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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2016

Integrating Spaceflight Human System Risk Research

NASA is working to increase the likelihood of human health and performance success during exploration missions as well as to maintain the subsequent long-term health of the crew. To manage the risks in achieving these goals, a system modelled after a Continuous Risk Management framework is in place. "Human System Risks" (Risks) have been identified, and approximately 30 are being actively addressed by NASA's Human Research Program (HRP). Research plans for each of HRP's Risks have been developed and are being executed. Inter-disciplinary ties between the research efforts supporting each Risk have been identified; however, efforts to identify and benefit from these connections have been mostly ad hoc. There is growing recognition that solutions developed to address the full set of Risks covering medical, physiological, behavioural, vehicle, and organizational aspects of exploration missions must be integrated across Risks and disciplines. This paper discusses how a framework of factors influencing human health and performance in space is being applied as the backbone for bringing together sometimes disparate information relevant to the individual Risks. The resulting interrelated information enables identification and visualization of connections between Risks and research efforts in a systematic and standardized manner. This paper also discusses the applications of the visualizations and insights into research planning, solicitation, and decision-making processes.

Mindock, Jennifer↗
NASA NTRS1993

An architecture and model for cognitive engineering simulation analysis - Application to advanced aviation automation

The process of designing crew stations for large-scale, complex automated systems is made difficult because of the flexibility of roles that the crew can assume, and by the rapid rate at which system designs become fixed. Modern cockpit automation frequently involves multiple layers of control and display technology in which human operators must exercise equipment in augmented, supervisory, and fully automated control modes. In this context, we maintain that effective human-centered design is dependent on adequate models of human/system performance in which representations of the equipment, the human operator(s), and the mission tasks are available to designers for manipulation and modification. The joint Army-NASA Aircrew/Aircraft Integration (A3I) Program, with its attendant Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis System (MIDAS), was initiated to meet this challenge. MIDAS provides designers with a test bed for analyzing human-system integration in an environment in which both cognitive human function and 'intelligent' machine function are described in similar terms. This distributed object-oriented simulation system, its architecture and assumptions, and our experiences from its application in advanced aviation crew stations are described.

Corker, Kevin M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Short Circuiting the Controller – Missteps in Maintenance and Inspection of Process and Wiring in STS-93

The primary objective of the Space Transportation System mission 93 (STS-93) was to deploy the Chandra X-Ray Observatory. Chandra, the world's most powerful X-Ray telescope, allowed scientists from around the world to study some of the most distant and dynamic objects in the universe. Stripped of nearly 7,000 pounds of its own gear to make room for the payload, the orbiter assigned to this mission was Space Shuttle Columbia. Prior to STS-93, Columbia had flown 25 flights and was NASA's oldest and heaviest orbiter. On July 23, 1999, after two prior launch scrubs, Eileen Collins and her crew of four launched from Kennedy Space Center. About five seconds after launch, Mission Control at Johnson Space Center detected a voltage drop on one of Columbia's electrical buses. As a result of this power fluctuation, a primary and back-up Main Engine controller dropped offline. Given design redundancy, the two remaining controllers supported all three engines. If there had been any other AC bus issues, one engine of the three on the Orbiter would have shut down. The redundant set of digital computer units in each engine controller saved Columbia and her crew from a very risky contingency abort. Post-flight inspection revealed soot on a screw head and a hole in an adjacent Kapton insulated wire. The single strand of polyimide wire was located nearly half-way down the payload bay. The Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) reported that the wire had rubbed and chaffed against a burred screw head. The burr was later determined to be the result of overtightening of the screw by a technician during a maintenance refurbishment. Alone, the burr may not have been problematic, but later, during another ground processing event, possibly years after, someone inadvertently stepped on the wiring harness. With the pressure and motion of unintended contact, some of the Kapton insulation rubbed off against the burred screw head. The SIAT suspected the wire damage was pre-existing and was caused 4 or 5 years prior to the flight. Finally, the intense vibrations during the launch sequence allowed contact between the exposed conductor and exposed metal area on the burred screw head, resulting in the arcing and shorting of the wire. Due to the quick turnaround times of Space Shuttle Orbiters, wiring issues caused from multiple maintenance events were often overlooked. Additionally, failing to incorporate thorough and early inclusion of human systems integration (HSI) applications as a crucial part of the decision process can result in these types of misshaps. In order to reduce human error associated with integrated manufacturing, maintenance, refurbishment and flight preparations, wire inspection criteria should be refined and standardized, visual inspection processes should be quantified, and technicians should be certified by specially trained instructors. This case, among many others, unveils why human error management and development of safety metrics is a vital piece in the development of complex systems, and why it should be supported aggressively and implemented program wide.

Human Systems Integration↗
NASA NTRS2003

Integrated Human Centered Systems Analysis for Aircraft Separation from Icing Conditions

This document contains five papers on coping with ice formation during the operation of aircraft. The first paper uses a pilot survey to identify the desired attributes of future information systems for aircraft icing. The second paper investigates the influence of potential remote ice-detection system features on pilot decision making. The third paper investigates the effectiveness of aviation weather forecasting along aircraft trajectories. The fourth paper applied a human-centered systems analysis to the adverse aircraft weather encounter problem in order to identify desirable functions of weather and icing information. The objective of the fifth paper, a viewgraph presentation, is to propose means to improve aviation weather information, training, and procedures based on a human-centered systems approach.

Hansman, Robert John↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human-in-the-Loop Evaluations: Process and Mockup Fidelity

Human-in-the-loop (HITL) evaluations are iterative events used during design and development to identify issues with the implementation of human systems integration. HITL evaluations involve human test subjects who are user-representative participants performing activities with representative hardware, software, and procedures. The paper will describe the process by which HITL evaluations can be implemented in a program or project. This will include definitions for developmental and verification HITL evaluations, levels of mockup fidelity, and certification of HITL articles. The proposed process can be tailored depending on the type of HITL evaluation being conducted. It is highly recommended that findings are timely reported and incorporated in the hardware and/or software design.

Jackelynne Silva-Martinez↗
NASA NTRS2017

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project: Detect and Avoid Display Evaluations in Support of SC-228 Minimum Operational Performance Standards Development

The primary activity for the UAS-NAS Human Systems Integration (HSI) sub-project in Phase 1 was support of RTCA Special Committee 228 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). We provide data on the effect of various Detect and Avoid (DAA) display features with respect to pilot performance of the remain well clear function in order to determine the minimum requirements for DAA displays.

detect and avoid↗
NASA NTRS2009

Human Rating Requirements for NASA's Constellation Program

This slide presentation reviews the human system integration (HSI) process in achieving human ratings for NASA Constellation Program (CxP). The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document that defines the Human Ratings Requirements is NPR 8705.2B. An example of the human rating requirements flow down is given in the handling qualities for space craft control.

Berdich, Debbie↗
NASA NTRS1992

Integrated human-machine intelligence in space systems

The integration of human and machine intelligence in space systems is outlined with respect to the contributions of artificial intelligence. The current state-of-the-art in intelligent assistant systems (IASs) is reviewed, and the requirements of some real-world applications of the technologies are discussed. A concept of integrated human-machine intelligence is examined in the contexts of: (1) interactive systems that tolerate human errors; (2) systems for the relief of workloads; and (3) interactive systems for solving problems in abnormal situations. Key issues in the development of IASs include the compatibility of the systems with astronauts in terms of inputs/outputs, processing, real-time AI, and knowledge-based system validation. Real-world applications are suggested such as the diagnosis, planning, and control of enginnered systems.

Boy, Guy A.↗
NASA NTRS2019

IMPACT Concept of Operations

NASA’s future exploration missions mandate a significant paradigm change for mission planning, spacecraft design, human systems integration, and in-flight medical care due to constraints on mass, volume, power, resupply missions, and medical evacuation capabilities. These constraints require further development of the human health and performance system, which includes the medical, task performance, wellness, data, human and other systems necessary to keep the crew healthy and functioning optimally. The human health and performance system will be tightly integrated with mission and habitat design to provide a sufficient human health and performance infrastructure to enable mission success. A suite of systems engineering tools will aid in the decision making process for the development of such a human health and performance system. This Concept of Operations provides a vision for a tool suite to conduct evaluations of human health and performance system options, inform research prioritization, and provide trade study support, based on evidence, risks, and systems engineering principles. The integrated tool suite under development is IMPACT.

Lumpkins, Sara↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Outside Influences as Latent Factors to Risk in Human Performance

During the Acquisition Life Cycle for a program, there are several opportunities for the system in design to be adjusted in accordance with its changing landscape as it is being shaped by evolving policy and organizational culture. Human Systems Integration is integral to identifying these opportunities of change as there are a set number of activities that may account for altered operational states, human performance deviations, and overall component engagement if HSI is enacted early enough in the life cycle. Some changes that occur in the operational environment may not be accounted for since the organizational culture and practices are not currently a part of the HSI focus. Likewise, policy changes themselves from a top-to-bottom analysis may not have the appearance of effecting human performance until having gone through a trail-and-error period. Workarounds to adjust for unforeseen policy affects become the system's solution that usually includes changes in the training and education of the operators, maintainers, and support personnel. A system full of workarounds and off-normal practices, that cause operators to disregard the purpose of the design, coupled with the false notion that these activities are proven for successful system operation, is the very definition of “an accident waiting to happen”. Unforeseen changes in policies and practices that cause new and unusual activities to successfully and keep the system running, should be considered latent factors that may cause a potential mishap, and not part of the resilience that humans provide to the successful operation of the system. This presentation will explore how latent factors may find their way into system operations and how they can be identified and addressed.

Human Systems Integration↗
NASA NTRS2020

Integration Test and Evaluation (IT&E) Flight Test Series 6 Live Virtual Constructive - Distributed Environment (LVC-DE) Test Report

The goals of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) (also UAS-NAS) Project are to reduce the barriers for UAS access and its integration into the NAS. The UAS-NAS project and industry stakeholders conducted a series of flight tests integrating technologies from the Modeling & Simulation (M&S), Human Systems Integration (HSI), and Communication and Control (C2), and Integration, Test & Evaluation (IT&E) research areas. The last of the flight test series, Flight Test Series 6 (FT6) was conducted in late 2019 and focused on evaluating the interaction of the airborne non-cooperative surveillance system and the Detect and Avoid (DAA) technology. The DAA system generated conflict alert and guidance for pilots using a Research Ground Control System (RGCS) to avoid intruder aircraft. The conflict alerting and guidance information was presented on the RGCS’s display using symbology developed by the human factors team. The objective of FT6 was to investigate the interoperability of Low Size, Weight, and Power (Low SWaP) sensors with the DAA alerting, guidance, and display requirements. To support this goal, the distributed test environments (DTE) were developed at Ames Research Center (ARC) and Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) and securely linked over a Virtual Private Network (VPN). These environments took advantage of existing Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) technologies to support research observation at both Centers with the insertion of live UAS and manned intruder aircraft into a simulated NAS environment with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and constructive manned aircraft. The experiment was distributed between AFRC flight operations and research facilities and the Distributed Simulation Research Laboratory (DSRL) and Software Development Laboratory (SDL) in building N243 at ARC. The Air Traffic Controller and pseudo pilots operated from the DSRL and SDL, respectively, using the Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS). The test subject and researchers operated from the Research Ground Control Station (RGCS) at AFRC using the Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) and associated DAA software and displays. Flight Operation for the unmanned aircraft (UA) and manned intruder traffic was conducted at AFRC. Virtual traffic was managed by ARC. Voice distribution was accomplished using a combination of disparate communication systems at ARC and AFRC. The purpose of this document is to record the development, design, and execution of activities in support of the FT6 efforts from the perspective of the ARC IT&E team. Furthermore, the Armstrong IT&E team has published a thorough FT6 Test Report, with emphasis on flight test support, facilities and vehicle development; this report complements the Armstrong report. Analysis of collected FT6 data will be conducted and reported by the M&S and HSI teams and will be published in separate reports.

UAS-NAS↗
DOE OSTI2024

The circular bioeconomy: a driver for system integration

Background: Human and earth system modeling, traditionally centered on the interplay between the energy system and the atmosphere, are facing a paradigm shift. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s mandate for comprehensive, cross-sectoral climate action emphasizes avoiding the vulnerabilities of narrow sectoral approaches. Our study explores the circular bioeconomy, highlighting the intricate interconnections among agriculture, forestry, aquaculture, technological advancements, and ecological recycling. Collectively, these sectors play a pivotal role in supplying essential resources to meet the food, material, and energy needs of a growing global population. We pose the pertinent question of what it takes to integrate these multifaceted sectors into a new era of holistic systems thinking and planning. Results: The foundation for discussion is provided by a novel graphical representation encompassing statistical data on food, materials, energy flows, and circularity. This representation aids in constructing an inventory of technological advancements and climate actions that have the potential to significantly reshape the structure and scale of the economic metabolism in the coming decades. In this context, the three dominant mega-trends—population dynamics, economic developments, and the climate crisis—compel us to address the potential consequences of the identified actions, all of which fall under the four categories of substitution, efficiency, sufficiency, and reliability measures. Substitution and efficiency measures currently dominate systems modeling. Including novel bio-based processes and circularity aspects might require only expanded system boundaries. Conversely, paradigm shifts in systems engineering are expected to center on sufficiency and reliability actions. Effectively assessing the impact of sufficiency measures will necessitate substantial progress in inter- and transdisciplinary collaboration, primarily due to their non-technological nature. In addition, placing emphasis on modeling the reliability and resilience of transformation pathways represents a distinct and emerging frontier that highlights the significance of an integrated network of networks. Conclusions: Existing and emerging circular bioeconomy practices can serve as prime examples of system integration. These practices facilitate the interconnection of complex biomass supply chain networks with other networks encompassing feedstock-independent renewable power, hydrogen, CO 2 , water, and other biotic, abiotic, and intangible resources. Elevating the prominence of these connectors will empower policymakers to steer the amplification of synergies and mitigation of tradeoffs among systems, sectors, and goals.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
NASA NTRS2017

What Machines Need to Learn to Support Human Problem-Solving

In the development of intelligent systems that interact with humans, there is often confusion between how the system functions with respect to the humans it interacts with and how it interfaces with those humans. The former is a much deeper challenge than the latter it requires a system-level understanding of evolving human roles as well as an understanding of what humans need to know (and when) in order to perform their tasks. This talk will focus on some of the challenges in getting this right as well as on the type of research and development that results in successful human-autonomy teaming. Brief Bio: Dr. Alonso Vera is Chief of the Human Systems Integration Division at NASA Ames Research Center. His expertise is in human-computer interaction, information systems, artificial intelligence, and computational human performance modeling. He has led the design, development and deployment of mission software systems across NASA robotic and human space flight missions, including Mars Exploration Rovers, Phoenix Mars Lander, ISS, Constellation, and Exploration Systems. Dr. Vera received a Bachelor of Science with First Class Honors from McGill University in 1985 and a Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1991. He went on to a Post-Doctoral Fellowship in the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University from 1990-93.

intelligent systems↗
NASA NTRS2017

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project KDP-C Review

The topics discussed are the UAS-NAS project life-cycle and ARMD thrust flow down, as well as the UAS environments and how we operate in those environments. NASA's Armstrong Flight Research Center at Edwards, CA, is leading a project designed to help integrate unmanned air vehicles into the world around us. The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System project, or UAS in the NAS, will contribute capabilities designed to reduce technical barriers related to safety and operational challenges associated with enabling routine UAS access to the NAS. The project falls under the Integrated Systems Research Program office managed at NASA Headquarters by the agency's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. NASA's four aeronautics research centers - Armstrong, Ames Research Center, Langley Research Center, and Glenn Research Center - are part of the technology development project. With the use and diversity of unmanned aircraft growing rapidly, new uses for these vehicles are constantly being considered. Unmanned aircraft promise new ways of increasing efficiency, reducing costs, enhancing safety and saving lives 460265main_ED10-0132-16_full.jpg Unmanned aircraft systems such as NASA's Global Hawks (above) and Predator B named Ikhana (below), along with numerous other unmanned aircraft systems large and small, are the prime focus of the UAS in the NAS effort to integrate them into the national airspace. Credits: NASA Photos 710580main_ED07-0243-37_full.jpg The UAS in the NAS project envisions performance-based routine access to all segments of the national airspace for all unmanned aircraft system classes, once all safety-related and technical barriers are overcome. The project will provide critical data to such key stakeholders and customers as the Federal Aviation Administration and RTCA Special Committee 203 (formerly the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) by conducting integrated, relevant system-level tests to adequately address safety and operational challenges of national airspace access by unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS. In the process, the project will work with other key stakeholders to define necessary deliverables and products to help enable such access. Within the project, NASA is focusing on five sub-projects. These five focus areas include assurance of safe separation of unmanned aircraft from manned aircraft when flying in the national airspace; safety-critical command and control systems and radio frequencies to enable safe operation of UAS; human factors issues for ground control stations; airworthiness certification standards for UAS avionics and integrated tests and evaluation designed to determine the viability of emerging UAS technology. Five Focus Areas of the UAS Integration in the NAS Project Separation Assurance Provide an assessment of how planned Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) separation assurance systems, with different functional allocations, perform for UAS in mixed operations with manned aircraft Assess the applicability to UAS and the performance of NASA NextGen separation assurance systems in flight tests with realistic latencies and uncertain trajectories Assess functional allocations ranging from today's ground-based, controller-provided aircraft separation to fully autonomous airborne self-separation Communications Develop data and rationale to obtain appropriate frequency spectrum allocations to enable safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Develop and validate candidate secure safety-critical command and control system/subsystem test equipment for UAS that complies with UAS international/national frequency regulations, standards and recommended practices and minimum operational and aviation system performance standards for UAS Perform analysis to support recommendations for integration of safety-critical command and control systems and air traffic control communications to ensure safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Human Systems Integration Develop a research test bed and database to provide data and proof of concept for GCS - ground control station - operations in the NAS Coordinate with standards organizations to develop human-factors guidelines for GCS operation in the NAS Certification Define a UAS classification scheme and approach to determining Federal Aviation Regulation airworthiness requirements applicable to all UAS digital avionics Provide hazard and risk-related data to support development of type design criteria and best development practices Integrated Tests and Evaluation Integrate and test mature concepts from technical elements to demonstrate and test viability Evaluate the performance of technology development in a relevant environment (full-mission, human-in-the-loop simulations and flight tests)

outreach↗
NASA NTRS2025

Private Astronaut Post-Mission Debrief Interviews Study

BACKGROUND The commercialization of space will increasingly include individuals that are not rigorously-selected, highly-trained professional astronauts. Private astronaut missions (PAMs), such as Axiom-1 in 2022, will continue to travel to the International Space Station in the coming years, but the risk of integrating private astronauts with NASA astronauts has not been clearly quantified nor mitigated. An earlier internal NASA operations assessment, which consisted of a comprehensive literature review and interviews of current NASA experts, found that PAMs are likely to increase the risk to NASA astronauts during integrated missions (Landon, Whiting, Russell, Schorn, Passmore, & Roma, 2022). There are ongoing efforts at NASA to mitigate concerns from a medical, psychological, and technical perspective. NASA experts are working closely with PAM providers to offer recommendations and best practices beyond the limits of requirements to ensure crew health and safety. However, efforts are siloed between groups to some extent, and with the rate of PAMs likely to increase, a more comprehensive and integrated process is needed to reduce the burden on NASA resources. AIMS The purpose of this project is to understand private astronauts’ motivations for journeying to space, their pre-mission preparation period, and their experiences in space. Data will be collected via private astronaut post-mission debrief interviews. This data will inform training needs and in-mission support needed for missions that include private astronauts; the preparation NASA astronauts and mission support personnel will need to work with these integrated crews; and gaps in knowledge to guide research and countermeasure development. Our study aims to (1) Characterize risks posed by commercialization and private astronaut crew integration in spaceflight operations, as it relates to Team, Human Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), and Behavioral Medicine (BMed) Risks, (2) Recommend potential countermeasures and identify gaps in current research. Countermeasures may be related to crew selection and composition, training, crew support systems (e.g., medical/psychological support, support from Mission Control, on-board resources), and habitability and human factors design. METHOD The BHP Lab will conduct 30-minute interviews with up to eight (8) private astronaut mission (PAM) astronauts (e.g., Axiom) and spaceflight participants (e.g., SFPs or “free flyers” on Polaris Dawn) per year from 2024-2030 to discuss knowledge gaps and needs related to selection and assessment, crew composition, training, crew support systems (e.g., medical/psychological support, support from Mission Control, onboard resources), and habitability and human factors design, which may influence the risk to NASA astronauts. Interviews will then be coded using thematic analysis and interpreted with the assistance of lexical analysis software (e.g., LIWC). As of the end of 2024, we have collected data from one PAM crew. At the conclusion of data collection in 2030, a final report will be prepared integrating all data collected by 2031. SUMMARY Post-return interviews of private astronauts are being conducted to understand their experiences and inform training and countermeasures to ensure the safety of all who journey to the ISS.

Private Astronaut Missions↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Launch System (SLS) Human Factors Engineering Modeling & Analysis

The Human Systems Integration & Engineering (HSI&E) team at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) strives to advocate for the humans in the loop of Space Launch System’s (SLS) ground operations. Using assessment methods like human simulation, virtual reality, and physical mockups, both flight hardware and ground support equipment (GSE) are evaluated for human integration. Those ranging from 5th percentile female (approximately 5’2” tall) to 95th percentile male (approximately 6’2” tall) should be able to perform all SLS stacking operations. Operations include element physical mates, element electrical mates, and testing activities. The primary human simulation software used is Process Simulate Human (PSH) made by Siemens. This software supplies highly accurate human manikins that can interact with CAD models. PSH was used to evaluate the Transportation and Integration Platform’s (TIP) side opening that was designed for access to the Payload Adapter (PLA) cables. Technicians will need to access these cables for testing purposes before element stacking at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). After performing an analysis in PSH using the TIP side opening, it was found that neither a 5th percentile female or a 95th percentile male could perform the task as the designers had intended. There is a C-beam that blocks access to the cables (both physically and visually). An alternative analysis was performed using PSH to look at another access point to the PLA cables. Although this method would disrupt already established procedures and produce more work, the designers confirmed it was an option. Instead of technicians accessing the cables through the side opening in the TIP, a human simulation was performed for going through a panel opening in the bottom of the TIP. This method requires removal of a TIP panel and a stepladder of at least 36 inches for a 5th percentile female to access the cables.

human factors↗
NASA NTRS2022

The Cooling Loop A Anomaly of 2013: A Case Study in Human-Systems Resilience

Throughout the history of human spaceflight, NASA has employed an operational paradigm of 24/7 dependence on experts in Mission Control Center (MCC). In addition to nominal flight control and mission operations, these 85+ experts per shift manage anomaly detection, diagnosis, and response, and support the crew in real-time in performing maintenance and repair, procedure execution, and other complex mission operations. Future long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) will not operate successfully using this same Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) where crew rely on ground controllers, have ready access to resupply, and have a fallback plan of evacuation. As distance from Earth increases and the communication delay grows, crews will need to respond independently and adequately to time-critical vehicle malfunctions. It will not always be sufficient or even possible to ‘safe the system’ and then wait upon ground intervention. A new and radically different HSIA is needed to accommodate the paradigm shift of deep-space travel. Historical International Space Station (ISS) data show that for a 30-day mission, the likelihood of a high-consequence vehicle anomaly of uncertain origin that requires rapid response is greater than 10%. The likelihood of such an event is 50% by the fourth month of the mission, and it grows exponentially with time. Our team has conducted in-depth investigations into these events and their corresponding anomaly resolution activities. Using MCC and Mission Evaluation Room (MER) anomaly resolution artifacts (including meeting summaries, caution and warning data, and ISS daily summaries), we created timelines detailing ground actions and in-orbit events for two significant anomalies. We then mapped these timelines onto Mars transit conditions, introducing a ground-crew communications time delay and shifting immediate response, time-critical task execution, and vehicle commanding to the crew. In detailing successful anomaly resolution in transit to Mars, the timelines highlight where effective resolution requires drastically evolved onboard capabilities. Though this research has yielded a rich data set based on ground response in past missions, there is still insufficient knowledge to assess the potential impact of inflight anomalies on a small autonomous crew on future LDEMs beyond LEO. To begin building an evidence base that will inform future HSIA standards and requirements, we are developing an approach to systematically capture crew anomaly response and procedure execution during early Artemis missions. Being the first human spaceflight beyond LEO since Apollo, early Artemis missions provide a rare and unique opportunity to serve as a testbed for Mars missions. Our work aims to capitalize on planned data collection to derive crew operational responses to anomalous events in real-time. Our team is also researching the level of simulation fidelity required for empirically validating proposed HSIA standards and evaluating HSIA implementations for LDEMs beyond LEO. This work will produce a trade space study of HSIA simulation objectives and fidelity requirements. Ultimately, these research efforts will assist in developing the standards and technologies needed to build a next-generation HSIA for LDEMs beyond LEO.

human-systems integration architecture↗