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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

wtDigiTwin (Wind Turbine Digital Twin) [SWR-21-15]

This wind turbine digital twin software (wtDigiTwin) provides a digital twin solution for wind turbine applications. The focus of wtDigiTwin is to estimate loads, motions and environmental conditions for an operating wind turbine. The program uses supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) measurements as inputs, together with a wind turbine model. The wind industry is currently challenged by the high cost of operation and maintenance. These costs could be mitigated if component failures are predicted, but such predictions are difficult unless the turbines are equipped with expensive measuring devices. The alternative is to use a digital twin such as wtDigiTwin to estimate the necessary signals. wtDigiTwin can perform online prediction of signals that are otherwise not measured, using a limited set of reliable measurements and a physics-based model. The predicted signals can be used in applications that have direct cost benefits: 1) real-time estimation of the fatigue consumption of key components of the wind turbine; 2) root cause analyses and failure detections ; 3) lifetime reassessments ; 4) improvements to follow-on designs. The current version provides examples to estimate wind speed, thrust, torque, tower-top position, and tower loads on an onshore wind turbine using the following measurements tower top acceleration, generator torque, pitch, and rotational speed. The model combines a linear state-space model, a wind speed estimator, and a Kalman filter algorithm that integrates measurements with the state model to perform state estimations. The state space model is obtained either using OpenFAST linearizations, or using the yams package provided with the software.

Branlard, Emmanuel↗
DOE OSTI2022

GridDS: Data Science Toolkit for Energy Grid Data

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the demand for energy is expected to increase 50% by the year 20501. While energy standards, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1547, (Basso 2015) and monitoring with wide area management systems (WAMS) (Liu 2017, Zhou 2016) have enabled large scale data collection and storage, the application of this data in mitigating costs associated with increased consumer demand is an ongoing focus for energy research. This ubiquitous data collection presents a promising opportunity for machine learning and data science to improve efficiency of distributed energy resources (DERs). The GridDS software toolkit is designed to leverage advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), outage management systems data (OMS), Supervisory control Data Acquisition (SCADA), and geographic information systems (GIS) to forecast future energy demands and detect incipient grid failures. GridDS is a python software library designed to be modular and generalizable to data recorded by DERs. In adapting to disparate datasets recorded by various WAMS, GridDS provides a range of unique functionality not presently implemented in current WAMS which have highly specific software infrastructure by design. GridDS functionality ranges from data specification and preparation, to training and validation for state of the art machine learning, to interactive data visualization. For data intake, GridDS combines: Pandera: a library for creating data specifications. TimeScaleDB: a postgresSQL database infrastructure for efficient storage of timeseries data. Dataset class: A custom dataset class / interface that ensures modularity between a range of synthetic and live recorded datasets. Is

Ladd, Alexander↗
DOE OSTI2022

HIDES (Hybrid Intrusion Detection for Energy Systems) [SWR-19-65]

Hybrid Intrusion Detection for Energy Systems (HIDES) is a conglomerate detector that incorporates three major components: (1) Signature-based detection that involves information technology (IT) related anomaly detection rules, (2) Behavior-based detection that utilizes specially crafted rulesets for detecting abnormal behavior regarding the power system's supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) communication streams, and (3) Learning-based detection that combines SCADA communication with phasor measurements to identify otherwise non-detectible attack vectors. The software itself interconnects intrusion detection engine (IDE) enabling communications between the generated OT and IT alerts with phasor measurements for the learning-based detection system. The resulting detection system can detect a wide array of IT, OT, and physical attacks in a real-time setting.

Rivera, Joshua↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modelling of Wastewater Heat Recovery Heat Pump Systems

Wastewater heat recovery is currently an underutilized technology that could be part of solving the climate crisis. A large portion of the heat that leaves a building in the form of wastewater is potentially recoverable for pre-heating domestic hot water or other service water systems. While there are several different approaches to wastewater heat recovery, this project focused on creating detailed, integrated building models for wastewater heat recovery heat pump systems. EnergyPlus models were developed featuring inputs and assumptions corresponding to manufacturers’ specifications, performance lab test data and feedback from engineering consultants. EnergyPlus’s supervisory control Energy Management System objects were heavily relied upon to overcome modelling challenges. The developed EnergyPlus model was integrated into U.S. Department of Energy New Construction Reference Building models for various climate zones and building types to assess potential energy use, energy cost and greenhouse gas emission reductions.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2020

National-Tribal Critical Infrastructure Protection: Collaboration for Extraordinary National Security Benefit

This paper examines national and tribal collaborative opportunities to get ahead of the critical infrastructure insecurity problem. Recommendations are viewed through the lens of the Sandia Labs Tribal Cyber-Energy initiative and national security projects. Recommendations include 1) Collaboratively address national priority and shared challenges to gain faster and better solutions to national priority problems on a smaller yet comprehensive American Indian and Alaskan Native sovereign single-point of authority scale 2) Utilize newer standards-based technologies to provide scalable, capable, and manageable solutions for greatly expanded and connected national critical infrastructures 3) Employ Cyber-Physical-Resilient design preliminary analysis to define concept- to-disposition design requirements for preemptive critical infrastructure risk mitigation and baked-in security; 4) Develop data-centric protection to provide increased information asset protection as data shifts from data-owner operated on-premises infrastructure to virtual service provider data-steward owned and operated off-premises infrastructure; and 5) Balance shared solutions with the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity and Risk Management frameworks, and the System Security Engineering Guidelines. As yet unallocated federal funding would support research, development, the timely application of National-Tribal critical infrastructure protection, and critical infrastructure Cyber disruption response and recovery with extraordinary mutual benefits for the foreseeable future. The Critical Infrastructure Insecurity Problem: Rapid modernization and expansive connectivity are due to advances in Information and Communications Technologies that have sweeping cyber impact across all critical infrastructure sectors. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition and Industrial Control Systems are particularly impacted as systems long separated from the Internet are now being connected and computerized. Virtualization and mobility create a Data Everywhere-User Anywhere paradigm that has evaporated the enterprise network perimeter. There are multi-front technological challenges at play, where long depended on technologies simply don't scale to current needs resulting in a digital dichotomy of competing old and new standards. New standards-based technologies scale but are not as well-known or as widely deployed, which leaves decision makers, stakeholders, and the workforce in a quandary, caught mid-stream between the technological past and the virtual future. Rapid and expansive cyber threat accompanies disruptive change in connectivity and computational dependencies. A lack of action will exacerbate the problem if new technologies roll out without baked-in security design. The Risk: If National-Tribal CIP collaboration to design in security is not done, then an ongoing state of insufficient bolt-on security and elevated threat exposure will remain for years to come.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Supporting Cyber Security of Power Distribution Systems by Detecting Differences Between Real-time Micro-Synchrophasor Measurements and Cyber-Reported SCADA (Final Report)

As modern power grids tend towards greater levels of automation and communication, the challenges of identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks are ones that are increasingly demanding attention. Today’s power system has evolved to form the foundational bedrock of modern society, and an attack on this infrastructure could prove disastrous. In this project we were tasked to investigate the use of distribution synchrophasors as an independent isolated sensor network with which we can corroborate, or flag potentially spoofed,Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) data. We adapted an approach to marry the underlying physical properties of power systems with the network communications used by power systems in order to offer insights unattainable by either data stream isolation. While the concept of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is well understood for monitoring network traffic and traditional IT computing systems, the approach discussed in this report is motivated by several key notions: first, current SCADA communications alone presents an incomplete view of the grid. Second, the power grid, and the equipment controlling it, is grounded by laws of physics. Given this, we leverage high-frequency physical grid measurements to understand the physical condition of the grid, and combine this with SCADA. While high-frequency physical grid measurements and SCADA communication over Internet Protocol (IP) networks are fundamentally disparate information sources, when collectively examined through appropriate lenses, they offer a much more nuanced depiction of the grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Consolidated Hydropower Data Repository: Value and Opportunities

Hydropower is one of several types of generating assets that provides energy, capacity, and services to electric power systems. It does so under rubrics and objectives—market driven and regulated, internal and external to asset and fleet owners—that address reliability, cost, price, and, increasingly, flexibility of output. The aggregation of data from multiple hydropower units can provide insights into asset operations and maintenance practices and needs and assist in meeting hydropower objectives. This paper examines the concept and potential benefits of aggregating hydropower asset data—primarily supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) information—with examples of insights developed from data aggregated by the Hydropower Research Institute (HRI). Data aggregation as discussed herein, and as implemented by the HRI, extends beyond multiple units in a powerhouse and beyond multiple hydropower facilities in an electric utility fleet or river system. Examples of research and analytics from such aggregated datasets range from unit load dependency analyses to modeling sensor measurements to detect and diagnose anomalies in assets. These examples showed the benefits of utilizing the entire dataset for insights into how the sensor layout of a single unit or set of units compares to the hydropower industry overall. Such insights include whether additional sensors are needed to complete analyses or to make decisions. In addition, utilizing multiple sensors of the same kind within a unit can provide an indication of possible current or upcoming problems with equipment. Although other analyses are possible, their use requires the development of complex models and, potentially, access to types of data that are currently not included with the example dataset used in this study. However, the examples studied herein confirmed the value of data aggregation in the fleet and unit contexts, and the value extends beyond multiple units in a powerhouse and beyond multiple hydropower facilities in an electric utility fleet or river system. The assessments also provided insights into potential extensions to the data aggregation concept that could further add to their value to the hydropower community, and these are included in this document as a set of recommendations.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) – Security and Administration: Cybersecurity of Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) Research and Development

A critical component of the Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) approach is the integrated security contained within its processing. This document describes how that security is designed and expected to be implemented by UUDEX Implementations (U-Implementations), including the UUDEX Server (U-Server) and UUDEX Clients (U-Clients). The UUDEX security hierarchy consists of three levels: 1. The UUDEX Instance (U-Instance) itself, which sits at the top of the hierarchy and contains the U-Server, the UUDEX Identity Authority (U-Identity Authority), and the UUDEX Administrator (U-Administrator) functions; 2. A group of one or more UUDEX Participants (U-Participants) that present “organizations” that participate in the U-Instance and contains the UUDEX Administrator Participant (U-U-Administrator Participant) function; 3. A group of one or more UUDEX Endpoints (U-Endpoints) that represent the individual UUDEX Publish Clients (U-Publish Client) responsible for supplying data to the U-Instance that is consumed by UUDEX Subscriber Clients (U-Subscriber Clients). U-Endpoints can be either autonomous devices that publish and subscribe data such as data exchange servers found in supervisory control and data acquisition and energy management systems, or they can be tied to users of applications that, for example, submit DOE OE-417 disturbance reports. U-Participants and U-Endpoints can be organized into UUDEX Groups (U-Groups). Any number of U-Participants or U-Endpoints can be members of a U-Group. A given U-Participant or U-Endpoint can be a member of multiple U-Groups, but a U-Group cannot contain other U-Groups. For example, a U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Transmission Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator, and another U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Generator Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator. U-Participants that are both Transmission Operators and Generator Operators would be members of both U-Groups. U-Participants, U-Endpoints, and U-Groups are used in the access control structures to provide access to individual UUDEX Subjects (U-Subjects). U-Groups are created by the U-Administrator and are managed by the U-Administrator or the designated U-Group Managers. U-Endpoints can be assigned UUDEX Roles (U-Roles) that can be used to further restrict access. U-Roles are assigned to individual U-Endpoints. For example, a U-Role of “Security Analyst” could be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish or subscribe security incident reports and vulnerability notifications, while a U-Role of “Transmission Planner” can be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish power system model updates. U-Role definitions are created by the U-Administrator, but the U-Roles are assigned to U-Endpoints by their respective UUDEX Participant Administrators (U-Participant Administrator). Because all information required to make security decisions is either included within the U-Endpoint’s X.509 digital certificate or stored in a datastore on the U-Server, all security decisions are performed and enforced within the U-Server. This reduces the complexity of the U-Client code and minimizes the chance for compromise of the integrity of the UUDEX security features.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Anomaly Detection in SCADA-Assisted OT Networks Using Ensemble-Based State Prediction Model

The cybersecurity threats of power system gradually grow due to the increased sophisticated interactions between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) networks. False data injection attack (FDIA) that aims to compromise the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) measurement and disturb the system operation is one of such cyber threats. Such attacks can potentially lead to significant operational issues at the control centers and substations, and hence, result in severe physical consequences. To avoid catastrophic failure across the power grid resulting from these attacks, it is essential to arm the OT network with real-time vulnerability assessment tools. To this end, this paper outlines various drawbacks of the Purdue architecture model to defend against cyberattacks in the OT network. Furthermore, a novel ensemble-based state prediction model is proposed to detect cybersecurity anomalies in SCADA assisted OT networks. The proposed model uses control center level generation and load forecasts, scheduled, and forced outages, power flow solutions, and the substation level historical data. The hypothesis of the proposed scheme relies on the fact that additional control center and substation data can hardly be accessed and compromised by attackers. One of the vital features of the proposed scheme is an hour-ahead prediction of the operational feasibility of the SCADA measurement range at the control center and substation in real time helps in detecting anomalies in measurements across both substation and the control center.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Developing and Evaluating a Smart Curtailment Strategy Integrated with a Wind Turbine Manufacturer Platform

The Renewable Energy Wildlife Institute lead a team of scientists, wind developers, and turbine manufacturers in a study to develop and test a “smart curtailment” system intended to help reduce bat collisions with wind turbines. The Vestas Bat Protection System (VBPS) is a newly developed software module within the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system of Vestas turbines. The VBPS combines data from commercially available environmental sensors and the turbine’s built-in sensors with the Vestas SCADA system. VBPS is designed to receive environmental data from sensors on the turbine such as temperature, wind speed, wind direction, time of day, and time of year, relays that information to the SCADA system to determine whether to execute turbine curtailments at any given time. The goals of this study were to 1) develop a bat fatality risk model based on bat activity data and environmental data collected in year 1, and to 2) evaluate the VBPS, using the bat fatality risk model to implement curtailment, in comparison to “blanket curtailment” (turbines curtailed when wind speed is below 5.0 meters per second (m/s)) and “control” (normally operating, feathered below 3.0 m/s) turbines in year 2. The field study took place at a wind energy facility in Iowa during the fall bat migration seasons (July – October) in 2021 and 2022. For VBPS to succeed as a viable strategy for the minimization of bat fatalities, it should meet or exceed the performance of blanket curtailment. Specifically, the VBPS should meet the following performance targets to demonstrate whether it an effective, practical risk reduction measure: (1) Turbines operating VBPS should have equal or fewer bat fatalities compared to turbines operating with blanket curtailment, and significantly fewer bat fatalities compared to control turbines; and (2) Turbines operating VBPS should have greater power production compared to turbines operating with blanket curtailment. The study was completed in accordance with the Statement of Project Objectives and within the terms of the Budget Justification. This Final Report describes the progress, challenges, and outcomes of the study.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Distributed Wind Monitoring Best Practices

Accessible performance and operational data have been identified as a key enabler for distributed wind energy industry advancement. While utility-scale wind turbines benefit from reliable and continuous supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)-based monitoring platforms, monitoring of the U.S. fleet of distributed wind (DW) turbines has been more inconsistent, unreliable, and sometime difficult to access. Without fleet monitoring data, the industry will never understand and thus work to improve turbine under-performance and reliability issues. For the DW industry to scale up, attract investors, and boost credibility, fleetwide monitoring must be robust and reliable, select data must be made accessible to stakeholders, and the data must be in a format useful to users. To help move the industry toward a more standardized, accessible stream of monitoring data, this distributed wind monitoring best practices report attempts to cover topics including key monitoring channels, hardware, communication strategies, and accessibility. Strategic engagement with DW original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), service providers, lab and university researchers, testing organization, certification bodies, end users and solar photovoltaic (PV) monitoring experts has enabled a better understanding of the current state-of-the-art of monitoring and aided in articulating this set of best practices that will guide OEMs toward harmonized monitoring strategies, aimed at a future goal of achieving accessible performance and operational data for the entire fleet of U.S. distributed wind turbines.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Real-time evaluation of cybersecurity threats to DER inverter grid-support functions

In this project we aim to contribute to the understanding of the type and severity of potential cybersecurity attacks to the grid-support functionalities of DER systems interconnected to the AC distribution grid via inverters. Our preliminary work focused on developing a small-scale testbed allowing to study cybersecurity threats to an isolated photovoltaic-battery system using a real-time simulator (Typhoon HIL602+) with a real DNP3 communication connection over TCP/IP, allowing for safe and efficient monitoring and manipulation of data traffic between the simulated hardware and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. In this project we propose to expand upon this development by utilizing a) a recently acquired NovaCor RTDS (Real Rime digital Simulator) to emulate the DER-inverter-grid topology including main grid-support functions as defined by IEEE Std. 1547-2018, and b) an industrial control and automation device to enable realistic evaluation of control functions and utilization of communication protocols for real-time data transmission.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Essence2.0 Development and Deployment (Final Report)

The objective of the project was to take two core technologies that have been developed under the Recipient’s solid laboratory products and integrate them into a single CyberPhysical awareness platform and complete development on current field-tested prototypes that will extend the integrated capability of the platform. During the final development phase, the Recipient development team and its selected industry partners tested and hardened the platform to ensure resilient and secure operation of the integrated platform. The team also executed substantial field testing and established the framework for defining the organization and/or commercial infrastructure needed to sustain operations and provide readiness for a national scale deployment. The focus of the project was (1) the improvement, refinement, and deployment of technology for the detection of cyber-attacks on utility operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) networks and assets, including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) systems; and (2) support for containment and remediation of adversarial threats and actions against those systems and environments.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Electric Utility Communications Standards Landscape 2025 Edition

Historically, challenges to managing electric utility data exchange have been addressed through dedicated communication solutions, enabling the transmission of data with both speed and security. Protocols have been deployed in a relatively uniform fashion; for example, field communications for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) are commonly implemented using IEEE 1815 (DNP3).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Data Management for the Wastewater Industry

This information sheet discusses the technology pillar Advanced Data Management as a pathway toward improving wastewater infrastructure sustainability and resiliency. To supplement existing literature on current technologies and policies for improving resiliency at wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), this document aims to accomplish the following: • Summarize key technologies such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), digital twins, and smart sensors • Summarize relevant cybersecurity measures and data management tools available for WW utilities • Summarize advances in sensing and monitoring technologies • Serve as a comprehensive (though not exhaustive) repository for data management for wastewater utilities The Advanced Management Technical Information Sheet should be viewed as a general guide to established best practices for the water and wastewater sector when considering implementing energy capture and energy- or process-efficient technologies. Further details are presented in the SWIFt Technology Information Sheet Series for accompanying Technology Pillars.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy (Final Project Report)

This project establishes a Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy with the objective of designing and operating a cyber-physical testbed for wind energy farms (WEFs) that enables comprehensive cybersecurity research. The testbed incorporates a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system connected to turbine models via industrial-grade programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs). It supports side-channel data acquisition, implementation and analysis of various cyberattack scenarios, and development of attack detection, mitigation, and best-practice guidance tailored to wind energy systems. During the project, the team expanded the number and fidelity of mathematical turbine models (MTMs), integrated these models with SCADA infrastructure, and deployed a scaled physical turbine and associated sensors. High-resolution operational and side-channel data streams were collected and used to refine machine-learning (ML)-based attack detection systems and to extend the WindCRAFT framework to multi-turbine threat scenarios. The project demonstrated a realistic, scalable environment for evaluating cyber threats, validated attack detection approaches using enriched datasets, and identified new multi-turbine and inter-turbine communication attack vectors. The resulting testbed, models, and security mechanisms provide a foundation for ongoing R&D and deployment of cyber-resilient offshore wind energy systems.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Unalakleet Microgrid Optimization for Tribal Community Resilience

The Unalakleet Microgrid Optimization Project aimed to strengthen the reliability and efficiency of the isolated electric power system that serves the Tribal community of Unalakleet, Alaska. The community relies entirely on a local wind-diesel microgrid, consisting of four 475 kW diesel generators and six 100 kW wind turbines, to provide electricity to approximately 745 residents and Tribal facilities. Because Unalakleet is not on a road system and is located nearly 400 miles from the nearest major power grid, maintaining a resilient and efficient local energy system is critical. The scope of this project included upgrading a portion of the transmission line between the wind farm and the power plant to increase voltage and reduce line losses, along with modernizing the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system to improve monitoring, control, and data management of the power system. These upgrades were designed to increase wind energy utilization, reduce diesel fuel consumption by tens of thousands of gallons annually, and improve overall grid stability. By allowing more of the community’s electricity to be supplied by local renewable wind resources, the project was designed to lower operating costs, reduce dependence on imported fuel, and strengthen the long-term resilience of the power system. These improvements represent an important step toward the community’s long-term energy vision of expanding renewable generation, incorporating energy storage, and eventually achieving “diesels-off” operation, where essential Tribal loads are powered primarily by local renewable resources.

17 WIND ENERGY↗