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This paper presents a portion of an overall research project on the generation of the network security assessment instrument to aid developers in assessing and assuring the security of software in the development and maintenance lifecycles.
This paper presents a portion of an overall research project on the generation of a software security assessment instrument to aid developers in assessing and assuring the security of software in the development and maintenance lifecycles.
This paper presents research on the generation of a software security assessment instrument to aid developers in assessing and assuring the security of software in the development and maintenance lifecycles.
To support the development and evaluation of future function allocation concepts for separation assurance systems for the Next Generation Air Transportation System, this paper presents the design and human-in-the-loop evaluation of three feasible function allocation concepts that allocate primary aircraft separation assurance responsibilities and workload to: 1) pilots; 2) air traffic controllers (ATC); and 3) automation. The design of these concepts also included rules of the road, separation assurance burdens for aircraft of different equipage levels, and utilization of advanced weather displays paired with advanced conflict detection and resolution automation. Results of the human-in-the-loop simulation show that: a) all the concepts are robust with respect to weather perturbation; b) concept 1 (pilots) had highest throughput, closest to assigned spacing, and fewest violations of speed and altitude restrictions; c) the energy of the aircraft during the descent phase was better managed in concepts 1 and 2 (pilots and ATC) than in concept 3 (automation), in which the situation awareness of pilots and controllers was lowest, and workload of pilots was highest. The paper also discusses further development of these concepts and their augmentation and integration with future air traffic management tools and systems that are being considered for NextGen.
NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.
NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.
Development of an alternate approach to the conventional methods of reliability assurance for large-scale integrated circuits. The product treated is a large-scale T squared L array designed for space applications. The concept used is that of qualification of product by evaluation of the basic processing used in fabricating the product, providing an insight into its potential reliability. Test vehicles are described which enable evaluation of device characteristics, surface condition, and various parameters of the two-level metallization system used. Evaluation of these test vehicles is performed on a lot qualification basis, with the lot consisting of one wafer. Assembled test vehicles are evaluated by high temperature stress at 300 C for short time durations. Stressing at these temperatures provides a rapid method of evaluation and permits a go/no go decision to be made on the wafer lot in a timely fashion.
A systematic approach is presented to constructing a radiation assurance case using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) for spacecraft containing COTS parts. The GSN paradigm is applied to an SRAM single-event upset experiment board designed to fly on a CubeSat in January 2017. A custom software language for development of a GSN assurance case is under development at Vanderbilt. Construction of a radiation assurance case without use of hardened parts or extensive radiation testing is discussed.
The National Facility Study (NFS) was initiated in 1992 by Daniel S. Goldin, Administrator of NASA as an initiative to develop a comprehensive and integrated long-term plan for future facilities. The resulting, multi-agency NFS consisted of three Task Groups: Aeronautics, Space Operations, and Space Research and Development (R&D) Task Groups. A fourth group, the Engineering and Cost Analysis Task Group, was subsequently added to provide cross-cutting functions, such as assuring consistency in developing an inventory of space facilities. Space facilities decisions require an assessment of current and future needs. Therefore, the two task groups dealing with space developed a consistent model of future space mission programs, operations and R&D. The model is a middle ground baseline constructed for NFS analytical purposes with excursions to cover potential space program strategies. The model includes three major sectors: DOD, civilian government, and commercial space. The model spans the next 30 years because of the long lead times associated with facilities development and usage. This document, Volume 3 of the final NFS report, is organized along the following lines: Executive Summary -- provides a summary view of the 30-year mission forecast and requirements baseline, an overview of excursions from that baseline that were studied, and organization of the report; Introduction -- provides discussions of the methodology used in this analysis; Baseline Model -- provides the mission and requirements model baseline developed for Space Operations and Space R&D analyses; Excursions from the baseline -- reviews the details of variations or 'excursions' that were developed to test the future program projections captured in the baseline; and a Glossary of Acronyms.
This presentation provides information on approach to total dose radiation hardness assurance that was developed that includes variability of the space radiation environment.
We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval.
Overview presentation for a streamlined Class D mission assurance requirements document developed by an Agency-wide team for NASA Science Mission Directorate
This document provides a survey of software assurance techniques for highly reliable systems including a discussion of relevant safety standards for various industries in the United States and Europe, as well as examples of methods used during software development projects. It contains one section for each industry surveyed: Aerospace, Defense, Nuclear Power, Medical Devices and Transportation. Each section provides an overview of applicable standards and examples of a mission or software development project, software assurance techniques used and reliability achieved.
Even though Model-based Software Engineering (MBSwE) techniques and Autogenerated Code (AGC) have been increasingly used to produce complex software systems, there is only anecdotal knowledge about the state-of-thepractice. Furthermore, there is a lack of empirical studies that explore the potential quality improvements due to the use of these techniques. This paper presents in-depth qualitative findings about development and Software Assurance (SWA) practices and detailed quantitative analysis of software bug reports of a NASA mission that used MBSwE and AGC. The mission’s flight software is a combination of handwritten code and AGC developed by two different approaches: one based on state chart models (AGC-M) and another on specification dictionaries (AGC-D). The empirical analysis of fault proneness is based on 380 closed bug reports created by software developers. Our main findings include: (1) MBSwE and AGC provide some benefits, but also impose challenges. (2) SWA done only at a model level is not sufficient. AGC code should also be tested and the models and AGC should always be kept in-sync. AGC must not be changed manually. (3) Fixes made to address an individual bug report were spread both across multiple modules and across multiple files. On average, for each bug report 1.4 modules, that is, 3.4 files were fixed. (4) Most bug reports led to changes in more than one type of file. The majority of changes to auto-generated source code files were made in conjunction to changes in either file with state chart models or XML files derived from dictionaries. (5) For newly developed files, AGC-M and handwritten code were of similar quality, while AGC-D files were the least fault prone.
The concepts behind operations engineering as applied to the requirements, design, development and testing of data processing systems are presented, together with the associated benefits. The objective of operations engineering is to reduce the overall life cycle costs by integrating operations experience with the development process. To achieve this goal, operations engineering seeks to reduce the development costs by that assuring operational requirements are incorporated into the design and development process as early as possible, and reduce the operational costs by decreasing operations staffing requirements and other related costs through improved system capabilities. The areas for improved system capabilities include: system recovery; data recovery; fault isolation; system operability; system flexibility; system automation; and system reporting. It is described how operations engineering is integrated with the development process, and the difficulties and misconceptions experienced in using operations engineering are discussed.
As space mission software systems become larger and more complex, it is increasingly important for the software assurance effort to have the ability to effectively assess both the artifacts produced during software system development and the development process itself. Conceptually, assurance is a straightforward idea - it is the result of activities carried out by an organization independent of the software developers to better inform project management of potential technical and programmatic risks, and thus increase management's confidence in the decisions they ultimately make. In practice, effective assurance for large, complex systems often entails assessing large, complex software artifacts (e.g., requirements specifications, architectural descriptions) as well as substantial amounts of unstructured information (e.g., anomaly reports resulting from testing activities during development). In such an environment, assurance engineers can benefit greatly from appropriate tool support. In order to do so, an assurance organization will need accurate and timely information on the tool support available for various types of assurance activities. In this paper, we investigate the current use of tool support for assurance organizations within NASA, and describe on-going work at JPL for providing assurance organizations with the information about tools they need to use them effectively.
A document discusses power converters suitable for space use that meet the DSCC MIL-PRF-38534 Appendix G radiation hardness level P classification. A method for qualifying commercially produced electronic parts for DC-DC converters per the Defense Supply Center Columbus (DSCC) radiation hardened assurance requirements was developed. Development and compliance testing of standard hybrid converters suitable for space use were completed for missions with total dose radiation requirements of up to 30 kRad. This innovation provides the same overall performance as standard hybrid converters, but includes assurance of radiation- tolerant design through components and design compliance testing. This availability of design-certified radiation-tolerant converters can significantly reduce total cost and delivery time for power converters for space applications that fit the appropriate DSCC classification (30 kRad).
This describes a method that could enable the civil use of autonomous aircraft in mission such as airborne package delivery. Establishing such a method greatly strengthens U.S. technology position.