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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1992

Fingerprinting of Materials

Recent issues emerging in our fiscal and ecological environments have promulgated that federal agencies shall promote activities which respond to the improvement of both. In response to these developments, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has undertaken an innovative approach to improve the control of materials used in all NASA manufacturing activities. In concert with this goal, NASA is requiring that its contractors and their sub-contractors perform a more intensive consolidation of technologies that can provide an accounting of materials, which includes in-coming materials, materials in process, end-products and waste materials. The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidelines to NASA and its contractor personnel for the planning and implementation of chemical fingerprinting programs and to illustrate the chemical and statistical fundamentals needed for successful use of chemical fingerprinting.

Workman, Gary L↗
NASA NTRS1966

New developments in NASA quality assurance

The purpose of this talk is to examine and discuss NASA's basic quality concept, the policy and procedures which define and implement this concept and subsequently explore the NASA-Industry quality relationships which are essential to the success of NASA's quality assurance concept. It is important to emphasize that NASA's Quality Assurance program is predicated on the concept of an individually tailored quality program for each significant NASA procurement - particularly, large space systems. As a result, NASA's Quality Assurance program - to be effective - must be responsive to various technologies, hardware systems, and space missions. In addition, the program must be responsive to changing policies and practices in research, engineering and procurement. Key issues in the NASA-Contractor quality relationships in the framework of an over all NASA-Industry partnership include: (1) the necessity for NASA to effectively discharge its responsibility for providing clear and complete definition of quality requirements at all phases of the procurement cycle; (2) the right of the contractor to expect an explicit definition of NASA quality requirements in each RFP and contract and to request same if it is not provided; (3) the necessity for the contractor to have a dynamic and responsive quality program which is directed towards assuring that the hardware meets all technical requirements and to accomplish this in an effective and efficient manner; and (4) the critical need for investigation and study of the economic aspects of quality and an evaluation of our policies and practices based upon the results of such a study.

Condon, John E.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Kennedy Space Center's NASA/Contractor Team-Centered Total Quality Management Seminar: Results, methods, and lessons learned

It is apparent to everyone associated with the Nation's aeronautics and space programs that the challenge of continuous improvement can be reasonably addressed only if NASA and its contractors act together in a fully integrated and cooperative manner that transcends the traditional boundaries of proprietary interest. It is, however, one thing to assent to the need for such integration and cooperation; it is quite another thing to undertake the hard tasks of turning such a need into action. Whatever else total quality management is, it is fundamentally a team-centered and team-driven process of continuous improvement. The introduction of total quality management at KSC, therefore, has given the Center a special opportunity to translate the need for closer integration and cooperation among all its organizations into specific initiatives. One such initiative that NASA and its contractors have undertaken at KSC is a NASA/Contractor team-centered Total Quality Management Seminar. It is this seminar which is the subject of this paper. The specific purposes of this paper are to describe the following: Background, development, and evolution of Kennedy Space Center's Total Quality Management Seminar; Special characteristics of the seminar; Content of the seminar; Meaning and utility of a team-centered design for TQM training; Results of the seminar; Use that one KSC contractor, EG&G Florida, Inc. has made of the seminar in its Total Quality Management initiative; and Lessons learned.

Kinlaw, Dennis C.↗
NASA NTRS1992

NASA Johnson Space Center: Total quality partnership

The development of and benefits realized from a joint NASA, support contractor continuous improvement process at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is traced. The joint effort described is the Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Directorate relationship with its three support contractors which began in early 1990. The Continuous Improvement effort started in early 1990 with an initiative to document and simplify numerous engineering change evaluation processes. This effort quickly grew in scope and intensity to include process improvement teams, improvement methodologies, awareness, and training. By early 1991, the support contractor had teams in place and functioning, program goals established and a cultural change effort underway. In mid-l991 it became apparent that a major redirection was needed to counter a growing sense of frustration and dissatisfaction from teams and managers. Sources of frustration were isolated to insufficient joint participation on teams, and to a poorly defined vision. Over the next year, the effort was transformed to a truly joint process. The presentation covers the steps taken to define vision, values, goals, and priorities and to form a joint Steering Committee and joint process improvement teams. The most recent assessment against the President's award criteria is presented as a summary of progress. Small, but important improvement results have already demonstrated the value of the joint effort.

Harlan, Charlie↗
NASA NTRS1993

Toxic substances registry system: Index of material safety data sheets

The Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS's) listed in this index reflect product inventories and associated MSDS's which were submitted to the Toxic Substances Registry database maintained by the Base Operations Contractor at the Kennedy Space Center. The purpose of this index is to provide KSC government, contractor, and tenant organizations a means to access information on the hazards associated with these chemicals. The Toxic Substance Registry Service (TSRS) was established to manage information dealing with the storage and use of toxic and otherwise hazardous materials at KSC. As a part of this service, the BOC Environmental Health Services maintains a central repository of MSDS's which were provided to TSRS. The data on the TSRS are obtained from NASA, contractor, and tenant organizations who use or store hazardous materials at KSC. It is the responsibility of these organizations to conduct inventories, obtain MSDS's, distribute Hazard Communication information to their employees, and otherwise implement compliance with appropriate Federal, State, and NASA Hazard Communication and Worker Right-to-Know regulations and policies.

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NASA NTRS1993

Towards the formal specification of the requirements and design of a processor interface unit

Work to formally specify the requirements and design of a Processor Interface Unit (PIU), a single-chip subsystem providing memory interface, bus interface, and additional support services for a commercial microprocessor within a fault-tolerant computer system, is described. This system, the Fault-Tolerant Embedded Processor (FTEP), is targeted towards applications in avionics and space requiring extremely high levels of mission reliability, extended maintenance free operation, or both. The approaches that were developed for modeling the PIU requirements and for composition of the PIU subcomponents at high levels of abstraction are described. These approaches were used to specify and verify a nontrivial subset of the PIU behavior. The PIU specification in Higher Order Logic (HOL) is documented in a companion NASA contractor report entitled 'Towards the Formal Specification of the Requirements and Design of a Processor Interfacs Unit - HOL Listings.' The subsequent verification approach and HOL listings are documented in NASA contractor report entitled 'Towards the Formal Verification of the Requirements and Design of a Processor Interface Unit' and NASA contractor report entitled 'Towards the Formal Verification of the Requirements and Design of a Processor Interface Unit - HOL Listings.'

Fura, David A.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Report of the Space Shuttle Management Independent Review Team

At the request of the NASA Administrator a team was formed to review the Space Shuttle Program and propose a new management system that could significantly reduce operating costs. Composed of a group of people with broad and extensive experience in spaceflight and related areas, the team received briefings from the NASA organizations and most of the supporting contractors involved in the Shuttle Program. In addition, a number of chief executives from the supporting contractors provided advice and suggestions. The team found that the present management system has functioned reasonably well despite its diffuse structure. The team also determined that the shuttle has become a mature and reliable system, and--in terms of a manned rocket-propelled space launch system--is about as safe as today's technology will provide. In addition, NASA has reduced shuttle operating costs by about 25 percent over the past 3 years. The program, however, remains in a quasi-development mode and yearly costs remain higher than required. Given the current NASA-contractor structure and incentives, it is difficult to establish cost reduction as a primary goal and implement changes to achieve efficiencies. As a result, the team sought to create a management structure and associated environment that enables and motivates the Program to further reduce operational costs. Accordingly, the review team concluded that the NASA Space Shuttle Program should (1) establish a clear set of program goals, placing a greater emphasis on cost-efficient operations and user-friendly payload integration; (2) redefine the management structure, separating development and operations and disengaging NASA from the daily operation of the space shuttle; and (3) provide the necessary environment and conditions within the program to pursue these goals.

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NASA NTRS1996

Advanced Orion Optimized Laser System Analysis

Contractor shall perform a complete analysis of the potential of the solid state laser in the very long pulse mode (100 ns pulse width, 10-30 hz rep-rate) and in the very short pulse mode (100 ps pulse width 10-30 hz rep rate) concentrating on the operation of the device in the 'hot-rod' mode, where no active cooling the laser operation is attempted. Contractor's calculations shall be made of the phase aberrations which develop during the repped-pulse train, and the results shall feed into the adaptive optics analyses. The contractor shall devise solutions to work around ORION track issues. A final report shall be furnished to the MSFC COTR including all calculations and analysis of estimates of bulk phase and intensity aberration distribution in the laser output beam as a function of time during the repped-pulse train for both wave forms (high-energy/long-pulse, as well as low-energy/short-pulse). Recommendations shall be made for mitigating the aberrations by laser re-design and/or changes in operating parameters of optical pump sources and/or designs.

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NASA NTRS1996

An optimal user-interface for EPIMS database conversions and SSQ 25002 EEE parts screening

The Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Information Management System (EPIMS) database was selected by the International Space Station Parts Control Board for providing parts information to NASA managers and contractors. Parts data is transferred to the EPIMS database by converting parts list data to the EP1MS Data Exchange File Format. In general, parts list information received from contractors and suppliers does not convert directly into the EPIMS Data Exchange File Format. Often parts lists use different variable and record field assignments. Many of the EPES variables are not defined in the parts lists received. The objective of this work was to develop an automated system for translating parts lists into the EPIMS Data Exchange File Format for upload into the EPIMS database. Once EEE parts information has been transferred to the EPIMS database it is necessary to screen parts data in accordance with the provisions of the SSQ 25002 Supplemental List of Qualified Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts, Manufacturers, and Laboratories (QEPM&L). The SSQ 2S002 standards are used to identify parts which satisfy the requirements for spacecraft applications. An additional objective for this work was to develop an automated system which would screen EEE parts information against the SSQ 2S002 to inform managers of the qualification status of parts used in spacecraft applications. The EPIMS Database Conversion and SSQ 25002 User Interfaces are designed to interface through the World-Wide-Web(WWW)/Internet to provide accessibility by NASA managers and contractors.

Watson, John C.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Predictive Engineering Implementation at KSC

This paper provides an overview of what the primary contractors at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are doing in the field of predictive engineering. The technologies employed by each of the contractors and the cost savings associated with the implementation of these predictive engineering methods are discussed. The sources include predictive engineering implementation plans, published by each of the contractors and interviews with the authors of these implementation plans.

Mosconi, Jane↗
NASA NTRS1997

Final Design and Integration of Micro-Chip Inductive Edge Sensors for the Seven Segment Demonstrator. Testing of Integrated Edge Sensors in Test Packages

The contractor attended the critical design review and evaluated the presentations of other team members and presented data on the inductive edge sensor. The prototype micro-chip inductive edge sensor was evaluated, and devices were found to have a number of characteristics which made them unsuitable for installation on the seven segment demonstrator. The amplifier bandwidth was too low, the output drive current was too small, and there is an interaction between the digital circuitry and the amplifier that causes the amplifier to stop functioning. Therefore, the inductive edge sensors were not installed on the seven segment demonstrator. The contractor has participated in instruction, problem analysis, and provided technical assistance to NASA and its contractors for the development of 8 hexagonal mirror faceplates with electronics and edge sensors.

Karpinsky, John↗
NASA NTRS2000

Shuttle Upgrade Using 5-Segment Booster (FSB)

In support of NASA's continuing effort to improve the over-all safety and reliability of the Shuttle system- a 5-segment booster (FSB) has been identified as an approach to satisfy that overall objective. To assess the feasibility of a 5-segment booster approach, NASA issued a feasibility study contract to evaluate the potential of a 5-segment booster to improve the overall capability of the Shuttle system, especially evaluating the potential to increase the system reliability and safety. In order to effectively evaluate the feasibility of the 5-segment concept, a four-member contractor team was established under the direction of NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). MSFC provided the overall program oversight and integration as well as program contractual management. The contractor team consisted of Thiokol, Boeing North American Huntington Beach (BNA), Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) and United Space Alliance (USA) and their subcontractor bd Systems (Control Dynamics Division, Huntsville, AL). United Space Alliance included the former members of United Space Booster Incorporated (USBI) who managed the booster element portion of the current Shuttle solid rocket boosters. Thiokol was responsible for the overall integration and coordination of the contractor team across all of the booster elements. They were also responsible for all of the motor modification evaluations. Boeing North American (BNA) was responsible for all systems integration analyses, generation of loads and environments. and performance and abort mode capabilities. Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) was responsible for evaluating the impacts of any changes to the booster on the external tank (ET), and evaluating any design changes on the external tank necessary to accommodate the FSB. USA. including the former USBI contingent. was responsible for evaluating any modifications to facilities at the launch site as well as any booster component design modifications.

Sauvageau, Donald R.↗
NASA NTRS2004

James Webb Space Telescope: Supporting Multiple Ground System Transitions in One Year

Ideas, requirements, and concepts developed during the very early phases of the mission design often conflict with the reality of a situation once the prime contractors are awarded. This happened for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) as well. The high level requirement of a common real-time ground system for both the Integration and Test (I&T), as well as the Operation phase of the mission is meant to reduce the cost and time needed later in the mission development for re-certification of databases, command and control systems, scripts, display pages, etc. In the case of JWST, the early Phase A flight software development needed a real-time ground system and database prior to the spacecraft prime contractor being selected. To compound the situation, the very low level requirements for the real-time ground system were not well defined. These two situations caused the initial real-time ground system to be switched out for a system that was previously used by the Bight software development team. To meet the high-!evel requirement, a third ground system was selected based on the prime spacecraft contractor needs and JWST Project decisions. The JWST ground system team has responded to each of these changes successfully. The lessons learned from each transition have not only made each transition smoother, but have also resolved issues earlier in the mission development than what would normally occur.

Detter, Ryan↗
NASA NTRS1978

Report of the Seasat Failure Review Board

The Seasat spacecraft failed on October 9, 1978, after satisfactory operation in orbit for 105 days, as a result of a loss of electrical power in the Agena bus that was used as a part of the spacecraft. This loss of power was caused by a massive and progressive short in one of the slip ring assemblies that was used to connect the rotating solar arrays into the power subsystem. The most likely cause of this short was the initiation of an arc between adjacent slip ring brush assemblies. The triggering mechanism of this arc could have been either a wire-to-brush assembly contact, a brush-to-brush contact, or a momentary short caused by a contaminant that bridged internal components of opposite electrical polarity. The slip ring assembly, as used in the Seasat spacecraft, was connected into the power subsystem in such a way that most of the adjacent brush assemblies were of opposite electrical polarity. This wiring arrangement, together with the congested nature of the design itself, made the Seasat slip ring assembly a unique, first-of-a-kind component that was particularly prone to shorting. The possibility of slip ring failures resulting from placing opposite electrical polarities on adjacent brush assemblies was known at least as early-as the summer of 1977 to other projects within the contractor's organization. Furthermore, failures of slip ring assemblies due to shorting between brushes had been experienced by the prime contractor on slip ring assemblies used by other programs. That the Seasat organization was not fully aware of these potential failure modes was due to a breakdown in communication within the contractor's organization.

Lundin, Bruce T.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Documentation: No Substitute for Communication

SO WHAT IS AN RFI? IT WAS ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS I learned about back when I started my project management career with my first large construction firm. I learned how to use these forms as a convenient and effective means of documenting the many legitimate clarifications needed on a major project. However, like most other young engineers, I also learned to use the RFI as a weapon in the ongoing battle between owners. or their designer and the construction contractors. Recently, our project team has done a few simple things to greatly reduce the waste and frustration that comes from this type of battle. The RFI form can be a great tool if used properly, and I certainly don t recommend that they be eliminated entirely. The RFI form was created to document the many clarifications that are commonly required on projects. Typically, the contractor uses the top half of the form to clarify-or request permission to vary from-the contract documents. The bottom half of the form is used to record the answer. But this seemingly simple process is plagued by a number of problems. From the contractor s perspective, RFIs are needed to secure information that should have been in the contract documents in the first place. The missing information keeps their crews from working effectively, and it makes hitting already demanding cost and schedule targets even more difficult. Owners, or their design firms, often view the RFI as a means of harassment. Both sides of the issue have legitimate complaints, and both sides cause most of their own pain.

Strickland, John↗
NASA NTRS2005

Putting EVM to the Test

IN MANY INSTANCES THERE IS NO FOREWARNING; SCHEDULES slip, costs soar, and the project manager is faced with the near impossible task of explaining why each impact occurred. With contractors performing the majority of the work, the management job can become even more obscure. The simple lack of proximity to the contractor can limit effective communication. Add to that a mixture of cultural differences and a desire for the contractor to portray the most optimistic view of their performance, and you create an even more difficult task for the project manager. This was the scenario when the Habitat Holding Rack (HHR) manager at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Stacy Counts, was introduced to the overall concept of Earned Value Management (EVM). Faced with increased costs (which eventually resulted in decreased scope of the project), continued schedule slides, and several technical anomalies, she was looking for a way to gain a better handle on the project performance. As a component of the Space Station Biological Research Program (SSBRP), the HHR project is an integral piece of the Program content. The HHR is the first rack hardware to be delivered for the Program and has therefore been the first rack to move through the trials of test and verification-documenting anomalies and technical difficulties that will benefit the other SSBRP rack projects. For these reasons, the HHR maintained high visibility throughout the manufacturing and assembly process, continuing through test and verification activities. Needless to say, the higher visibility emphasized the need for improved performance on this project. And to improve project performance, Stacy first had to figure out how to measure the cost, schedule and technical objectives effectively.

Kerby, Jerald↗
NASA NTRS2006

The TPS Advanced Development Project for CEV

The CEV TPS Advanced Development Project (ADP) is a NASA in-house activity for providing two heatshield preliminary designs (a Lunar direct return as well as a LEO only return) for the CEV, including the TPS, the carrier structure, the interfaces and the attachments. The project s primary objective is the development of a single heatshield preliminary design that meets both Lunar direct return and LEO return requirements. The effort to develop the Lunar direct return capable heatshield is considered a high risk item for the NASA CEV development effort due to the low TRL (approx. 4) of the candidate TPS materials. By initiating the TPS ADP early in the development cycle, the intent is to use materials analysis and testing in combination with manufacturing demonstrations to reduce the programmatic risk of using advanced TPS technologies in the critical path for CEV. Due to the technical and schedule risks associated a Lunar return heatshield, the ADP will pursue a parallel path design approach, whereby a back-up TPS/heatshield design that only meets LEO return requirements is also developed. The TPS materials and carrier structure design concept selections will be based on testing, analysis, design and evaluation of scalability and manufacturing performed under the ADP. At the TPS PDR, the preferred programmatic strategy is to transfer the continued (detailed) design, development, testing and evaluation (DDT&E) of both the Lunar direct and LEO return designs to a government/prime contractor coordinated sub-system design team. The CEV prime contractor would have responsibility for the continued heatshield sub-system development. Continued government participation would include analysis, testing and evaluation as well as decision authority at TPS Final System Decision (FSD) (choosing between the primary and back-up heatshields) occurring between TPS PDR and TPS Critical Design Review (CDR). After TPS FSD the prime CEV contractor will complete the detailed design, certification testing, procurement, and integration of the CEV TPS.

Reuther, James↗
NASA NTRS2010

ISS Logistics Hardware Disposition and Metrics Validation

I was assigned to the Logistics Division of the International Space Station (ISS)/Spacecraft Processing Directorate. The Division consists of eight NASA engineers and specialists that oversee the logistics portion of the Checkout, Assembly, and Payload Processing Services (CAPPS) contract. Boeing, their sub-contractors and the Boeing Prime contract out of Johnson Space Center, provide the Integrated Logistics Support for the ISS activities at Kennedy Space Center. Essentially they ensure that spares are available to support flight hardware processing and the associated ground support equipment (GSE). Boeing maintains a Depot for electrical, mechanical and structural modifications and/or repair capability as required. My assigned task was to learn project management techniques utilized by NASA and its' contractors to provide an efficient and effective logistics support infrastructure to the ISS program. Within the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) I was exposed to Logistics support components, such as, the NASA Spacecraft Services Depot (NSSD) capabilities, Mission Processing tools, techniques and Warehouse support issues, required for integrating Space Station elements at the Kennedy Space Center. I also supported the identification of near-term ISS Hardware and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) candidates for excessing/disposition prior to October 2010; and the validation of several Logistics Metrics used by the contractor to measure logistics support effectiveness.

Rogers, Toneka R.↗