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DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of Naturally Occurring Be-7 Activity on LANL Stack Filter Clumps

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is responsible for providing solutions to challenging issues through multidisciplinary science, engineering, and technology that impact national security. As part of the Radioactive Air Emissions Management (RAEM) Team, it is our responsibility to ensure LANL operates within the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 40 CFR 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (Rad-NESHAP). The standard states, “Emissions of radionuclides to the ambient air from Department of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amounts that would cause any member of the public to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent of 10 mrem/yr” (EPA, 2002) During a routine assessment of LANL’s Rad-NESHAP compliance program, an opportunity for improvement was identified that addresses the evaluation of routine stack samples which potentially have naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) on the filter media. In the past and based on professional judgment, detections of NORM such as K-40 and Be-7 typically were rejected from the analytical results. The assessment finding suggested developing a technical criterion to ensure that such rejections were justified, comparing actual measured values with anticipated NORM concentrations for various stacks located at LANL. The significance of accepting or rejecting samples as “true” or “NORM” and its impact on the RAEM’s mission and compliance to the regulations is explained later in the document. Additionally, this document will describe the process and calculations for how such results are to be accepted as actual samples “true positive” or rejected as NORM.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

Eligibility Assessment of Items in the TA-60 Rack Assembly and Alignment Complex Legacy Storage Yard

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Field Office (NA-LA), documented and evaluated seven structures in the Technical Area 60 (TA-60) Rack Assembly and Alignment Complex (RAAC) legacy storage yard at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or Laboratory) for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register). This documentation and evaluation was conducted in compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended; the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR 800); the Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Field Office, the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Office and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning Management of the Historic Properties at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos New Mexico (PA)1; and A Plan for the Management of the Cultural Heritage at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico (LANL’s Cultural Resources Management Plan (2017). NA-LA makes the following National Register eligibility determinations: la cuna; the rack transporter (jeep, rack trailer, and steering dolly); the Mexia diagnostic rack; the Mexia device canister; the Mexia device mounting stand; and the Mexia target stand are eligible for listing in the National Register, and the second steering dolly is not eligible for listing in the National Register. This National Register evaluation was completed because LANL proposes to develop a consolidated waste facility in TA-60 next to the former RAAC. Across 3.56 acres, LANL proposes to construct an 8,000-square-foot, pre-engineered waste storage building; a 1,500-square-foot office/warehouse building; and 28,500 square feet of covered storage. The development will also include access control features and fencing, parking spaces, and utilities. Additionally, the Laboratory will continue to use the southern part of TA-60-0017 and reuse TA-60-0086 and TA-60-0324 in the development. The consolidated waste facility will operate as a central accumulation area—storing universal waste, mixed low-level (radioactive) waste, hazardous chemicals, and New Mexico special waste—until the waste can be shipped off site.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2024

LLNL NESHAPs 2023 Annual Report

Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC operates facilities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in which radionuclides are handled and stored. These facilities are subject to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) in Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 40, Part 61, Subpart H, which regulates radionuclide emissions to air from Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. Specifically, NESHAPs limits the emission of radionuclides to the ambient air to levels resulting in an annual effective dose equivalent of 10 mrem (100 µSv) to any member of the public. Using measured and calculated emissions, and building-specific and common parameters, LLNL personnel applied the EPA-approved computer code, CAP88-PC, Version 4.1.1.0, to calculate the dose to the maximally exposed individual member of the public for the Livermore Site and Site 300.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

X-ray Security Imaging on Personal Dosimetry [Slides]

Federal regulations mandate that personal dosimetry devices — like optically stimulated luminescence (OSLs) — must be worn by all US Department of Energy (DOE) and associated radiation workers to track their occupational dose. Unfortunately, the inadvertent passage of OSLs through x-ray security scanners can compromise their validity. With the advent of high energy, advanced resolution security technology used in airports, this once insignificant issue now requires that Radiological Control (RadCon) be able to accurately discern non-occupational dose to effected OSLs. This presentation will discuss the principles, methods, and, rather surprising, models for establishing the corrective dose estimates at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and its implication across the DOE.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Stack Test Summary for TA-59-0001

The Radioactive Air Emissions Management (RAEM) team performed stack flow characterization tests at Technical Area (TA) 59 Building 0001 Exhaust Stack (ES) 8. These tests were completed in accordance with Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 61, Subpart H and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N13.1-1999 required by the Clean Air Act. Subpart H of the regulation is the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for radionuclides, which compliance with is maintained by the REAM team.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

Determining Unabated Airborne Radionuclide Emissions Monitoring Requirements Using Inventory-Based Methods

Compliance with the airborne radionuclide emission monitoring requirements in the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP; Title 40 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations Part 61, Subpart H) and State requirements in Washington Administrative Code 246–247: Radiation Protection – Air Emissions and 173-480: Ambient Air Quality Standards and Emission Limits for Radionuclides were evaluated for Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) operations. Additional guidance may be found in the U.S. Department of Energy Handbook, Environmental Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance. To meet regulatory requirements, reviews of planned or proposed projects and activities provide the basis for implementing necessary monitoring adjustments or for implementing changes to projects and activities in a timely manner. Potential unabated off-site doses were evaluated for emission locations managed by PNNL and licensed to the Department of Energy. These locations were at facilities in Richland, Washington (i.e., the Hanford Site and PNNL–Richland campus) and in Sequim, Washington, (PNNL–Sequim campus). This report describes the inventory-based methods and provides the results for the NESHAP assessment performed in January 2024 for calendar year ending 2023.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

DOE OSTI2024

Development and Demonstration of a Risk Assessment Approach for Approval of a Transportation Package of a Transportable Nuclear Power Plant for Domestic Highway Shipment

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) has tasked PNNL to address the regulatory challenges associated with confirming the safe transport of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs) containing irradiated nuclear fuel. A previous report—Proposed Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework for Approval of Microreactor Transportation Packages (PNNL-31867)—determined that the expected radioactive inventory in the irradiated fuel of a TNPP would likely require shipment in an NRC-approved Type B package (or spent nuclear fuel cask) but that a TNPP “package” is unlikely to meet the entire suite of NRC requirements set forth in Part 71 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for a Type B package. It was therefore concluded that shipment of this initial TNPP transportation package, as well as possibly others, under existing regulations would likely require NRC approval using the 10 CFR 71.12 (“Specific exemptions”) process that relies on risk-informed decision making supported by quantitative risk assessment (i.e., Probabilistic Risk Assessment).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

PNNL-Sequim Campus Radionuclide Air Emissions Report for Calendar Year 2023

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science (DOE-SC) Pacific Northwest Site Office has oversight and stewardship duties associated with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Sequim campus. Some research projects have the potential to emit low levels of radioactive materials. This report is prepared to document compliance with the Code of Federal Regulation, Title 40, Protection of the Environment, Part 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities” and Washington Administrative Code Chapter 246-247, "Radiation Protection–Air Emissions." Compliance is indicated by comparing the estimated effective dose equivalent (EDE) to the maximally exposed individual (MEI) member of the public with the 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standard. The PNNL-Sequim campus has only fugitive emissions sources.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗

DOE OSTI2024

Addendum to Architectural Documentation and National Register of Historic Places Evaluations of Built-Environment Resources at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos County, New Mexico

The Los Alamos National Laboratory contracted Statistical Research, Inc. (SRI), to document and evaluate 110 facilities for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register). This effort was conducted in compliance with Section 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended; the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR 800); the Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Field Office, the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Office and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning Management of the Historic Properties at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos New Mexico; and A Plan for the Management of the Cultural Heritage at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico (LANL’s Cultural Resources Management Plan) (2017).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Facility Radionuclide Emission Points and Sampling Systems

Battelle–Pacific Northwest Division operates numerous research and development laboratories in Washington State. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contracts to Battelle at Richland facilities on both the DOE Hanford Site and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Richland campus. These facilities have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. The PNNL contract with DOE also includes operations at the PNNL-Sequim campus in Sequim, where there is also the potential for radionuclide air emissions. This document is a periodic update that describes current PNNL facility emission units and sampling systems. The National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP [40 Code of Federal Regulations 61, Subpart H]) requires an assessment of all emission units that have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. Emission units are registered with the State of Washington. Potential emissions from emission units are assessed annually by PNNL staff. Sampling, monitoring, and other regulatory compliance requirements are designated based on the potential to-emit dose criteria, a graded approach to facility-identified potential impact categories, and regulatory requirements. The purpose of this document is to describe the facility radionuclide air emission sampling program and provide current and historical facility emission unit system performance, operation, and design information. For sampled emission units, the building, exhaust unit, control technologies, and sample extraction details are provided. Additionally, applicable configuration drawings, figures, and photographs are included. For non-sampled emission units, emission estimation and radionuclide source details are provided. Site-wide permits for the lowest potential impact category are described. Deregistered/transitioned emission unit details are also provided as necessary for at least 5 years post-closure/transition. Currently, five emission units are sampled continuously for particulate radionuclides at PNNL managed facilities on the PNNL-Richland campus (3 of the 5) and on the Hanford Site (2 of the 5). Four of these units have sampling systems that comply with the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) N13.1–2011 standard for sampling from stacks and ducts of nuclear facilities, and the fifth is grandfathered and compliant with the older ANSI N13.1–1969 standard. In addition, the PNNL-managed Hanford Site 325 Building EP 325-01-S stack is sampled continuously for emissions of tritium. No emissions sampling is required for the single licensed emission unit on the PNNL-Sequim campus.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment and Considerations for a Reasonable Rate of Return

This white paper identifies the following recommendations for states as they consider issues related to electric vehicle supply equipment program income under the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure program and other programs covered by National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Standards and Requirements in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (23 CFR 680): 1. Conduct value analysis for better outcomes 2. Promote pricing transparency

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Diversion Path Analysis: A Proposed Methodology to Develop an MC&A Approach for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors

Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) is a critical element of both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and US Department of Energy (DOE)’s domestic safeguards and security requirements. NRC licensees are required, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74 to establish and maintain an MC&A program that captures and records the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM) at the facility. Along with physical protection, MC&A is a key element of domestic nuclear material safeguards that enables the NRC to ensure that SNM is controlled and accounted for. SNM, per 10 CFR Part 74, refers to plutonium, 233 U, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 U or 235 U, but does not include source material. Periodic physical inventories, coupled with material balance evaluations, are effective and demonstrated tools to account for and detect theft or diversion of SNM in facilities containing SNM in bulk material form (i.e., not in discrete, countable items). Historically in the United States, these types of facilities have included fuel fabrication, conversion, and enrichment facilities. In comparison, reactors have relied on item counting of assemblies and control of SNM while in containment (e.g., a sealed reactor pressure vessel) because, to date, reactor fuel has been in item form. In liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), unlike traditional light water reactors (LWRs) or bulk facilities, bulk SNM quantities can change significantly during operation as a result of depletion and transmutation. This introduces challenges to the use of traditional periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations to detect theft or diversion of SNM in reactors that use SNM in bulk material form. Liquid-fueled (i.e., salt-fueled) MSR facilities are MSRs that use SNM within a salt eutectic as the fuel. The SNM is in a bulk material form any time it is outside of fresh or spent fuel storage containers. Some examples of when SNM will be in bulk form in the facility are during addition of fuel to the reactor system, while fuel is circulating in operation, and while fuel is in a drain tank. Periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations can likely be effectively applied to many portions of an MSR facility, including all areas where depletion and transmutation are not significantly changing the quantities of SNM within the control area. Within an MSR facility, this would include fresh fuel receipt and loading, waste streams that may contain SNM, irradiated fuel storage outside of the reactor core, and any irradiated fuel processing that may happen after SNM has been removed from the reactor. All of these process steps could rely on measurements of SNM quantities compared with documented inventories. Any discrepancies from predicted (i.e., book) inventories and measured inventories could be quantified as inventory differences, consistent with traditional MC&A guidance from the NRC (e.g., in NUREG-1065 Revision 2, NUREG-2159 Revision 1, and RG 5.29 Revision 2). Within the reactor system, additions and removals to the book inventory include depletion of the SNM (e.g., fission of 235 U), which complicates the use of physical inventories. SNM control, however, can also likely be effectively applied to detect theft of SNM throughout a liquid-fueled MSR facility. To complement these approaches, prior technical reports have identified that a diversion path analysis may be a useful, risk-informed, and performance-based tool to determine suitable elements of an MC&A approach for the reactor system within a liquid-fueled MSR facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Test Report for the Regulatory Testing of the Welded Isotek-SFC-W-3 Special Form Capsule

Two prototypes the welded ISOTEK-SFC-W-3 special form capsules (SFCs) of the same design were evaluated to determine if the requirements of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 173.469, Tests for Special Form Class 7 (Radioactive) Materials, were met. The results of the special form tests are documented in this test report. This report describes the special form testing activities performed on the two welded ISOTEK-SFC-W-3 capsules. The test units were designated as TU-1 and TU-2. TU-1 was subjected to leak testing, percussion testing, and impact testing. TU-1 was leak tested using the leak rate test specified in 49 CFR 173.469(a)(4)(i). The impact test on TU-1 was conducted according to the requirements in 49 CFR 173.469 (b)(1). The percussion test that was carried out on TU-1 was conducted in accordance with 49 CFR 173.469 (b)(2). TU-2 was subjected to a leak rate test as specified in 173.469(a)(4)(i) and a heat test as specified in 49 CFR 173.469(b)(4). Each test unit was leak tested before and after these respective tests. The leak rate tests performed were helium back-pressure tests and bubble tests, as specified in American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.5-2014. The measured leak rates were converted to standard condition leak rates as specified in American Society for Testing and Measurement (ASTM) E 493. The determined standardized leak rates obtained from the test and the calculations for all the test units met the requirements for special form certification. The testing was performed under the direction of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Package Testing Program (PTP).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Nuclear Materials Packaging, Transportation, and Systems Analysis Group Software Quality Assurance Plan: ANSYS Mechanical Finite Element Analysis Software Version 2023R1

ANSYS Inc. develops and markets engineering simulation software and services used in the aerospace, automotive, manufacturing, electronics, biomedical, energy, defense, and many other industries. ANSYS is dedicated to engineering simulation and is the world’s leading software provider. ANSYS was founded in 1970 and is headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. ANSYS provides an engineering analysis tool combining structural, thermal, computational fluid dynamics, acoustic, and electromagnetic simulation capabilities. ANSYS has two main programs, which use the same solvers: (1) Mechanical APDL (ANSYS Design Parametric Language), a Fortran-based coding platform, and (2) ANSYS Workbench, which uses a graphical user interface to aid in finite element analysis implementation. This plan covers both APDL and Workbench. The ANSYS computer program is a large-scale, multipurpose finite element program that can be used to solve several classes of engineering analyses. The analysis capabilities of ANSYS include the ability to solve static and dynamic structural analyses, steady-state and transient heat transfer problems, mode-frequency and buckling eigenvalue problems, static or time-varying magnetic analyses, and various types of field and coupled-field applications. The program contains many special features that allow nonlinearities or secondary effects such as plasticity, large strain, hyperelasticity, creep, swelling, large deflections, contact, stress stiffening, temperature dependency, material anisotropy, and radiation to be included in the solution. As ANSYS has been developed, other special capabilities such as substructuring, submodeling, random vibration, kinetostatics, kinetodynamics, free convection fluid analysis, acoustics, magnetics, piezoelectrics, coupled-field analysis, and design optimization have been added to the program. These capabilities contribute further to making ANSYS a multipurpose analysis tool for varied engineering disciplines. The ANSYS program has been in commercial use for over 50 years and has been used extensively in the aerospace, automotive, construction, electronic, energy services, manufacturing, nuclear, plastics, oil, and steel industries. Additionally, many consulting firms and hundreds of universities have used ANSYS for analysis, research, and educational purposes. ANSYS is recognized worldwide as one of the most widely used and capable programs of its type. Ansys design analysis software is the first created within a quality system with ISO 9001 certification, the internationally accepted quality standard. Product development, testing, maintenance and support processes also meet the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's quality requirements, as they have for nearly four decades. The Quality Assurance Service Agreement is suitable for the customers working in the nuclear industry who need to meet specific federal regulations including 10CRF50 Appendix B and provisions of 10CFR21. ANSYS has retained its original International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001 accreditation certificate since1995-05-04, It’s current certificate is valid until 2027-05-29.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Microreactor Incident-Free Transportation Radiation Dose Assessment

This report, prepared by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provides an estimate of the radiation dose related to the transportation of microreactors following the regulatory limits established in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 71.47(b). The transportation of irradiated microreactors poses unique challenges. Microreactors may be challenged to meet the current 10 mrem/hr limit at 2 meters from the vehicle in 10 CFR 71.47(b). The need to modify packaging to be within practical weight and size limits for shipping may limit the amount of shielding that can be applied for a microreactor transportation package design. Operational strategies that would necessitate moving a reactor within a short time after its operating life may result in higher radiation dose rates associated with lower cooling times. This study estimates the radiation dose to maximally exposed individuals (MEIs) under the current regulatory radiation level limit of 10 mrem/hr at 2 meters from the vehicle as well as alternative limits of 10, 50, 100, and 200 mrem/hr at 2 meters from the vehicle. This analysis expands on prior incident free transportation radiation dose assessments conducted for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste transportation. The key factors analyzed include the microreactor fuel type and burnup, shipment cooling periods, shielding designs integrated into transport packaging, and exposure scenarios for MEIs for highway and rail transport. This report considers additional distances that may be associated with compensatory measures to ensure safe transport conditions under varying radiation dose limits, including enhanced routing measures, escort protocols, vehicle inspections, and operational restrictions.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Updated Commercial Aviation Non-Airport Crash Density Values Using Data Obtained from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board for 2000 through 2019

This report documents the calculation of the commercial aviation (CA) non-airport crash density for Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) area associated with the Contiguous United States (CONUS) using the methodology outlined in the Department of Energy (DOE) Standard 3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash Into Hazardous Facilities. For analytical purposes, the CA aircraft fleet is comprised of aircraft engaged in operations under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 (i.e., Air Carrier) and Part 135 (i.e., Air Taxi).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Idaho National Laboratory CY 2024 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Analysis, Methodology, and Results for Radionuclides

This report documents the methodology and results for calculating the effective dose equivalent (EDE) to the maximally exposed individual (MEI) from atmospheric radionuclide emissions from Idaho National Laboratory (INL) sources in Calendar Year (CY) 2024. The calculations were performed in accordance with requirements in Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 40, “Protection of the Environment,” Part 61, “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs),” Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities” (40 CFR 61, Subpart H). UDFs were calculated using the computer model CAP88-PC for unit (1 Ci/yr) emission rates at INL Site facilities and INL in-town (Idaho Falls) facilities and stored in Microsoft Access databases. The UDFs—in this case, mrem/Ci—were then combined with radionuclide-specific release (emission) rates for each facility-specific source to compute doses at predetermined public receptor locations, including the MEI locations. This report contains the dose results and a description of the methodology and tools used to compute the doses.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗