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Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Vulcan-Forge: Architecture and Design of a Multi-Modal Forensic Analysis Plugin for CALDERA

Forge and VULCAN together describe an open-architecture cybersecurity analysis ecosystem that unifies forensic artifact processing, detection engineering, and vulnerability intelligence within integrated platforms. Forge operates as a plugin for MITRE CALDERA, ingesting diverse evidence formats—including EVTX, PCAP/PCAPNG, CSV, JSON, YAML, XML, binaries, and archives—to construct a unified artifact graph enriched with severity scoring, TLP classification, and audit trails. It provides subsystems for artifact parsing, streaming structured-data visualization, NetworkMiner-based packet inspection, PE/.NET binary analysis, and LLM-assisted triage and rule generation, with outputs validated against CCCS-YARA and pySigma schemas. VULCAN complements this by serving as a cybersecurity analyst platform that integrates a Neo4j knowledge graph, Qdrant vector retrieval, SSVC-based triage, and a local LLM to deliver CVE intelligence and forensic analysis through a multi-source ingest pipeline drawing from NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, MITRE ATT&CK, and CAPEC. Together, they bridge structured threat intelligence with automated forensic analysis and detection workflows.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

MACCS User Guide - Version 5.2

MACCS is used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This user guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/MACCS-UI User Interface (UI) model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 5.2, model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

SIERRA Code Coupling Module: Arpeggio User Manual - Version 5.30

The SNL Sierra Mechanics code suite is designed to enable simulation of complex multiphysics scenarios. The code suite is composed of several specialized applications which can operate either in standalone mode or coupled with each other. Arpeggio is a supported utility that enables loose coupling of the various Sierra Mechanics applications by providing access to Framework services that facilitate the coupling. More importantly Arpeggio orchestrates the execution of applications that participate in the coupling. This document describes the various components of Arpeggio and their operability. The intent of the document is to provide a fast path for analysts interested in coupled applications via simple examples of its usage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Workforce Training for SMR Integration into Distribution Grids: A Competency Framework and Containerized Hands-On Lab for the SMR/DER/Microgrid Boundary

Small modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors are entering the U.S. distribution grid as synchronous generation on feeders designed for loads and inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs). No existing cybersecurity training program addresses this intersection of nuclear operations, DER management, and operational technology security. As subcontractor to Iowa State University on the CyDERMS Center, Argonne analyzed the relevant standards and training landscape, translated the resulting gaps into a twelve-objective competency framework across distribution-operator and graduate-analyst role tracks, and built a containerized training lab using a ∼400-bus composite grid model behind a realistically simulated Modbus TCP SCADA stack. The analysis isolates the balance-of-plant / energy-management-system (BOP/EMS) boundary as the critical jurisdictional seam where, as of March 2026, neither NRC nor NERC CIP cleanly claims cybersecurity responsibility for distribution-connected SMRs. The framework maps each objective across NIST CSF 2.0, ISA/IEC 62443, NIST NICE Task–Knowledge–Skill statements, and NRC RG 5.71 awareness-and-training controls. The training lab implements operator-recognition assessment scenarios spanning grid-side disturbances and telemetry-layer anomalies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

ANNUAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE TANK INSPECTION PROGRAM- 2007

Aqueous radioactive wastes from Savannah River Site (SRS) separations and vitrification processes are contained in large underground carbon steel tanks. The 2007 inspection program revealed that the structural integrity and waste confinement capability of the Savannah River Site waste tanks were maintained. A very small amount of material had seeped from Tank 12 from a previously identified leaksite. The material observed had dried on the tank wall and did not reach the annulus floor. A total of 5945 photographs were made and 1221 visual and video inspections were performed during 2007. Additionally, ultrasonic testing was performed on four Waste Tanks (15, 36, 37 and 38) in accordance with approved inspection plans that met the requirements of WSRC-TR-2002- 00061, Revision 2 'In-Service Inspection Program for High Level Waste Tanks'. The Ultrasonic Testing (UT) In-Service Inspections (ISI) are documented in a separate report that is prepared by the ISI programmatic Level III UT Analyst. Tanks 15, 36, 37 and 38 are documented in 'Tank Inspection NDE Results for Fiscal Year 2007'; WSRC-TR-2007-00064.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Scoping Study for Demand Respose DFT II Project in Morgantown, WV

This scoping study describes the underlying data resources and an analysis tool for a demand response assessment specifically tailored toward the needs of the Modern Grid Initiatives Demonstration Field Test in Phase II in Morgantown, WV. To develop demand response strategies as part of more general distribution automation, automated islanding and feeder reconfiguration schemes, an assessment of the demand response resource potential is required. This report provides the data for the resource assessment for residential customers and describes a tool that allows the analyst to estimate demand response in kW for each hour of the day, by end-use, season, day type (weekday versus weekend) with specific saturation rates of residential appliances valid for the Morgantown, WV area.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Reliability of Current Biokinetic and Dosimetric Models for Radionuclides: A Pilot Study

This report describes the results of a pilot study of the reliability of the biokinetic and dosimetric models currently used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as predictors of dose per unit internal or external exposure to radionuclides. The study examines the feasibility of critically evaluating the accuracy of these models for a comprehensive set of radionuclides of concern to the NRC. Each critical evaluation would include: identification of discrepancies between the models and current databases; characterization of uncertainties in model predictions of dose per unit intake or unit external exposure; characterization of variability in dose per unit intake or unit external exposure; and evaluation of prospects for development of more accurate models. Uncertainty refers here to the level of knowledge of a central value for a population, and variability refers to quantitative differences between different members of a population. This pilot study provides a critical assessment of models for selected radionuclides representing different levels of knowledge of dose per unit exposure. The main conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) To optimize the use of available NRC resources, the full study should focus on radionuclides most frequently encountered in the workplace or environment. A list of 50 radionuclides is proposed. (2) The reliability of a dose coefficient for inhalation or ingestion of a radionuclide (i.e., an estimate of dose per unit intake) may depend strongly on the specific application. Multiple characterizations of the uncertainty in a dose coefficient for inhalation or ingestion of a radionuclide may be needed for different forms of the radionuclide and different levels of information of that form available to the dose analyst. (3) A meaningful characterization of variability in dose per unit intake of a radionuclide requires detailed information on the biokinetics of the radionuclide and hence is not feasible for many infrequently studied radionuclides. (4) The biokinetics of a radionuclide in the human body typically represents the greatest source of uncertainty or variability in dose per unit intake. (5) Characterization of uncertainty in dose per unit exposure is generally a more straightforward problem for external exposure than for intake of a radionuclide. (6) For many radionuclides the most important outcome of a large-scale critical evaluation of databases and biokinetic models for radionuclides is expected to be the improvement of current models. Many of the current models do not fully or accurately reflect available radiobiological or physiological information, either because the models are outdated or because they were based on selective or uncritical use of data or inadequate model structures. In such cases the models should be replaced with physiologically realistic models that incorporate a wider spectrum of information.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

INVESTIGATION OF THE TOTAL ORGANIC HALOGEN ANALYTICAL METHOD AT THE WASTE SAMPLING CHARACTERIZATION FACILITY (WSCF)

Total organic halogen (TOX) is used as a parameter to screen groundwater samples at the Hanford Site. Trending is done for each groundwater well, and changes in TOX and other screening parameters can lead to costly changes in the monitoring protocol. The Waste Sampling and Characterization Facility (WSCF) analyzes groundwater samples for TOX using the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) SW-846 method 9020B (EPA 1996a). Samples from the Soil and Groundwater Remediation Project (S&GRP) are submitted to the WSCF for analysis without information regarding the source of the sample; each sample is in essence a 'blind' sample to the laboratory. Feedback from the S&GRP indicated that some of the WSCF-generated TOX data from groundwater wells had a number of outlier values based on the historical trends (Anastos 2008a). Additionally, analysts at WSCF observed inconsistent TOX results among field sample replicates. Therefore, the WSCF lab performed an investigation of the TOX analysis to determine the cause of the outlier data points. Two causes were found that contributed to generating out-of-trend TOX data: (1) The presence of inorganic chloride in the groundwater samples: at inorganic chloride concentrations greater than about 10 parts per million (ppm), apparent TOX values increase with increasing chloride concentration. A parallel observation is the increase in apparent breakthrough of TOX from the first to the second activated-carbon adsorption tubes with increasing inorganic chloride concentration. (2) During the sample preparation step, excessive purging of the adsorption tubes with oxygen pressurization gas after sample loading may cause channeling in the activated-carbon bed. This channeling leads to poor removal of inorganic chloride during the subsequent wash step with aqueous potassium nitrate. The presence of this residual inorganic chloride then produces erroneously high TOX values. Changes in sample preparation were studied to more effectively remove inorganic chloride from the activated carbon adsorption tubes. With the TOX sample preparation equipment and TOX analyzers at WSCF, the nitrate wash recommended by EPA SW-846 method 9020B was found to be inadequate to remove inorganic chloride interference. Increasing the nitrate wash concentration from 10 grams per liter (g/L) to 100 g/L potassium nitrate and increasing the nitrate wash volume from 3 milliliters (mL) to 10 mL effectively removed the inorganic chloride up to at least 100 ppm chloride in the sample matrix. Excessive purging of the adsorption tubes during sample preparation was eliminated. These changes in sample preparation have been incorporated in the analytical procedure. The results using the revised sample preparation procedure show better agreement of TOX values both for replicate analyses of single samples and for the analysis of replicate samples acquired from the same groundwater well. Furthermore, less apparent column breakthrough now occurs with the revised procedure. One additional modification made to sample preparation was to discontinue the treatment of groundwater samples with sodium bisulfite. Sodium bisulfite is used to remove inorganic chlorine from the sample; inorganic chlorine is not expected to be a constituent in these groundwater samples. Several other factors were also investigated as possible sources of anomalous TOX results: (1) Instrument instability: examination of the history of results for TOX laboratory control samples and initial calibration verification standards indicate good long-term precision for the method and instrument. Determination of a method detection limit of 2.3 ppb in a deionized water matrix indicates the method and instrumentation have good stability and repeatability. (2) Non-linear instrument response: the instrument is shown to have good linear response from zero to 200 parts per billion (ppb) TOX. This concentration range encompasses the majority of samples received at WSCF for TOX analysis. (3) Improper sample preservation: ion-chromatographic analysis of several samples with anomalous TOX results revealed that the samples were properly preserved with sulfuric acid and not hydrochloric acid.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Code Reference Manual

The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer. SAPHIRE is funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The INL's primary role in this project is that of software developer. However, the INL also plays an important role in technology transfer by interfacing and supporting SAPHIRE users comprised of a wide range of PRA practitioners from the NRC, national laboratories, the private sector, and foreign countries. SAPHIRE can be used to model a complex system’s response to initiating events, quantify associated damage outcome frequencies, and identify important contributors to this damage (Level 1 PRA) and to analyze containment performance during a severe accident and quantify radioactive releases (Level 2 PRA). It can be used for a PRA evaluating a variety of operating conditions, for example, for a nuclear reactor at full power, low power, or at shutdown conditions. Furthermore, SAPHIRE can be used to analyze both internal and external initiating events and has special features for transforming models built for internal event analysis to models for external event analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify risk in terms of release consequences to both the public and the environment (Level 3 PRA). SAPHIRE includes a separate module called the Graphical Evaluation Module (GEM). GEM provides a highly specialized user interface with SAPHIRE that automates SAPHIRE process steps for evaluating operational events at commercial nuclear power plants. Using GEM, an analyst can estimate the risk associated with operational events in a very efficient and expeditious manner. This reference guide will introduce the SAPHIRE Version 7.0 software. A brief discussion of the purpose and history of the software is included along with general information such as installation instructions, starting and stopping the program, and some pointers on how to get around inside the program. Next, database concepts and structure are discussed. Following that discussion are nine sections, one for each of the menu options on the SAPHIRE main menu, wherein the purpose and general capabilities for each option are furnished. Next, the capabilities and limitations of the software are provided.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Intergrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Summary Manual

The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer (PC) running the Microsoft Windows operating system. SAPHIRE is primarily funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). INL's primary role in this project is that of software developer and tester. However, INL also plays an important role in technology transfer by interfacing and supporting SAPHIRE users, who constitute a wide range of PRA practitioners from the NRC, national laboratories, the private sector, and foreign countries. SAPHIRE can be used to model a complex system’s response to initiating events and quantify associated consequential outcome frequencies. Specifically, for nuclear power plant applications, SAPHIRE can identify important contributors to core damage (Level 1 PRA) and containment failure during a severe accident which lead to releases (Level 2 PRA). It can be used for a PRA where the reactor is at full power, low power, or at shutdown conditions. Furthermore, it can be used to analyze both internal and external initiating events and has special features for transforming an internal events model to a model for external events, such as flooding and fire analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify risk in terms of release consequences to the public and environment (Level 3 PRA). SAPHIRE also includes a separate module called the Graphical Evaluation Module (GEM). GEM is a special user interface linked to SAPHIRE that automates the SAPHIRE process steps for evaluating operational events at commercial nuclear power plants. Using GEM, an analyst can estimate the risk associated with operational events (for example, to calculate a conditional core damage probability) very efficiently and expeditiously. This report provides an overview of the functions available in SAPHIRE and presents general instructions for using the software. Section 1 presents SAPHIRE’s historical evolution and summarizes its capabilities. Section 2 presents instructions for installing and using the code. Section 3 explains the database structure used in SAPHIRE and discusses database concepts. Section 4 explains how PRA data (event frequencies, human error probabilities, etc.) can be generated and manipulated using “change sets.” Section 5 deals with fault tree operations, including constructing, editing, solving, and displaying results. Section 6 presents operations associated with event trees, including rule application for event tree linking, partitioning, and editing sequences. Section 7 presents how accident sequences are generated, solved, quantified, and analyzed. Section 8 discusses the functions available for performing end state analysis. Section 9 explains how to modify data stored in a SAPHIRE database. Section 10 illustrates how to generate and customize reports. Section 11 covers SAPHIRE utility options to perform routine functions such as defining constant values, recovering databases, and loading data from external sources. Section 12 provides an overview of GEM’s features and capabilities. Finally, Section 13 summarizes SAPHIRE’s quality assurance process.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Technology Review of Nondestructive Methods for Examination of Water Intrusion Areas on Hanford’s Double-Shell Waste Tanks

Under a contract with CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc., PNNL has performed a review of the NDE technology and methods for examination of the concrete dome structure of Hanford’s double-shell tanks. The objective was to provide a matrix of methodologies that could be evaluated based on applicability, ease of deployment, and results that could provide information that could be used in the ongoing structural analysis of the tank dome. PNNL performed a technology evaluation with the objective of providing a critical literature review for all applicable technologies based on constraints provided by CH2M HILL. These constraints were not mandatory, but were desired. These constraints included performing the evaluation without removing any soil from the top of the tank, or if necessary, requesting that the hole diameter needed to gain access to evaluate the top of the tank structure to be no greater than approximately 12-in. in diameter. PNNL did not address the details of statistical sampling requirements as they depend on an unspecified risk tolerance. PNNL considered these during the technology evaluation and have reported the results in the remainder of this document. Many of the basic approaches to concrete inspection that were reviewed in previous efforts are still in use. These include electromagnetic, acoustic, radiographic, etc. The primary improvements in these tools have focused on providing quantitative image reconstruction, thus providing inspectors and analysts with three-dimensional data sets that allow for operator visualization of relevant abnormalities and analytical integration into structural performance models. Available instruments, such as radar used for bridge deck inspections, rely on post-processing algorithms and do not provide real-time visualization. Commercially available equipment only provides qualitative indications of relative concrete damage. It cannot be used as direct input for structural analysis to assess fitness for use and if necessary to de-rate critical components. There are currently no tools that automatically convert the NDE data to formats compatible with structural analysis programs. While radiographic techniques still provide significant advantages in spatial resolution, non-ionizing techniques are still preferred. Radar imagining in the 1–5 GHz has become the most useful. Unfortunately the algorithms and underlying assumptions used in these reconstructions are proprietary, and it is not possible to assess the quality and limitations of the analytical methods used to generate the derived structural data. The hypothesis that water intrusion may contribute to potential rebar corrosion of the tank domes provided the primary guidance in reviewing and evaluating available NDE technologies. Of primary concern is the need to employ technologies that provide the best opportunity for visualizing the rebar and providing quantitative data that can be integrated into structural analysis efforts to better understand and quantify the structural capacity of the domes. The conclusion is that an imaging system capable of locating and quantifying the distribution and conditions of the cement, aggregate, and rebar will provide the most valuable baseline upon which to build a case for the integrity of the structure. If successful, such a system would fulfill the need to incorporate valuable data into current structural load capacity analysis.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lawrence Livermore National Security CFO Processes Functional Management Assessment

The scope of the Functional Management Assessment of the CFO included a review of the CFO Organizational Structure, including deployed financial services and the division of responsibilities and internal controls between CFO and other organizations that perform financial functions across the Laboratory. In addition, the assessment team solicited input from end users and reviewers. Three issues discussed are: ISSUE 1: Financial activities and cash transactions are occurring outside the CFO organization. Approximately $200M of non-purchase order spending occurs in seven areas outside CFO control (travel, relocation, special disbursements, IPO, legal, risk management, and freight). NIF financial services have not been integrated into the CFO organization and operate outside CFO control. Business risks--There is no single point of financial accountably; Currently within the CFO and Business and Operations organizations there is a lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities for financial activities; Financial talent within the laboratory is fragmented; and Inefficiencies exist based on the current structure; An example of the above business risks associated with organizational structure can be observed in the process for reimbursement of relocation costs to employees. Currently, Human Resources and Travel both administer portions of an employee's relocation. Costs are reviewed for compliance with FAR travel guidelines and for compliance with the offer letter but there is no financial review for allowability of costs nor is there a single point where the total relocation costs are reviewed. Through the e-pay system the check is processed by the CFO organization but there is no review by that organization. ISSUE 2: Impact of involuntary separation on current and future activities. 3 risks are: (1) Loss of internal controls--with the upcoming involuntary reductions there will be a loss of personnel with institutional knowledge which will increase the risk of losing internal control on some processes. The organization needs to be cognizant of this risk and take measures to minimize financial risk and ensure on-going A-123 compliance. (2) Project Costing Implementation (PCI) delay--the implementation of PCI is key to achieving integration and reporting of financial data. Presently, business analysts spend half of their time collecting and compiling data and 94% of the labs financial management reports are created using spreadsheets. Currently, the PCI project is on schedule but the involuntary reductions may result in loss of support in this area. (3) Financial Performance Milestones not met--for FY-08 there are fixed, base and stretch financial performance milestones for the laboratory. With reductions in staff the risk of missing key milestones increases. ISSUE 3: Strategically growing the Work for Others (WFO) Portfolio. A key objective of the laboratory is to increase WFO. Greater reliance on WFO will result in additional funding sources and increase the number of control points and financial activities to be monitored thus increasing the level of financial complexity at the lab. The CFO organization should work now to improve controls and processes to accommodate these changes. In particular the following areas should be focused on: (1) Cost reporting needs to be streamlined; (2) Cost Transfer controls need to be increased; and (3) Timely monitoring and close out of contracts needs occur.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗