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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1995

Draft Tier 2 Environmental Impact Statement for International Space Station

The Draft Tier 2 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the International Space Station (ISS) has been prepared by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and follows NASA's Record of Decision on the Final Tier 1 EIS for the Space Station Freedom. The Tier 2 EIS provides an updated evaluation of the environmental impacts associated with the alternatives considered: the Proposed Action and the No-Action alternative. The Proposed Action is to continue U.S. participation in the assembly and operation of ISS. The No-Action alternative would cancel NASA's participation in the Space Station Program. ISS is an international cooperative venture between NASA, the Canadian Space Agency, the European Space Agency, the Science and Technology Agency of Japan, the Russian Space Agency, and the Italian Space Agency. The purpose of the NASA action would be to further develop a human presence in space; to meet scientific, technological, and commercial research needs; and to foster international cooperation.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2013

Robonaut 2 - Preparing for Intra-Vehicular Mobility on the International Space Station

Robonaut 2 (R2) has been undergoing experimental trials on board the International Space Station (ISS) for more than a year. This upper-body anthropomorphic robotic system shown in Figure 1 has been making steady progress after completing its initial checkout. R2 demonstrated free space motion, physically interacted with its human crew mates, manipulated interfaces on its task board and has even used its first tool. This steady growth in capability will lead R2 to its next watershed milestone. Developers are currently testing prototype robotic climbing appendages and a battery backpack in preparation of sending flight versions of both subsystems to the ISS in late 2013. Upon integration of its new components, R2 will be able to go mobile inside the space station with a twofold agenda. First, R2 will learn to maneuver in microgravity in the best possible laboratory for such a task. Second, it will start providing early payback to the ISS program by helping with intra-vehicular (IVA) maintenance tasks. The experience gained inside the ISS will be invaluable in reducing risk when R2 moves to its next stage and is deployed as an extra-vehicular (EVA) tool. Even on its current fixed base stanchion, R2 has already shown its capability of performing several maintenance tasks on the ISS. It has measured the air flow through one of the stations vents and provided previously unavailable real time flow data to ground operators. R2 has cleaned its first handrail, exciting some crew members that perhaps Saturday morning housekeeping on the station may someday become a task they can hand off to their robotic colleague. Other tasks, including using radio frequency identification (RFID) tools for inventory tasks or vacuuming air filters, have also been suggested and will be explored. Once mobile, R2 will take on these tasks and more to free up crew time for more important science and exploration pursuits. In addition to task exploration, research and testing is happening on orbit to prepare for R2 mobility operations. The current vision system in R2 s head is being used to identify and localize IVA handrails throughout the US Lab and ground control software is being updated and integrated in advance of supporting mobility operations.

Badger, Julia↗
NASA NTRS2013

Configuration Management at NASA

NASA programs are characterized by complexity, harsh environments and the fact that we usually have one chance to get it right. Programs last decades and need to accept new hardware and technology as it is developed. We have multiple suppliers and international partners Our challenges are many, our costs are high and our failures are highly visible. CM systems need to be scalable, adaptable to new technology and span the life cycle of the program (30+ years). Multiple Systems, Contractors and Countries added major levels of complexity to the ISS program and CM/DM and Requirements management systems center dot CM Systems need to be designed for long design life center dot Space Station Design started in 1984 center dot Assembly Complete in 2012 center dot Systems were developed on a task basis without an overall system perspective center dot Technology moves faster than a large project office, try to make sure you have a system that can adapt

Doreswamy, Rajiv↗
NASA NTRS2017

International Space Station Requirement Verification for Commercial Visiting Vehicles

The COTS program demonstrated NASA could rely on commercial providers for safe, reliable, and cost-effective cargo delivery to ISS. The ISS Program has developed a streamlined process to safely integrate commercial visiting vehicles and ensure requirements are met Levy a minimum requirement set (down from 1000s to 100s) focusing on the ISS interface and safety, reducing the level of NASA oversight/insight and burden on the commercial Partner. Partners provide a detailed verification and validation plan documenting how they will show they've met NASA requirements. NASA conducts process sampling to ensure that the established verification processes is being followed. NASA participates in joint verification events and analysis for requirements that require both parties verify. Verification compliance is approved by NASA and launch readiness certified at mission readiness reviews.

Garguilo, Dan↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

More Data Needed for Failure Rate Estimation, Validation, and Uncertainty Reduction

The currently planned schedule for advanced Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) development and test activities to support human exploration missions is unlikely to generate sufficient data to enable statistically-supportable, precise Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) failure rate estimates to meet existing crew safety expectations. Accurate and precise failure rate estimates are critical for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) because current risk mitigation approaches –namely regular resupply and rapid abort capabilities –will not be available. Safe operations will depend on mission planners’ ability to accurately forecast spares demand and efficiently provide the necessary resources. However, even after more than a decade of International Space Station (ISS) ECLSS operations, a significant amount of uncertainty remains in failure rate estimates. Uncertain or inaccurate failure rates result in increased risk and spares mass. A Bayesian estimation approach, such as the one currently implemented by the ISS Program, can reduce uncertainty by incorporating engineering judgement into failure rate estimates. However, experience on the ISS and with other complex systems shows that these prior failure rate estimates are often inaccurate. In addition, prior estimates are typically point values; some level of uncertainty must be added to convert these into probability distributions for Bayesian updating, and there are several potential methods for doing so. Due to the low rate of data collection, any inaccuracy in theseprior estimates currently hasa strong influence on the end result. This paper examines the challenges associated with failure rate estimation, validation, and uncertainty reduction in the context of ECLSS development for beyond-LEO missions. A variety of techniques for generating and updating Bayesian priors are discussed and evaluated using both real-world and simulated data. Potential solutions for improving failure rate estimation, including testing additional units, are analyzed and discussed, and a set of recommendations are provided for next-generation system development activities.

Reliability↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

More Data Needed for Failure Rate Estimation, Validation, and Uncertainty Reduction

The currently planned schedule for advanced Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) development and test activities to support human exploration missions is unlikely to generate sufficient data to enable statistically-supportable, precise Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) failure rate estimates to meet existing crew safety expectations. Accurate and precise failure rate estimates are critical for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) because current risk mitigation approaches –namely regular resupply and rapid abort capabilities –will not be available. Safe operations will depend on mission planners’ ability to accurately forecast spares demand and efficiently provide the necessary resources. However, even after more than a decade of International Space Station (ISS) ECLSS operations, a significant amount of uncertainty remains in failure rate estimates. Uncertain or inaccurate failure rates result in increased risk and spares mass. A Bayesian estimation approach, such as the one currently implemented by the ISS Program, can reduce uncertainty by incorporating engineering judgement into failure rate estimates. However, experience on the ISS and with other complex systems shows that these prior failure rate estimates are often inaccurate. In addition, prior estimates are typically point values; some level of uncertainty must be added to convert these into probability distributions for Bayesian updating, and there are several potential methods for doing so. Due to the low rate of data collection, any inaccuracy in theseprior estimates currently hasa strong influence on the end result. This paper examines the challenges associated with failure rate estimation, validation, and uncertainty reduction in the context of ECLSS development for beyond-LEO missions. A variety of techniques for generating and updating Bayesian priors are discussed and evaluated using both real-world and simulated data. Potential solutions for improving failure rate estimation, including testing additional units, are analyzed and discussed, and a set of recommendations are provided for next-generation system development activities.

Reliability↗
NASA NTRS1997

United States Control Module Guidance, Navigation, and Control Subsystem Design Concept

Should the Russian Space Agency (RSA) not participate in the International Space Station (ISS) program, then the United States (U.S.) National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) may choose to execute the ISS mission. However, in order to do this, NASA must build two new space vehicles, which must perform the functions that the Russian vehicles and hardware were to perform. These functions include periodic ISS orbit reboost, initial ISS attitude control, and U.S. On-Orbit Segment (USOS) control Moment gyroscope (CMG) momentum desaturation. The two new NASA vehicles that must perform these functions are called the U.S. control module (USCM) and the U.S. resupply module. This paper presents a design concept for the USCM GN&C subsystem, which must play a major role in ISS orbit reboost and initial attitude control, plus USOS CMG momentum desaturation. The proposed concept is structured similar to the USOS GN&C subsystem, by design. It is very robust, in that it allows the USCM to assume a variety of vehicle attitudes and stay power-positive. It has a storage/safe mode that places the USCM in a gravity-gradient orientation and keeps it there for extended periods of time without consuming a great deal of propellant. Simulation results are presented and discussed that show the soundness of the design approach. An equipment list is included that gives detailed information on the baselined GN&C components.

Polites, M. E.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Floating Potential Probe Deployed on the International Space Station

In the spring and summer of 2000, at the request of the International Space Station (ISS) Program Office, a Plasma Contactor Unit Tiger Team was set up to investigate the threat of the ISS arcing in the event of a plasma contactor outage. Modeling and ground tests done under that effort showed that it is possible for the external structure of the ISS to become electrically charged to as much as -160 V under some conditions. Much of this work was done in anticipation of the deployment of the first large ISS solar array in November 2000. It was recognized that, with this deployment, the power system would be energized to its full voltage and that the predicted charging would pose an immediate threat to crewmembers involved in extravehicular activities (EVA's), as well as long-term damage to the station structure, were the ISS plasma contactors to be turned off or stop functioning. The Floating Potential Probe was conceived, designed, built, and deployed in record time by a crack team of scientists and engineers led by the NASA Glenn Research Center in response to ISS concerns about crew safety.

Ferguson, Dale C.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

More Data Needed for Failure Rate Estimation, Validation, and Uncertainty Reduction

Current Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) development and test activities are not generating data fast enough to provide statistically-supportable precise Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) failure rate estimates for future missions. Accurate and precise failure rate estimates are critical for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) because current risk mitigation approaches – namely regular resupply and rapid abort capabilities – will not be available. Safe operations will depend on mission planners’ ability to accurately forecast spares demand and efficiently provide the necessary resources. However, even after more than a decade of operations on board the International Space Station (ISS), a significant amount of uncertainty remains in failure rate estimates. Uncertain or inaccurate failure rates result in increased risk and spares mass for future missions. A Bayesian failure rate estimation approach, such as the one currently implemented by the ISS Program, can help reduce uncertainty by incorporating engineering judgement into failure rate estimates. However, experience on the ISS and with other complex systems shows that these prior failure rate estimates are often inaccurate. In addition, prior failure rate estimates are typically point values; some level of uncertainty must be added to convert these into probability distributions for Bayesian updating, and there are several potential methods for doing so. Due to the low rate of data collection, these subjective (and often inaccurate) prior estimates currently have a strong influence on the end result. This paper examines the challenges associated with failure rate estimation, validation, and uncertainty reduction in the context of ECLSS development for beyond-LEO missions. A variety of techniques for generating and updating Bayesian priors are discussed and evaluated using both real-world and simulated data. Potential solutions for improving failure rate estimation, including testing additional units, are analyzed and discussed, and a set of recommendations are provided for next-generation system development activities.

Supportability↗
NASA NTRS2013

Evolution of International Space Station Program Safety Review Processes and Tools

The International Space Station Program at NASA is constantly seeking to improve the processes and systems that support safe space operations. To that end, the ISS Program decided to upgrade their Safety and Hazard data systems with 3 goals: make safety and hazard data more accessible; better support the interconnection of different types of safety data; and increase the efficiency (and compliance) of safety-related processes. These goals are accomplished by moving data into a web-based structured data system that includes strong process support and supports integration with other information systems. Along with the data systems, ISS is evolving its submission requirements and safety process requirements to support the improved model. In contrast to existing operations (where paper processes and electronic file repositories are used for safety data management) the web-based solution provides the program with dramatically faster access to records, the ability to search for and reference specific data within records, reduced workload for hazard updates and approval, and process support including digital signatures and controlled record workflow. In addition, integration with other key data systems provides assistance with assessments of flight readiness, more efficient review and approval of operational controls and better tracking of international safety certifications. This approach will also provide new opportunities to streamline the sharing of data with ISS international partners while maintaining compliance with applicable laws and respecting restrictions on proprietary data. One goal of this paper is to outline the approach taken by the ISS Progrm to determine requirements for the new system and to devise a practical and efficient implementation strategy. From conception through implementation, ISS and NASA partners utilized a user-centered software development approach focused on user research and iterative design methods. The user-centered approach used on the new ISS hazard system utilized focused user research and iterative design methods employed by the Human Computer Interaction Group at NASA Ames Research Center. Particularly, the approach emphasized the reduction of workload associated with document and data management activities so more resources can be allocated to the operational use of data in problem solving, safety analysis, and recurrence control. The methods and techniques used to understand existing processes and systems, to recognize opportunities for improvement, and to design and review improvements are described with the intent that similar techniques can be employed elsewhere in safety operations. A second goal of this paper is to provide and overview of the web-based data system implemented by ISS. The software selected for the ISS hazard systemMission Assurance System (MAS)is a NASA-customized vairant of the open source software project Bugzilla. The origin and history of MAS as a NASA software project and the rationale for (and advantages of) using open-source software are documented elsewhere (Green, et al., 2009).

Ratterman, Christian D.↗
NASA NTRS2008

ISS Charging Hazards and Low Earth Orbit Space Weather Effects

Current collection by high voltage solar arrays on the International Space Station (ISS) drives the vehicle to negative floating potentials in the low Earth orbit daytime plasma environment. Pre-flight predictions of ISS floating potentials Phi greater than |-100 V| suggested a risk for degradation of dielectric thermal control coatings on surfaces in the U.S. sector due to arcing and an electrical shock hazard to astronauts during extravehicular activity (EVA). However, hazard studies conducted by the ISS program have demonstrated that the thermal control material degradation risk is effectively mitigated during the lifetime of the ISS vehicle by a sufficiently large ion collection area present on the vehicle to balance current collection by the solar arrays. To date, crew risk during EVA has been mitigated by operating one of two plasma contactors during EVA to control the vehicle potential within Phi less than or equal to |-40 V| with a backup process requiring reorientation of the solar arrays into a configuration which places the current collection surfaces into wake. This operation minimizes current collection by the solar arrays should the plasma contactors fail. This paper presents an analysis of F-region electron density and temperature variations at low and midlatitudes generated by space weather events to determine what range of conditions represent charging threats to ISS. We first use historical ionospheric plasma measurements from spacecraft operating at altitudes relevant to the 51.6 degree inclination ISS orbit to provide an extensive database of F-region plasma conditions over a variety of solar cycle conditions. Then, the statistical results from the historical data are compared to more recent in-situ measurements from the Floating Potential Measurement Unit (FPMU) operating on ISS in a campaign mode since its installation in August, 2006.

Minow, Joseph↗
NASA NTRS2005

Safety and Mission Assurance Performance Metric

The safety and mission assurance (S&MA) performance metric is a method that provides a process through which the managers of a large, complex program can readily understand and assess the accepted risk, the problems, and the associated reliability of the program. Conceived for original use in helping to assure the safety and success of the International Space Station (ISS) program, the S&MA performance metric also can be applied to other large and complex programs and projects. The S&MA-performance-metric data products comprise one or more tables (possibly also one or more graphs) that succinctly display all of the information relevant (and no information that is irrelevant) to management decisions that must be made to assure the safety and success of a program or project, thereby facilitating such decisions.

Holsomback, Jerry↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

International Space Station Space Environments Performance and Anomaly Resolution

The International Space Station is the largest and most complex on-orbit platform for space science utilization in low Earth orbit. The Space Environments Team addresses natural and induced environments for the ISS Program including external contamination, ionizing radiation, neutral atmosphere and solar ultraviolet radiation, plasma effects, and acoustics. For the ISS to fulfill its mission as a long-duration science platform, space environments effects are assessed, monitored, and controlled through design or operational mitigation. Interactions of ISS hardware with the natural and induced space environments, and the assessment and mitigation of those effects play a critical role in ISS mission operations. The Space Environments Team has complete system integration responsibility in these area for U.S./International Partner/Russian hardware, visiting vehicles, ISS payloads and operation. Lessons learned and processes developed for ISS are applicable to the design, assembly, and operations of long-duration space systems.

space environments↗
NASA NTRS2018

Robotic External Leak Locator (RELL) Leak Plume Field Detection on the International Space Station (ISS)

The Robotic External Leak Locator (RELL) was deployed to the International Space Station (ISS) with the objective of demonstrating the ability to detect and locate small leaks. On-orbit operations began in late November 2016 and following scanning activities to characterize the natural and induced environment of the ISS, RELL focused on the United States External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS). RELL successfully detected ammonia related to a known small ammonia leak in the port-side EATCS, with the highest pressure values around the inboard Radiator Beam Valve Module 1 (RBVM 1). An additional day of scanning was subsequently performed in December 2017 to focus on RBVM 1. RELL was approved for additional external operations in February 2017 with the goal of fine tuning the location of the leak. Using grid scanning patterns, RELL detected ammonia around RBVM 1 and located the approximate source of the leak. The potential leak site was inspected by a crew member during an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) in March 2017, and the suspected radiator-side lines were isolated from the port-side EATCS coolant loop in April 2017. Subsequent monitoring of the system pressures showed that the leak has stopped, indicating RELL accurately located the source of the EATCS leak. These activities verify that RELL enhances the ISS Program's ability to not only locate small leaks, but isolate the source with minimal impact to the entire ISS system.

External Active Thermal Control System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Light Microscopy Module A Facility Overview-History and Science

We will share a brief history and provide a science overview of the many accomplishments of the Light Microscopy Module (LMM), a microscope that has been operating in the microgravity environment of the International Space Station (ISS) since 2010. It will be removed in October 2021. It was initially outfitted for the Constrained Vapor Bubble – Wickless Heat Pipe experiment. It was later reconfigured and upgraded many times to support a broad portfolio of Physical science and Biological experiments including: Complex Fluids, Colloids, Macro-Molecular Biophysics, Protein Crystals, and Plant Biology. The LMM has enabled many significant studies and discoveries and has seen its fair share of pleasant surprises. These include recording order arising out of disorder, e.g., systems of colloids that were glasses on Earth crystallizing to form large defect-free crystals, nematic ordering of elliptical colloids, and colloidal-polymer systems crystallizing. The LMM science teams have also seen how to improve product stabilizers once the effects of sedimentation on Earth were removed; they were able to see which tagged genes express in plants when gravity is removed, telling them which genes are essential for growing plants in space; they’ve tested protein crystal growth models; checked models for creating bijel electrodes that turn batteries into fast-charging supercapacitors; tested many forms of colloidal self-assembly: including those using depletion attraction, magnetic fields, and critical Casimir forces; they’ve observed explosive bubble nucleation in a wickless heat pipe, and much more. This work has been supported by the NASA Biological and Physical Sciences (BPS) Division and the ISS Program Office, Johnson Space Center Code OZ and Code OB, the Center for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS) / ISS National Lab, EPSCoR, and ISS international partners from ESA – the Netherlands and Italy, CSA, JAXA and S. Korea, and by Space Act Agreements with Procter and Gamble (P&G).

Colloids↗
NASA NTRS2014

NASA's Astronant Family Support Office

During the NASA‐Mir program of the 1990s and due to the challenges inherent in the International Space Station training schedule and operations tempo, it was clear that a special focus on supporting families was a key to overall mission success for the ISS crewmembers pre‐, in‐ and post‐flight. To that end, in January 2001 the first Family Services Coordinator was hired by the Behavioral Health and Performance group at NASA JSC and matrixed from Medical Operations into the Astronaut Office's organization. The initial roles and responsibilities were driven by critical needs, including facilitating family communication during training deployments, providing mission‐specific and other relevant trainings for spouses, serving as liaison for families with NASA organizations such as Medical Operations, NASA management and the Astronaut Office, and providing assistance to ensure success of an Astronaut Spouses Group. The role of the Family Support Office (FSO) has modified as the ISS Program matured and the needs of families changed. The FSO is currently an integral part of the Astronaut Office's ISS Operations Branch. It still serves the critical function of providing information to families, as well as being the primary contact for US and international partner families with resources at JSC. Since crews launch and return on Russian vehicles, the FSO has the added responsibility for coordinating with Flight Crew Operations, the families, and their guests for Soyuz launches, landings, and Direct Return to Houston post‐flight. This presentation will provide a summary of the family support services provided for astronauts, and how they have changed with the Program and families the FSO serves. Considerations for future FSO services will be discussed briefly as NASA proposes one year missions and beyond ISS missions. Learning Objective: 1) Obtain an understanding of the reasons a Family Support Office was important for NASA. 2) Become familiar with the services provided for astronauts and their families and how they changed with the Program and family needs.

Beven, Gary↗
NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗