ISSI IS46DR16640B-25DBA25 DDR2 SDRAM Heavy Ion Single-Event Upset Test Report
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Abstract not provided.
The single event effects or phenomena (SEP), which so far have been observed as events falling on one or another of the SE classes: Single Event Upset (SEU), Single Event Latchup (SEL) and Single Event Burnout (SEB), are examined. Single event upset is defined as a lasting, reversible change in the state of a multistable (usually bistable) electronic circuit such as a flip-flop or latch. In a computer memory, SEUs manifest themselves as unexplained bit flips. Since latchup is in general caused by a single event of short duration, the single event part of the SEL term is superfluous. Nevertheless, it is used customarily to differentiate latchup due to a single heavy charged particle striking a sensitive cell from more ordinary kinds of latchup. Single event burnout (SEB) refers usually to total instantaneous failure of a power FET when struck by a single particle, with the device shorting out the power supply. An unforeseen failure of these kinds can be catastrophic to a space mission, and the possibilities are discussed.
The CALIPSO (Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observations) mission is a comprehensive suite of active and passive sensors including a 20Hz 230mj Nd:YAG lidar, a visible wavelength Earth-looking camera and an imaging infrared radiometer. CALIPSO flies in formation with the Earth Observing System Post-Meridian (EOS PM) train, provides continuous, near-simultaneous measurements and is a planned 3 year mission. CALIPSO was launched into a 98 degree sun synchronous Earth orbit in April of 2006 to study clouds and aerosols and acquires over 5 gigabytes of data every 24 hours. The ground track of one CALIPSO orbit as well as high and low intensity South Atlantic Anomaly outlines is shown. CALIPSO passes through the SAA several times each day. Spaced based remote sensing systems that include multiple instruments and/or instruments such as lidar generate large volumes of data and require robust real-time hardware and software mechanisms and high throughput processors. Due to onboard storage restrictions and telemetry downlink limitations these systems must pre-process and reduce the data before sending it to the ground. This onboard processing and realtime requirement load may mean that newer more powerful processors are needed even though acceptable radiation-hardened versions have not yet been released. CALIPSO's single board computer payload controller processor is actually a set of four (4) voting non-radiation hardened COTS Power PC 603r's built on a single width VME card by General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (GDAIS). Significant radiation concerns for CALIPSO and other Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites include the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA), the north and south poles and strong solar events. Over much of South America and extending into the South Atlantic Ocean the Van Allen radiation belts dip to just 200-800km and spacecraft entering this area are subjected to high energy protons and experience higher than normal Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single Event Latch-up (SEL) rates. Although less significant, spacecraft flying in the area around the poles experience similar upsets. Finally, powerful solar proton events in the range of 10MeV/10pfu to 100MeV/1pfu as are forecasted and tracked by NOAA's Space Environment Center in Colorado can result in Single Event Upset (SEU), Single Event Latch-up (SEL) and permanent failures such as Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) in some technologies. (Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCRs) are another source, especially for gate rupture) CALIPSO mitigates common radiation concerns in its data handling through the use of redundant processors, radiation-hardened Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC), hardware-based Error Detection and Correction (EDAC), processor and memory scrubbing, redundant boot code and mirrored files. After presenting a system overview this paper will expand on each of these strategies. Where applicable, related on-orbit data collected since the CALIPSO initial boot on May 4, 2006 will be noted.
This paper addresses the issues involved in radiation testing of devices and subsystems to obtain the data that are required to predict the performance and survivability of satellite systems for extended missions in space. The problems associated with space environmental simulations, or the lack thereof, in experiments intended to produce information to describe the degradation and behavior of parts and systems are discussed. Several types of radiation effects in semiconductor components are presented, as for example: ionization dose effects, heavy ion and proton induced Single Event Upsets (SEUs), and Single Event Transient Upsets (SETUs). Examples and illustrations of data relating to these ground testing issues are provided. The primary objective of this presentation is to alert the reader to the shortcomings, pitfalls, variabilities, and uncertainties in acquiring information to logically design electronic subsystems for use in satellites or space stations with long mission lifetimes, and to point out the weaknesses and deficiencies in the methods and procedures by which that information is obtained.
This work describes radiation testing of Actel's ProASIC Plus and Altera's Stratix-II FPGAs. The Actel Device Under Test (DUT) was a ProASIC Plus APA300-PQ208 nonvolatile, field reprogrammable device which is based on a 0.22micron flash-based LVCMOS technology. Limited investigation has taken place into flash based FPGA technologies, therefore this test served as a preliminary reference point for various SEE behaviors. The Altera DUT was a Stratix-II EP2S60F1020C4. Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single Event Latchup (SEL) were the focus of these studies. For the Actel, a latchup test was done at an effective LET of 75.0 MeV-sq cm/mg at room temperature, and no latchup was detected when irradiated to a total fluence of 1 x 10(exp 7) particles/sq cm. The Altera part was shown to latchup at room temperature.
This report summarizes the testing and analysis of "single event clock upset' in the RH1020. Also included are SEU-rate predictions and design recommendations for risk analysis and reduction. The subject of "upsets" in the RH1020 is best understood by using a model consisting of a global clock buffer and a D-type flip-flop as the basic memory unit. The RH1020 is built on the ACT 1 family architecture. As such, it has one low-skew global clock buffer with a TTL-level input threshold that is accessed via a single dedicated pin. The clock signal is driven to full CMOS levels, buffered, and sent to individual row buffers with one buffer per channel. For low-skew performance, the outputs of all of the RH1020 row buffers are shorted together via metal lines, as is done in the A1020B. All storage in the RH1020 consists of routed flip-flops, constructed with multiplexors and feedback through the routing segments. A simple latch can be constructed from a single (combinatorial or C) module; an edge-triggered flip-flop is constructed using two concatenated latches. There is no storage in the I/O modules. The front end of the clock buffering circuitry, at a common point relative to the row buffer, is a sub-circuit that was determined to be the most susceptible to heavy ions. This is due, in part, to its smaller transistors compared to the rest of the circuitry. This conclusion is also supported by SPICE simulations and an analysis of the heavy ion data, described in this report. The edge triggered D flip-flop has two single-event-upset modes. Mode one, called C-module upset, is caused by a heavy ion striking the C-module's sensitive area on the silicon and produces a soft single bit error at the output of the flip-flop. Mode two, called clock upset, is caused by a heavy ion strike on the clock buffer, generating a runt pulse interpreted as a false clock signal and consequently producing errors at the flip-flop outputs. C-module upset sensitivity in the RH1020 is essentially the same as that of its ACT 1 siblings (A1020, A1020A and A1020B), which were well tested, analyzed, and documented in the literature.
This research describes the development of an experimental radiation testing environment to investigate the single event effect (SEE) susceptibility of the 486-DX4 microprocessor. SEE effects are caused by radiation particles that disrupt the logic state of an operating semiconductor, and include single event upsets (SEU) and single event latchup (SEL). The relevance of this work can be applied directly to digital devices that are used in spaceflight computer systems. The 486-DX4 is a powerful commercial microprocessor that is currently under consideration for use in several spaceflight systems. As part of its selection process, it must be rigorously tested to determine its overall reliability in the space environment, including its radiation susceptibility. The goal of this research is to experimentally test and characterize the single event effects of the 486-DX4 microprocessor using a cyclotron facility as the fault-injection source. The test philosophy is to focus on the "operational susceptibility," by executing real software and monitoring for errors while the device is under irradiation. This research encompasses both experimental and analytical techniques, and yields a characterization of the 486-DX4's behavior for different operating modes. Additionally, the test methodology can accommodate a wide range of digital devices, such as microprocessors, microcontrollers, ASICS, and memory modules, for future testing. The goals were achieved by testing with three heavy-ion species to provide different linear energy transfer rates, and a total of six microprocessor parts were tested from two different vendors. A consistent set of error modes were identified that indicate the manner in which the errors were detected in the processor. The upset cross-section curves were calculated for each error mode, and the SEU threshold and saturation levels were identified for each processor. Results show a distinct difference in the upset rate for different configurations of the on-chip cache, as well as proving that one vendor is superior to the other in terms of latchup susceptibility. Results from this testing were also used to provide a mean-time-between-failure estimate of the 486-DX4 operating in the radiation environment for the International Space Station.
The Xilinx Virtex-II Pro is a platform FPGA that embeds multiple microprocessors within the fabric of an SRAM-based reprogrammable FPGA. The variety and quantity of resources provided by this family of devices make them very attractive for spaceflight applications. However, these devices will be susceptible to single event effects (SEE), which must be mitigated. To use the Virtex-II Pro reliably in space applications, these devices must first be tested to determine if they are susceptible to single event latchup (SEL), the degree to which they are susceptible to single event upsets (SEU) and single event transients (SET), and how these effects are manifested in the device. With this information, mitigations schemes can be developed and tested that address the specific susceptiblities of these devices. This initial SEE test uses a commercial off the shelf Virtex-II Pro evaluation board, with a single processor XC2VP7 FPGA. The FPGA on this board is an acid etched device, which can be partially covered with a shield. The shield covers a portion of the logic, routing, and memory resources along with some of the RocketIO transceivers. The processor, along with a large portion of logic, routing, memory, and transceivers are left exposed. This test will be performed at the Cyclotron Laboratories at Texas A&M University and Michigan State University using ions of varying energy levels and fluencies.
This viewgraph presentation provides an overview of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), what they are, implementations in space missions, and current available technologies. Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Single Event Transients (SETs) are discussed in relation to their effects on FPGAs. Testing goals, considerations, and data analysis are reviewed.
Commercial digital signal processors (DSPs) for use in high-speed satellite computers are challenged by the damaging effects of space radiation, mainly single event upsets (SEUs) and single event functional interrupts (SEFIs). Innovations have been developed for mitigating the effects of SEUs and SEFIs, enabling the use of very-highspeed commercial DSPs with improved SEU tolerances. Time-triple modular redundancy (TTMR) is a method of applying traditional triple modular redundancy on a single processor, exploiting the VLIW (very long instruction word) class of parallel processors. TTMR improves SEU rates substantially. SEFIs are solved by a SEFI-hardened core circuit, external to the microprocessor. It monitors the health of the processor, and if a SEFI occurs, forces the processor to return to performance through a series of escalating events. TTMR and hardened-core solutions were developed for both DSPs and reconfigurable field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). This includes advancement of TTMR algorithms for DSPs and reconfigurable FPGAs, plus a rad-hard, hardened-core integrated circuit that services both the DSP and FPGA. Additionally, a combined DSP and FPGA board architecture was fully developed into a rad-hard engineering product. This technology enables use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) DSPs in computers for satellite and other space applications, allowing rapid deployment at a much lower cost. Traditional rad-hard space computers are very expensive and typically have long lead times. These computers are either based on traditional rad-hard processors, which have extremely low computational performance, or triple modular redundant (TMR) FPGA arrays, which suffer from power and complexity issues. Even more frustrating is that the TMR arrays of FPGAs require a fixed, external rad-hard voting element, thereby causing them to lose much of their reconfiguration capability and in some cases significant speed reduction. The benefits of COTS high-performance signal processing include significant increase in onboard science data processing, enabling orders of magnitude reduction in required communication bandwidth for science data return, orders of magnitude improvement in onboard mission planning and critical decision making, and the ability to rapidly respond to changing mission environments, thus enabling opportunistic science and orders of magnitude reduction in the cost of mission operations through reduction of required staff. Additional benefits of COTS-based, high-performance signal processing include the ability to leverage considerable commercial and academic investments in advanced computing tools, techniques, and infra structure, and the familiarity of the science and IT community with these computing environments.
We present results and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to proton and heavy ion induced single event effects (SEE), proton-induced displacement damage (DD), and total ionizing dose (TID). Introduction: This paper is a summary of test results.NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment is often limited by its susceptibility to single event effects (SEE), total ionizing dose (TID), and displacement damage (DD). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is quite difficult. Given the rapidly changing nature of technology, radiation test data are most often application-specific and adequate understanding of the test conditions is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), single-event transient (SET), TID, enhanced low dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS), and DD effects.
NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment are often limited by their susceptibility to single event effects (SEE). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is and adequate understanding of the test condition is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), and single-event transient (SET). For total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage dose (DDD) results, see a companion paper submitted to the 2015 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC) Radiation Effects Data Workshop (REDW) entitled "compendium of Current Total Ionizing Dose and Displacement Damage for Candidate Spacecraft Electronics for NASA by M. Campola, et al.
The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment is often limited by susceptibility to single-event effects (SEE), total ionizing dose (TID), and displacement damage (DD). Interpreting the results of SEE, TID, and DD testing of complex devices is quite difficult given the rapidly changing nature of both technology and the related radiation issues. Radiation testing is performed to establish the sensitivities of candidate spacecraft electronics to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), single-event transients (SETs), TID, and DD effects. Knowing where to search for these test results is a valuable resource for the aerospace engineer or spacecraft design engineer. This poster is intended to be a resource tool for finding radiation test data.
To enable autonomy in space, machine-learning and computer vision applications become invaluable for sensor processing. However, these algorithms are computationally complex and unfeasible for many embedded central processing units (CPUs) and usually require external coprocessors, such as graphics processing units (GPUs) or accelerators specific to the application, including application specific integrated circuits (ASICs). In power-constrained systems, GPUs tend to consume more power than is acceptable (>40W), so lower-power accelerators have shown promise to provide the performance needed under spacecraft constraints. For radiation engineers, developing methodologies that can properly test CPUs, GPUs, and accelerators, and enable comparisons between them remains a necessary complication to solve as the devices become more complex. The methodology in this test aims to be a start in developing a baseline single-event effect (SEE) test for client-device machine learning accelerators. This category of devices do not host their own operating system. This testing campaign is a continuation of a previous 200 MeV proton test performed in January 2024. This report covers two heavy ion tests of the SAKURA-I card: one in April 2024, and one in June 2024. Additional data was needed after the April test due to ion-range issues experienced at higher linear-energy transfers (LETs). These range issues are described in more detail in Section 8. This experiment characterizes SEEs and data error susceptibility of the EdgeCortix SAKURA-I machine-learning accelerator under heavy ions. The device was monitored for single event upsets (SEUs) and single event functional interrupts (SEFIs) at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s 88-inch cyclotron. The SAKURA-I board accelerates machine-learning inference applications on a host computer through a PCIex16 connection. For the purposes of devising an end to end automated analysis workflow for this experiment, the YOLO-V5 and SSD300 objection-detection models, and the ResNet-50, EfficientNet, and MobileNetV2 image classification models were used as a representative suite of analytical machine-learning models.
Report describes experimental study of use of microelectronic advanced laser scanner (MEALS) to cause single-event upsets (SEUs) in integrated logic circuits. Basic concepts of SEU testing by use of MEALS described in "Laser Scanner Tests for Single-Event Upsets" (NPO-18216), "Single-Event-Upset Laser Scanner With Optical Bias" (NPO-18217), and "More About Laser Scanner Tests for Single-Event Upsets" (NPO-18494). Study part of continuing effort to study SEU effects of ionizing radiation on such circuits and to use MEALS as relatively inexpensive SEU-prescreening laboratory apparatus serving as alternative to heavy-ion acclerator.
This presentation on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) Devices will include challenges for critical applications and space radiation environments, Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and FPGA configuration, Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and FPGA data paths, and fail-safe strategies for critical applications.
Mathematical models represent single-event upset in bipolar memory chips. Physics of single-event upset in integrated circuits discussed in theoretical paper. Pair of companion reports present mathematical models to predict critical charges for producing single-event upset in bipolar randomaccess memory (RAM) chips.