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At least 1,189 records · Page 66

An economic analysis of a light and heavy water moderated reactor synergy: burning americium using recycled uranium

An economic analysis is presented for a proposed synergistic system between 2 nuclear utilities, one operating light water reactors (LWR) and another running a fleet of heavy water moderated reactors (HWR). Americium is partitioned from LWR spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to be transmuted in HWRs, with a consequent averted disposal cost to the LWR operator. In return, reprocessed uranium (RU) is supplied to the HWRs in sufficient quantities to support their operation both as power generators and americium burners. Two simplifying assumptions have been made. First, the economic value of RU is a linear function of the cost of fresh natural uranium (NU), and secondly, plutonium recycling for a third utility running a mixed oxide (MOX) fuelled reactor fleet has been already taking place, so that the extra cost of americium recycling is manageable. We conclude that, in order for this scenario to be economically attractive to the LWR operator, the averted disposal cost due to partitioning americium from LWR spent fuel must exceed 214 dollars per kg, comparable to estimates of the permanent disposal cost of the high level waste (HLW) from reprocessing spent LWR fuel. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MA transmutation performance in the optimized MYRRHA

MYRRHA (multi-purpose hybrid research reactor for high-tech applications) is a multipurpose research facility currently being developed at SCK-CEN. It will be able to work in both critical and subcritical modes and, cooled by lead-bismuth eutectic. In this paper the minor actinides (MA) transmutation capabilities of MYRRHA are investigated. (Pu + Am, U) MOX fuel and (Np + Am + Cm, Pu) Inert Matrix Fuel test samples have been loaded in the central channel of the MYRRHA critical core and have been irradiated during five cycles, each one consisting of 90 days of operation at 100 MWth and 30 days of shutdown. The reactivity worth of the test fuel assembly was about 1.1 dollar. A wide range of burn-up level has been achieved, extending from 42 to 110 MWd/kg HM, the samples with lower MA-to-Pu ratios reaching the highest burn-up. This study has highlighted the importance of the initial MA content, expressed in terms of MA/Pu ratio, on the transmutation rate of MA elements. For (Pu + Am, U) MOX fuel samples, a net build-up of MA is observed when the initial content of MA is very low (here, 1.77 wt% MA/Pu) while a net decrease in MA is observed in the sample with an initial content of 5 wt%. This suggests the existence of some 'equilibrium' initial MA content value beyond which a net transmutation is achievable.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Hanford's 100-HX Pump and Treat Project - a Successful Blend of Science, Technology, Construction, and Project Management - 12412

CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) recently completed construction and start-up of the $25 million 100-HX Groundwater Pump and Treat Project for the Department of Energy (DOE) at its Hanford Reservation site in Washington State. From the onset, the 100-HX Project Leadership Team was able to successfully blend the science and technology of a state-of-the-art groundwater pump and treat system with the principles, tools, and techniques of traditional industrial-type construction and project management. From the 1940's through most of the 1980's, the United States used the Hanford Site to produce nuclear material for national defense at reactor sites located along the Columbia River. While the reactors were operational, large volumes of river water were treated with sodium dichromate (to inhibit corrosion of the reactor piping) and used as a coolant for the reactors. After a single pass through the reactor and before being discharged back to the river, the coolant water was sent to unlined retention basins to cool and to allow the short-lived radioactive contaminants to decay. As a result of these operations, hexavalent chromium was introduced to the vadose zone, and ultimately into the groundwater aquifer and the adjacent Columbia River. In addition, numerous leaks and spills of concentrated sodium dichromate stock solution over the lifetime of reactor operations led to higher concentrations of chromate in the vadose zone and groundwater in localized areas. As a result, the 100 Area was included in the National Priorities List sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). The mission of the 100-HX Project is to significantly reduce the concentration of hexavalent chromium in the groundwater by treating up to 3.8 billion gallons (14,300 mega-liters) of contaminated water over its first nine years of operations. In order to accomplish this mission, groundwater scientists and geologists using sophisticated scientific modeling optimized the 100-HX's approximately 0.7 square mile (181 hecto-meters) extraction and injection well field to support continuous operation of a maximum of 800 gallons (3,028 liters) per minute, 24 hours per day, and 7 days per week. The use of traditional resin technology for the plant's ion exchange system required a change out of the resin every 12 weeks and shipment to an offsite facility 1,500 miles (2,414 kilometers) away for regeneration. Instead, the project leadership pursued newer technology with a disposable resin that could be disposed of on-site and would require less frequent change outs, reducing the project's life cycle costs by more than $16 million. Constructing the facility had its own challenges. The well field location overlapped ecologically sensitive lands where bald eagles and native wildlife use the land for their mating habitat for nearly half of the year. Building locations had to be planned around historically and culturally sensitive areas, and around another contractor's remediation work zones. Also, the size of the well field required a transfer (pumping) facility and installation of more than 60 miles (97 kilometers) of high-density polypropylene pipe, 23 miles (38 kilometers) of power cable, and 28 miles (46 kilometers) of control cable. Along with schedule and budget constraints typical of any fast-track project, the project team dealt with severe resource constraints due to competing projects across the Hanford Site caused by the influx of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act stimulus funding. In addition, the project team itself was stretched between completing another $25 million dollar construction project while designing and constructing this project. In order to save money, the project schedule was compressed by three months from the original baseline schedule. This was made possible by the strong use of project management principles throughout the design, construction, and testing phases, as well as implementation of many lessons learned from a similar construction project. In summary, the 100-HX Project truly was a unique blend of science, technology, construction and project management. In summary, Hanford's 100-HX Pump and Treat Project was a successful blend of science, technology, construction, and project management. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an over-pack container, similar to the pipe component, called the criticality control over-pack, which will significantly enhance the efficiency of disposal. Hundreds of shipments of transuranic SNM, suitably packaged to meet WIPP waste acceptance criteria and with safeguards terminated have been successfully emplaced at WIPP (primarily from the Rocky Flats site clean-up) since WIPP opened. DOE expects that thousands more may eventually result from SNM consolidation efforts throughout the weapons complex. (authors)

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Deep Geologic Nuclear Waste Disposal - No New Taxes - 12469

To some, the perceived inability of the United States to dispose of high-level nuclear waste justifies a moratorium on expansion of nuclear power in this country. Instead, it is more an example of how science yields to social pressure, even on a subject as technical as nuclear waste. Most of the problems, however, stem from confusion on the part of the public and their elected officials, not from a lack of scientific knowledge. We know where to put nuclear waste, how to put it there, how much it will cost, and how well it will work. And it's all about the geology. The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future has drafted a number of recommendations addressing nuclear energy and waste issues (BRC 2011) and three recommendations, in particular, have set the stage for a new strategy to dispose of high-level nuclear waste and to manage spent nuclear fuel in the United States: 1) interim storage for spent nuclear fuel, 2) resumption of the site selection process for a second repository, and 3) a quasi-government entity to execute the program and take control of the Nuclear Waste Fund in order to do so. The first two recommendations allow removal and storage of spent fuel from reactor sites to be used in the future, and allows permanent disposal of actual waste, while the third controls cost and administration. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NPWA 1982) provides the second repository different waste criteria, retrievability, and schedule, so massive salt returns as the candidate formation of choice. The cost (in 2007 dollars) of disposing of 83,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) high-level waste (HLW) is about $ 83 billion (b) in volcanic tuff, $ 29 b in massive salt, and $ 77 b in crystalline rock. Only in salt is the annual revenue stream from the Nuclear Waste Fund more than sufficient to accomplish this program without additional taxes or rate hikes. The cost is determined primarily by the suitability of the geologic formation, i.e., how well it performs on its own for millions of years with little engineering assistance from humans. It is critical that the states most affected by this issue (WA, SC, ID, TN, NM and perhaps others) develop an independent multi-state agreement in order for a successful program to move forward. Federal approval would follow. Unknown to most, the United States has a successful operating deep permanent geologic nuclear repository for high and low activity waste, called the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Its success results from several factors, including an optimal geologic and physio-graphic setting, a strong scientific basis, early regional community support, frequent interactions among stakeholders at all stages of the process, long-term commitment from the upper management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) over several administrations, strong New Mexico State involvement and oversight, and constant environmental monitoring from before nuclear waste was first emplaced in the WIPP underground (in 1999) to the present. WIPP is located in the massive bedded salts of the Salado Formation, whose geological, physical, chemical, redox, thermal, and creep-closure properties make it an ideal formation for long-term disposal, long-term in this case being greater than 200 million years. These properties also mean minimal engineering requirements as the rock does most of the work of isolating the waste. WIPP has been operating for twelve years, and as of this writing, has disposed of over 80,000 m{sup 3} of nuclear weapons waste, called transuranic or TRU waste (>100 nCurie/g but <23 Curie/1000 cm{sup 3}) including some high activity waste from reprocessing of spent fuel from old weapons reactors. All nuclear waste of any type from any source can be disposed in this formation better, safer and cheaper than in any other geologic formation. At the same time, it is critical that we complete the Yucca Mountain license application review so as not to undermine the credibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the scientific community. (authors)

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Estimation of time resolution for DOI-PET detector using diameter 0.2 mm WLS fibers

We are developing the whole-body PET detector with high position resolution (1 mm) and low cost (1 M dollars). Scintillator plates, Wave Length Sifting Fibers and SiPMs are used. In this work, time resolution of our PET detector is estimated. Our detector may also have good time resolution such as a few ps. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Decommissioning of the TRIGA mark II and III and radioactive waste management

KAERI has carried out decommissioning projects for two research reactors (KRR-1 and 2). The decommissioning project of KRR-1 (TRIGA Mark II) and 2 (TRIGA Mark III) was launched in 1997 with a total budget of 23.25 million US dollars. KRR-2 and all auxiliary facilities were already decommissioned, and KRR-1 is being decommissioned now. Much more dismantled waste is generated than in any other operations of nuclear facilities. Thus, the waste needs to be reduced and stabilized through decontamination or treatment before disposal. This paper introduces the current status of the decommissioning projects and describes the volume reduction and conditioning of decommissioning waste for final disposal. (authors)

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Transient performance of accident tolerant fuel in design basis accidents

A set of transient analysis has been performed to assess the performance of candidate accident tolerant fuel (ATF) against reference UO{sub 2} fuel with Zircaloy cladding under design basis accident (DBA) conditions. This study examined two ATF options, U{sub 3}Si{sub 2} fuel with SiC cladding and UO{sub 2} fuel with APMT cladding. The accident analyses were conducted using the system code TRACE for a three-loop PWR plant. PARCS standalone full-core calculations were done for each fuel/cladding combination to provide inputs to the TRACE point-kinetics model. The design basis accidents analyzed were a reactivity insertion accident (RIA) and a large break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA). The RIA was simulated by the insertion of a reactivity ramp of $1 (one dollar) in 0.1 s at hot full power (HFP) condition. The LBLOCA was a simulation of a double-ended pipe break in one of the cold legs of the primary loops. Differences in thermal responses of the fuel and the cladding are attributed to their thermal properties. The U{sub 3}Si{sub 2} fuel with its lower volumetric heat capacity and higher thermal conductivity (i.e. higher thermal diffusivity) generally results in a lower fuel temperature than the UO{sub 2} fuel and a correspondingly faster thermal response. Additional calculations for the U{sub 3}Si{sub 2} fuel shows that in a RIA the cladding material, SiC versus Zr, has little impact on the maximum fuel centerline temperature and the PCT (peak cladding temperature). An increase in the hot rod power factor is shown to raise the centerline fuel temperature in a RIA but has little impact on the PCT. The analysis results show that for a relatively fast decay heat driven transient, such as the LBLOCA, the thermal-hydraulics and fuel/cladding thermal properties dictate the overall response more so than the reactivity feedback. The results show that the PCTs in a LBLOCA are similar for all fuel/cladding combinations considered in this study. The LBLOCA analysis also notes the impact of the asymmetry in the system response. The fuel rods in the sector of the core connected to the hot leg of the broken loop (Sector 1 in the PWR model) is shown to have a much lower PCT than fuel rods in the other five sectors of the core. Results of this study indicate that for the two DBAs considered (RIA and LBLOCA) the transient behavior and the resulting peak cladding temperature of the two ATF options (U{sub 3}Si{sub 2} fuel with SiC cladding and UO{sub 2} fuel with APMT cladding) are similar to the standard light-water reactor fuel (UO{sub 2} fuel with Zircaloy cladding). (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Savannah River Remediation Liquid Waste Operations Lifecycle Savings through a Lean Business System at the Savannah River Site - 17245

Savannah River Remediation (SRR) was contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to manage its liquid waste project at the Savannah River Site. The liquid waste project is a unique, high hazard nuclear waste treatment and disposal facility consisting of 51 one million-gallon underground waste tanks, a solvent extraction processing unit, a vitrification facility for the highest radioactive waste, and a grout solidification and disposal facility for lower radioactive decontaminated salt solution. Our Project mission is to treat the nuclear waste and close the associated storage and treatment facilities, of which, 8 tanks have been closed to date. The Lean philosophy took root decades ago in the manufacturing sector and started with the work of W. Edwards Deming and his contemporaries. In more recent years the process has matured in the Toyota Production System and migrated into fields as diverse as services industries, health-care, and now the DOE complex. At SRR, a Lean business management system was adopted to address site inefficiencies, aging infrastructure concerns and budget constraints. With yearly escalation and flat budgets, continuous improvement is taking on a larger role - improving the work accomplished for each dollar. This paper focuses on the program results achieved to date, including the lifecycle savings identified through the Rapid Improvement Event (RIE) process. The RIE process is a Lean tool which creates a cross-functional team to analyze, develop and implement improvements for a given process. DOE-EM has recently emphasized the value of contractor's continuous improvement programs through their implementation of Plan of Action and Milestone (POAM): Goal 2 (Increase Efficiency/Improve Performance) Reduce EM Operations Cost in FY16. POAM Goal 2 was a FY 16 effort to achieve 5% cost savings across most programs. This past year's cost savings initiatives will likely become a trend as DOE and its contractors look to do more with less. In support of our own business objectives, as well as, DOE's motivation to improve efficiencies, SRR has held over one hundred formal Lean events and dozens of 5S events that have driven improvement across the Project, including tank closure and production facilities. These improvements have significantly reduced the time required to process material and achieve the overall goal of hazard reduction and tank closure. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Characterization and Well Remediation Strategies for Improved Long-term Pump and Treat System Injection Well Performance - 17272

In June of 2012 the CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company completed construction of a 2,500 gallon-per-minute (gpm) pump and treat (P and T) system designed to remove technetium-99, uranium, carbon tetrachloride, trichloroethene, nitrate, and total and hexavalent chromium from incoming groundwater. The entire pump and treat system consists of the following primary components: 1) extraction wells (20+); 2) a radionuclide removal facility; 3) a biological system; 4) sludge processing; 5) vapor processing; and 6) injection wells. Overall efficiency of the 200 West P and T has been adversely impacted due to fouling in vertical injection wells where treated water is being reinjected into the subsurface. Fouling of the wells is thought to be caused by bacteria producing extracellular polymeric substances (EPS), as well as high manganese and iron in the biofilm. Due to decreased specific injectivity, all injection wells are on a maintenance schedule requiring rehabilitation. During rehabilitation, the wells are out of service affecting the overall capacity of the P and T, plus the rehabilitation process adds hundreds of thousands of dollars of cost to operate the P and T each year. Chemical and biological foulants may be coming from the P and T or are already present in the subsurface and active pumping has stimulated growth of the microbes present. Chemical and microbiological characterization efforts are in progress for the biological plant and injection well system to determine causative agents in the biofouling. P and T effluent tank samples, injection well distribution tanks, bailed samples from the fouled well, and post-rehabilitation samples were analyzed. Chemical constituents analyzed include, sulfate, phosphorus, chemical oxygen demand, total organic carbon, and iron. Microbial characterization included total heterotrophs, anaerobic heterotrophs, nitrate reducing bacteria, iron reducing bacteria and sulfate reducing bacteria. Molecular biological tools employed included 16S rRNA meta-genomes, and functional gene analysis using qPCR. Chemical analysis of the P and T effluent and injection well tanks showed the presence of ∼6.5 mg/L nitrate, 96 mg/L sulfate and phosphorus levels below 1 mg/L. Bailed samples from the injection well showed similar concentrations for each chemical, but following cleaning, TOC, total iron, manganese and other constituents were higher than prior to cleaning. These data show that bacterial nutrients and metals that may precipitate are present in the well water and are likely the causative agent in the biofouling. (authors)

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Implementing an Alternative Modeling Strategy for Closure of the Rainier Mesa Corrective Action Unit at the Nevada National Security Site - 17481

The strategy to close the Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RMSM) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is defined under a joint agreement between the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DoD). That strategy required a corrective action investigation (CAI) to define the evolution of contaminated volumes of groundwater under uncertainty as a means to define a surface-projected contaminant boundary and serve as a basis for longer term monitoring. As the initial phase of the CAI was nearing completion in 2012, concerns were raised as to whether the original Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) strategy was achievable. This was evident when the complexity of the system and the additional costs required to sufficiently characterize it were judged to be out of balance with the overall perceived risks (low) associated with this particular CAU. As a result, an Alternative Modeling Strategy (AMS) and New FFACO Strategy Decision Process for UGTA RM/SM CAU were approved in November 2013. The AMS removes the requirement for developing ensembles of 3D contaminant transport simulations and replaces it with a simpler one requiring the generation of multiple 1D streamline models. These are meant to encompass a range of alternative, yet plausible release and transport scenarios as a means to bound the overall lateral extent of contaminant transport. The new Decision Process is streamlined and progresses from the revised CAI stage, to an external peer review, and then, upon favorable evaluation, directly to a closure stage. Although the project has suffered some delays from implementation of the new strategy, the new process of achieving closure is expected to save several years in time and several million dollars over the original process while still protecting human health and the environment over the 1,000-year compliance period stipulated in the FFACO. (authors)

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Investigations of dual-purpose canister direct disposal feasibility - 15106

Direct disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) could avoid the cost and complexity of re-packaging spent fuel into smaller purpose-built containers, avoid disposing of the DPC hulls as low-level waste, and potentially decrease worker dose. Technical objectives for disposal are: 1) safety of workers and the public, 2) engineering feasibility; 3) thermal management; and 4) criticality control after permanent closure of a repository. The postclosure safety case for DPC direct disposal would resemble that for any repository-waste isolation would be enhanced by choosing host geology in which radionuclide transport is diffusion dominated, and for which transport properties and pathways are insensitive to the expected temperature history. Containment functions would be assigned to the disposal overpack, and published data show that suitable materials exist for most possible disposal environments. Earlier studies showed that DPC-based waste packages would be only slightly larger and heavier than those proposed for a repository in volcanic tuff. Engineered solutions are available for transporting and emplacing them underground, although some could be the largest of their kind. The cost of DPC direct disposal in various geologic settings has been compared to options involving a change to loading standardized multi-purpose canisters, or continuing to load DPCs and re-packaging all of them for disposal. In general DPC direct disposal would cost tens of billions of dollars less, in packaging and disposal costs. Calculations for emplacement in hard rock and sedimentary rock show that host rock peak temperature targets of 100 to 200 deg.C could be met by managing fuel age and burnup, with repository closure at up to 150 years from reactor discharge. For disposal in salt, DPC-based waste packages could be emplaced at only 50 to 100 years from discharge, depending on burnup. Sedimentary media such as shales pose special challenges especially if they have low thermal conductivity. If backfill is used around DPC-based packages its peak temperature could be 150 to 200 deg.C. Without flooding of waste packages with ground water, criticality can never occur. However, some small number of disposal overpacks could fail within the postclosure performance period due to corrosion or disruptive events. Once flooded, the aluminum-based neutron absorber materials used in most DPCs would readily degrade. Analysis has shown that even without neutron absorbers, virtually all DPCs could be subcritical if flooded with chloride brines such as would occur in a salt repository. The licensing basis for existing DPCs involves criticality analysis that may be conservative compared to fuel that is actually loaded, and the difference provides uncredited reactivity margin. Uncredited margin can offset increases in reactivity associated with flooding and basket degradation. For flooding with fresh water, with loss of neutron absorbers, many DPCs have been shown to be subcritical using uncredited margin. Significantly fewer are subcritical if the fuel basket also degrades. Thus, the materials of DPC basket construction (e.g., aluminum or carbon steel) could be deleterious if they fully corrode, along with the neutron absorbers, during the performance period. Logistical simulations are used to better understand the relationship between the needed DPC decay storage time for disposal, and the timing of future events such as the repository opening date, or a transition to loading multi-purpose (disposable) canisters at nuclear power plants. Results show that the maximum benefit from implementing a new canister design, with respect to shortening the cooling time for all SNF including that in DPCs, is associated with the earliest repository start date. As time passes more of the total SNF inventory will be in DPCs such that the value of a transition to multi-purpose canisters will decline, and the remaining options are DPC direct disposal and re-packaging in purpose-designed disposal canisters. Fuel age at emplacement is of interest to evaluate potential impacts from future changes in the fuel management system that could place fuel age limits on dry storage or transportation. The minimum fuel age at emplacement (best-case) is obtained by re-packaging all DPCs into smaller canisters for disposal, thus drastically decreasing the needed decay storage time for any geologic disposal setting. If the industry transitions to smaller, multi-purpose canisters, and without re-packaging, the fuel age at emplacement would be comparable to the best case if: 1) the emplacement power limit is high enough, or 2) both the transition and the repository start date occur early (e.g., 2036 was analyzed). Technical feasibility evaluation continues to show that direct disposal could be safe and cost effective, for some DPCs and in some geologic settings. Direct disposal of a substantial fraction of existing DPCs, limited mainly by thermal management, uncredited criticality margin, materials of DPC basket construction, and the salinity of ground water in the disposal environment, could be part of the overall waste management system. (authors)

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Integration of performance assessments and 3116 basis documents within the Savannah River Site liquid waste facilities - 15375

The end of the Cold War has left a legacy of over 136 million liters (36 million gallons) of radioactive waste in the aging waste tanks at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS). A robust program is in place to remove waste from these tanks, treat the waste to separate it into a relatively small volume of high-level waste and a large volume of low-level waste, and to actively dispose of the low-level waste on-site. This process allows the US Department of Energy (DOE) to move forward with closure of the cleaned waste tanks and associated ancillary structures. To support performance-based, risk decision making for closure and disposal activities, three individual performance assessments (PAs) have been developed - salt-stone Disposal Facility, F-Tank Farm and H-Tank Farm. In addition, three Waste Determinations (WDs) have been made by the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), under the authority of Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA Section 3116). To support these waste determination decisions, individual '3116 Basis Documents' were developed that describe the assumptions and conditions under which the criteria outlined in NDAA Section 3116 are met. The development of each of the PAs represented a long and arduous effort that involved the development of both deterministic and probabilistic conceptual models of the facilities, the development of assumptions and associated ranges, uncertainty and sensitivity analyses, model data collection and analyses, writing of the actual performance assessment, internal and external peer reviews, and ultimately approval by DOE. Similarly, the development of the 3116 Basis Documents represents similar time and financial commitments. At the end of these efforts, after years of preparation and millions of dollars in investment, we have thousands of pages of highly technical text, tables of data and hundreds of graphs and charts all contained in a series of thick binders that fit neatly on the shelf of a bookcase. We were done - right? Actually, we were just getting started. Performance Assessments and 3116 Basis Documents are living documents that shape day-to-day and long-term decision making in the operation of a low-level waste disposal facility (e.g., salt-stone Disposal Facility) or in area closure activities (e.g., F-Tank Farm or H-Tank Farm). Although these documents do not contain specifically described requirements per se, they do utilize specific assumptions that, if changed significantly, could result in no longer being able to demonstrate that there is reasonable assurance that the required performance objectives or the criteria from NDAA Section 3116 can be met. Savannah River Remediation LLC (SRR), the contractor responsible for Liquid Waste operations at SRS, has not only developed the PAs and 3116 Basis Documents to support this work and shepherded these documents through the DOE approval process, but has also developed the processes and procedures to ensure the successful implementation and integration of these documents into day-to-day decision making within the associated facilities. This paper describes these processes, including the Un-reviewed Waste Management Question process and the PA Maintenance process, and provides specific examples of their successful implementation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A study of transfer of UNF from non-disposable canisters - 15388

A study was performed by AREVA and URS for the Department of Energy (DOE) [1] to establish optimal methods for the opening of dry storage canisters (DSC) and the subsequent repackaging of used nuclear fuel (UNF) from the DSCs into generic standard transportation, aging, and disposal canisters (STADs) in wet or dry environments at reactor, consolidated storage, or repository sites. Eight dry and wet cutting technologies were evaluated: (1) skiving; (2) milling; (3) arc gouging/plasma torch; (4) cutting wheel; (5) diamond cable cutting; (6) laser cutting; (7) sawing; and (8) electrical discharge machining. The evaluated UNF repackaging technologies options included: (1) wet transfer in a pool; (2) dry transfer in a dry transfer system (DTS); (3) dry transfer in a fixed hot cell (FHC); (4) dry transfer in a mobile hot cell (MHC), and (5) a hybrid approach utilizing wet transfer in a pool and dry transfer in a FHC. A systems engineering evaluation was utilized for ranking the eight viable cutting options and the five different repackaging approaches for each of the sites. The systems engineering evaluation took into account six criteria (i.e., life cycle costs, worker dose, operational efficiency, technical maturity, ease of licensing, and waste generation) and performed a qualitative pairwise ranking of their relative importance to one another. Then quantitative or qualitative factors associated with each criterion (e.g., cost in millions of dollars, relative ease of licensing, etc.) for each option at each location (reactor, consolidated storage facility [CSF], repository) were developed based on historical experience, existing design studies, current 'state-of-the art', and/or engineering judgment. Using this input, the systems engineering evaluation identified dry skiving as the preferred cutting technology, with the wheel cutting technology in either a dry or wet environment identified as a promising technology that, with some RD and D, could mature to a better option (depending also on the disposition of the used DSC). For a reactor and a CSF/repository site, the systems engineering evaluation ranked the repackaging option using the skiving dry cutting technique and wet transfer of UNF in a pool as the highest option. However for a CSF and a repository site, the team recommended the hybrid option using the skiving dry cutting technique and both dry and wet transfer of UNF in a pool and FHC as a potentially better option (providing specific benefits such as higher throughput and more flexibility in operation). (authors)

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Benefits of Lean Management in liquid waste operations - One company's journey - 15402

For Savannah River Remediation, LLC (SRR), Lean Management is the culmination of a number of years of searching for an effective process improvement methodology. SRR formally applies Lean Management as the cornerstone to transforming the way we work and lead. Two foundational principles support all Lean efforts: respect for people and continuous process improvement. Respect for people means we respect the work they do and the knowledge they have attained. Continuous process improvement focuses on continuous because to be successful we must continuously return to the process to refine, improve, and optimize. Like every other US DOE contractor, SRR is faced with challenges to accomplish more with less. Our initial round of Lean events focused on value streams such as Work Planning and Control, Supply Chain, and Tank Closure acceleration. We have completed a first pass through these programs. As a result, in general terms, process times were cut in half, while reducing rework and quality issues significantly. SRR reduced Corrective Maintenance backlogs without any appreciable increase in the workforce. This paper chronicles our search for improvement, what we did right, what we did wrong, and where we go next. In short, we want to challenge the management, contractors, and employees in US DOE complex to take this journey. The work we do is vitally important to our nation, our families, and our future. We owe it to the US DOE mission to do all we can with entrusted facilities, personnel, and taxpayer dollars. (authors)

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Salt Waste Processing Facility project lessons learned: Acquisition through construction - 15518

The Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), located at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina, is a multi-billion dollar Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW) processing facility that represents the keystone for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-EM clean-up mission at SRS. The SWPF facilitates DOE-EM clean-up at SRS by decontaminating the salt waste, which is the dominant volumetric component in the LRW tanks, thereby allowing the cleaned salt waste to be removed from the tanks and stabilized into an approved grout-based final waste form. The small volume of removed radionuclides is sent to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. Emptied LRW storage tanks are then grouted into an approved configuration for final closure. The SWPF project is currently 100% complete with design, 80% complete with construction, and 10% complete with commissioning. To date there have been numerous lessons learned with regard to project acquisition, design, procurement, construction, and quality assurance (QA) approaches (both good practices and mistakes) that are considered to be of significant value in improving the state of major project execution within the DOE-EM clean-up program as well as to the wider DOE enterprise. An overview of the current SWPF project status is provided and key lessons learned in the aforementioned areas are presented relative to improving future DOE major project execution performance. Specific areas to be addressed include strategies to optimize integration of design and nuclear safety, constructability tools for design and construction synchronization, commercial grade dedication (CGD) approaches to mitigate atrophy in the nuclear supply chain, and QA perspectives to facilitate effective and efficient project execution. (authors)

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Salt Waste Processing Facility Project (SWPF) project management improvements: Working under a cost cap contract - 15523

The Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), located at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina, is a multi-billion dollar LRW processing facility that represents the keystone for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-EM clean-up mission at SRS. In June 2013, DOE and Parsons agreed to Contract Modification 0116 that definitized the remaining work to achieve Construction Complete with a target schedule and a cost cap contract structure. The SWPF project is currently 85 percent complete with construction, and approximately 10 percent complete with commissioning. To date there have been numerous lessons learned with regard to contract and project management, procurement, construction, safety and quality assurance approaches (both good practices and mistakes). These lessons learned are considered to be of significant value in improving the state of major project execution within the DOE-EM clean-up program as well as to the wider DOE complex. An overview of the current SWPF project status is provided, along with challenges associated with operating under a cost cap environment within a cost-plus contract structure. Key lessons learned will be discussed including contract management, baseline development and acceptance under DOE O 413.3, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets requirements, cost and schedule control, change management and risk strategies. (authors)

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Canada's Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program - Ten Years of Progress and Achievements - 16456

Nuclear legacy liabilities have resulted from more than 60 years of nuclear research and development carried out on behalf of Canada. The liabilities are located at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario and Whiteshell Laboratories in Manitoba, as well as three shutdown prototype reactors in Ontario and Quebec that are being maintained in a safe storage state. Estimated at about $10.6 billion (B) (current day Canadian dollars), these liabilities consist of disused nuclear facilities and associated infrastructure, a wide variety of buried and stored waste, and contaminated lands. The Government of Canada established the Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP) in 2006 to implement a long-term strategy to safely and cost-effectively reduce risks and liabilities, and invested approximately $1.4 B over the 10-year duration of the Program to implement the strategy. Risks and liabilities were reduced through projects and activities that decommissioned and removed out-dated facilities, remediated lands affected by past practices, and improved the management of legacy radioactive waste. The NLLP formally ended in September 2015 when the restructuring of AECL's Nuclear Laboratories was completed, and a Government-owned Contractor-operated (GoCo) management model came into effect. The nuclear decommissioning and waste management work that was previously carried out under the NLLP was transitioned into the new GoCo contract. Over the 10-year duration of the NLLP, the Program achieved good progress in addressing health, safety and environmental priorities, reducing liabilities, and providing the studies, plans and facilities that will be needed to enable subsequent phases of the strategy. The NLLP provided a strong basis for the GoCo contractor to accelerate risk and liability reduction at AECL sites. (authors)

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