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Ground Control Annual Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (Rev. 8)

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is designed to permanently dispose of transuranic radioactive waste left from the research and production of nuclear weapons. Transuranic waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, and other such items contaminated with trace amounts of radioactive elements, mostly plutonium. Located in southeastern New Mexico, 26 miles east of Carlsbad, project facilities include disposal rooms excavated in an ancient, stable salt formation 2,150 feet (655 meters) underground. This deep geologic setting requires that a comprehensive ground control program be in place to monitor and assure the stability of the underground openings and address issues of concern. The primary objective of the WIPP ground control program is to provide a safe environment for personnel and equipment in a manner that is consistent with the primary facility operational objective of waste disposal. In meeting this primary objective, the regulatory requirements specific to ground control are also satisfied. The ground control program is a concerted and centralized activity responsible for providing a continuing assessment of the capabilities of the underground openings to achieve that objective. The fundamentals on which the ground control program at WIPP is based are as follows: (1) safe access is maintained as long as access is required; (2) regular ground-control maintenance is required to maintain safe access; (3) ground control maintenance efforts increase with the age of the openings; (4) ground control plans are specific but flexible; and (5) regulatory requirements are met. The extensive geotechnical monitoring program provides a high degree of confidence in the ability to predict and mitigate ground control issues before they become safety problems. The evaluation of ground conditions is a continuous process. The Westinghouse TRU Solutions (WTS) Geotechnical Engineering Section gathers and evaluates data from various sources on a periodic basis. This information is formally presented in a variety of ways, primarily bimonthly and annual reports.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CH Packaging Operations for High-Wattage Waste (Rev. 10)

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is designed to permanently dispose of transuranic radioactive waste left from the research and production of nuclear weapons. Transuranic waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, and other such items contaminated with trace amounts of radioactive elements, mostly plutonium. Located in southeastern New Mexico, 26 miles east of Carlsbad, project facilities include disposal rooms excavated in an ancient, stable salt formation 2,150 feet (655 meters) underground. This deep geologic setting requires that a comprehensive ground control program be in place to monitor and assure the stability of the underground openings and address issues of concern. The primary objective of the WIPP ground control program is to provide a safe environment for personnel and equipment in a manner that is consistent with the primary facility operational objective of waste disposal. In meeting this primary objective, the regulatory requirements specific to ground control are also satisfied. The ground control program is a concerted and centralized activity responsible for providing a continuing assessment of the capabilities of the underground openings to achieve that objective. The fundamentals on which the ground control program at WIPP is based are as follows: (1) safe access is maintained as long as access is required; (2) regular ground-control maintenance is required to maintain safe access; (3) ground control maintenance efforts increase with the age of the openings; (4) ground control plans are specific but flexible; and (5) regulatory requirements are met. The extensive geotechnical monitoring program provides a high degree of confidence in the ability to predict and mitigate ground control issues before they become safety problems. The evaluation of ground conditions is a continuous process. The Westinghouse TRU Solutions (WTS) Geotechnical Engineering Section gathers and evaluates data from various sources on a periodic basis. This information is formally presented in a variety of ways, primarily bimonthly and annual reports.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CH Packaging Operations for High-Wattage Waste (Rev. 11)

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is designed to permanently dispose of transuranic radioactive waste left from the research and production of nuclear weapons. Transuranic waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, and other such items contaminated with trace amounts of radioactive elements, mostly plutonium. Located in southeastern New Mexico, 26 miles east of Carlsbad, project facilities include disposal rooms excavated in an ancient, stable salt formation 2,150 feet (655 meters) underground. This deep geologic setting requires that a comprehensive ground control program be in place to monitor and assure the stability of the underground openings and address issues of concern. The primary objective of the WIPP ground control program is to provide a safe environment for personnel and equipment in a manner that is consistent with the primary facility operational objective of waste disposal. In meeting this primary objective, the regulatory requirements specific to ground control are also satisfied. The ground control program is a concerted and centralized activity responsible for providing a continuing assessment of the capabilities of the underground openings to achieve that objective. The fundamentals on which the ground control program at WIPP is based are as follows: (1) safe access is maintained as long as access is required; (2) regular ground-control maintenance is required to maintain safe access; (3) ground control maintenance efforts increase with the age of the openings; (4) ground control plans are specific but flexible; and (5) regulatory requirements are met. The extensive geotechnical monitoring program provides a high degree of confidence in the ability to predict and mitigate ground control issues before they become safety problems. The evaluation of ground conditions is a continuous process. The Westinghouse TRU Solutions (WTS) Geotechnical Engineering Section gathers and evaluates data from various sources on a periodic basis. This information is formally presented in a variety of ways, primarily bimonthly and annual reports.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CH Packaging Operations for High-Wattage Waste (Rev. 12)

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is designed to permanently dispose of transuranic radioactive waste left from the research and production of nuclear weapons. Transuranic waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, and other such items contaminated with trace amounts of radioactive elements, mostly plutonium. Located in southeastern New Mexico, 26 miles east of Carlsbad, project facilities include disposal rooms excavated in an ancient, stable salt formation 2,150 feet (655 meters) underground. This deep geologic setting requires that a comprehensive ground control program be in place to monitor and assure the stability of the underground openings and address issues of concern. The primary objective of the WIPP ground control program is to provide a safe environment for personnel and equipment in a manner that is consistent with the primary facility operational objective of waste disposal. In meeting this primary objective, the regulatory requirements specific to ground control are also satisfied. The ground control program is a concerted and centralized activity responsible for providing a continuing assessment of the capabilities of the underground openings to achieve that objective. The fundamentals on which the ground control program at WIPP is based are as follows: (1) safe access is maintained as long as access is required; (2) regular ground-control maintenance is required to maintain safe access; (3) ground control maintenance efforts increase with the age of the openings; (4) ground control plans are specific but flexible; and (5) regulatory requirements are met. The extensive geotechnical monitoring program provides a high degree of confidence in the ability to predict and mitigate ground control issues before they become safety problems. The evaluation of ground conditions is a continuous process. The Westinghouse TRU Solutions (WTS) Geotechnical Engineering Section gathers and evaluates data from various sources on a periodic basis. This information is formally presented in a variety of ways, primarily bimonthly and annual reports.

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An Alternative to the Continued Accumulation of Separated Plutonium in Japan: Dry Cask Storage of Spent Fuel

As of the end of 2017, Japan had a stockpile of 48 tons of separated plutonium. It will take more than a decade for Japan to convert most of that plutonium into “mixed-oxide” (MOX) fuel and load it into power reactors licensed to use such fuel. This is a very costly program. Including the cost of reprocessing, MOX fuel costs about ten times more than the low-enriched-uranium fuel that otherwise would be used by these reactors. Yet Japan has a policy to start separating more plutonium from spent reactor fuel as soon as the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant can be put into operation – currently projected for 2021 after 24 years of delay due to a variety of technical problems and upgrades in safety requirements. Japan’s government remains committed to this costly and troubled program primarily because, pending the availability of additional spent-fuel storage space on or off site, reprocessing is seen as the only way to get spent fuel out of reactor pools that are getting full. Because of concerns about the safety of dense-packed spent-fuel pools, however, the prefectures and towns hosting Japan’s power reactors are beginning to accept on-site storage of spent fuel in dry casks. This is the option the United States and many other countries chose after they cancelled their reprocessing programs and their powerplant pools filled up. Its increasing availability in Japan, if backed by a determined policy to accelerate its introduction, should make it possible to cancel reprocessing in Japan as well.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Precipitation Risk when Diluting DFLAW Feed Saturated in Aluminum Hydroxide

The technical bases to support the One System River Protection Project Integrated Flowsheet assumption for diluting staged Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) from the Hanford waste tanks with raw river water must be assessed in light of the risk of aluminum hydroxide (gibbsite) precipitation prior to the subsequent transfer of tank contents into the Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) from days to months after dilution. The operational and mission impacts of using other dilution fluids such as inhibited water, demineralized water, or a 2 M sodium hydroxide solution also must be assessed. As a first step to help inform this investigation, a survey was conducted of Hanford waste-related tests documenting the processing of tank waste materials (solutions, salt cakes, sludges) or their simulants for instances of gibbsite dissolution and precipitation. Experience from the aluminum industry, particularly the Bayer process, also was surveyed to gain insight into the precipitation and dissolution of gibbsite in sodium hydroxide solutions. The dependence of aluminum concentration on hydroxide concentration in analyses of actual tank waste solutions also was surveyed for tanks that have a long-term static inventory and tanks suspected of containing or known to contain substantial gibbsite solid phase in their sludge solids. Finally, an experimental program is outlined to aid prediction of the outcomes of DFLAW staged feed dilution with respect to significant variables that influence gibbsite dissolution and precipitation. The results of these investigations are summarized in this report.

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International Collaboration Activities in Geologic Disposal Research: FY2021 Progress

This report describes the FY21 status of international collaboration regarding geologic disposal research in the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) Campaign. Since 2012, in an effort coordinated by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, SFWD has advanced active collaboration with several international geologic disposal programs across the world. Such collaboration has allowed the SFWD Campaign to benefit from a deep knowledge base in regards to alternative repository environments developed over decades and has provided a framework for active peer-to-peer research participation in international groups which conduct, analyze, and model performance-relevant processes. Via international collaboration, the SFWD Campaign also benefits from substantial international investments in research facilities (such as underground research laboratory testing and modeling) and achieves cost savings via joint funding of expensive field experiments. To date, SFWD’s International Disposal R&D Program has established formal collaboration agreements with multiple international initiatives and various international partners, and national lab scientists associated with SFWD have conducted a large number of specific collaborative R&D activities that align well with its R&D priorities.

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Criteria for Determination of MC&A System Effectiveness

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is a test bed for implementation of the Safeguards First Principles Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based approach to Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) requirements. The Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Strategies (COMPASS) model is used to determine the effectiveness of safeguards systems under SFPI. Under this model, MC&A is divided into nine primary elements. Each element is divided into sub-elements. Then, each sub-element is assigned two values, effectiveness and contribution, that are used to calculate the rating. Effectiveness is a measure of sub-element implementation and how well it meets requirements. Contribution is a relative measure of the importance, and functions as a weighting factor. The COMPASS model provides the methodology for calculation of element and subelement, but not the actual criteria. Each site must develop its own criteria. For the rating to be meaningful, the effectiveness criteria must be objective and based on explicit, measurable criteria. Contribution (weights) must reflect the importance within the MC&A program. This paper details the NTS approach to system effectiveness and contribution values, and will cover the following: the basis for the ratings, an explanation of the contribution weights, and the objective, performance-based effectiveness criteria. Finally, the evaluation process will be described.

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Neptunium(IV) Diffusion through Bentonite Clay

DOE Fellow, Silvina A. Di Pietro, completed a 10-week internship at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California. The objective of the study was to determine the diffusion profile of neptunium (Np) in bentonite clay (potential geo-engineered barrier for nuclear waste repositories). Under the mentorship of Drs. Claudia Joseph (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany) and Mavrik Zavarin, she prepared a series of core abrasion peeling samples. This procedure was a continuation of a Np diffusion experiment conducted by Dr. Joseph during her post-doc residency at LLNL in the year 2016. The second part of the experiment (from now on will be referred as abrasive peeling) focuses on understanding (1) the Np movement through the clay core and (2) the influence of temperature (25°C, 65°C, and 85°C) for the Np transport across the clay core under anaerobic conditions. End of 2016, the diffusion core samples were embedded in epoxy resin to stabilize them for long-term. The abraded core powder samples vary in material (epoxy vs. clay), Np activity and concentration, temperature exposed during the diffusion experiment, and mass, or amount of clay peeled off. Throughout the course of the 10-week internship program at LLNL, the experiments implemented and discussed in this report aimed to answer the questions: (1) How is the Np(IV) diffusion profile through bentonite influenced by the temperature? and (2) Will Np(IV) migrate through the geoengineered barrier of a nuclear waste repository? In addition, Ph.D. candidate Di Pietro received invaluable guidance in experimental design and development that will benefit her ongoing research endeavors.

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Drying Model for Fukushima Fuel Debris - 17489

The FATE{sup TM} code is a well-established software tool for simulation of processing, shipping, and interim storage of damaged spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that was used for process design and safety analysis for the Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (SNFP). This paper describes new model developments that allow FATE to be used for simulation of drying of damaged LWR fuel and, in particular, for simulation of processing, shipping, and interim storage of Fukushima fuel debris. The model is capable of quantifying important tradeoffs in the debris chunk size, process conditions such as temperature and pressure, container size, etc. to optimize process design. The model is also capable of demonstrating proof-of-dryness and to demonstrate the link between observed quantities such as pressure and the amount of residual water. (authors)

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Los Alamos National Laboratory standard nuclear material container

The shut down of United States (U.S.) nuclear-weapons production activities in the early 1990s left large quantities of nuclear materials throughout the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex in forms not intended for long-term storage. In May 1994, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) issued Recommendation 94-1, which called for the stabilization and disposition of 'thousands of containers of plutonium-bearing liquids and solids' in the DOE complex, including LANL in the nuclear-weapons-manufacturing pipeline when manufacturing ended. This resulted in the development of the 3013 standard with container requirements for long term storage (up to 50 years). A follow on was the Criteria For Interim Storage of Plutonium Bearing Materials, Charles B. Curtis, in 1996 to address storage other than the 3013 standard for shorter time frames. In January 2000, the DNFSB issued Recommendation 2000-1, which stated the need for LANL to repackage 'about one ton of plutonium metal and oxide,' declared excess to Defense Program (DP) needs. The DNFSB recommended that LANL 'stabilize and seal within welded containers with an inert atmosphere the plutonium oxides ... which are not yet in states conforming to the long-term storage envisaged by DOE-STD-3013,' and that they '... enclose existing and newly-generated legacy plutonium metal in sealed containers with an inert atmosphere,' and 'remediate and/or safely store the various residues.' Recommendation 2000-1, while adding to the number of items needing remediation, also reiterated the need to address remaining items from 1994-1 in a timely fashion. Since timetables slipped, the DNFSB recommended that the Complex 'prioritize and schedule tasks according to the consideration of risks.' In March 2005, the DNFSB issued Recommendation 2005-1. This recommendation addresses the need for a consistent set of criteria across the DOE complex for the interim storage of nuclear material packaged outside an engineered barrier. The Department of Energy (DOE) approved and issued on March 7, 2008, DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual [hereafter referred to as Manual] to address this recommendation, and a Prioritization Methodology as a complex-wide requirement for the packaging of nuclear material outside an engineered barrier. The Manual establishes 'technically justified criteria' for packages in order to ensure safe interim storage and handling outside an engineered barrier. The Prioritization Methodology establishes a risk-based procedure for identifying the order to repackage that would most efficiently reduce the overall risk. It is a logical extension of the work performed to meet the two earlier DNFSB recommendations to include all materials stored outside of engineered barriers, i.e., not just excess materials. LANL will continue to work all aspects of a comprehensive Implementation Plan to d monstrate all aspects of compliance with the Manual. Assessment of materials in nonstandard containers utilizing a risk based approach, repackaging up to 400 containers/year; activities include reprocessing of items to allow container consolidation and subsequent increase in vault capacity. Continued efforts in establishing and implementing a Surveillance and Maintenance Program for current Hagans and for the NG SNMCSs supported by a database for packaging and surveillance. Elastomer aging studies for the NG SNMCs will continue to justify extending the design life well beyond the currently specified five years. First production with containers available for use anticipated in June 2010. LANL will continue to define schedule and resources to meet these objectives.

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Integrated Salt Waste Processing at the Savannah River Site - 17413

Treatment and disposition of salt waste is the critical path to completion of the Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste (LW) Disposition and Cleanup Program. The new Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) is a critical link in the pre-treatment chain and will process high-curie salt waste removed from various SRS liquid waste storage tanks. Significant infrastructure modifications are underway throughout the existing LW facilities to integrate the SWPF into the LW system. (authors)

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Benefits of a Full Waste Cost Recovery Program - 16322

A full waste cost recovery program has been established at the INL in order to fund disposition of all newly-generated hazardous, radioactive, and mixed waste at the INL. Significant improvements have resulted from implementation of this program at the INL, and it is anticipated that others could benefit from using a similar approach. The INL Waste Management Program (WMP) administers two site-wide service centers that collect revenue from programs and projects in order to pay waste disposition costs. These service centers are administered separately due to their unique scope and functions. The combination of these service centers provides the INL with a fully functional cost recovery program for all newly generated waste. This cost recovery program ensures that funding is available for disposition of all waste types and that waste costs are paid for by the generating programs or facilities. The implementation of these service centers in Fiscal Year 2014 has resulting in several significant improvements in waste disposition, including a substantial increase in awareness and emphasis on waste minimization and segregation. The service centers have virtually eliminated funding shortfalls from projects that end and have not budgeted for dispositioning waste. (authors)

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Nuclear Material Process Modeling at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Dynamic simulation modeling is used at Y-12 to evaluate and forecast nuclear material inventories and production capacities to ensure that future supply can meet mission demand. Model outputs are analyzed by numerous Y-12 organizations and programs and coordinated with NNSA’s Office of Secondary Stage Production Modernization. Data-driven decisions for both short-term and long-term strategic planning for Y-12 mission execution are informed by the model. Dynamic simulation modeling capabilities for Y-12 nuclear material production continue to be expanded and refined.

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Nevada Higher Education Benefits from US Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program's Transfer of Geologic Samples - 20442

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was the location of 100 historic atmospheric and 828 historic underground nuclear tests from 1951 to 1992. Related to this historic nuclear testing, geologic and hydrologic studies of the site were conducted utilizing the skills and the expertise of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and national laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), who were principal in leading the development of weapons and were responsible for specific underground testing programs. The subsurface samples and technical/scientific data associated with NNSS geologic studies (past and present) are preserved and stored at the USGS Mercury Core Library and Data Center located at the NNSS. Currently, the facility stores over 2,000,000 linear feet of cores and cuttings from more than 2,600 drill holes that can be accessed for study. Most of the samples and historic geologic work was focused directly on subsurface geologic settings that relate directly to historic underground nuclear testing. Since 1992, the United States has observed a unilateral moratorium on full-scale nuclear testing, and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is now responsible for hydrogeologic characterization of the potential impacts to the natural groundwater systems that may have resulted from historic underground nuclear tests. As part of this effort, the EM Nevada Program Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity has drilled and completed over 58 deep (2,000 - 7,000 ft.) characterization wells, totaling in excess of 170,000 linear feet of cuttings and core samples. Cutting samples were collected as triplicate samples for each respective depth interval, to account for potential later nondestructive/destructive analysis and to preserve samples for regulatory purposes. Recently, it was recognized by the EM Nevada Program that opportunities may exist to reduce the cost and floor space required for the storage of geologic samples at the Mercury Core Library without impacting the integrity and representative nature of the samples necessary for project execution. An initiative was sponsored by EM Nevada Program to evaluate several options: 1) disposal of a portion of cuttings and cores in a land fill setting; 2) reduction in sample volume through skeletonizing core and cuttings from wells to a representative but much smaller number of samples; and 3) solicit potential interest in the academic community where other geoscientists could freely access the samples for studies. The Nevada state university system through the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology responded positively to the opportunity to receive these NNSS samples from the EM Nevada Program. In June 2019, approximately 17,000 geologic samples, representing greater than 170,000 linear feet of drilling and weighing over 20,000 pounds, were shipped from the NNSS to the Great Basin Science Sample and Records Library located in Reno, Nevada. The benefits resulting from this transfer were realized by the EM Nevada Program in terms of cost and space savings for geologic sample storage at the NNSS. The transfer did not impact the EM Nevada Program mission as access to representative geologic samples for regulatory and scientific purposes was preserved. Moreover, the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology acquired a significant resource of subsurface geologic samples and supporting technical data to support academic and scientific studies in a complex volcanic setting in southwest Nevada. (authors)

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First Step in Validating the Radiological Inventories of the Current French Nuclear Fleet - 19000

To anticipate the evolution of the mechanical characteristics of its PWR vessels, EDF developed a vessels fluence monitoring program. This program was based on vessel samples and neutron dosimeters deployed between the fuel assemblies and vessels. These samples and dosimeters are regularly analyzed in laboratories. To calculate the radioactive inventories, we have developed a calculation scheme which includes a 3D mapping of the neutron flux, the calculation of the radiological inventories of the structures of interest, and finally the validation of the results. The validation needs samples to propose calculation/measurement ratios. Unfortunately before the final shut down, the internal and vessel samplings are not possible. To anticipate the decommissioning of the current French nuclear fleet, this paper shows how the samples of the vessels fluence monitoring program can be used to validate the calculated radiological inventories. Using state-of-the-art simulations (i.e. 3D geometric model, 3D neutron sources, 3D neutron propagation, operational fuel loading coupled with effective power distributions) we calculated the radiological inventories of some vessel fluence monitoring program samples. The comparisons between calculated and measured results were done on 'standard chemical elements'. To qualify a chemical element as 'standard', many criteria must be satisfied such as a high concentration level, a low uncertainty about concentration, activation into an expanded cross section range, production of radionuclides having significant half-lives and finally no difficulties measuring the radionuclides produced. The retained 'standard' is Fe which produces, under neutrons flux, Fe-55. The comparisons show that the calculations slightly overestimate the measurements. (authors)

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FY 2021 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan

The mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) is to ensure America’s security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental, and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions. This FY 2021 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan (SSP) was developed to enable and sustain Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear solutions, clean energy options, and critical infrastructure. The SSP was developed according to the narrative requirements from the “FY 2021 DOE Site Sustainability Plan Guidance” document issued in August 2020. The SSP contains strategies and activities that will lead to continual energy, water, and waste reductions that move INL toward meeting DOE sustainability goals and requirements. The SSP summarizes energy and available fuel use reporting requirements and references criteria for instituting sustainable design. SSP requirements are integrated into each INL contractor’s Integrated Safety Management System and Environmental Management System (EMS). Finally, the Sustainability Program directives, based on this SSP, are integrated into the INL Annual Laboratory Plan Fiscal Year 2020 (INL/LTD-20-59747), and operations and acquisition systems.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Path to a commercial fast reactor option in the United States

Fast reactors represent one technology with the potential to transform the energy sector through increased resource utilization and unique waste management opportunities that are not available through the established light water reactor (LWR) technology. The technology is 'old' by 21 st century standards, as the United States and other nations have funded fast reactor research and development efforts from the birth of nuclear power that have led to deployment at all scales from experimental to commercial. Yet, in spite of great promise, the experience with fast reactors can be characterized as mixed, with both notable successes and failures. Why then, after 50 years of development, is there no commercial fast reactor operating in the United States? Is commercialization of the technology possible? If so, what business case is needed for a commercial utility to operate a fast reactor? This paper will attempt to sketch a possible path for the development and demonstration of technology needed to make fast reactors a real option for commercial operation by mid-century. This path starts with today's proven LWR technology and uranium oxide fuels and takes an evolutionary route to a first commercial fast reactor that complements and supports the existing reliable LWR fleet. This paper is not intended to promote any one technology or approach, but instead seeks to illustrate the value of national level support for an energy technology program oriented toward demonstration and seeks eventual deployment of transformational energy systems on the scale and time-frame that matters. The observations and conclusions presented are derived primarily from the collective experience and expertise of the authors who represent a broad range of commercial perspectives from the utility, vendor, research and development, and regulatory policy communities. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗