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An Overview of the A-3 Subscale Diffuser Test Project

The Subscale Diffuser Test (SDT) Project comprised a series of tests of a subscale model of SSC s A-3 Test Stand diffuser. SDT was conducted at NASA s Stennis Space Center (SSC) Apr 2007 - Jan 2008. Purpose of SDT was to mitigate design risk for the A-3 diffuser. Initial scope of the SDT project successfully completed in Jan 2008. Follow-on A-3 risk mitigation testing being planned/considered. This presentation presents an overview of the SDT project.

Ryan, James E.

Risk Assessment and Integration Team (RAIT) Portfolio Risk Analysis Strategy

Impact at management level: Qualitative assessment of risk criticality in conjunction with risk consequence, likelihood, and severity enable development of an "investment policy" towards managing a portfolio of risks. Impact at research level: Quantitative risk assessments enable researchers to develop risk mitigation strategies with meaningful risk reduction results. Quantitative assessment approach provides useful risk mitigation information.

Edwards, Michelle

An Overview of Follow-On Testing Activities of the A-3 Subscale Diffuser Test Project

An overview of NASA Stennis Space Center's (SSC) A-3 Subscale Diffuser Test (SDT) Project is presented. The original scope of the SDT Project, conducted from April 2007 to January 2008, collected data to support mitigation of risk associated with design and procurement activities of the A-3 Test Stand Project, an effort to construct a simulated altitude test facility at SSC in support of NASA's Constellation Program. Follow-on tests were conducted from May 2008 through August 2009, utilizing the SDT test setup as a testbed for additional risk mitigation activities. Included are descriptions of the Subscale Diffuser (SD) test article, the test facility configuration, and test approaches.

Ryan, James E.

Flight Crew Health Stabilization Program

This document establishes the policy and procedures for the HSP and is authorized through the Director, Johnson Space Center (JSC). This document delineates the medical operations requirements for the HSP. The HSP goals are accomplished through an awareness campaign and procedures such as limiting access to flight crewmembers, medical screening, and controlling flight crewmember activities. NASA's Human Space Flight Program uses strategic risk mitigation to achieve mission success while protecting crew health and safety. Infectious diseases can compromise crew health and mission success, especially in the immediate preflight period. The primary purpose of the Flight Crew Health Stabilization Program (HSP) is to mitigate the risk of occurrence of infectious disease among astronaut flight crews in the immediate preflight period. Infectious diseases are contracted through direct person-to-person contact, and through contact with infectious material in the environment. The HSP establishes several controls to minimize crew exposure to infectious agents. The HSP provides a quarantine environment for the crew that minimizes contact with potentially infectious material. The HSP also limits the number of individuals who come in close contact with the crew. The infection-carrying potential of these primary contacts (PCs) is minimized by educating them in ways to avoid infections and avoiding contact with the crew if they are or may be sick. The transmission of some infectious diseases can be greatly curtailed by vaccinations. PCs are strongly encouraged to maintain updated vaccinations.

Johnston, Smith L.

Airborne Radar for sUAS Sense and Avoid

A primary challenge for the safe integration of small UAS operations into the National Airspace System (NAS) is traffic deconfliction, both from manned and unmanned aircraft. The UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project being conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) considers a layered approach to separation provision, ranging from segregation of operations through airspace volumes (geofences) to autonomous sense and avoid (SAA) technologies for higher risk, densely occupied airspace. Cooperative SAA systems, such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and/or vehicle-to-vehicle communication systems provide significant additional risk mitigation but they fail to adequately mitigate collision risks for non-cooperative (non-transponder equipped) airborne aircraft. The RAAVIN (Radar on Autonomous Aircraft to Verify ICAROUS Navigation) flight test being conducted by NASA and the Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership (MAAP) was designed to investigate the applicability and performance of a prototype, commercially available sUAS radar to detect and track non-cooperative airborne traffic, both manned and unmanned. The radar selected for this research was a Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar with 120 degree azimuth and 80 degree elevation field of view operating at 24.55GHz center frequency with a 200 MHz bandwidth. The radar transmits 2 watts of power thru a Metamaterial Electronically Scanning Array antenna in horizontal polarization. When the radar is transmitting, personnel must be at least 1 meter away from the active array to limit nonionizing radiation exposure. The radar physical dimensions are 18.7cm by 12.1cm by 4.1cm and it weighs less than 820 grams making it well suited for installation on small UASs. The onboard, SAA capability, known as ICAROUS, (Independent Configurable Architecture for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems), developed by NASA to support sUAS operations, will provide autonomous guidance using the traffic radar tracks from the onboard radar. The RAAVIN set of studies will be conducted in three phases. The first phase included outdoor, ground-based radar evaluations performed at the Virginia Tech’s Kentland Farm testing range in Blacksburg, VA. The test was designed to measure how well the radar could detect and track a small UAS flying in the radar’s field of view. The radar was used to monitor 5 test flights consisting of outbound, inbound and crossing routes at different ranges and altitudes. The UAS flown during the ground test was the Inspire 2, a quad copter weighing less than 4250 grams (10 pounds) at maximum payload. The radar was set up to scan and track targets over its full azimuthal field of view from 0 to 40 degrees in elevation. The radar was configured to eliminate tracks generated from any targets located beyond 2000 meters from the radar and moving at velocities under 1.45 meters per second. For subsequent phases of the study the radar will be integrated with a sUAS platform to evaluate its performance in flight for SAA applications ranging from sUAS to manned GA aircraft detections and tracking. Preliminary data analysis from the first outdoor ground tests showed the radar performed well at tracking the vehicle as it flew outbound and repeatedly maintained a track out to 1000 meters (maximum 1387 meters) until the vehicle slowed to a stop to reverse direction to fly inbound. As the Inspire flew inbound tracks from beyond 800 meters, a reacquisition time delay was consistently observed between when the Inspire exceeds a speed of 1.45 meters per second and when the radar indicated an inbound target was present and maintained its track. The time delay varied between 6 seconds to over 37 seconds for the inbound flights examined, and typically resulted in about a 200 meter closure distance before the Inspire track was maintained. The radar performed well at both acquiring and tracking the vehicle as it flew crossing routes out past 400 meters across the azimuthal field of view. The radar and ICAROUS software will be integrated and flown on a BFD-1400-SE8-E UAS during the next phase of the RAAVIN project. The main goal at the conclusion of this effort is to determine if this radar technology can reliably support minimum requirements for SAA applications of sUAS. In particular, the study will measure the range of vehicle detections, lateral and vertical angular errors, false and missed/late detections, and estimated distance at closest point of approach after an avoidance maneuver is executed. This last metric is directly impacted by sensor performance and indicates its suitability for the task.

Szatkowski, George N.

Learning from Failures: Archiving and Designing with Failure and Risk

Identifying and mitigating risks during conceptual design remains an ongoing challenge. This work presents the results of collaborative efforts between The University of Missouri-Rolla and NASA Ames Research Center to examine how an early stage mission design team at NASA addresses risk, and, how a computational support tool can assist these designers in their tasks. Results of our observations are given in addition to a brief example of our implementation of a repository based computational tool that allows users to browse and search through archived failure and risk data as related to either physical artifacts or functionality.

VanWie, Michael

Independent Reliability Assessment of the NASA GSFC Laser Transmitter for the LISA Program

The Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA) is a partnership between the European Space Agency (ESA) and NASA to build a Gravitational Wave (GW) observatory. The observatory, which consists of a three-spacecraft constellation with a nominal separation of 2.5 million km between each spacecraft, provides a tool for scientists to directly detect gravitational waves generated from various astronomical phenomena in a waveband that is not accessible from Earth. NASA is developing laser transmitters as one of the potential US contributions to LISA. The NASA laser design leverages lessons learned from previous flight missions and included the latest technologies in photonics packaging and reliability engineering to ensure a laser lifetime of >16 years covering integration and test through a possible extended mission phase. As part of the laser development process, NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) requested support from the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to independently assess the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the LISA Laser System (LS). The independent assessment included the following tasks: (a) assess the design for weaknesses and suggest improvements to mitigate risks, (b) assess the laser reliability plan for weaknesses and suggest improvements to mitigate risks and improve effectiveness, and (c) assess the current redundancy plan on laser subsystems for weaknesses and suggest improvements to mitigate risks and improve effectiveness. The NESC team comprised of a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) and performed a 12-month review of every aspect of the laser design. We present the assessment findings and the current development progress of the LISA laser to meet the mission requirements with a delivery of a form, fit, and functional TRL6 laser to the LSIA mission by late 2023.

LISA

Independent Reliability Assessment of the Laser Transmitter for the ESA-NASA Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA) Program

As part of the laser development process, NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) requested support from the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to independently assess the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the LISA Laser System (LS). The independent assessment included the following tasks: (a) assess the design for weaknesses and suggest improvements to mitigate risks, (b) assess the laser reliability plan for weaknesses and suggest improvements to mitigate risks and improve effectiveness, and (c) assess the current redundancy plan on laser subsystems for weaknesses and suggest improvements to mitigate risks and improve effectiveness. The presentation will focus on the assessment findings and the current development progress of the LISA laser to meet the mission requirements with a delivery of a form, fit, and functional TRL6 laser to the LISA mission by late 2023.

Laser Interferometry

Calculating and Mitigating the Risk of a Cut Glove to a Space Walking Astronaut

One of the high risk operations on the International Space Station (ISS) is conducting a space walk, or an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA). Threats to the space walking crew include airlock failures, space suit failures, and strikes from micro ]meteoroids and orbital debris (MM/OD). There are risks of becoming untethered from the space station, being pinched between the robotic arm and a piece of equipment, tearing your suit on a sharp edge, and other human errors that can be catastrophic. For decades NASA identified and tried to control sharp edges on external structure and equipment by design; however a new and unexpected source of sharp edges has since become apparent. Until recently, one of the underappreciated environmental risks was damage to EVA gloves during a spacewalk. The ISS has some elements which have been flying in the environment of space for over 14 years. It has and continues to be bombarded with MM/OD strikes that have created small, sharp craters all over the structure, including the dedicated EVA handrails and surrounding structure. These craters are capable of cutting through several layers of the EVA gloves. Starting in 2006, five EVA crewmembers reported cuts in their gloves so large they rendered the gloves unusable and in some cases cut the spacewalk short for the safety of the crew. This new hazard took engineers and managers by surprise. NASA has set out to mitigate this risk to safety and operations by redesigning the spacesuit gloves to be more resilient and designing a clamp to isolate MM/OD strikes on handrails, and is considering the necessity of an additional tool to repair strikes on non ]handrail surfaces (such as a file). This paper will address how the ISS Risk Team quantified an estimate of the MM/OD damage to the ISS, and the resulting likelihood of sustaining a cut glove in order to measure the effectiveness of the solutions being investigated to mitigate this risk to the mission and crew.

Castillo, Theresa

Security Risks: Management and Mitigation in the Software Life Cycle

A formal approach to managing and mitigating security risks in the software life cycle is requisite to developing software that has a higher degree of assurance that it is free of security defects which pose risk to the computing environment and the organization. Due to its criticality, security should be integrated as a formal approach in the software life cycle. Both a software security checklist and assessment tools should be incorporated into this life cycle process and integrated with a security risk assessment and mitigation tool. The current research at JPL addresses these areas through the development of a Sotfware Security Assessment Instrument (SSAI) and integrating it with a Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP) risk management tool.

securiy

Habitability Assessments And Lessons-learned From 3-day And 11-day Enriched Oxygen Hypobaric Chamber Tests At NASA Johnson Space Center

INTRODUCTION: Decompression sickness (DCS) is a risk to the health and performance of astronauts and high-altitude aircrew. Tolerance to flammability, hypoxia, prebreathe duration, and DCS risk varies across different organizations, vehicles, suits, and destinations, necessitating a variety of DCS risk mitigation approaches. Existing models of altitude DCS risk are often insufficient to enable accurate risk-informed decisions during hardware development, mission planning, and flight operations. METHODS: NASA completed outfitting of a dedicated facility at Johnson Space Center to support testing of up to eight human subjects for multiple days in hypobaric and enriched oxygen atmospheres. The primary purpose of the testing capability is validation of DCS risk mitigation protocols for Artemis missions to the Moon; however, it will also support development and validation of a generalizable altitude DCS risk estimation tool. A 3-day and an 11-day prebreathe validation test were completed in 2022, each with 8 human subjects living at 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2, with 5 simulated EVAs performed on masks at 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi), 85% O2, 15% N2. Facility and organizational lessons-learned and process improvements were recorded during and following the tests, and subjective habitability ratings were recorded daily during the 11-day test. Hypoxia and DCS-related physiological and cognitive outcome measures were recorded during both tests and are reported in companion presentations. RESULTS & DISCUSSION: All subjects completed each of the tests. Primary habitability issues related to mask discomfort during simulated EVAs and poor sleep quality due to thin mattresses. Polybenzimidazole (PBI) clothing was worn by all subjects due to the increased fire risk and may be required for Artemis missions; clothing was found to be acceptable overall with the worst ratings being due to poor fit and inelasticity. Chamber O2 and CO2 sensor inconsistency was observed that did not result in test termination but required post-test follow-up. Forward plans include additional hypobaric testing and integration of existing and future physiological outcome data into an open-source Aerospace Estimation Tool for Hypobaric Exposure Risk (AETHER). NASA is also working to make the testing capability available to commercial companies.

Andrew F J Abercromby

Habitability Assessments And Lessons-learned From 3-day And 11-day Enriched Oxygen Hypobaric Chamber Tests At NASA Johnson Space Center

INTRODUCTION: Decompression sickness (DCS) is a risk to the health and performance of astronauts and high-altitude aircrew. Tolerance to flammability, hypoxia, prebreathe duration, and DCS risk varies across different organizations, vehicles, suits, and destinations, necessitating a variety of DCS risk mitigation approaches. Existing models of altitude DCS risk are often insufficient to enable accurate risk-informed decisions during hardware development, mission planning, and flight operations. METHODS: NASA completed outfitting of a dedicated facility at Johnson Space Center to support testing of up to eight human subjects for multiple days in hypobaric and enriched oxygen atmospheres. The primary purpose of the testing capability is validation of DCS risk mitigation protocols for Artemis missions to the Moon; however, it will also support development and validation of a generalizable altitude DCS risk estimation tool. A 3-day and an 11-day prebreathe validation test were completed in 2022, each with 8 human subjects living at 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2, with 5 simulated EVAs performed on masks at 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi), 85% O2, 15% N2. Facility and organizational lessons-learned and process improvements were recorded during and following the tests, and subjective habitability ratings were recorded daily during the 11-day test. Hypoxia and DCS-related physiological and cognitive outcome measures were recorded during both tests and are reported in companion presentations. RESULTS & DISCUSSION: All subjects completed each of the tests. Primary habitability issues related to mask discomfort during simulated EVAs and poor sleep quality due to thin mattresses. Polybenzimidazole (PBI) clothing was worn by all subjects due to the increased fire risk and may be required for Artemis missions; clothing was found to be acceptable overall with the worst ratings being due to poor fit and inelasticity. Chamber O2 and CO2 sensor inconsistency was observed that did not result in test termination but required post-test follow-up. Forward plans include additional hypobaric testing and integration of existing and future physiological outcome data into an open-source Aerospace Estimation Tool for Hypobaric Exposure Risk (AETHER). NASA is also working to make the testing capability available to commercial companies.

Andrew Abercromby

microRNA Based Countermeasure Mitigate Health Risks Associated with Space Radiation and Microgravity

From our earlier work, we demonstrated a circulating microRNA (miRNA) signature that is present and involved with the general increased health risks during spaceflight. From this work we demonstrated that this miRNA signature impacted the overall biology and health with both the microgravity and space radiation components of the space environment. We showed that this miRNA signature can be an optimal biomarker for health risk and also has potential to be utilized as a countermeasure to mitigate the damage caused by the space environment by utilizing a human 3D microvascular tissue model. By applying a novel self-delivery system to target 3 miRNAs (i.e. antagomirs) from our spaceflight miRNA signature impacting cardiovascular health risks, we were able to completely mitigate damage caused by exposure to simulated Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) irradiation. Here we further expand on the countermeasure experiments to uncover the specific novel biology involved with this countermeasure and in vivo experiments that demonstrates that these antagomirs rescue damage caused to certain organs due to both microgravity and space radiation. Specifically, the miRNAs rescued damage to the heart and immune suppression that occurred in addition to other key biology. In addition, we have also observed with the 3D microvascular tissue model improved DNA double strand break repair machinery which can also contribute to improved recovery and protection against damage caused by space radiation. This work expands on our previous work and further uncovers how a potential minimally invasive countermeasure can be used to mitigate space environment effects.

Afshin Beheshti

Risk Reduction on X-33/RLV Engines

Risk management has received considerable attention in the X-33 and Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) program due to aggressive schedules, limited funding. and planned private investment to develop the commercial VentureStar vehicle. As an X-33 and RLV team member and main propulsion supplier, Boeing Rocketdyn Propulsion and Power has addressed risk through a methodical application of systems engineering in identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks. The methods employed involve rigorous risk mitigation planning early in development, continuous risk monitoring and assessment during the course of development, and the systematic verification of compliance with technical requirements prior to delivery. In addition, an engine system reliability analysis was conducted to reduce risk. In July 1996, NASA selected Lockheed Martin's "Skunk Works" (LMSW) as the lead contractor for the X-33 and RLV program. The X-33 vehicle is a half-scale pathfinder for the full-scale RLV. The LMSW RLV design is a lifting body shaped vehicle employing linear aerospike engine provided propulsion. The initial X-33 flight is planned for the summer of 2000, and the initial VentureStar flight is planned for between 2005 and 2007.

Crowley, Tim

Managing Risk for Cassini During Mission Operations and Data Analysis (MOandDA)

A Risk Management Process has been tailored for Cassini that not only satisfies the requirements of NASA and JPL, but also allows the Program to proactively identify and assess risks that threaten mission objectives. Cassini Risk Management is a team effort that involves both management and engineering staff. The process is managed and facilitated by the Mission Assurance Manager (MAM), but requires regular interactions with Program Staff and team members to instill the risk management philosophy into the day to day mission operations. While Risk Management is well defined for projects in the development phase, it is a relatively new concept for Mission Operations. The Cassini team has embraced this process and has begun using it in an effective, proactive manner, to ensure mission success. It is hoped that the Cassini Risk Management Process will form the basis by which risk management is conducted during MO&DA on future projects. proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working put into place will become visible and will be illusmted in future papers.

risk management

Behavioral Medicine Risks and Mitigations in Isolated, Confined, and Extreme Environments

Human spaceflight beyond low Earth orbit will present unique environmental challenges to astronauts’ operational performance and well-being. Crews will need to work and live in confined and hazardous environments for prolonged missions that involve variable workloads and limitations to privacy, food options, exercise capabilities, leisure outlets, and communication with ground support personnel and loved ones. Currently, behavioral and cognitive risks of spaceflight are mitigated by selecting exceptionally resilient crews and providing extensive individual and team skills training pre-mission, as well as in-mission crew support via a suite of countermeasures targeting sleep and performance optimization, stress management, family support, and team cohesion. However, current countermeasures are difficult or impossible to implement in long-distance exploration as they require real-time communication with Earth and routine resupply. New countermeasure approaches are needed to adapt and enhance the current complement for the new challenges ahead. NASA therefore conducts research at ground-based spaceflight analogs to aid in characterizing the behavioral and cognitive risks of living and working in isolated, confined, and extreme (ICE) operational environments. Antarctic research stations are among the few long-duration ICE analogs in existence and are therefore uniquely positioned to support behavioral medicine research to enable human exploration beyond Earth. In this review, we will discuss previous and ongoing efforts to better understand spaceflight behavioral medicine risks, as well as validate new countermeasure approaches for future missions to the moon and Mars.

Behavioral Health

Agile Approach to Adding Assurance and Mitigating Overall Mission Risk for Orion Software on EM-1

Human-rated missions like Orion are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software contribution to achieving mission objectives, and this creates a resource challenge for everyone whose job is to add assurance that the mission is going to fly safely. Orion IV&V has addressed this challenge by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V was evaluating areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the Agile software development cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer. As a result of evolving the approach to providing assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance data and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and aspirations for long-term performance.

Assurance

Quantifying Investment Risk: Analysis of the Purchase Decision of a Nuclear Power Plant (Presentation)

Cost overruns are an ill-fated part of the deployment history of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States, and yet studies increasingly show the important role nuclear technologies must play in decarbonizing the U.S. economy. Paradoxically, then, a key piece of a coherent decarbonization strategy depends on attracting investor action to a purchase where historical cost overruns have been sizable. To address this challenge, this study aims to develop a financial model that quantifies the risk of cost overruns in the decision-making process for purchasing advanced reactor concepts. Using the concept of value at risk (VaR), the model is built to evaluate financial risk nuclear construction with the aim to identify risk mitigation strategies. The objective is to identify strategies to mitigate cost-risk challenges and assess the potential reduction in investor risk exposure. This paper presents the initial development and preliminary verification of the financial risk analysis model. The development of this model involved a comprehensive approach to estimating financial risk over the operating life of NPP that stems from construction uncertainties. By utilizing net present value (NPV) with discounted cash flows, the model captures the complex interconnections of project costs, construction timelines, revenue, and uncertainties. Verifying the model involved testing historical data from previous reactor construction projects against the construction project of Vogtle 3 and 4. This paper’s results present the comparison of the preconstruction cost overrun prediction with the current cost estimates from a nearly complete Vogtle 3 and 4.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS