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SpaceVPX Interoperability Assessment

The existing VMEbus (VersaModular Eurocard bus) International Trade Association (VITA)-78 industry standard, also known as SpaceVPX, is an avionics board- and chassis-level standard derived from the OpenVPX standard as defined in VITA-65. While VITA-65 defines backplane and board-level profiles from COTS vendors to ensure interoperability of products used in developing systems and subsystems, the VITA-78 standard defines SpaceVPX to incorporate fault tolerance features that are required by many spaceflight systems. However, VITA-78 allows so much flexibility that interoperability between modules cannot be assured. This assessment provides guidelines on the use of, and extensions to, the VITA-78 standard to enable avionics interoperability for future NASA missions. The assessment team was comprised of subject matter experts (SMEs) from Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), Johnson Space Center (JSC), and Langley Research Center (LaRC). The team included valuable external consulting support from a SME who was a key participant in the development of the VITA-78 standard. The team had extensive collaboration with the NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) High Performance Spaceflight Computing (HPSC) project, specifically in the development of SpaceVPX interconnect findings, observations, and NESC recommendations. To provide an understanding of the breadth of implementations that SpaceVPX must accommodate, multiple NASA use cases were analyzed to assess the requirements for SpaceVPX implementations across a wide range of NASA missions (Appendix C). Applications included crewed missions, science missions, and orbital and surface robotic systems. Product surveys were conducted to assess the level of industry support for SpaceVPX, applications, and the variations in their implementations (Appendix D). In-depth analysis was conducted in the areas of: (a) power management and distribution, (b) form factors and daughtercards, (c) interconnect, and (d) fault tolerance. Leveraging the use cases, product surveys, and SMEs from multiple NASA Centers, these areas were analyzed to determine the range of implementations permitted by the VITA-78 standard and potential interoperability issues. Applicable findings and NESC recommendations were provided for each area. During this assessment, there were multiple opportunities to engage with other agencies to learn about their interest in SpaceVPX, their strategies for implementing SpaceVPX-based systems, and their internal development efforts. These engagements also generated findings and NESC recommendations. Based on this assessment analysis, NESC recommendations were made regarding the feature set and module profiles to support NASA SpaceVPX implementations. This feature set includes restrictions on features in VITA-78, and extensions to the standard. Key recommendations in this area include the use of 10 Gigabit Ethernet and Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIe) as high bandwidth interconnect on the backplane, the retention of SpaceWire interconnect for control functions, and support for 3U (unit) and 6U, form factors for NASA systems. Restrictions were proposed on the usage of user-defined signals to promote interoperability, and specific power managements and distribution schemes for 3U systems. Beyond the technical implementation of SpaceVPX, recommendations were made on areas that warrant further investigation. Primary among these is the recommendation for NASA to collaborate with other space-going agencies and industry to incorporate recommendations into a future ‘dot spec’ of VITA-78. This would ensure wide adoption and availability of the modules that comply with the specification. The assessment includes appendices with candidate module profiles that can be considered as a starting point for this activity, and example systems based on the recommendations. Follow-on studies are recommended for architectures beyond SpaceVPX to address potential enhancements including condensed set of interconnect, software required to implement protocol layers on the interconnect (and other features), alternative power architectures, and system-level testability.

SpaceVPX↗

Application of Acoustical Holography for Projecting Near-Field Data to the Far Field

In this report, the application of the acoustical holography (AH) technique for projecting near-field acoustic data to the far field is discussed. Test problems will be used to showcase the accuracy and utility of this technique and to demonstrate its superiority over the more common technique of spherical spreading projection. Three versions of the technique will be presented: planar, cylindrical, and spherical. Depending on the nature of the acoustic field, one or more of these versions may be useful and practical to use. Since the cylindrical and spherical versions depend on the accurate numerical computations of certain special functions, such as the Hankel functions and the associated Legendre polynomials, the implementation of the high-precision numerical computation of the required special functions on a computer are included in the appendixes at the end of the report. In some cases, the material presented in these appendixes represents a substantial extension of the results previously published in the open literature. As appropriate, special considerations associated with the use of the AH technique in practical situations are discussed.

Holography↗

Human Landing System (HLS) Program Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Compatibility Interface Requirements Document (IRD)

The purpose of this document is to establish a set of EVA compatibility design requirements for the HLS Program. This document contains the fundamental information required for building hardware compatible with suited EVA flight crewmembers to perform EVAs. Compatibility requirements are located in section 3.0 with a gravity field applicability table provided in APPENDIX G, Human Landing System Program Applicability Matrix. Each HLS Provider will use the EHP-provided matrix in Appendix G to assess applicability to the awarded mission provider on a per-mission basis. Providers will negotiate applicability with EHP, and this will be documented in the appropriate Annex (reference section 2.2)

Christine N Kovich↗

Plug20 Test Report: Particle Image Velocimetry (PIV) Measurements

This report provides turbulent flow statistics made using particle image velocimetry (PIV) for several internally mixed exhaust systems with external plugs (Plug20 designs). The tests were conducted at the NASA Glenn Research Center’s Aero-Acoustic Propulsion Laboratory (AAPL) in May and June 2022. The corresponding acoustic data for the configurations and flows presented in this report can be found in an earlier Technical Memorandum, NASA/TM-20210010291, “Plug20 Test Report.” The Plug20 nozzle family was designed to represent commercial supersonic vehicles in the 2025 to 2035 timeframe with a bypass ratio around 4, having an internal mixer, with and without an external plug to improve nacelle boattail drag and shock. The flow conditions measured represent engine cycles for commercial supersonic aircraft at takeoff, having pressure ratios of 2.0 and heated fan and core streams, measured both with and without a flight stream surrounding the plume. A few unheated flow conditions were also tested to tie results to other baseline test results. The PIV measurements in both streamwise and cross-stream planes are described, along with brief analysis to visually catalog the contents and confirm their validity. In this analysis, the streamwise PIV is found to match benchmark datasets within its experimental error. However, the cross-stream turbulent quantities measured by two systems do not match each other or the streamwise measurements in amplitude—caution is required when using the cross-stream data. Data acquired and included in this report are (1) velocity statistics of the plumes in both a streamwise and several cross-stream planes, and (2) the hot nozzle geometry. Tabular forms of the data and computer-aided design (CAD) files of the hot geometry are presented as supplemental files described in Appendix A (TM-20230006779SUPPL1.zip) and Appendix B (TM-20230006779SUPPL2.zip).

Turbulence↗

Summary of Additional In-situ Cloud Data in High Ice Water Content Conditions from Three Recent Flight Campaigns

In-situ measurements of cloud Total Water Content and ice particle Median Mass Diameter have been previously collected during the High Altitude Ice Crystal – High Ice Water Content (HAIC-HIWC) and HIWC RADAR I flight campaigns. These measurements have been provided to an Ice Crystal Icing Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee to assess Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14CFR) Part 33 Appendix D, and recommend possible changes to the envelopes contained therein. Since then, NASA and the FAA have completed three additional flight campaigns in similar clouds. This article examines these new measurements and any impact they might have on Appendix D assessment. The addition of the new flight campaign data had little effect on previous estimates of the properties of high total water content regions of clouds. Some new information on the occurrence of graupel particles may be important to some ice crystal icing applications.

Aircraft Icing, Aircraft Instrumentation, Airspeed↗

Evidence Report: Risk of Renal Stone Formation

Kidney stone formation and passage has the potential to greatly impact mission success and crewmember health, especially for long-duration missions. Alterations in hydration state (relative dehydration), spaceflight-induced changes in urine biochemistry (urine super-saturation), and bone metabolism (increased calcium excretion) during exposure to microgravity may increase the risk of kidney stone formation. There are possible countermeasures and treatments available that are used terrestrially that may then be applied to spaceflight. Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) are used throughout this document to communicate spaceflight conditions that may lead to renal stone formation, the countermeasures that may be used to prevent their formation, and possible treatment modalities. The DAGs are sorted by strength of evidence, according to Table 6. Additionally, for the full Renal Stone Evidence Report Content: Directed Acyclic Graphs and Evidence Report, please see Appendix A, Expanded Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) and Evidence. Additionally, a proposed Concept of Operations for the Prevention, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Renal Stones for a Mars Mission was created in conjunction with and to complement this Evidence Report update. Please see Appendix B, Proposed Expanded Concept of Operations for the Prevention, Diagnosis and Treatment of Renal Stones for Mars Missions, for the full report. Areas in the following Evidence Report will be cross-linked to scenarios from the Concept of Operations.

Emily Stratton↗

Expansion of Check-Cases for 6DOF Simulation

This is the Appendix containing a description of the solution for Case 1 in the assessment, “Expansion of Check-Cases for 6DOF Simulation”. For cases of spherical gravity, it is possible to provide a two-body solution without recourse to numerical integration and thus it is accurate to machine precision. Python code for a Keplerian Propagator (propagate.py) which produced a reference trajectory for Case 1 is provided in this appendix. There is also code for generating test cases which was used as an independent verification of the propagator. This is a high-level description of the algorithm employed. The documentation of each function includes implementation details, including equations for each task.

Modeling↗

Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate: Moon to Mars Architecture Definition Document

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) explores the unknown in air and space, innovates for the benefit of humanity, and inspires the world through discovery. Extending the reach of humanity through the human exploration of the Moon, Mars, and beyond is key to that mission. NASA’s Moon to Mars Strategy and Objectives document establishes long-term goals and objectives for crewed deep space exploration; however, satisfying NASA’s Moon to Mars Objectives requires an innovative approach to the definition, management, and execution of NASA’s Moon to Mars Architecture. An architecture offers a high-level unifying structure and defines a system. It provides rules, guidelines, and constraints that define a cohesive and coherent framework that identifies constituent parts, relationships, and connections and establishes how those parts fit and work together. This Architecture Definition Document (ADD) establishes the process for the decomposition of objectives empowers the agency’s success in achieving human exploration of the cosmos. NASA updates this document annually to reflect the maturation of the architecture and the progress NASA and partners make toward achieving exploration objectives. The ADD is not a manifest or requirements document. Instead, it serves as a tool for the programs, projects, and engineers who will implement and execute NASA’s bold ambitions for crewed exploration of deep space. As established in the Moon to Mars Strategy and Objectives, “Why” we explore encompasses three pillars: Science, Inspiration, and National Posture. Ensuring success in all three areas requires an architectural approach that incorporates innovation, collaboration, and partnerships that can be sustained across a multi-decadal effort. This second revision (Rev-B) of the ADD, developed to support NASA’s 2024 Architecture Concept Review (ACR), incorporates several key updates to support the continued evolution of the architecture. Since the last revision of the ADD, NASA has significantly improved the clarity of the objective decomposition, which distills exploration objectives into the characteristics and needs and use cases and functions needed to achieve them. The updated decomposition incorporates findings from internal studies and diverse stakeholder feedback. A model-based systems engineering approach ensures coherence and consistency, removing inconsistency and repetition. Revision B also incorporates advancements to NASA’s Mars architecture, including insight into initial capabilities, systems, and operations necessary to support the Humans to Mars segment. Updates to objective decomposition for Mars add significant detail to the ADD and hint at areas of forward work and future study. An appendix adds greater depth in the future decisions needed for Mars that will drive lunar needs. They are not the only decisions to be made, but they will have huge effects on subsequent decisions. NASA continues to introduce new exploration systems into the architecture. Two new elements — initial surface habitat and lunar surface cargo lander—successfully passed mission concept review in 2024 as a result of extensive analysis, concept refinement, and studies. These elements and their respective reference missions appear in this revision. NASA also continues to apply architecture processes to cross-agency efforts and coordination with external stakeholders by including definitions of architecture technology gaps — essential areas for engagement across and beyond the agency. The technology gaps appendix identifies areas that need attention and innovation to enable future exploration. In publishing this information, NASA communicates the technologies and capabilities that may benefit from partnership with industry, academia, other U.S. government agencies, and international space agencies. Ultimately, NASA established the Moon to Mars Architecture approach to communicate and facilitate humanity’s journey into the universe according to the principles and recurring tenets of NASA’s Moon to Mars Strategy and Objectives. The NASA architecture team thanks their many stakeholders, participants, and partners for their efforts to review and provide feedback. Their support has been critical to the success of this approach.

Elements↗

Mechanics of Preloaded Bolt Tensile Loading With Focus on Load Introduction Factor

The bolt tensile and joint separation loads are directly influenced by the locations at which the external loads enter the clamped members of a preloaded bolted joint (PBJ) and the associated load-paths through the joint. This physical load introduction mechanism affecting the bolt tensile loading is typically represented in the bolt tensile load equation, in part, by a load introduction factor (LIF), which was shown by H.M. Lee of Marshall Spaceflight Center to be a natural product of the bolt tensile load equation using a linear spring stiffness model. This LIF, being a function of load-path stiffness, has subsequently been denoted as the stiffness-based LIF (SBLIF), providing a framework to calculate the LIF using whatever load-path stiffness approximations are appropriate. Expanding upon the work of Lee, it is shown that the SBLIF and the joint stiffness factor are functions of the stiffnesses of the same load-paths and regions within a PBJ, and thus they should not be treated as independent variables. Mathematical expressions for the SBLIF are presented. Comparisons are shown between the analytically calculated SBLIF, the analytically calculated geometric LIF (GLIF), which is a simple clamped-member thickness ratio, the experimentally derived LIF, and the LIF determined by finite element analysis (FEA). Using experiment and FEA as a benchmark, the SBLIF, using traditional load-path stiffness approximations, enables a more accurate prediction of bolt tensile loading than the GLIF, although it can be unconservative near joint separation. The GLIF generally attributes more of the externally applied tensile load to the bolt than does the SBLIF, potentially resulting in heavier and/or more costly bolted joints. Mathematical relationships between the SBLIF and the GLIF are developed. Supplemental material is provided in the appendixes where the historical practice of using the joint compressive stiffness in place of the joint tensile stiffness is evaluated. The appendixes include step-by-step examples demonstrating the calculation of the SBLIF using traditional stiffness approximations and conclude with the development of the joint diagram in terms of the SBLIF, culminating into formulas for the key features of a joint diagram, which is useful for programming.

Load Path↗

RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY STATION DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PIT DISASSEMBLY AND CONVERSION PROJECT

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has developed prototype equipment to demonstrate remote surveying of Inner and Outer DOE Standard 3013 containers for fixed and transferable contamination in accordance with DOE Standard 3013 and 10 CFR 835 Appendix B. When fully developed the equipment will be part of a larger suite of equipment used to package material in accordance with DOE Standard 3013 at the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Project slated for installation at the Savannah River Site. The prototype system consists of a small six-axis industrial robot with an end effector consisting of a force sensor, vacuum gripper and a three fingered pneumatic gripper. The work cell also contains two alpha survey instruments, swipes, swipe dispenser, and other ancillary equipment. An external controller interfaces with the robot controller, survey instruments and other ancillary equipment to control the overall process. SRNL is developing automated equipment for the Pit Disassembly and Conversion (PDC) Project that is slated for the Savannah River Site (SRS). The equipment being developed is automated packaging equipment for packaging plutonium bearing materials in accordance with DOE-STD-3013-2004. The subject of this paper is the development of a prototype Radiological Survey Station (RSS). Other automated equipment being developed for the PDC includes the Bagless transfer System, Outer Can Welder, Gantry Robot System (GRS) and Leak Test Station. The purpose of the RSS is to perform a frisk and swipe of the DOE Standard 3013 Container (either inner can or outer can) to check for fixed and transferable contamination. This is required to verify that the contamination levels are within the limits specified in DOE-STD-3013-2004 and 10 CFR 835, Appendix D. The surface contamination limit for the 3013 Outer Can (OC) is 500 dpm/100 cm2 (total) and 20 dpm/100 cm2 (transferable). This paper will concentrate on the RSS developments for the 3013 OC but the system for the 3013 Inner Can (IC) is nearly identical.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

ADDITIONAL STRESS AND FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSES OF PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL NOZZLES

In past years, the authors have undertaken various studies of nozzles in both boiling water reactors (BWRs) and pressurized water reactors (PWRs) located in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) adjacent to the core beltline region. Those studies described stress and fracture mechanics analyses performed to assess various RPV nozzle geometries, which were selected based on their proximity to the core beltline region, i.e., those nozzle configurations that are located close enough to the core region such that they may receive sufficient fluence prior to end-of-life (EOL) to require evaluation of embrittlement as part of the RPV analyses associated with pressure-temperature (P-T) limits. In this paper, additional stress and fracture analyses are summarized that were performed for additional PWR nozzles with the following objectives: To expand the population of PWR nozzle configurations evaluated, which was limited in the previous work to just two nozzles (one inlet and one outlet nozzle). To model and understand differences in stress results obtained for an internal pressure load case using a two-dimensional (2-D) axi-symmetric finite element model (FEM) vs. a three-dimensional (3-D) FEM for these PWR nozzles. In particular, the ovalization (stress concentration) effect of two intersecting cylinders, which is typical of RPV nozzle configurations, was investigated. To investigate the applicability of previously recommended linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) hand solutions for calculating the Mode I stress intensity factor for a postulated nozzle corner crack for pressure loading for these PWR nozzles. These analyses were performed to further expand earlier work completed to support potential revision and refinement of Title 10 to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Requirements, and are intended to supplement similar evaluation of nozzles presented at the 2008, 2009, and 2011 Pressure Vessels and Piping (PVP) Conferences. This work is also relevant to the ongoing efforts of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, Section XI, Working Group on Operating Plant Criteria (WGOPC) efforts to incorporate nozzle fracture mechanics solutions into a revision to ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Nonmandatory Appendix G.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

In-service Inspection Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds for Assessing Flaw Density and Size Distribution per 10 CFR 50.61a, Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements

Pressurized thermal shock (PTS) events are system transients in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) in which there is a rapid operating temperature cool-down that results in cold vessel temperatures with or without repressurization of the vessel. The rapid cooling of the inside surface of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) causes thermal stresses that can combine with stresses caused by high pressure. The aggregate effect of these stresses is an increase in the potential for fracture if a pre-existing flaw is present in a material susceptible to brittle failure. The ferritic, low alloy steel of the reactor vessel beltline adjacent to the core, where neutron radiation gradually embrittles the material over the lifetime of the plant, can be susceptible to brittle fracture. The PTS rule, described in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Section 50.61 (§50.61), “Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events,” adopted on July 23, 1985, establishes screening criteria to ensure that the potential for a reactor vessel to fail due to a PTS event is deemed to be acceptably low. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a research program that concluded that the risk of through-wall cracking due to a PTS event is much lower than previously estimated. The NRC subsequently developed a rule, §50.61a, published on January 4, 2010, entitled “Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events” (75 FR 13). Use of the new rule by licensees is optional. The §50.61a rule differs from §50.61 in that it requires licensees who choose to follow this alternate method to analyze the results from periodic volumetric examinations required by the ASME Code, Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection (ISI) of Nuclear Power Plants. These analyses are intended to determine if the actual flaw density and size distribution in the licensee’s reactor vessel beltline welds are bounded by the flaw density and size distribution values used in the PTS technical basis. Under a contract with the NRC, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been working on a program to assess the ability of current inservice inspection (ISI)-ultrasonic testing (UT) techniques, as qualified through ASME Code, Appendix VIII, Supplements 4 and 6, to detect small fabrication or inservice-induced flaws located in RPV welds and adjacent base materials. As part of this effort, the investigators have pursued an evaluation, based on the available information, of the capability of UT to provide flaw density/distribution inputs for making RPV weld assessments in accordance with §50.61a. This paper presents the results of an evaluation of data from the 1993 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, Spirit of Appendix VIII reactor vessel examination, a comparison of the flaw density/distribution from this data with the distribution in §50.61a, possible reasons for differences, and plans and recommendations for further work in this area.

alloy 82/182↗

Risk considerations for WIPP passive institutional controls - 15173

The regulatory assurance measures for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) include such things as active and passive institutional controls, monitoring, waste retrieval/removal capabilities and engineered barriers. Passive Institutional Controls (PICs) are an assurance measure intended to reduce the likelihood of humans unintentionally intruding the WIPP geologic radioactive waste disposal system for thousands of years after it is closed. The waste repository is designed such that it should not pose a significant risk to future populations if it is left undisturbed. The design has also been demonstrated through a performance assessment (PA) analysis to not pose a significant risk to future generations even if it is intruded upon by an inadvertent drilling intrusion [1, Appendix PA]. Through PA, it has been determined that the overall risk of the disposal system to people and the environment is small. The intent of the regulatory Assurance Requirements and PICs is to provide additional confidence that the repository will perform as expected after closure. However, the actual implementation of the proposed PICs design may pose a greater risk to the current population than they would potentially reduce for future generations. Specifically, the risks due to industrial accidents, construction and transportation risks incurred during the fabrication and construction of the permanent markers system may be greater than the overall reduction in risk to future generations due to the existence of the permanent markers. If this were true, implementation of the current PICs design may be counter to the intention of the regulatory requirement to include such assurance measures. As such, provisions for assurance measures used in geologic radioactive waste disposal facilities, such as PICs, should consider risk impacts. A provision of any disposal program's Regulatory Assurance Requirements should address the impacts of the known risks from all the components of the assurance-related systems. The initial WIPP PICs design was developed as part of the regulatory certification process in 1996 with the intent of being revised when the WIPP closes several decades from now [2, Appendix PIC]. The revised design that will be developed at closure should address the design's potential reduction to long-term risks from the repository and the risks due to the implementation of the final design. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Certification of RadICS FPGA-based platform under US NRC requirements - 386

The paper discusses approach, applicable to certify digital instrumentation and control (I and C) platform under US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. Currently, Radics LLC is certifying its Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)-based RadICS Platform using Platform-based test specimen. The Platform has been recently certified under IEC 61508 to meet Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 3 requirements. Up to now Radics LLC has developed a number of FPGA-based I and C applications based on RadICS Platform. Those applications include applications based on customer's specification and reverse engineering applications (Fit, Form and Function reproduction of existing equipment). The life cycles of applications include independent verification and validation of FPGA-based I and C systems/components, Commercial Grade Dedication of components for FPGA-based I and C systems, turnkey implementation of I and C project, supply of hardware, engineering tools and application design process. The paper also describes in details certification approach, which is based on Digital I and C-ISG- 06 and includes the following stages: general agreement with the US NRC, Topical Report submittal, timely responses and successful audits, and timely issuance of approved Topical Report. Such approach is supported by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Quality Management System, which is also discussed in the paper. In addition, an overview of RadICS Platform Topical Report is presented, including its overview and structure, certification scope and obligatory appendixes. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluating Age Effects on HEPA Filter Performance

Nuclear grade high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are routinely employed as the final control element in confinement ventilation systems. The traditional HEPA filter utilizes a pleated filter medium of fibrous glass that has been produced in a manner analogous to manufacturing paper. These filters are the physically weakest element in a containment ventilation system. Containment ventilation systems are designed to condition the air-stream (temperature, relative humidity, moisture, particle size distribution of aerosols, and aerosol concentration) to levels/conditions that fibrous glass HEPA filters can handle. Approximately 6000 nuclear grade HEPA filters are purchased each year for use in the DOE/NNSA complex. Additional filters are purchased for use in commercial nuclear power generation and ventilation systems of other nuclear applications. These filters are designed and tested in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) AG-1 Code Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment. This code establishes design requirements and qualification procedures. Qualification testing of axial flow filters is described in paragraphs 5000 and following of AG-1. The series of qualification tests are intended to describe the operating envelope of HEPA filters and verify the reliability of a filter design. AG-1 qualification also confirms the pedigree of components used in manufacture for that filter design. The collective set of qualification tests establishes the assumed operating envelope for AG-1 filters. The effects of age on HEPA filter performance have been a concern for at least two decades. A combination of physical evaluation of aged filter media and a review of filter failure records resulted in Appendix C of the Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook (NACH), Determination of HEPA Filter Life. This states that HEPA filters are not to be used beyond 10 years from the date of manufacture. Additionally, filters put into service in locations where they may become wet are to be taken out of service five years from date of manufacture. Filters that have become wet are to be taken out of service immediately. Finally, it should also be pointed out that filters held in Level B storage are subject to the same 10-year service life. Very limited bench-scale testing in the 1990's raised concern that aging HEPA filters do not have the strength to withstand an accident scenario. In May of 1999, the DNFSB released a Technical Report 23 entitled HEPA Filters Used in the Department of Energy's Hazardous Facilities. This report expressed concerns for the potential vulnerability of HEPA filters in vital safety systems. Concerns and uncertainty associated with degradation of HEPA filter performance over time led the DOE sites to limit HEPA filter service life to 10 years from the date of manufacture or five years in cases where filters may become wet. Establishment of a conservative service life needs to be based on data from a structured series of tests comparing the performance envelope of new and aged full-scale filters. A service life that is insufficiently conservative endangers workers and the public. One that is excessively conservative costs can cause hundreds of otherwise unnecessary filter changes. This increases exposure of employees, disrupts facility operations, and increase disposal costs by millions of dollars annually. Conclusive data are needed to resolve uncertainty associated with the damaging effects of aging on durability of HEPA filters. Therefore, this study needs to provide a sufficient body of evidence to allow DOE and site professionals to make prudent decisions. An updated version of ASME AG-1 Section FC included a non-mandatory appendix that would include the DOE guidance for service life of HEPA filters. Balloting of this revision generated significant resistance to inclusion of any kind of service life language citing the lack of supporting experimental data. Efforts to resolve negative votes failed and resistance to acceptance of the language increased. The result has been to not include service language in Section FC and requests to remove it from sections that already include such language. The recent activity of the ASME AG-1 Committee on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment effectively de-emphasizes following DoE's service life guidelines. The DOE Office of Nuclear Safety under its NSR and D program provided the Mississippi State University Institute for Clean Energy Technology (ICET) finding to initiate a study to determine the effects of aging on AG-1 axial flow filters just prior to actions taken within the AG-1 committee regarding service life. The NSR and D funding facilitated timely development of a national technical working group comprised of members from the regulatory community, DOE complex, and commercial power to resolve uncertainty associated with effects of aging. The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) has been funding the ICET to evaluate the performance envelope for AG-1 HEPA filters. ICET is one of DOE-EM's qualified suppliers. Synergy has been achieved by associating the NSR and D aged filter activities to testing activities evaluating the performance envelopes of separator and separator-less AG-1 HEPA filters funded by DOE-EM. The DOE-EM funded activities establish baseline data for the aged filter study and future EM funding will provide long term support for testing additional aged filters. EM funding of new filters includes analytical evaluation of media tensile strength by thermal analysis to establish baseline values and determine mass loss of moisture resistance and acrylic binders due to use. All of these values can be used for comparison of test results for aged filters. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

A New Look at Historic CRAC 'Divergence' Experiments - Implications for a CAAS Minimum Accident of Concern

This paper examines power history parameters and results based on historic fissile solution criticality 'divergence' experiments (referenced here as Divergence Experiments) from the 1960's-70's' Consequences Radiologiques d'un Accident de Criticite' (CRAC) campaign. The results from specific Divergence Experiments have implications for an ANSI/ANS-8.3 (1997) Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Minimum Accident of Concern (MAC). Specifically, this paper examines select CRAC Divergence Experiments in conjunction with 'qualifying reactivity additions' for a MAC defined by an absolute time constraint. A previous paper presented at the 2011 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality (ICNC 2011) illustrated the differences in 'qualifying reactivity additions' above delayed critical (and below prompt) for a variety of MAC constructs. That paper was the first to examine delayed critical kinetics in greater detail over a range of process and MAC considerations. The ICNC2011 work did not consider an absolute MAC time constraint from the excursion onset and assumed an initial excursion power. That study evaluated MAC constructs based on 'relative time differences' between reaching a specific fission rate and total fissions. The work presented here thus picks up where the ICNC2011 study left off. The primary focus of this work provides simulated power histories for specific Divergence Experiments that served as a basis for justifying a MAC noted in ANS-8.3 Appendix A. This paper documents computational modeling and dynamic multiphysics simulation with known Divergence Experiment parameters for reactivity additions at, below, and above the reported terminal reactivity. The initial step considers replicating what could be a reasonable power history for the terminal reactivity addition to the extent the same peak power and total fissions are obtained over the total time considered. Power histories for all other reactivity additions are simulated by varying the input reactivity and solution heights for the same model. A relationship is obtained between reactivity addition and the time to reach specific MAC power and fission levels within a given time constraint (e.g. 60 s). The 'qualifying reactivity addition' is determined for the total MAC fissions within that time. This value is then compared to the historic terminal value (e.g. $0.33) or any other values (e.g. 'excess reactivity of only a few cents') noted in ANS-8.3 Appendix A. In general, calculated MAC power levels have ranged from 1.8 kW to 173 kW depending on material type and form, H/U, enrichment, critical volume, and dose response function. A minimum accident consideration noted a SHEBA experiment with an excess reactivity 7 cents above delayed critical (TD ∼110 s). This excursion provided an additional 10{sup 15} fissions after an undetermined buildup time resulting in a 'few times 10{sup 15} fissions'. ICNC 2011 LEU solutions calculations show 0.2 Gy in air corresponds to 1.4 x10{sup 16} fissions. Thus, while historically, 0.2 Gy has been loosely associated with 'several times 10{sup 15} fissions', in reality, the actual total fissions could be an order of magnitude larger, and the power associated with 0.2 Gy/min (7.5 kW) larger as well. The reactivity addition required to obtain the actual 0.2 Gy total fissions over 60 s could be much larger than considered. Another reason the qualifying reactivity level could be larger than previously noted, involves temperature reactivity feedback. Compensated reactivity results in a departure from a pure exponential power rise, increasing the doubling time (TD) as the excursion approaches peak power. Uncompensated reactivity additions and constant TD have been traditionally assumed for a pure exponential power rise through the kW range to determine either total MAC fissions, power, or arrival time to these values.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Criticality Safety Controls and the Safety Basis at PFP

With the implementation of DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, and DOE-STD-3007-2007, 'Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities', a new requirement was imposed that all criticality safety controls be evaluated for inclusion in the facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and that the evaluation process be documented in the site Criticality Safety Program Description Document (CSPDD). At the Hanford site in Washington State the CSPDD, HNF-31695, 'General Description of the FH Criticality Safety Program', requires each facility develop a linking document called a Criticality Control Review (CCR) to document performance of these evaluations. Chapter 5, Appendix 5B of HNF-7098, Criticality Safety Program, provided an example of a format for a CCR that could be used in lieu of each facility developing its own CCR. Since the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is presently undergoing Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D), new procedures are being developed for cleanout of equipment and systems that have not been operated in years. Existing Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) are revised, or new ones written, to develop the controls required to support D&D activities. Other Hanford facilities, including PFP, had difficulty using the basic CCR out of HNF-7098 when first implemented. Interpretation of the new guidelines indicated that many of the controls needed to be elevated to TSR level controls. Criterion 2 of the standard, requiring that the consequence of a criticality be examined for establishing the classification of a control, was not addressed. Upon in-depth review by PFP Criticality Safety staff, it was not clear that the programmatic interpretation of criterion 8C could be applied at PFP. Therefore, the PFP Criticality Safety staff decided to write their own CCR. The PFP CCR provides additional guidance for the evaluation team to use by clarifying the evaluation criteria in DOE-STD-3007-2007. In reviewing documents used in classifying controls for Nuclear Safety, it was noted that DOE-HDBK-1188, 'Glossary of Environment, Health, and Safety Terms', defines an Administrative Control (AC) in terms that are different than typically used in Criticality Safety. As part of this CCR, a new term, Criticality Administrative Control (CAC) was defined to clarify the difference between an AC used for criticality safety and an AC used for nuclear safety. In Nuclear Safety terms, an AC is a provision relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, assessment, and reporting necessary to ensure safe operation of a facility. A CAC was defined as an administrative control derived in a criticality safety analysis that is implemented to ensure double contingency. According to criterion 2 of Section IV, 'Linkage to the Documented Safety Analysis', of DOESTD-3007-2007, the consequence of a criticality should be examined for the purposes of classifying the significance of a control or component. HNF-PRO-700, 'Safety Basis Development', provides control selection criteria based on consequence and risk that may be used in the development of a Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) to establish the classification of a component as a design feature, as safety class or safety significant, i.e., an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), or as equipment important to safety; or merely provides defense-in-depth. Similar logic is applied to the CACs. Criterion 8C of DOE-STD-3007-2007, as written, added to the confusion of using the basic CCR from HNF-7098. The PFP CCR attempts to clarify this criterion by revising it to say 'Programmatic commitments or general references to control philosophy (e.g., mass control or spacing control or concentration control as an overall control strategy for the process without specific quantification of individual limits) is included in the PFP DSA'. Table 1 shows the PFP methodology for evaluating CACs. This evaluation process has been in use since February of 2008 and has proven to be simple and effective. Each control identified in the applicable new/revised CSE is evaluated via the table. The results of this evaluation are documented in tables attached to the CCR as an appendix, for each CSE, to the base document.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

VALIDATION OF ANALYTICAL METHODS AND INSTRUMENTATION FOR BERYLLIUM MEASUREMENT: REVIEW AND SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE GUIDES, PROCEDURES, AND PROTOCOLS

This document proposes to provide a listing of available sources which can be used to validate analytical methods and/or instrumentation for beryllium determination. A literature review was conducted of available standard methods and publications used for method validation and/or quality control. A comprehensive listing of the articles, papers, and books reviewed is given in Appendix 1. Available validation documents and guides are listed in the appendix; each has a brief description of application and use. In the referenced sources, there are varying approaches to validation and varying descriptions of validation at different stages in method development. This discussion focuses on validation and verification of fully developed methods and instrumentation that have been offered up for use or approval by other laboratories or official consensus bodies such as ASTM International, the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the Association of Official Analytical Chemists (AOAC). This review was conducted as part of a collaborative effort to investigate and improve the state of validation for measuring beryllium in the workplace and the environment. Documents and publications from the United States and Europe are included. Unless otherwise specified, all documents were published in English.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗