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies that offer to solve problems from shopping habits to mortgage approvals to critical systems operations. The rapidity of the development of these systems has led to both excitement and apprehension about the roles these systems should play in our modern societies. Furthermore, this paper focuses on the critical infrastructure industry, in general, and nuclear power generation, in particular, and seeks to scrutinize how we can leverage these novel technologies in human-centered ways to maintain or enhance the established high levels of reliability and resilience in these industries. First, we discuss the broader aspects of cognitive systems and activities that are critical to understanding the human-AI space. Then we explore different approaches to explainability in AI and the notions of trust. We then move on to discuss several human factors concepts and methods and how they can support the design of human-AI teams. We then explore recent research related to nuclear power that has been undertaken and evaluate the current industry and regulatory landscapes. Finally, we discuss identified research gaps and recommendations for solving these for the critical infrastructure space.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

GeoCricket

SAND2025-12229O Geospatial Critical Infrastructure and Census Data Stockpile Tool (GeoCricket) is a set of functions that collect critical infrastructure and census data for use in the Resilient Node Cluster Analysis Tool (ReNCAT) and Quantum Geographic Information System Social Burden Calculator. It can also act to inform other place-based work. The code queries public-facing Representational State Transfer (REST) servers to collect geospatial data related to a specific area. It then exports that data as standard geographic information system file types or as a .csv file. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Haines, John↗
DOE OSTI2020

System Health and Status Reporting is Used to Improve Infrastructure Systems at the Hanford Site - 20449

Reliable physical infrastructure systems are vital to completing the clean-up mission and the start-up and commissioning of new nuclear waste processing facilities at the Hanford Site. Key infrastructure systems at Hanford include water, sewer, and electrical utilities, roads, telecommunications/network systems, and fire systems. All of the infrastructure systems are non-nuclear, General Service systems that are being maintained under formal engineering configuration control and none are specifically credited in any documented safety analysis (DSA). Starting in calendar year 2017, the Hanford Site's infrastructure and services contractor started producing system health and status reports for a total of 15 critical infrastructure systems as means to get a better understanding of each system's health and how it could be improved to ensure better and more reliable service delivery. As the reporting, tracking, and use of the metrics has matured, the number of systems for which reports are being developed has been expanded to a total of 23. Each of the critical infrastructure systems are assigned primary and alternate design authorities that complete qualifications on each assigned system. The design authorities actively manage and maintain configuration control on each of their systems and track metrics associated with availability, maintenance (corrective and preventive), and configuration of the technical baseline. The metrics are based on the principles established in Chapter V of DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety, [1] and have been tailored as appropriate to each of the key infrastructure systems. An overall assessment of system health is performed and documented on a routine basis (e.g., quarterly). Included in this documentation is a quantitative score for each of the metrics (i.e., availability, maintenance, configuration management) along with results of system walk-downs, description of any permanent design modifications, identification of new or emerging issues and vulnerabilities affecting the system, and an assessment by the design authority of actions necessary to improve the system health score. The overall status scores are calculated using a formula and based on a pre-determined grading scale, a color is assigned for simple presentation. The information gained from developing the reports is being used to (1) assist with making timely and better informed decisions through the use of solid technical bases that are increasing the overall reliability and capabilities of the Site's infrastructure systems as new expense and capital projects in the Reliability Projects Investment Portfolio (RPIP) are prioritized and executed; (2) feed the risk management program, and (3) integrate the technical content of Master Plans that describe the Site's needs for the system and the system's capabilities to meet those future needs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Consequence Based Framework for Deployment of Cloud Solutions in the Digital Energy Transition

This study proposes a framework for evaluating cloud computing deployment in the electric sector, focusing on the digital transition of energy systems. It assesses the implications of cloud technology adoption, particularly in terms of security, operational resilience, and efficiency. The paper introduces a framework for consequence-driven applied risk analysis, enabling utilities to prioritize and mitigate potential threats effectively, and responsibly deploy cloud applications. It also discusses the shared responsibility model in cloud computing, highlighting the need for collaborative security efforts. The research aims to provide utilities with a strategic assessment tool for cloud adoption, emphasizing the importance of security culture in enhancing cloud computing's role in critical infrastructure.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

InterGraph-CPS: A Graph-Theoretic Approach to Characterize Cross-Domain Cyber-Physical Interdependencies and Uncertainties in Electric Grid Systems for Improved Decision-Making in Operation and Response

Critical infrastructure systems such as the electric grid are increasingly cyber-physical; yet, despite the cyber-physical characteristics of critical infrastructure systems, the physical process system and communication/control network system are traditionally analyzed in siloes. As these systems become more cyber-physical, it is crucial that models and methods are available to assess the cyber physical system (CPS) interdependencies, characteristics, and event propagation for improved planning, operation, and response. Thus, we proposed an integrated structural and temporal CPS interdependency analysis framework, InterGraph-CPS, that provides insight into the CPS function during normal operation as well as disturbances. This integrated structural and temporal interdependency framework is uniquely designed for assessing CPSs by account for the challenges of analyzing cyber and physical data streams together due to data availability, data type, and time scale differences. By leveraging both structural (e.g., graph analysis) and temporal (e.g., data analytics) techniques, different CPS behaviors and configurations can be accounted for.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗