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At least 1,135 records · Page 63

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Engine Technology Demonstration Testing

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) engines have been deemed a key technology to enable human missions to Mars due to their high efficiency, also known as specific impulse (Isp). Ground testing the NTP engine is critical in maturing the technology and increasing the design’s Technology Readiness Level (TRL), thus mitigating risk from NTP engine performance/operations. NTP engine development began with open-air ground testing through the Rover/NERVA program back in the 1960s when regulatory requirements were not as stringent as they are today. Due to the formation of regulatory bodies, increase in oversight and environmental requirements, the exhaust gas released from NTP engines must be captured or processed to gain approval in the case that the exhaust gas contains fission products from the nuclear fuel elements within the reactor. Ground test campaigns following Rover/NERVA focused on the certification of a full scale NTP engine, which led to exhaust processing systems such as the Rocket Exhaust Capture System (RECS) and Real Time (RT) exhaust processing. These systems were deemed favorable for regulatory compliance but have a high initial investment cost. Reassurance on the feasibility of ground testing and the NTP engine technology likely need to be achieved before NASA invests in these systems. Recently the objectives for NTP engine ground testing have shifted from certification testing of a full scale engine to demonstration testing of a subscale engine. The shift to demonstration testing allows for a shorter testing duration and a lower operational thrust (for demo testing purposes only) to demonstrate the NTP engine (5k-12.5k lbf). Due to these factors, the infrastructure, consumables, total footprint, and exhaust system complexity are able to be drastically reduced, thus reducing cost significantly. The High-pressure Exhaust Capture System (HECS) concept was designed for a NTP engine ground test demonstration. The HECS concept greatly reduces cost compared to previous concepts and suggests favorable regulatory acceptance due to its ability to capture all of the exhaust gas from the NTP engine.

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion↗

Ensuring Safety of Government Personnel During Suborbital Spaceflight

The NASA Suborbital Crew (SubC) project is focused on enabling flights by NASA civil servants, such as scientists and engineers conducting research, on suborbital vehicles. A broader goal is ensuring that commercial human spaceflight is both viable and safe. Within the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), the SubC project is exploring game-changing methods to perform safety assessments to enable NASA personnel to fly on suborbital missions. Commercial suborbital space flight capabilities are anticipated to be more accessible, affordable, and available than missions to the International Space Station and could provide additional opportunities for testing and qualification of space flight hardware, human-tended microgravity research, and further cutting-edge research enabled by the space environment. Although NASA currently permits human tended suborbital payloads for non-civil servants under auspices of NASA’s Flight Opportunities Program, the SubC effort will enable civil servant scientists, researchers, and even engineers to accompany their experiments and tests into the space microgravity environment. Figure 1 illustrates how the SubC program complements other microgravity experimental platforms. The targeted scope for SubC includes end-to-end suborbital capabilities reaching ~80km with several minutes of sustained microgravity (Table 1). The NASA SubC project office is working with the Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA-AST) and the commercial suborbital space transportation industry to develop an efficient and holistic approach to a safety review and eventual government participation in suborbital flight. The current FAA certification process for suborbital launches is congressionally mandated to only consider public safety. NASA is responsible for understanding the risks to its employees should they fly on a commercially available suborbital flight. The SubC project is employing a Safety Case approach, applied to commercial suborbital providers, which is not a traditional certification process as was used for the SpaceX Dragon and Boeing Starliner vehicles. Rather, it is an assessment using elements of NASA’s Risk-Informed Safety Case and the Armstrong Flight Research Center’s Airworthiness Assessment process.

Elizabeth C Blome↗

An Overview of the NASA Lift+Cruise eVTOL Crash Test

Introduction – NASA RVLT Project Impact Dynamics / Crash Safety Task - Task Objective: “To improve the crashworthiness and impact safety of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) vehicle and provide data to simplify the certification process. Efforts will include development of validated computational models of these vehicles, as well as other impacting bodies such as birds and drones. Efforts will also focus on developing and evaluating energy absorbing and crush properties of emerging and non-traditional composite materials and processes. Finally, occupant protection will be addressed using computational models and physical assets as it pertains to all rotorcraft environments.” - Problem Statement: “There currently is a lack of data for requirements regarding the crashworthy performance of UAM vehicles and impact loads generated by a bird strike. To address this technology gap, NASA will develop test guidelines, adopt modeling methodologies demonstrating capability for ‘certification by analysis’, acquire vehicle and occupant data on full-scale representative vehicles, and provide data/guidance to consensus standards organizations and the UAM community.” - 4 Main focus points - The investigation of occupant injury using physical and computational assets - The development of energy absorbing technology - The generation of data from sub- and full-scale crash test data - The execution of advanced finite element modelling techniques

evtol↗

NASA Support for Commercial Crew Launch Capabilities

Since the earliest days of U.S. human spaceflight, NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, has played a key role in American crew launch capability, from engineering support for the first Mercury-Redstone launches, to the Saturn launches to the Moon, through Shuttle and now Artemis. Today, Marshall brings that expertise gained through decades of crewed space launches to NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP), providing launch vehicle engineering and programmatic support. The team’s responsibilities have included human certification of commercial launch systems for the CCP missions, including Atlas V and Falcon 9, and verifying each launch vehicle complies with flight certification. MSFC provides expertise in nearly all aspects of launch vehicle design and performance including solid motors and liquid engines, stage propulsion, thrust vector control, structural and dynamics, safety and mission assurance. During each commercial crew launch, an engineering support team is on console at Marshall’s Huntsville Operations Support Center, which has provided launch operations support since Apollo, providing real-time oversight to safety standards for the vehicle and verifying data. Launch vehicle support for Commercial Crew has come as a paradigm shift for the MSFC team, inspiring new approaches that leverage expertise and best practices from past NASA-developed launch vehicle missions, while at the same time providing new synergies from work with commercial partners on CCP. This paper will explore the role that the Marshall launch vehicle services team plays in the Commercial Crew Program, as well as lessons learned from the program that will continue to benefit a new era of spaceflight partnerships.

Commercial Crew↗

Conceptual Design Trade Studies for Acoustic Predictions of the NASA UAM Tiltrotor Reference Vehicle

A toolchain of low-and mid-fidelity tools is applied to NASA’s Urban Air Mobility tiltrotor reference vehicle to quantify trades in sizing, performance, and noise at the conceptual design level. The process includes conceptual sizing, comprehensive analysis, and acoustic analysis to design and analyze versions of the concept tiltrotor with differing design variables. Rotor tip speed is the primary design variable studied, with blade twist, blade taper, and blade number also considered. The noise metrics used are the FAA/EASA certification Effective Perceived Noise Levels for takeoff, flyover, and approach. Certification condition noise is calculated for all conditions in both conversion and airplane flight modes, with airplane mode flight resulting in noise 10-25EPNdB quieter than conversion mode and tip speed variation providing noise reduction up to 9EPNdB.

Acoustic↗

Quantification of margins and uncertainty for risk-informed decision analysis.

QMU stands for 'Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties'. QMU is a basic framework for consistency in integrating simulation, data, and/or subject matter expertise to provide input into a risk-informed decision-making process. QMU is being applied to a wide range of NNSA stockpile issues, from performance to safety. The implementation of QMU varies with lab and application focus. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program develops validated computational simulation tools to be applied in the context of QMU. QMU provides input into a risk-informed decision making process. The completeness aspect of QMU can benefit from the structured methodology and discipline of quantitative risk assessment (QRA)/probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). In characterizing uncertainties it is important to pay attention to the distinction between those arising from incomplete knowledge ('epistemic' or systematic), and those arising from device-to-device variation ('aleatory' or random). The national security labs should investigate the utility of a probability of frequency (PoF) approach in presenting uncertainties in the stockpile. A QMU methodology is connected if the interactions between failure modes are included. The design labs should continue to focus attention on quantifying uncertainties that arise from epistemic uncertainties such as poorly-modeled phenomena, numerical errors, coding errors, and systematic uncertainties in experiment. The NNSA and design labs should ensure that the certification plan for any RRW is supported by strong, timely peer review and by an ongoing, transparent QMU-based documentation and analysis in order to permit a confidence level necessary for eventual certification.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Regulatory fire test requirements for plutonium air transport packages : JP-4 or JP-5 vs. JP-8 aviation fuel.

For certification, packages used for the transportation of plutonium by air must survive the hypothetical thermal environment specified in 10CFR71.74(a)(5). This regulation specifies that 'the package must be exposed to luminous flames from a pool fire of JP-4 or JP-5 aviation fuel for a period of at least 60 minutes.' This regulation was developed when jet propellant (JP) 4 and 5 were the standard jet fuels. However, JP-4 and JP-5 currently are of limited availability in the United States of America. JP-4 is very hard to obtain as it is not used much anymore. JP-5 may be easier to get than JP-4, but only through a military supplier. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that readily-available JP-8 fuel is a possible substitute for the aforementioned certification test. Comparisons between the properties of the three fuels are given. Results from computer simulations that compared large JP-4 to JP-8 pool fires using Sandia's VULCAN fire model are shown and discussed. Additionally, the Container Analysis Fire (CAFE) code was used to compare the thermal response of a large calorimeter exposed to engulfing fires fueled by these three jet propellants. The paper then recommends JP-8 as an alternate fuel that complies with the thermal environment implied in 10CFR71.74.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

REMOVAL OF LEGACY PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FROM SWEDEN

U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) recently removed legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in collaboration with AB SVAFO, Sweden. This paper details the activities undertaken through the U.S. receiving site (Savannah River Site (SRS)) to support the characterization, stabilization, packaging and removal of legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in 2012. This effort was undertaken as part of GTRI’s Gap Materials Program and culminated with the successful removal of plutonium from Sweden as announced at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. The removal and shipment of plutonium materials to the United States was the first of its kind under NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The Environmental Assessment for the U.S. receipt of gap plutonium material was approved in May 2010. Since then, the multi-year process yielded many first time accomplishments associated with plutonium packaging and transport activities including the application of the of DOE-STD-3013 stabilization requirements to treat plutonium materials outside the U.S., the development of an acceptance criteria for receipt of plutonium from a foreign country, the development and application of a versatile process flow sheet for the packaging of legacy plutonium materials, the identification of a plutonium container configuration, the first international certificate validation of the 9975 shipping package and the first intercontinental shipment using the 9975 shipping package. This paper will detail the technical considerations in developing the packaging process flow sheet, defining the key elements of the flow sheet and its implementation, determining the criteria used in the selection of the transport package, developing the technical basis for the package certificate amendment and the reviews with multiple licensing authorities and most importantly integrating the technical activities with the Swedish partners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

New Whole-House Solutions Case Study: Lancaster County Career and Technology Center Green Home 3 - Mount Joy, Pennsylvania

This case study describes a unique vocational program at Lancaster County Career Technology Center in Mount Joy, PA, where high school students are gaining hands-on construction experience in building high performance homes with help from Building America team, Home Innovation Research Labs. This collaboration resulted in the Green Home 3, the third in a series of high performance homes for Apprentice Green. As one of LCCTC’s key educational strategies for gaining practical experience, students are involved in building real houses that incorporate state-of-the-art energy efficiency and green technologies. With two homes already completed, the Green Home 3 achieved a 44% whole-house energy savings over the Building America New Construction B10 Benchmark, DOE Zero Energy Ready Home (formerly Challenge Home) certification, and National Green Building Standard Gold-level certification.

BUILDING AMERICA↗

Component Modeling Approach Software Tool

The Component Modeling Approach Software Tool (CMAST) establishes a set of performance libraries of approved components (frames, glass, and spacer) which can be accessed for configuring fenestration products for a project, and btaining a U-factor, Solar Heat Gain Coefficient (SHGC), and Visible Transmittance (VT) rating for those products, which can then be reflected in a CMA Label Certificate for code compliance. CMAST is web-based as well as client-based. The completed CMA program and software tool will be useful in several ways for a vast array of stakeholders in the industry: Generating performance ratings for bidding projects Ascertaining credible and accurate performance data Obtaining third party certification of overall product performance for code compliance

Source record↗

Quantum key management

Innovations for quantum key management harness quantum communications to form a cryptography system within a public key infrastructure framework. In example implementations, the quantum key management innovations combine quantum key distribution and a quantum identification protocol with a Merkle signature scheme (using Winternitz one-time digital signatures or other one-time digital signatures, and Merkle hash trees) to constitute a cryptography system. More generally, the quantum key management innovations combine quantum key distribution and a quantum identification protocol with a hash-based signature scheme. This provides a secure way to identify, authenticate, verify, and exchange secret cryptographic keys. Features of the quantum key management innovations further include secure enrollment of users with a registration authority, as well as credential checking and revocation with a certificate authority, where the registration authority and/or certificate authority can be part of the same system as a trusted authority for quantum key distribution.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Validating the Test Procedures Described in UL 1741 SA and IEEE P1547.1: Preprint

This paper investigates the test procedures specified in UL 1741 SA and the upcoming revision to IEEE P1547.1. A 550 kVA photovoltaic inverter was chosen for the tests. This research reveals some of key the components to consider while doing certification tests for UL 1741 SA and IEEE P1547.1. This paper also identifies some issues requiring consideration for future releases of the standard, i.e. IEEE P1547.1. This paper investigates the test procedures specified in UL 1741 SA and the upcoming revision to IEEE P1547.1. A 550 kVA photovoltaic inverter was chosen for the tests. This research reveals some of key the components to consider while doing certification tests for UL 1741 SA and IEEE P1547.1. This paper also identifies some issues requiring consideration for future releases of the standard, i.e. IEEE P1547.1.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

INL High-Performance and Sustainable Building Strategy

High-performance buildings are reliable, cost-effective, and sustainable structures that minimize energy and water use, reduce solid waste and pollutant emissions, and limit the depletion of natural resources while also providing a thermally and visually comfortable working environment that increases productivity for building occupants. As Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the nation’s premier nuclear energy research laboratory, the physical infrastructure requires continual updating and re-purposing to help accomplish that mission. INL’s infrastructure must incorporate high-performance sustainable design features to be fiscally responsible and reflect an image of innovation to the public and prospective employees. INL is a large consumer of energy with annual energy costs exceeding $9M. In the current fiscal reality and with energy costs constantly increasing, this High-Performance and Sustainable Building Strategy will help engineering and construction project teams design facilities that are sustainable and will help to reduce life-cycle operating costs while providing INL employees with a safe and healthy working environment. With these goals in mind, the recommendations described in this document are intended to form INL’s foundation for sustainable and high-performance building standards. This strategy incorporates the latest federal and Department of Energy (DOE) orders and directives including Executive Order (EO) 13834, “Efficient Federal Operations” and its associated implementing instructions, DOE Order 436.1, “Departmental Sustainability,” the DOE Sustainability Report and Implementation Plan (SRIP), the INL Site Sustainability Plan (SSP), and Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). This document identifies the requirements of the Guiding Principles for Sustainable Federal Buildings (Guiding Principles) and briefly highlights the requirements of Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED®) Gold certification. LEED Gold certification, while optional, can be used to meet many of the requirements of the Guiding Principles.

13834↗

Establishing Regulatory Jurisdictional Boundaries at Collocated Advanced-Reactor Facilities

This white paper discusses establishing and applying nuclear facility jurisdictional boundaries at advanced-nuclear-reactor facilities. It was written for industry review and evaluation with possible consideration by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for subsequent regulatory action. The paper proposes a regulatory basis for establishing jurisdictional boundaries at operational advanced (i.e., non-light water) reactor installations at sites proximate to and sharing systems with non-NRC regulated facilities (e.g., users of process heat, fossil-plant retrofits, microgrid electrical power, desalination, etc.). Advanced-reactor technologies can be applied to support many industrial applications to replace the burning of fossil fuels as well as produce steam for electricity. The principal application of the current light-water reactor fleet is electricity generation. These varied industrial applications may involve an advanced-reactor design in combination with different site-specific energy-conversion systems. Some of these process-heat applications will require process-heat delivery systems to lie partially outside the advanced-reactor operator’s facility. Energy conversion systems are conventional, non-nuclear equipment and buildings. Given these varied applications, there should be a clear understanding between the advanced-reactor applicant and the NRC regarding a nominal demarcation between those systems that reside within the nuclear facility under the regulatory jurisdiction of the NRC (i.e., within the scope of a 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50 operating license or Part 52 design certification and a combined license) and those that fall outside the scope of the NRC (e.g., an industrial facility). Additionally, it is important to have a clear understanding regarding the plant scope that should be addressed in an advanced-reactor facility Part 52, design certification application and the part of the plant scope that could be addressed as part of a site specific combined license application.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Systems and methods for revocation management in an AMI network

Systems and methods for certificate revocation management for advanced metering infrastructure networks are provided. An accumulation manager can be used to accumulate certificate revocation list (CRL) information and determine an accumulator value and a proof value based on the accumulated CRL information using a plurality of functions. These values can be sent on to smart meters, which can then use them for authentication purposes.

Cebe, Mumin↗

Repackaging of High Fissile TRU Waste at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center - 13240

Twenty-six drums of high fissile transuranic (TRU) waste from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) operations were declared waste in the mid-1980's and placed in storage with the legacy TRU waste inventory for future treatment and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Repackaging and treatment of the waste at the TRU Waste Packaging Center (TWPC) will require the installation of additional equipment and capabilities to address the hazards for handling and repackaging the waste compared to typical Contact Handled (CH) TRU waste that is processed at the TWPC, including potential hydrogen accumulation in legacy 6M/2R packaging configurations, potential presence of reactive plutonium hydrides, and significant low energy gamma radiation dose rates. All of the waste is anticipated to be repackaged at the TWPC and certified for disposal at WIPP. The waste is currently packaged in multiple layers of containers which presents additional challenges for repackaging activities due to the potential for the accumulation of hydrogen gas in the container headspace in quantities than could exceed the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL). The outer container for each waste package is a stainless steel 0.21 m{sup 3} (55-gal) drum which contains either a 0.04 m{sup 3} or 0.06 m{sup 3} (10-gal or 15-gal) 6M drum. The inner 2R container in each 6M drum is ∼12 cm (5 in) outside diameter x 30-36 cm (12-14 in) long and is considered to be a > 4 liter sealed container relative to TRU waste packaging criteria. Inside the 2R containers are multiple configurations of food pack cans, pipe nipples, and welded capsules. The waste contains significant quantities of high burn-up plutonium oxides and metals with a heavy weight percentage of higher atomic mass isotopes and the subsequent in-growth of significant quantities of americium. Significant low energy gamma radiation is expected to be present due to the americium in-growth. Radiation dose rates on inner containers are estimated to be 1-3 mSv/hr (100-300 mrem/hr) with an unshielded dose rate on the waste itself of over 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr). Additional equipment to be installed at the TWPC will include a new perma-con enclosure and a shielded/inert glovebox in the process building to repackage and stabilize the waste. All of the waste will be repackaged into Standard Pipe Overpacks. Most of the waste (21 of the 26 drums) is expected to be repackaged at the food-pack can level (i.e. the food-pack cans will not be opened). Five of the incoming waste containers are expected to be repackaged at the primary waste level. Three of the containers exceed the 200 gram Pu-239 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) limit for the Standard Pipe Overpack. These three containers will be repackaged down to the primary waste level and divided into eight Standard Pipe Overpacks for shipment to WIPP. Two containers must be stabilized to eliminate any reactive plutonium hydrides that may be present. These containers will be opened in the inert, shielded glovebox, and the remaining corroded plutonium metal converted to a stable oxide form by using a 600 deg. C tube furnace with controlled oxygen feed in a helium carrier gas. The stabilized waste will then be packaged into two Standard Pipe Overpacks. Design and build out activities for the additional repackaging capabilities at the TWPC are scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2013 with repackaging, stabilization, and certification activities scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2014. Following repackaging and stabilization activities, the Standard Pipe Overpacks will be certified for disposal at WIPP utilizing Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) to verify the absence of prohibited items and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) to verify the isotopic content under the TWPC WIPP certification program implemented by the Central Characterization Project (CCP). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Status of Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Activities Underway to Address Major Domestic Radiological Security Challenges - 12105

During their service lives, radioactive sealed sources are used for a wide variety of essential purposes. However, each year, thousands of radioactive sealed sources that pose a potential risk to national security, health, and safety become disused and unwanted in the United States. Due to their concentrated activity and portability, these sources could be used in radiological dispersal devices ('dirty bombs'). For more than a decade, the National Nuclear Security Administration and the U.S. Department of Energy, through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Offsite Source Recovery Project (GTRI/OSRP), have facilitated the removal and disposition of thousands of disused/unwanted sources worldwide. However, the ability of GTRI/OSRP to continue its work is critically dependent on the ability to transport and appropriately dispose of these sources. On that front, GTRI/OSRP progress includes development of two prototype Type B transport containers and significant efforts toward certification, increased commercial disposal access for risk-significant sealed sources at commercial sites, and cooperation through the International Atomic Energy Agency to increase source repatriation. Disused sealed sources continue to pose a national security concern. The impact of a dirty bomb detonation could be costly both financially and to those exposed to the resulting radiation. However, significant progress has been made since 2008 on each of the challenges identified in the DHS Sealed Source Security Workshop. Not only will there be increased opportunity for commercial disposal of many sizes and types of sealed sources, but also stakeholders are studying front-end solutions to the problem of disused sealed sources, such as financial assurance and recycle. The lack of sealed source transport containers is also likely to be mitigated with the development and certification by NNSA of two new Type B models. Internationally, increased efforts at source repatriation will mitigate the threat posed by disused sealed sources abroad. Sealed sources provide irreplaceable benefits to those who use them or who benefit from their use; now stakeholders are rising to the challenge of ensuring that those benefits are safely and securely realized. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗