Results for “Contamination Control Engineering” — Page 7

DOE OSTI2019

Dry Cask Shipments of ATR Spent Nuclear Fuel at INL

The High Load Charger (HLC) cask will be replacing the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) spent fuel transfer cask that has been used at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to wet-transfer spent ATR fuel elements from ATR to Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) in order to support future plans at both facilities. INTEC intends to discontinue use of the CPP-666 storage pools in compliance with the Idaho Settlement Agreement and the basins will no longer be available to store spent ATR fuel elements. In order to support the core-internals change out in 2021 for ATR, spent ATR fuel elements must be removed from the canal and shipped to INTEC. INL contractors will use the HLC cask for safe, dry transfer of spent Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) fuel elements between the ATR Complex managed by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC and the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) managed by Fluor Idaho, LLC. The HLC cask (also known as the High Load Charging Cask or High Load Charger) is a lead-shielded, stainless steel transfer container originally designed in 1954 by the Idaho Nuclear Corporation to meet the radiation and contamination controls requirements of the time for shipment of spent nuclear fuel. The cask has been modified over the years and is currently used for wet-to-dry transfers at INTEC. It is approved only for out-of-commerce transfers. The cask will arrive at the ATR where eight spent ATR fuel elements will be loaded into two, newly-designed buckets. Each bucket is a quarter section, right-cylinder shape that has four compartments. The cask will be lifted out of the ATR canal allowing most of the water to drain from the cask. Processing the 12,500 kg cask will be completed in ATR and then transported on a tractor trailer to INTEC where the loaded buckets will be removed from the cask. The loaded buckets will undergo a drying process before placing the four buckets into a canister for long-term storage in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) at INTEC. A new transportation plan that was submitted to, and approved by, the U.S. Department of Energy to provide the cask safety basis, which describes the hazard analysis and accident analysis for the cask during transport. Supporting accident analysis include criticality, thermal, dose, and drop analyses. Of particular interest for this cask was the drop analysis from which was derived the speed limit for the transport. The drop analysis addressed drops in air onto an unyielding surface and in water onto an energy-absorbing pad for the cask in the ATR facility. These analyses are typically applied as the bounding drop scenarios during transport; however, this resulted in a safety basis speed limit of 12.9 kph. In order to more accurately represent the in-transit accident scenario, LS-DYNA software was procured and the model was updated to more closely represent the potential drop heights and impact surfaces of asphalt and soil for the cask while in transit. This analysis resulted in a safety basis speed limit of 48 kph. This safety basis speed limit is more practical to implement and control.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS1995

N-Butane To Replace Trichlorotrifluoroethane

According to proposal, trichlorotrifluoroethane replaced by n-butane as solvent for removal of oils, greases, hydraulic fluids, and other oily surface contaminants. N-butane candidate is replacement fluid because physical and chemical properties relevant to use as solvent similar to corresponding properties of trichlorotrifluoroethane. Considerably less expensive. Major disadvantage is flammability. As in cases of other hydrocarbon fluids, flammability hazard minimized by engineering controls.

Biesinger, Paul H.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Chapter 9: MEMS Applications in Spacecraft Thermal Control and Chapter 13: Handling and Contamination Control Considerations for Critical Space Applications

Thermal control systems (TCS) are an integral part of all spacecraft and instruments. To operate properly all spacecraft components must be maintained within a specified temperature band, which in some instances can be quite tight (less than 1 degree C). Traditionally this is accomplished by "passive" designs, but with modem spacecraft and instruments it is increasingly necessary to use active thermal control technologies. Microelectromechanical System (MEMS) can be useful in developing an active TCS, and may be especially useful for small spacecraft. As the MEMS knowledge matures, the applications of MEMS in spacecraft thermal control emerges as a viable technology for thermal engineers. Potential applications include specialized thermal control coatings, thermal switches, and specialized filters for instruments. Although MEMS technology demonstrates benefits, it also poses challenges for thermal en,oineers due to the lack of in-flight MEMS data. As a consequence, in order to design a MEMS thermal control device and receive the full advantage, it is important to understand the potential impact of the space environment on MEMS devices and the design/operational constraints imposed in their use. An entire chapter is devoted to handling and contamination controls for Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS) in space applications due to the importance of the topic area to final mission success. Handling and contamination control is discussed relative to the full life cycle from the very basic wafer level processing up through on orbit deployment. MEMS packaging will drive the need to tailor the Handling and Contamination Control Plan in order to assure adequacy of the overall program on a program by program basis. Plan elements are discussed at length to assist the user in preparing and implementing effective plans for both handling and contamination control to prevent deleterious effects.

Osiander, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2026

The Contaminant Footprint of Landed Spacecraft: Toward an Inventory and Modelling Framework

All spacecraft generate and carry contaminants, i.e., unwanted and potentially harmful material. When a spacecraft lands and operates in near-vacuum, as onto Earth’s Moon, it introduces contaminants into its environment that may compromise mission science objectives and engineering performance. Contamination of solar system bodies may irrevocably degrade targets of unique value to planetary scientists, for instance, as lunar landed spacecraft introduce propellant effluents into the otherwise pristine ice of the Moon’s permanently shadowed regions. NASA’s planetary protection discipline seeks to ensure that solar system bodies are not contaminated, for scientific purposes, by terrestrial material (i.e., forward contamination). This interest aligns with planetary science interest in mitigating the transport of terrestrial contaminants onto solar system bodies and in controlling types of contamination that could compromise the scientific value of samples or measurements. NASA, and other entities that practice planetary science, have compelling and multidisciplinary interests in the preservation of special regions and sampling sites of high scientific value – including lunar permanently shadowed regions (PSRs) – from inadvertent contamination by any spacecraft, and in understanding the contamination of such regions by all spacecraft. Organic molecular contamination here represents a primary threat. Organic molecules will be introduced to solar system bodies by nominal landed spacecraft and crew processes – including by the action of descent and ascent engines; natural materials outgassing; and crew environmental and life support system sources. Molecular contaminants can also travel in the free-molecular sense at global scale across near-vacuum bodies, including into regions where they may be permanently trapped. This presentation will address a high-level study to identify sources of contaminants – in particular, organic material – generated by landed spacecraft along with the transport vectors by which these contaminants can reach sites of scientific interest on bodies like the Moon. A vision for an integrated modeling framework for the organic contamination footprint of spacecraft missions, individually and collectively, will also be described and presented along with initial conclusions related to organic molecular transport.

Gas Dynamics↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA's planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective's NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle.Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine's Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

Planetary Protection↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA’s planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective’s NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientiﬁc consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle. Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientiﬁc consensus, and to identify and ﬁll in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

James Benardini↗

NASA NTRS1993

STS-55 pad abort: Engine 2011 oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter check valve leak

The STS-55 initial launch attempt of Columbia (OV102) was terminated on KSC launch pad A March 22, 1993 at 9:51 AM E.S.T. due to violation of an ME-3 (Engine 2011) Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) limit exceedance. The event description and timeline are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 22 March, 1993 at 1:15 AM EST. All SSME chill parameters and launch commit criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.44 seconds, a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2011 for exceeding the 50 psia Oxidizer Preburner (OPB) purge pressure redline. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2034 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. The OPB purge pressure redline violation and the abort profile/overlay for all three engines are depicted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 013-414, OPB purge pressure redline exceeded. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to the oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter purge check valve not being fully closed due to contamination. The source of the contaminant was traced to a cut segment from a rubber O-ring which was used in a fine clean tool during valve production prior to 1992. The valve was apparently contaminated during its fabrication in 1985. The valve had performed acceptably on four previous flights of the engine, and SSME flight history shows 780 combined check valve flights without failure. The failure of an Engine 3 (SSME No. 2011) check valve to close was sensed by onboard engine instruments even though all other engine operations were normal. This resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.

Source record↗

DOE OSTI2024

Development and Implementation of a Bag Degradation Predictive Tool at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Nuclear material packaging involves many complex variables derived from the stored material's properties, the storage environment, and the synergistic interaction of said material and its environment on the containment boundary. In the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) the typical containment boundary found, starting from the stored material itself to the outermost containment layer, consists of the material contained within a stainless steel (typically 304) slip-lid (or other equivalent stainless steel packaging layer) wrapped in an sPVC bag-out bag contained within a facility approved outer container stored within the boundaries of an approved facility (i.e., a building designed and approved to store nuclear material). This packaging configuration, though occasionally deviated from in the past, represents the current procedurally enforced, expected containment structure for all interim nuclear material containment outside of an engineered control barrier (e.g., a glovebox). Over the life of containerization research at LANL, packaging engineers have become increasingly concerned with the degradation of the sPVC bag-out bag, which can cause corrosion to the outermost packaging layer as well as possible exposure to alpha contamination if the bag-out bag layer is degraded to the point of containment failure. A bag-out bag degradation predictive tool (BDT) is therefore needed to assess the current and future nuclear material inventory for possible bag degradation in order to continue to ensure safe operations for the facility and its workers to deliver on the vital national security mission of 30 PPY.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Plume Impingement Studies in Space Environments for NASA Deep Space Logistics

NASA’s Artemis program is preparing to return Americans to the moon, in preparation for future deep space missions to Mars and beyond. The Lunar Gateway – a space station to be placed in orbit around the moon – serves as a critical component of the Artemis program, and will be the launchpad for future astronauts to visit the lunar surface and for humanity to learn how to live in a deep space environment. Much like the ISS, during operations and visiting vehicles approaches, the Lunar Gateway structures will be impinged upon from various plume sources: reaction control system rocket engine plumes, wastewater venting plumes, and plasma plumes from electric thrusters for station keeping. This presentation will describe the engineering challenges associated with each of these plume impingement scenarios and will detail the physical models and simulation approaches to predict the thermomechanical loading, contamination accretion, and erosion of station components due to plume impingement in space environments.

computational fluid dynamics↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Plume Impingement Studies in Space Environments for NASA Deep Space Logistics

NASA’s Artemis program is preparing to return Americans to the moon, in preparation for future deep space missions to Mars and beyond. The Lunar Gateway – a space station to be placed in orbit around the moon – serves as a critical component of the Artemis program, and will be the launchpad for future astronauts to visit the lunar surface and for humanity to learn how to live in a deep space environment. Much like the ISS, during operations and visiting vehicles approaches, the Lunar Gateway structures will be impinged upon from various plume sources: reaction control system rocket engine plumes, wastewater venting plumes, and plasma plumes from electric thrusters for station keeping. This presentation will describe the engineering challenges associated with each of these plume impingement scenarios and will detail the physical models and simulation approaches to predict the thermomechanical loading, contamination accretion, and erosion of station components due to plume impingement in space environments.

Plume Impingement↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Genesis Solar Wind Sample Curation Documentation

Introduction: A scientist with experience as a sample science analyst, provider of flight hardware for multiple missions, and senior engineer in an ISO 2000-rated manufacturing plant has described the timeline of key participants in any PI-led sample return mission, the breadth of the organizations involved [1,2], and, of interest to this meeting, choosing the types of data to preserve and issues of future data accessibility. This work broadens that perspective by giving similar lessons from Genesis sample curation point-of-view. Curation participation regarding data gathering was part of the mission review process from the beginning. Genesis’ story illustrates outcome of several choices about types of data to record and preserve. Precision analysis of solar wind atoms captured in pure, ultraclean substrates is the driving science goal; therefore, detailed documentation was captured from all mission and curation phases and from investigator laboratories because these processes affect the final analytical results [3]. Pre-flight: Design and fabrication of the spacecraft. Like many modern small sample return missions, Genesis was a tightly managed team integrated across science, engineering and curation. Communication across the team was excellent, and, for the most part, the hands-on engineering technicians understood the impacts of “small choices” they routinely make, and the eyes-on oversight of manufacturing processes by scientists was mindful of details. The payload was designed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the spacecraft by Lockheed Martin. Solar wind collectors and instruments were fabricated by multiple vendors and laboratories. The main portion of the payload was assembled at JSC. Fabrication procedures and contamination-control data (with witness coupons) were stored primarily at JSC. The original composition, dimensions and configuration of components, results of thermal testing, etc. are still needed for interpretation of analytical data. At times, these must be estimated from secondary information acquired pre-flight. Moreover, some files (e.g., original 3-D models and early Powerpoint) cannot be opened using software. Archived curation data includes 2-D drawings, material usage lists, QA documentation and analyses of consumables used during fabrication. Important chemical information still resides in archived hardware, paints and lubricants, material coupons, cleaning coupons, environmental witness plates and reference materials from manufacturing facilities. Purity and cleanliness of collector substrates. Semi-conductor vendors provided surface cleanliness data and some purity data. Purity for specific elements of interest was verified by science team members in their laboratories [4]. Curation archived procurement and shipping records, analysis reports, and non-proprietary fabrication data. A physical archive of flight collector reference materials is maintained for future use so additional data can be collected as analytical techniques improve. These are of increased value due to the hard landing upon re-entry. Cleaning and cleanliness assessments of flight hardware. Cleaning of the science canister payload was performed at JSC in a dedicated ISO 4 cleanroom using ultrapure water (UPW). The cleanliness of this UPW was monitored throughout processing. The archive for the clean lab also includes airborne particle counts, airborne molecular and inorganic contamination measurements as well as cleanroom construction material coupons and witness coupons. Hardware cleanliness was assessed by particle counts in rinse water batches. This information is recorded in batch cleaning forms and logbooks, and are, perhaps, of decreased value due to the hard landing. Post-flight: Curation-generated data. The curation handling history of each Genesis sample is documented in a typical astromaterials sample database which captures sample location, physical description and characterization data. Samples have a “shelf life”. Crucial to the preservation of samples is ongoing documentation of the sample environment, initially under curatorial control but is now a separate facility function with requires coordination. PI-generated data. Data on sample characterization and cleaning techniques continues to be generated by sample users [5]. These are often captured in LPSC abstracts, but these “engineering” results often are not publishable as stand-alone papers. We are actively looking for ways to make this information more accessible to users. Ion implants into samples have aided science return and can be shared among investigators. These (and similar) materials should be added to the curatorial collection with appropriate process and characterization data generated externally. Summary: Complete data archives for returned astromaterial samples must be broad in types and formats, and inclusive of environmental monitoring.

Genesis↗

DOE OSTI2019

Environmental Systems Biology Approach to Bioremediation

Pollution is everywhere. Microbes are also everywhere, and many have the ability to degrade environmental contaminants. Understanding how these microbial communities work to degrade environmental contaminants will enable us to use these microbes to clean up the pollution. Understanding, monitoring, and controlling the environment with biological processes, i.e., an environmental systems biology approach to bioremediation, answer the need which is everywhere. By using an environmental systems approach to bioremediation, we make sure we know of any “fatal flaws” in the approach, get a much better handle on life-cycle cost analysis, and can grade an engineered solution into a natural attenuation solution. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. By using an environmental systems biology approach to bioremediation and cross-linkage of systems at all levels providing multiple lines of evidence involving environmental observations, laboratory testing, microcosm simulations, hypothesis refinement, field testing and validation, and multiple iterations of this circle, we will be able to make new theories and paradigms for bioremediation of contaminated environments.

Hazen, Terry C.↗

DOE OSTI2019

Dust Control Planning

At the Hanford Site, dust control is required during many activities for health and safety purposes and to prevent contaminant dispersal via atmospheric transport. Water is commonly used to reduce dust dispersal, but can mobilize contaminants and facilitate transport through the vadose zone to groundwater as observed with past activities within the River Corridor. To prevent contaminant mobilization associated with remediation activities in the Central Plateau, alternative approaches for dust suppression are presented considering site-specific requirements at Hanford. There are two high-level categories of approaches to dust control: proactive work strategies to minimize fugitive dust generation and reactive engineered controls to mitigate dust generation and/or capture fugitive dust. Because a variety of activities have the potential to generate fugitive dust at a given site, there is no unique response to dust prevention and control. In fiscal year 2018, an evaluation was completed to identify alternatives, determine limits on surface water additions, and develop information suitable for consideration in feasibility studies. The technical basis detailed in the 2018 evaluation has been condensed into this document that provides a practical Dust Control Plan template and site-specific guidance in the appendices. This Dust Control Plan template specifically provides a workflow to 1) identify key project information, 2) identify fugitive dust sources, 3) assign dust control methods, and 4) determine appropriate monitoring practices to mitigate impacts to groundwater.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS1991

Fourth Annual Workshop on Space Operations Applications and Research (SOAR 90)

The papers from the symposium are presented. Emphasis is placed on human factors engineering and space environment interactions. The technical areas covered in the human factors section include: satellite monitoring and control, man-computer interfaces, expert systems, AI/robotics interfaces, crew system dynamics, and display devices. The space environment interactions section presents the following topics: space plasma interaction, spacecraft contamination, space debris, and atomic oxygen interaction with materials. Some of the above topics are discussed in relation to the space station and space shuttle.

Savely, Robert T.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Cleaning Genesis Sample Return Canister for Flight: Lessons for Planetary Sample Return

Sample return missions require chemical contamination to be minimized and potential sources of contamination to be documented and preserved for future use. Genesis focused on and successfully accomplished the following: - Early involvement provided input to mission design: a) cleanable materials and cleanable design; b) mission operation parameters to minimize contamination during flight. - Established contamination control authority at a high level and developed knowledge and respect for contamination control across all institutions at the working level. - Provided state-of-the-art spacecraft assembly cleanroom facilities for science canister assembly and function testing. Both particulate and airborne molecular contamination was minimized. - Using ultrapure water, cleaned spacecraft components to a very high level. Stainless steel components were cleaned to carbon monolayer levels (10 (sup 15) carbon atoms per square centimeter). - Established long-term curation facility Lessons learned and areas for improvement, include: - Bare aluminum is not a cleanable surface and should not be used for components requiring extreme levels of cleanliness. The problem is formation of oxides during rigorous cleaning. - Representative coupons of relevant spacecraft components (cut from the same block at the same time with identical surface finish and cleaning history) should be acquired, documented and preserved. Genesis experience suggests that creation of these coupons would be facilitated by specification on the engineering component drawings. - Component handling history is critical for interpretation of analytical results on returned samples. This set of relevant documents is not the same as typical documentation for one-way missions and does include data from several institutions, which need to be unified. Dedicated resources need to be provided for acquiring and archiving appropriate documents in one location with easy access for decades. - Dedicated, knowledgeable contamination control oversight should be provided at sites of fabrication and integration. Numerous excellent Genesis chemists and analytical facilities participated in the contamination oversight; however, additional oversight at fabrication sites would have been helpful.

Allton, J. H.↗

DOE OSTI2019

Dry Cask Shipments of ATR Spent Nuclear Fuel at INL - 19600

The High Load Charger (HLC) cask will be replacing the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) spent fuel transfer cask that has been used at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to wet-transfer spent ATR fuel elements from ATR to Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) in order to support future plans at both facilities. INTEC intends to discontinue use of the CPP-666 storage pools in compliance with the Idaho Settlement Agreement and the basins will no longer be available to store spent ATR fuel elements. In order to support the core-internals change out in 2021 for ATR, spent ATR fuel elements must be removed from the canal and shipped to INTEC. INL contractors will use the HLC cask for safe, dry transfer of spent Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) fuel elements between the ATR Complex managed by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC and the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) managed by Fluor Idaho, LLC. The HLC cask (also known as the High Load Charging Cask or High Load Charger) is a lead-shielded, stainless steel transfer container originally designed in 1954 by the Idaho Nuclear Corporation to meet the radiation and contamination controls requirements of the time for shipment of spent nuclear fuel. The cask has been modified over the years and is currently used for wet-to-dry transfers at INTEC. It is approved only for out-of-commerce transfers. The cask will arrive at the ATR where eight spent ATR fuel elements will be loaded into two, newly-designed buckets. Each bucket is a quarter section, right-cylinder shape that has four compartments. The cask will be lifted out of the ATR canal allowing most of the water to drain from the cask. Processing the 12,500 kg cask will be completed in ATR and then transported on a tractor trailer to INTEC where the loaded buckets will be removed from the cask. The loaded buckets will undergo a drying process before placing the four buckets into a canister for long-term storage in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) at INTEC. A new transportation plan that was submitted to, and approved by, the U.S. Department of Energy to provide the cask safety basis, which describes the hazard analysis and accident analysis for the cask during transport. Supporting accident analysis include criticality, thermal, dose, and drop analyses. Of particular interest for this cask was the drop analysis from which was derived the speed limit for the transport. The drop analysis addressed drops in air onto an unyielding surface and in water onto an energy-absorbing pad for the cask in the ATR facility. These analyses are typically applied as the bounding drop scenarios during transport; however, this resulted in a safety basis speed limit of 12.9 kph. In order to more accurately represent the in-transit accident scenario, LS-DYNA software was procured and the model was updated to more closely represent the potential drop heights and impact surfaces of asphalt and soil for the cask while in transit. This analysis resulted in a safety basis speed limit of 48 kph. This safety basis speed limit is more practical to implement and control. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

CONTAMINATION CONTROL FOR ULTRA-SENSITIVE LIFE DETECTION SCIENCE MISSIONS

"This study report summarizes technological developments in science-required contamination control for cost-capped, life-detection missions in the Solar System. Technology advances focus on developing implementable strategies to restrict contamination of the spacecraft and instruments by the launch vehicle hardware. Secondary bake out operations during cruise further reduce molecular contaminants down to femtomolar levels in the sample path. The study validated a full-spacecraft, deployable barrier design as an effective strategy to isolate the spacecraft from the pre-launch processing and launch environment (e.g., fairing acoustic materials). It accommodates late mounting of RTGs and other required prelaunch activities. A new, high-fidelity physics, contamination-transport model for particles (including cells and their parts) and science-relevant molecules (e.g., possible biomolecules) was developed to validate the barrier concept. Importantly, this model takes into account the physics of extremely clean surfaces achieved by the best traditional contamination engineering. The ability to deal with very low levels of particulate and molecular contamination makes this model unique among standard contamination modeling approaches. Modeling also demonstrated that a high-temperature bake out during interplanetary cruise of the sample collector that comprises the largest surface area in the sample path for an Enceladus orbiter reference mission, was extremely effective. This study included the evaluation of other details necessary for an effective contamination control strategy for life detection missions including feasibility of achieving parts per trillion level cleanliness for semi-volatile hydrocarbons in nitrogen purge gas, identification of launch vehicle services required for the baseline contamination control, and defining additional contamination control measures to be taken during launch operations. Key results of the study are: • New spacecraft barrier design that accommodates RTGs is readily cleanable and repairable. Deployment of a 1/3 scale model was successfully demonstrated. • The barrier reduces particle contamination (likely biological) from fairing to spacecraft by 1e-2 to 1e-3. • On-cruise bake-out of critical surfaces significantly reduced molecular contamination (by as much as 1e-12). Subsequently, the probability of a surface contamination particle being transported to an instrument by an ice particle is less than 5.1e-5 (for microbes specifically, 4.39e-10). The report concludes that a full-spacecraft barrier designed specifically for life-detection missions that require stringent control of particulate and molecular contaminates is an effective means of mitigating risks of false positive and negative results for life signature investigations. Further, secondary cleaning steps for critical sections of the sample path can be highly effective at reducing molecular contaminants to low femtomolar levels."

Contamination↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Contamination Control for Ultra-Sensitive Life-Detection Missions

"This study report summarizes technological developments in science-required contamination control for cost-capped, life-detection missions in the Solar System. Technology advances focus on developing implementable strategies to restrict contamination of the spacecraft and instruments by the launch vehicle hardware. Secondary bake out operations during cruise further reduce molecular contaminants down to femtomolar levels in the sample path. The study validated a full-spacecraft, deployable barrier design as an effective strategy to isolate the spacecraft from the pre-launch processing and launch environment (e.g., fairing acoustic materials). It accommodates late mounting of RTGs and other required prelaunch activities. A new, high-fidelity physics, contamination-transport model for particles (including cells and their parts) and science-relevant molecules (e.g., possible biomolecules) was developed to validate the barrier concept. Importantly, this model takes into account the physics of extremely clean surfaces achieved by the best traditional contamination engineering. The ability to deal with very low levels of particulate and molecular contamination makes this model unique among standard contamination modeling approaches. Modeling also demonstrated that a high-temperature bake out during interplanetary cruise of the sample collector that comprises the largest surface area in the sample path for an Enceladus orbiter reference mission, was extremely effective. This study included the evaluation of other details necessary for an effective contamination control strategy for life detection missions including feasibility of achieving parts per trillion level cleanliness for semi-volatile hydrocarbons in nitrogen purge gas, identification of launch vehicle services required for the baseline contamination control, and defining additional contamination control measures to be taken during launch operations. Key results of the study are: • New spacecraft barrier design that accommodates RTGs is readily cleanable and repairable. Deployment of a 1/3 scale model was successfully demonstrated. • The barrier reduces particle contamination (likely biological) from fairing to spacecraft by 1e-2 to 1e-3. • On-cruise bake-out of critical surfaces significantly reduced molecular contamination (by as much as 1e-12). Subsequently, the probability of a surface contamination particle being transported to an instrument by an ice particle is less than 5.1e-5 (for microbes specifically, 4.39e-10). The report concludes that a full-spacecraft barrier designed specifically for life-detection missions that require stringent control of particulate and molecular contaminates is an effective means of mitigating risks of false positive and negative results for life signature investigations. Further, secondary cleaning steps for critical sections of the sample path can be highly effective at reducing molecular contaminants to low femtomolar levels."

contamination, life detection, barrier, modeling↗