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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Tritium Pressure Enhancement on the TPBAR Cladding by Physical Processes at the Getter

Tritium for the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile is produced in tritium producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) inserted into Tennessee Valley Authoritys (TVA) light-water nuclear reactors. The rods are stainless steel tubes with a permeation barrier coating and internal components that generate and contain the tritium. The TPBAR incorporates a Ni-plated Zircoloy getter tube to capture tritium and prevent it from reaching the rod cladding and permeating into the environment. Under the conventional view of getter behavior, the tritium pressure outside the getter tube is expected to be limited to the equilibrium vapor pressure of Zr hydride at the temperature of the rod as long as the total hydrogen concentration remains below the capacity of the hydride. Since the tritium pressure is higher within the rod core, this behavior relies on the thin getters ability to hold off a differential tritium pressure. The effective tritium pressure on the cladding can also be enhanced by isotope exchange. Hydrogen ingress through the cladding from the reactor coolant creates a hydrogen pressure on the outer surface of the getter that can exchange with tritium, allowing the tritium partial pressure to increase toward this hydrogen gettering pressure. The goal of this work was to use laboratory-scale experiments to examine these mechanisms and create a model of getter behavior that describes tritium transport within the TPBAR. A third mechanism wherein the concentration at the outer surface of the getter is increased by the temperature gradient within the getter tube wall (the Soret effect) is not experimentally tested but is captured in the model. While not conclusively demonstrated by the experiments due to low pressure, high temperature, and small gap volume conditions, the model shows that when combined, the three mechanisms can explain both the magnitude and time dependence of the tritium release observed for reactor fuel assemblies with TPBARs. The model also shows how various modifications of the TPBAR design can reduce this tritium release into the environment.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nevada National Security Site 2019 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2019 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (Mission Support and Test Services, LLC 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS are below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection systems at the Area 5 mixed low-level waste disposal unit are below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2019, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 77 percent above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 69 percent above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter at the Area 5 RWMS dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring in the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS soil covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 120 centimeters (3.9 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS during 2019. There was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. At the Area 3 RWMS, which received three times the natural precipitation, 57 percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter. All 2019 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

2019↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment

Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Knowledge Transfer Program for International Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2020

Expedited Walkdowns and Preparation of Cost Estimates for Decontamination and Demolition of Excess Facilities - 20335

Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) is the prime contractor responsible for managing and operating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The mission of the LLNL is to strengthen security of the United States through development and application of world-class science and technology to enhance the nation's defense, reduce the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and respond with vision, quality, integrity, and technical excellence to scientific issues of national importance. To accomplish its mission, LLNL must plan and manage its campus space and facilities to optimize use of its relatively small one-square-mile footprint. LLNL currently has numerous excess facilities that require decontamination and demolition (D and D). The LLNL Legacy Facility Program is responsible for stewardship and risk reduction programs to effectively manage these excess assets at LLNL. The Legacy Facility Program identified 10 excess facilities at LLNL that were candidates for demolition based on risks from further degradation of the facilities, potential exposure to hazardous materials, or need for removal to make way for new program facilities. The buildings range from a structure built in 1943 to serve as a US Navy drill hall during World War II, to a facility that provided neutrons to study material properties for the fusion energy program. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appropriated FY19 funding for the development of Class 3 estimates for these 10 excess facilities that would be used to develop a Program Management Plan for funding consideration. Class 3 estimates are not conceptual, nor overly detailed, but adequate to be used for budget and appropriation purposes. Using existing strategic sourcing agreements, LLNL was able to organize a team of senior subject matter experts (SMEs) with diverse technical backgrounds across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex to complete extensive process knowledge (PK) reviews and walk-downs of each excess facility and to deliver accurate and complete estimates under an expedited schedule (i.e., within eight weeks). To facilitate the expedited schedule, LLNL was fully prepared for the arrival of the JGMS team, which consisted of the following companies: J.G. Management Systems, Inc. (JGMS); Strata-G, LLC; and Michael Baker International. LLNL provided background and PK information on the excess facilities, pictures, supporting historical documentation, and radiological survey history as well as escorted access to the facilities. The JGMS team has previous experience supporting Program Management Plans for excess facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The team mobilized to LLNL and performed the facility walk-downs from January 22-25, 2019. Using a methodical evaluation process, expertise, and experience, the team was able to deliver walk-down draft reports and estimates to LLNL before their February 8, 2019 deadline. LLNL then in turn reviewed, completed the estimates by adding waste management costs and other LLNL costs, and delivered the estimates to NNSA by February 15, 2019. The completed final reports, including draft D and D estimates, were delivered to LLNL before their March 6, 2019 deadline. The work was successfully completed ahead of the expedited schedule required by LLNL, resulting in a commendation from the client. This paper describes how the partnership and collaboration as a fully integrated team comprised of the prime contractor, LLNS, and the JGMS team successfully met the needs of the US government, resulting in the performance of expedited site walk-downs, the development of summary evaluation reports, and the preparation of draft Class 3 estimates and preliminary schedules for the D and D of 10 excess facilities at LLNL. The efforts of the team will enable the D and D of the first excess facility in the 2020-2021 time frame. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Verification of Upcoming MCNP Features For Estimating Nuclear Data Sensitivities in Fixed Source Simulations [Abstract]

Predictive simulation codes, like the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code, are used throughout the nuclear community. These simulations are based on nuclear data. Maximizing the accuracy and precision of nuclear data maximizes the accuracy and precision of the overall simulation. This is imperative to applications that rely on simulations. For example, improving nuclear data for special nuclear material improves simulation accuracy in stockpile stewardship applications, which results in larger safety margins and decreased operational costs. The improvement and validation of nuclear data is completed through integral benchmark experiments. Past benchmarks have primarily been limited to focus on the effective multiplication factor ($\kappa$ eff ); broadening the purview of benchmarks beyond $\kappa$ eff -dependent nuclear data addresses nuclear data deficiencies. Different response types depend on different areas of nuclear data. This dependence is quantified as nuclear data sensitivity: the change in response due to perturbation of a contributing parameter. The larger the nuclear data sensitivity of a response, the more the experiment is influenced by the uncertainties of the nuclear data. The optimization of nuclear data sensitivities in future benchmarks would result in more detailed validation of lesser studied areas of nuclear data. Currently, direct sensitivity capabilities are not easily found for all experiment types and parameters. An MCNP tool to directly estimate the cross section sensitivities of tallied values is under development. Additionally, updates have been made to the perturbation feature of MCNP, which can be used in a less direct approach to estimating sensitivities. This work verifies these features to estimate nuclear data sensitivities in fixed source simulations of a 4.5-kg sphere of alpha- phase weapons-grade plutonium surrounded by differing amounts of copper and polyethylene. Integrated estimates made using MCNP’s tools were found to statistically agree with integrated estimates made from manual perturbation of nuclear data proving the validity of the MCNP tools.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation and Uncertainty of Radioxenon Transport with a Mesoscale Model after the February 2013 Underground Test in North Korea

Abstract The transport of radioxenon released from the February 2013 underground nuclear weapons test in North Korea was analyzed at two receptors—one at the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty site Rn58 in Russia (400 km downwind) and a second at Rn38 in Japan (1000 km downwind). Transport was modeled with two ensembles of mesoscale simulations, one generated with varying initial and lateral boundary conditions taken from the Global Forecasting System uncertainty ensemble, and a second created from different parameterizations and surface conditions. The wind variability was similar for the two ensembles and consistent with observations at 925 mb (1 mb = 1 hPa) but not at the surface. Biases in calculated surface winds and the radioxenon concentration in the ensembles were attributed mainly to poor simulation of the sea breeze at both locations and mountain lee affects at Rn38 in Japan. These wind regimes affected the timing of the surface radioxenon plume at Rn58 and its duration at Rn38. Surface wind variability induced by terrain and land–sea contrast (the sea breeze) also had a significant effect on the surface winds and plume dynamics, including blocking of flow approaching elevated terrain near Vladivostok and the west side of Japan. Increased plume uncertainty was seen at night because of surface wind variability. Measured surface chemical variability was larger than found in the first European Tracer Experiment in central Europe. The study found that horizontal model resolution contributes to uncertainty but not as much as vertical resolution, boundary layer parameterizations, and assimilation of surface meteorological data near the receptor.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Disulfonamide Ligands as f-Element Extractants from Alkaline High-Level Waste

Almost 100 million gallons of high level waste (HLW) has been generated from defense reprocessing programs to support nuclear weapons production. HLW is currently stored at the Hanford and Savannah River Sites (SRS) [1]. It contains radioactive components, such as {sup 137}Cs, {sup 99}Tc and {sup 90}Sr, as well as large amounts of non-radioactive species, including solvated cations and insoluble metal hydroxides. HLW has high concentration of soluble hydroxides ([OH{sup -}] = 2 M at SRS [2]), complexing inorganic anions ([NO{sub 3}{sup -}] ∼ 0.65 - 3.7 M at SRS [2]) and a high ionic strength. Even though the majority of actinide component in alkaline HLW is precipitated, studies of An(III) and Ln(III) complexation in highly alkaline solutions in the presence of high nitrate concentrations have showed that soluble nitrate complexes can be formed [3]. The current treatment of HLW at SRS currently consists of two processes: The Actinide Removal Process (ARP) and the Next-Generation Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction process (NG-CSSX). Strontium and actinides are removed by sorption on monosodium titanate through the Actinide Removal Process (ARP) commonly referred to as the alpha-strike step [4]. Then, cesium is selectively extracted from the alkaline media via the Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) process [5]. The CSSX solvent consists of a calix[4]arene-crown-6 extractant dissolved in an inert hydrocarbon matrix containing i) a solvent modifier (alkylphenoxy alcohol) which increases extractant solubility and prevents third phase formation, and ii) a suppressor (trioctylamine or guanidine) - that mitigates surfactant effects. The CSSX process removes {sup 137}Cs selectively and rapidly, yet the post- CSSX aqueous stream may still contain high amounts of An, thus requiring a second ARP treatment (referred to as 'alpha-finishing') for some tanks. Despite the success of the ARP process in removing Sr and An, it often represents the kinetic bottleneck of integrated processing, as it is slower than solvent extraction. Understanding the complexation of actinides by organic ligands that are compatible with the CSSX process could eventually lead to a combined caustic-side Cs/Sr/actinide extraction process with better economics due to a reduced amount of monosodium titanate and/or a shorter required contact time with titanate during ARP. This would ensure a low-activity waste (LAW) stream with no actinides without additional ARP processing post-CSSX. Disulfonamides were studied for extraction of Sm(III) from alkaline aqueous media of pH 10-14 into dichloromethane. Up to 82% of Sm(III) was extracted from solutions of pH 12.5 -13.5 and up to 84% from solutions of pH 10.5 - 11.5. These results show some resemblance with Am extraction results by calixarene ligands previously reported [10]. Kinetic studies demonstrated that even 5 min is enough to complete stripping, whereas extraction is time-limiting process and requires up to 20 h for efficient removal of Sm(III) from alkaline aqueous media. Determination of composition of complexes in solution after extraction by the equilibrium shift method showed a 1:1 Sm(III):dsa-2 complexation ratio for the extracted species.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Heat Loss Correction Factor for Fireball Yield Measurements

Fireball yield calculations are performed using Taylor’s radius equation. However, at early times, the x-ray diffusion process has a significant effect on the size of the fireball, and at late times the shock wave degenerates into an acoustic wave. Thus, earlier research determined that the range of validity for Taylor’s equation was in the scaled time regime of 0.004–0.008 s. So, when performing a yield calculation, the only values that are analyzed are those that lie within that range of validity. While Taylor’s equations offer an approximation of the scaled yield, they also rely on several assumptions. For example, the equations assume that the shock wave is adiabatic, when, in fact, the first light pulse on the nuclear test films, which occurs as the shock wave is forming, suggests that the shock wave is not adiabatic. Furthermore, the amount of heat loss from the shock wave that occurs prior to the scaled time regime of 0.004–0.008 s can change significantly as a function of air density. This may cause the shock wave radius to be smaller relative to the assumed adiabatic shock wave. Therefore, the objective of this project was to determine the correction factor for heat transfer, which should be applied in order to produce a more accurate approximation of the weapon’s yield.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Small-scale production of bespoke accelerated aging plutonium alloy

Here, this study demonstrates the 100 g scale manufacture of a plutonium alloy that ages at an accelerated rate. The resulting alloy ages six times faster than typical weapons-grade plutonium due to the addition of 238 Pu. As a major innovation, the process involved using a partial direct oxide reduction technique. This method was achieved by developing a new, complex geometry stirrer using additive manufacturing to reduce the 238Pu oxide and efficiently incorporate it into weapons-grade plutonium metal. The material was then purified by molten salt extraction and electrorefining before being alloyed with gallium. The alloy was then cold-rolled and annealed in a homogenization heat treatment. The resulting disk was characterized by metallography and differential scanning calorimetry, and the impurity content was determined using analytical chemistry techniques. The results show that a homogeneous delta phase plutonium alloy was achieved with expected microstructure and minimal impurities. This study was also successful in changing the plutonium isotopic composition by incorporating additional 238 Pu to accelerate the effects of radiation damage. This enables researchers to study long-term aging phenomena in a reduced time frame, thus avoiding the need for large-scale material production and circumventing the limitations of using naturally aged, archived plutonium.

Aging theory↗
DOE OSTI2024

Design and Materials of Reference Electrodes for Radioactive Waste Tank Service – A Literature Review

The Hanford site stores approximately 55 million gallons of radioactive and chemically hazardous wastes from the production of weapons materials. The wastes are stored in 177 underground, carbon steel storage tanks, 149 of these are single shell tanks (SSTs) and 28 of these are double shell tanks (DSTs). The DSTs provide critical retrieval and interim storage before the waste is vitrified in the Waste Treatment and Isolation Plant (WTP). The DSTs have been in service for 38 to 56 years and current plans indicate that WTP operations will be completed in 2075. Thus, the tanks will need to remain in service far beyond the initial 40-year life expectancy. For life extension of the tanks, effective corrosion control practices must remain in force. This effort includes direct measurements of the extent of corrosion (e.g., ultrasonic measurements and corrosion coupons) and electrochemical processes (e.g., linear polarization measurements).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Multiple monoenergetic gamma radiography (MMGR) with a compact superconducting cyclotron

Smuggling of special nuclear materials and nuclear devices through borders and ports of entry constitutes a major risk to global security. Technologies are needed to reliably screen the flow of commerce for the presence of high-Z materials such as uranium and plutonium. Here, we present an experimental proof-of-concept of a technique that uses inelastic (p,p') nuclear reactions to generate monoenergetic photons, which provide means to measure the areal density and the effective-Z (Z eff ) of an object with an accuracy surpassing that achieved by current methods. We use an ION-12 SC superconducting 12 MeV proton cyclotron to produce 4.4, 6.1, 6.9, and 7.1 MeV photons from a variety of nuclear reactions. Using these photons in a transmission mode, we show that we are able to accurately reconstruct the areal densities and Zeff of a test object. This methodology could enable mobile applications to screen commercial cargoes with high material specificity, providing a means of distinguishing common cargo materials from high-Z materials that include uranium and plutonium.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Expanded Intercomparison of Nuclear Data Libraries Using Jupiter and Jupiter High-240 Experiments

There is a limited availability of plutonium experiments with sensitivity to lead in the ICSBEP (International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments) Handbook. The Jupiter and Jupiter High-240 experiments were performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center as a collaborative effort between Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency to assess lead void coefficients in a plutonium-lead system containing weapons- and reactor-grade plutonium, respectively. Concurrent with benchmark development, an intercomparison of calculations using different nuclear data libraries has been performed to assess the usability of the experimental data for nuclear data adjustment in a “softer-that-fast” neutron energy spectrum. Eigenvalue calculations using MCNP with the ENDF/B-VIII.0 and TENDL-2021 nuclear data libraries calculate closest to the benchmark values for Jupiter. Calculations using JENDL-5 and ENDF/B-VIII.1 match best with the Jupiter High-240 values. Lead void worth calculations using the various nuclear data libraries are all within 3σ of their respective measured values. Perturbation studies between ENDF/B-VIII.0 and ENDF/B-VIII.1 demonstrate an approximate increase in calculated eigenvalues for the Jupiter series experiments by ~240 pcm for plutonium (mostly 239 Pu) and ~120 pcm for lead accompanied by a decrease contributed by ~113 pcm for copper and ~13 pcm for stainless steel. Nuclear data sensitivities and uncertainties investigated using Whisper show slightly lower sensitivity to scatter than a lead-reflected plutonium sphere but greater sensitivity to neutron capture. The sensitivities between Jupiter and Jupiter High-240 for lead are very similar for both ENDF/B-VIII.0 and ENDF/B-VIII.1 nuclear data. These benchmarks are more sensitive to neutron capture in lead than other plutonium benchmark experiments and would be useful for both lead and 240 Pu validation. In conclusion, with the high degree of compensating effects between copper, lead, and plutonium cross sections, additional isolated Pb-Pu and Cu-Pu benchmarks would be beneficial in improving these nuclear data.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Building 23-620, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory J-3 Office, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-620, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) J-3 Office Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-620 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-620 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-620 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Scoping Analysis of Pebble-Bed Reactors for the Destruction of the Transuranic Inventory of LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel

With the forecasted increase in the construction and operation of nuclear reactors, there will be a corresponding increase in the quantity of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that requires long-term storage. In SNF, transuranic isotopes contribute the most to the long-term radiotoxicity of the fuel and pose a proliferation risk. One option that has been explored to address these issues is the removal of the transuranic isotopes from SNF and the conversion of these isotopes into transuranic fuel (TRU fuel). Here, this work sought to determine how effective a micro-modular Pebble-Bed High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (PB-HTGR); the 10-MW High Temperature Gas-cooled Test Reactor (HTR-10); and a salt-cooled small-modular pebble-bed reactor (PBR), i.e. the generic Fluoride-cooled High-temperature Reactor (gFHR), are at reducing the inventory of transuranic isotopes while still maintaining the intrinsic safety features of the PBR designs, such as negative temperature coefficients of reactivity. Optimized pebble designs utilizing TRU fuel were found for both reactors through the adjustment for the packing fraction of fuel in each pebble. The Axial Zone Equilibrium Modeling (A-ZEM) method was used in this work to help select the optimized pebble design. Once an optimized pebble design was selected and an equilibrium model was produced, the results from the deep burn (DB) HTR-10 and gFHR designs were compared to the results of two models from the literature. While both the DB gFHR and the DB HTR-10 were able to reduce the weapons-usable transuranic inventory, the performance of these reactors did not match that of the small-modular PB-HTGRs in the literature. Therefore, a need was identified for further refinement of the gFHR design using TRU fuel, as the results for this model were more promising than those of the DB HTR-10, which was strongly limited by the high leakage intrinsic to micro-modular PB-HTGRs.

Transuranic fuel↗