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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1972

Life support system definition for a low cost shuttle launched space station.

Discussion of the tradeoffs and EC/LS definition for a low cost shuttle launched space station to be launched in the late 1970s for use as a long-term manned scientific laboratory. The space station consists of 14-ft-diam modules, clustered together to support a six-man crew at the initial space station (ISS) level and a 12-man crew at the growth space station (GSS) level. Key design guidelines specify low initial cost and low total program cost and require two separate pressurized habitable compartments with independent lift support capability. The methodology used to select the EC/LS design consisted of systematically reducing quantitative parameters to a common denominator of cost. This approach eliminates many of the inconsistencies that can occur in such decision making. The EC/LS system selected is a partially closed system which recovers urine, condensate, and wash water and concentrates crew expired CO2 for use in a low thrust resistojet propulsion system.

Nelson, W. G.↗
NASA NTRS1974

Earth Observatory Satellite system definition study. Report 3: Design cost trade-off studies and recommendations

An analysis of the design and cost tradeoff aspects of the Earth Observatory Satellite (EOS) development is presented. The design/cost factors that affect a series of mission/system level concepts are discussed. The subjects considered are as follows: (1) spacecraft subsystem cost tradeoffs, (2) ground system cost tradeoffs, and (3) program cost summary. Tables of data are provided to summarize the results of the analyses. Illustrations of the various spacecraft configurations are included.

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NASA NTRS1976

Payload specialist station study. Volume 3: Program study cost estimates. Part 1: Work breakdown structure

The work breakdown structure (WBS) for the Payload Specialist Station (PSS) is presented. The WBS is divided into two elements--PSS contractor and mission unique requirements. In accordance with the study ground rules, it is assumed that a single contractor, hereafter referred to as PSS Contractor will perform the following: (1) provide C and D hardware (MFDS and elements of MMSE), except for GFE; (2) identify software requirements; (3) provide GSE and ground test software; and (4) perform systems engineering and integration in support of the Aft Flight Deck (AFD) C and D concept. The PSS Contractor WBS element encompasses a core or standardized PSS concept. Payload peculiar C and D requirements identified by users will originate as a part of the WBS element mission unique requirements; these requirements will be provided to the PSS Contractor for implementation.

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NASA NTRS1982

NECAP 4.1: NASA's Energy Cost Analysis Program thermal response factor routine

A thermal response factor is described and calculation sequences and flowcharts for RESFAC2 are provided. RESFAC is used by NASA's (NECAP) to calculate hourly heat transfer coefficients (thermal response factors) for each unique delayed surface. NECAP uses these response factors to compute each spaces' hourly heat gain/loss.

Weise, M. R.↗
NASA NTRS2020

History and Logic Model NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Instrument and Payload Systems Engineering Technical Performance Study

Historically, some NASA missions have exceeded schedule and cost commitments. Studies suggest technical performance is a contributor. The 1980 NASA Project Management Study concluded, "one of the most significant contributors to cost and schedule growth is inadequate definition of technical and management aspects of a program..." (as cited in GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p. 11). The 1991 NASA Roles and Missions Report identified a "need for increased emphasis on technological readiness and requirements on the front end of a program" (as cited in GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p. 11). The 1992 NASA Program Costs Report stated that NASA officials identified, among other things, "insufficient definition studies... [and] program redesigns and technical complexities" as reasons for cost and schedule overruns (GAO/NSAID-93-97, p. 11). The 2002 Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs found "requirements definition and control issues, unhealthy cost bias in proposal evaluation, widespread lack of budget reserves required to implement high risk programs on schedule, and an overall underappreciation of the importance of appropriately staffed and trained system engineering staff to manage the technologically demanding and unique aspects of space programs" (DoD, 2003, p.i.) In 2007, The NASA Office of the Chief Engineer chartered the NASA Instrument Capability Study (NICS) “to determine whether NASA instrument developers are facing challenges that impact the capability to design and build quality instruments or whether there are flaws in the acquisition strategy evidenced by schedule delays, cost overruns, and increased technical risk via design deficiencies. The... team was also chartered to determine if occurrences [are]... isolated cases or if there are generic issues... If the issues [are] found to be generic, the team [is] to offer solutions to recover such capability" (NICS Report, 2008, p. vi). The 2008 NICS Report, led by Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), identified challenges to instrument technical performance consistent with findings from previous reports. In 2017, the Instrument Project Division (IPD) Implementation Study was initiated to determine if there was a change in meeting schedule and cost commitments after implementing certain NICS recommendations. In 2018, the Instrument Technical Performance Study was initiated to determine the current state of Instrument Technical Performance in the GSFC Payload & Instrument Systems Engineering Branch. The purpose of the combined studies is to answer the question, "Is there a relationship between meeting NASA scientific instrument technical success and meeting schedule and cost commitments? If yes, what is the relationship?" References Department of Defense Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. (2003). The report of the defense science board/ air force scientific advisory board joint task force on acquisition of national security space programs. Washington DC. Government Accounting Office. (1992). NASA program costs: Space missions require substantially more funding than initially estimated. GAO/NSIAD-93-97. Washington DC. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, Department of Defense. (2008). The NASA instrument capability study final report. NP-2008-11-058-GSFC. Washington DC.

Robbins, Geraldine↗
NASA NTRS1972

Integrated operations/payloads/fleet analysis (executive summary)

The Integrated Operations/Payloads/Fleet Analysis predicts total national space program costs and launch vehicle traffic assuming either an expendable, a partially reusable or a fully reusable launch vehicle fleet. The payload system costs are estimated and reported for each payload program at the subsystem level, payload program level, user level and national level, providing complete system cost traceability. The analysis determines the primary changes to be expected for space payload programs and space operations in the space shuttle era. When the space shuttle becomes fully operational, not only will launch costs be reduced but refurbished satellite units will be flown instead of new units and maintenance will be performed on failing satellites. It is possible to implement the concepts of satellite refurbishment and maintenance because of the space shuttle's capability to retrieve and return payloads to the earth's surface. The two-way satellite transportation capability is extended to high energy orbits by use of the space shuttle/space tug combination.

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NASA NTRS1986

Manned Mars mission cost estimate

The potential costs of several options of a manned Mars mission are examined. A cost estimating methodology based primarily on existing Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) parametric cost models is summarized. These models include the MSFC Space Station Cost Model and the MSFC Launch Vehicle Cost Model as well as other modes and techniques. The ground rules and assumptions of the cost estimating methodology are discussed and cost estimates presented for six potential mission options which were studied. The estimated manned Mars mission costs are compared to the cost of the somewhat analogous Apollo Program cost after normalizing the Apollo cost to the environment and ground rules of the manned Mars missions. It is concluded that a manned Mars mission, as currently defined, could be accomplished for under $30 billion in 1985 dollars excluding launch vehicle development and mission operations.

Hamaker, Joseph↗
NASA NTRS1987

Report of the Committee on the Space Station of the National Research Council

The Space Station Program will be the most ambitious space project the nation has ever undertaken; will require tens of billions of dollars; and will entwine for many years the space program with those of international partners. It must have enduring stable support across administrations, and the support must be generous. The current Space Shuttle is barely adequate for the limited purpose of deploying the Space Station, and it is inadequate to meet broader national needs in space. The Committee recommends in the strongest terms that the Shuttle be upgraded with new improved solid rocket motors, that it be supplemented with expendable launch vehicles, and that a heavy lift launch vehicle be developed for use in the latter half of the 1990s. The Committee strongly recommends that NASA prepare a new Space Station Program cost estimate in conjunction with the Program Requirements Review scheduled for early next year by NASA. The exercise should address the full range of uncertainties in the current Program, some of which are discussed in the report.

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NASA NTRS1976

Applications Study of Aero-Maneuvering Orbit-to-Orbit Shuttle (AMOOS), Executive Summary

Preliminary designs and the supporting analysis for both the Aeromaneuvering Orbit-to-Orbit Shuttle (AMOOS) and the Aeromaneuvering Recovery System (AMRS) are presented. The AMOOS design is shown to yield from twice to almost three times the high energy, round-trip payloads as a purely propulsive vehicle of the same weight. Typically AMOOS can perform a crew rotation mission to equatorial geosynchronous orbit in one space shuttle launch. The flight test program analysis modeled parameters such as maximum dynamic pressure, heating rates, guidance, stability and recovery. Two model flight schedules were developed, one consisting of four flights and the other of two flights. The former is considered a very low risk, high information return program whereas the latter is a minimal cost program consistent with reasonable data returns and chance of success. The AMOOS and AMRS guidance scheme developed using linear regulator theory proved a precise and accurate guidance scheme. Both it and a classical linear system's based scheme were evaluated using 65 simulated trajectories in which the position in the entry corridor and the atmospheric density were varied randomly.

White, J.↗
NASA NTRS1978

Ground operations and concepts for future space activities

The Kennedy Space Center Shuttle launch site operations concept involves launch site facilities, operations, and crews being organized for maximum flexibility and minimum impact in support of future programs. The goal is to reduce program costs by having optimum utilization of facilities resulting in a greater return on the investment for these facilities. The present paper develops the notion that the cost and lead times associated with a program such as Space Industrialization can be significantly influenced by early planning for the transition of launch site operations concepts developed for the Space Transportation System.

Mccoy, H. E.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Geostationary platform systems concepts definition study. Volume 2: Technical, book 1

The initial selection and definition of operational geostationary platform concepts is discussed. Candidate geostationary platform missions and payloads were identified from COMSAT, Aerospace, and NASA studies. These missions and payloads were cataloged; classified with to communications, military, or scientific uses; screened for application and compatibility with geostationary platforms; and analyzed to identify platform requirements. Two platform locations were then selected (Western Hemisphere - 110 deg W, and Atlantic - 15 deg W), and payloads allocated based on nominal and high traffic models. Trade studies were performed leading to recommendation of selected concepts. Of 30 Orbit Transfer Vehicle (0TV) configuration and operating mode options identified, 18 viable candidates compatible with the operational geostationary platform missions were selected for analysis. Each was considered using four platform operational modes - 8 or 16 year life, and serviced or nonserviced, providing a total of 72 OTV/platform-mode options. For final trade study concept selection, a cost program was developed considering payload and platform costs and weight; transportation unit and total costs for the shuttle and OTV; and operational costs such as assembly or construction time, mating time, and loiter time. Servicing costs were added for final analysis and recommended selection.

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NASA NTRS1984

Evaluation of propellant tank insulation concepts for low-thrust chemical propulsion systems

An analytical evaluation of cryogenic propellant tank insulations for liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen low-thrust 2224N (500 lbf) propulsion systems (LTPS) was conducted. The insulation studied consisted of combinations of N2-purged foam and multilayer insulation (MLI) as well as He-purged MLI-only. Heat leak and payload performance predictions were made for three Shuttle-launched LTPS designed for Shuttle bay packaged payload densities of 56 kg/cu m, 40 kg/cu m and 24 kg/cu m. Foam/MLI insulations were found to increase LTPS payload delivery capability when compared with He-purged MLI-only. An additional benefit of foam/MLI was reduced operational complexity because Orbiter cargo bay N2 purge gas could be used for MLI purging. Maximum payload mass benefit occurred when an enhanced convection, rather than natural convection, heat transfer was specified for the insulation purge enclosure. The enhanced convection environment allowed minimum insulation thickness to be used for the foam/MLI interface temperature selected to correspond to the moisture dew point in the N2 purge gas. Experimental verification of foam/MLI benefits was recommended. A conservative program cost estimate for testing a MLI-foam insulated tank was 2.1 million dollars. It was noted this cost could be reduced significantly without increasing program risk.

Kramer, T.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Evaluation of propellent tank insulation concepts for low-thrust chemical propulsion systems: Executive summary

Cryogenic propellant tank insulations or liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen low-thrust 2224N (500 lbf) propulsion systems (LTPS) were assessed. The insulation studied consisted of combinations of N2-purged foam and multilayer insulation (MLI) as well as He-purged MLI-only. Heat leak and payload performance predictions were made for three shuttle-launched LTPS designed for shuttle bay packaged payload densities of 56 kg cu/m (3.5 lbm/cu ft), 40 kg/cu m (2.5 lbm/cu ft) and 24 kg/cu m (1.5 lbm/cu ft). Foam/MLI insulations were found to increase LTPS payload delivery capability when compared with He-purged MLI-only. An additional benefit of foam/MLI was reduced operational complexity because orbiter cargo bay N2 purge gas could be used for MLI purging. Maximum payload mass benefit occurred when an enhanced convection, rather than natural convection, heat transfer was specified for the insulation purge enclosure. The enhanced convection environment allowed minimum insulation thickness to be used for the foam/MLI interface temperature selected to correspond to the moisture dew point in the N2 purge gas. Experimental verification of foam/MLI benefits was recommended. A conservative program cost estimate for testing a MLI-foam insulated tank was 2.1 million dollars. This cost could be reduced significantly without increasing program risk.

Kramer, T.↗