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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2017

Considerations for RTCA Phase 2 Low Size, Weight, and Power (SWAP) Surveillance Requirements

RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Special Committee 228 has initiated a second phase for the development of minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) detect and avoid (DAA) systems. Technologies to enable UAS with less available Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) will be considered. A white paper is in development for what topics and issues need to be addressed to develop DAA requirements for low SWAP surveillance systems. This briefing will document the issues to be investigated in SC-228. It will also serve as a review with the committee to get feedback so the white paper can be written and finalized. These topics and issues are not necessarily all the things that NASA will contribute to SC-228 during Phase 2, but what the overall committee needs to accomplish. A portion of the work will be in NASA's UAS in the NAS (National Airspace System) project plan.

Santiago, Confesor↗
NASA NTRS2015

Java Architecture for Detect and Avoid Extensibility and Modeling

Unmanned aircraft will equip with a detect-and-avoid (DAA) system that enables them to comply with the requirement to "see and avoid" other aircraft, an important layer in the overall set of procedural, strategic and tactical separation methods designed to prevent mid-air collisions. This paper describes a capability called Java Architecture for Detect and Avoid Extensibility and Modeling (JADEM), developed to prototype and help evaluate various DAA technological requirements by providing a flexible and extensible software platform that models all major detect-and-avoid functions. Figure 1 illustrates JADEM's architecture. The surveillance module can be actual equipment on the unmanned aircraft or simulators that model the process by which sensors on-board detect other aircraft and provide track data to the traffic display. The track evaluation function evaluates each detected aircraft and decides whether to provide an alert to the pilot and its severity. Guidance is a combination of intruder track information, alerting, and avoidance/advisory algorithms behind the tools shown on the traffic display to aid the pilot in determining a maneuver to avoid a loss of well clear. All these functions are designed with a common interface and configurable implementation, which is critical in exploring DAA requirements. To date, JADEM has been utilized in three computer simulations of the National Airspace System, three pilot-in-the-loop experiments using a total of 37 professional UAS pilots, and two flight tests using NASA's Predator-B unmanned aircraft, named Ikhana. The data collected has directly informed the quantitative separation standard for "well clear", safety case, requirements development, and the operational environment for the DAA minimum operational performance standards. This work was performed by the Separation Assurance/Sense and Avoid Interoperability team under NASA's UAS Integration in the NAS project.

unmanned aircraft systems↗
NASA NTRS2023

Safety Case for Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Operations at NASA Langley Research Center

This Technical Memorandum (TM) is written to provide for dissemination of the methods and safety considerations for operations of small Uncrewed Aerial Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)at NASA Langley Research Center. It includes the Safety Case used to acquire a BVLOS Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the FAA and is being published to enable others to benefit from this work. The intended operations, subject to approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), will include a combination of Within Visual Line of Sight (WVLOS) and Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights, comprising of at most five sUAS operating concurrently, with no more than three operating BVLOS. Flights will occur in a subset of the Langley Air Force Base (LAFB) Class D airspace (KLFI) at a maximum altitude of 400 ft AGL. Most operations within this subset will take place in the City Environment Range Testing for Autonomous Integrated Navigation (CERTAIN) Range. The CERTAIN Range includes airspace inside the borders of NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). Additional airspace over the northern section of CERTAIN will be requested as part of the Certificate of Authorization (COA). NASA LaRC BVLOS operations on the CERTAIN Range can be broken down into five critical components needed to meet the 14 CFR § 91.113 see and avoid requirement: 1) procedural deconfliction with LAFB for UAS operations at or below 400 ft and manned aircraft at or above 900’ AGL; 2) ground equipment for detection of intruder aircraft and to support communications between crewmembers ; 3) sUAS vehicles with advanced onboard automation capable of autonomously maintaining safe separation; 4) BVLOS standardized operating procedures (SOPs); 5) and personnel to execute the flight operations in accordance with the SOPs and respond to airborne contingencies. The introduction of new ground equipment includes the use of the Remote Operations for Autonomous Missions (ROAM) UAS Operations Center, development and use of an Integrated Airspace Display (IAD), use of the L-STAR and GA-9120 radars, and the incorporation of standardized Vertiports. The ROAM Operations Center will be the central point for all BVLOS sUAS operations. All command and control (C2), voice communications and airspace awareness displays will reside inside ROAM. The IAD will provide raw data from ADS-B, FLARM, radar tracks and telemetered GPS vehicle positions for interpretation by an Airspace Monitor. The radars will search the class D airspace around the CERTAIN Range and serve as a backup to procedural deconfliction procedures coordinated with LAFB. In the event of a procedural deconfliction breakdown, radar detections of non-participating aircraft will be available so that the 91.113 see and avoid requirement can still be safely met. Finally, the incorporation of Vertiports will have video and network connectivity that enables large numbers of sUAS launches and recoveries from a single location. This is a continuation of the remote command and control of unpiloted aircraft component focused on evaluating unpiloted aircraft flight crew roles and responsibilities, control interfaces and the associated data links needed to operate a fleet of aircraft within a UAM Ecosystem. This work supports the development of future aviation operational concepts based on an Urban Air Mobility Maturity Level (UML) 4 environment (Patterson, 2020). It is assumed that future airspace will include hundreds of simultaneous aircraft operations within the airspace, therefore scalable operations are essential for enabling this future airspace to become a reality. Follow on work includes envisioned flights that expand operations beyond the CERTAIN range and lead to an effective Maritime Surveillance capability.

Matthew W Coldsnow↗
NASA NTRS2019

Terminal Area Considerations for UAS Detect and Avoid

Unmanned Aircraft Systems need to be able to comply with manned aviation ‘see and avoid’ separation requirements. A Detect and Avoid (DAA) System includes sensors, a tracker, and alerting and guidance algorithms that assist a remote pilot in maintaining separation from airborne traffic. To date, DAA system requirements development has focused on operations transiting to and from Class A or special use airspace. Current efforts are defining DAA system requirements for operations in and around terminal airspace. As a contribution to the current efforts, this paper highlights results from a Human in the Loop (HiTL) experiment comparing methods of changing from the transit-specific alerting and guidance criteria to proposed terminal-specific alerting and guidance criteria. It discusses operational considerations that are beyond the HiTL.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems↗
NASA NTRS1999

Aircraft NO(x) had no Unique Fingerprint on Sonex; Lightning Dominated Fresh NO(x) Sources

Key questions to which SONEX was directed were the following: Can aircraft corridors be detected? Is there a unique tracer for aircraft NO(x)? Can a "background" NO(x) (or NO(y) be defined? What fraction of NO(x) measured during SONEX was from aircraft? How representative was SONEX of the North Atlantic in 1997 and how typical of other years? We attempt to answer these questions through species-species correlations, probability distribution functions (PDFs), and meteorological history. There is not a unique aircraft tracer, largely due to the high variability of air mass origins and tracer ratios, which render "average" quantities meaningless. The greatest NO and NO(y) signals were associated with lightning and convective NO sources. Well-defined background CO, NO(y) and NO(y)/ozone ratio appear in subsets of two cross-track flights with subtropical origins and five flights with predominantly mid-latitude air. Forty percent of the observations on these 7 flights showed NO(y)/ozone to be above background, evidently due to unreacted NO(x). This NO(x) is a combination of aircraft, lightning and surface pollution injected by convection. The strongly subtropical signatures in SONEX observations, confirmed by pv (potential vorticity) values along flight tracks, argues for most of the unreacted NO(x) originating from lightning. Potential vorticity statistics along SONEX flight tracks in 1992-1998, and for the North Atlantic as a whole, show the SONEX meteorological environment to be representative of the North Atlantic flight corridor in the October-November period.

Thompson, A.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Development of a safe ground to space laser propagation system for the optical communications telescope laboratory

Furthering pursuits in high bandwidth communications to future NASA deep space and neat-Earth probes, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is building the Optical communications Telescope Laboratory (OCTL) atop Table Mountain in Southern California. This R&D optical antenna will be used to develop optical communication strategies for future optical ground stations. Initial experiments to be conducted include propagating high-powered, Q-switched laser beams to retro-reflecting satellites. Yet laser beam propagation from the ground to space is under the cognizance of various government agencies, namely: the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (ISHA) that is responsible for protecting workforce personnel; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) responsible for protecting pilots and aircraft; and the Laser Clearinghouse of Space Command responsible for protecting space assets. To ensure that laser beam propagation from the OCTL and future autonomously operated ground stations comply with the guidelines of these organizations, JPL is developing a multi-tiered safety system that will meet the coordination, monitoring, and reporting functions required by the agencies. At Tier 0, laser operators will meet OSHA safety standards for protection and access to the high power lasers area will be restricted and interlocked. Tier 1, the area defined from the telescope dome out to a range of 3.4-km, will utilize long wave infrared camera sensors to alert operators of at risk aircraft in the FAA controlled airspace. Tier 2, defined to extend from 3.4-km out to the aircraft service ceiling in FAA airspace, will detect at risk aircraft by radar. Lastly, beam propagation into space, defined as Tier 3, will require coordination with the Laser Clearinghouse. A detailed description of the four tiers is presented along with the design of the integrated monitoring and beam transmission control system.

laser safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Detecting Risk and Anomalies in Airplane Dynamics Through Entropic Analysis of Time Series Data

Despite recent efforts to move away from traditional threshold exceedance detection methods for aircraft state monitoring, modern aircraft still rely on safety thresholds to communicate to pilots the identification of an anomaly in the aircraft when a threshold is surpassed. Current anomaly detection methods mainly depend on uninterpretable machine learning models to learn complex patterns and relationships contained in the time series data of aircraft. Although these methods are capable of identifying known anomalies, their deficiency in interpretability presents a challenge when translating them to different aircraft. To overcome this deficiency, entropic analysis of aircraft dynamics seeks to characterize the complexity, or lack thereof, of the aircraft dynamics prior to the development of a risk scenario. This complexity characterization provides a more straightforward summary of state changes in the dynamics of flight variables. To build a foundation for entropic analysis, we analyzed the complexity of unstable approaches, an anomalous event present in many of today’s aviation accidents. The analysis revealed a statistically significant difference in the complexity distribution of flight variables under a stable approach versus an unstable approach. These differences in complexity were especially notable minutes before an approach was identified as unstable. Moreover, the multiscale entropic analysis revealed the presence of signal complexity at multiple time scales across multiple time windows before landing. By capturing state changes and corrections in the aircraft dynamics using entropy, advanced, yet still interpretable, sensor systems based on entropic frameworks from this study can be constructed in the future using classical machine learning approaches.

Risk detection↗
NASA NTRS1976

Status report on the generalized likelihood ratio failure detection technique, with application to the F-8 aircraft

The generalized likelihood ratio technique, a scheme for detecting and identifying abrupt changes in dynamic systems, is described in detail. Attention is given to distinguishability, detectability, and sensitivity to modeling errors. This failure detection technique is applied to a two-dimensional model of the F-8, flying at Mach .6 at 20,000 ft. in cumulus clouds.

Bueno, R.↗
NASA NTRS1985

A preliminary evaluation of the generalized likelihood ratio for detecting and identifying control element failures in a transport aircraft

The application of the Generalized Likelihood Ratio technique to the detection and identification of aircraft control element failures has been evaluated in a linear digital simulation of the longitudinal dynamics of a B-737 aircraft. Simulation results show that the technique has potential but that the effects of wind turbulence and Kalman filter model errors are problems which must be overcome.

Bundick, W. T.↗
NASA NTRS2018

An Exploratory Evaluation of UAS Detect and Avoid Operations in the Terminal Environment

New technical standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) detect and avoid (DAA) systems mark recent progress toward realizing the goal of full integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). The DAA system is intended to provide a means of compliance with operating regulations that required pilots on board manned aircraft to remain "well clear" of other aircraft which is accomplished through out-the-window visual acquisition of other aircraft and application of a subjective judgment of safe separation. The requirements for the DAA system, including the specification of a DAA well clear threshold as well as functional requirements for detecting, tracking, alerting and guidance processing, and displays, are specified in DO-365, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA Systems developed within RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228). Intended as the first in a series of phased versions, these requirements are frequently referred to as the "Phase 1" DAA system. The Phase 1 DAA system is limited for use by aircraft transitioning to and from Class A or special use airspace, through Class D, E, and G airspace. In particular, the Phase 1 DAA MOPS are not intended for terminal airspace operations, a critical gap for enabling a full range of UAS operations. The application of the Phase 1 DAA system and DAA well clear threshold within the terminal area is predicted to result in a high number of unnecessary alerts when the UAS is safely separated from other traffic. The goal of the present study was to examine pilot performance and operational issues related to the operation of the Phase 1 DAA system in a terminal area. This experiment was intended as an exploratory study that would be used to inform the development of a new terminal area-specific DAA well clear definition, and associated alerting and guidance requirements. The two main objectives of this study were to: 1) characterize pilot behavior in the terminal environment with the Phase 1 DAA system, and 2) investigate the effect of modifications to the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance structure. In particular, the authors were interested in determining whether the removal of specific alerting and guidance levels, without changing the DAA well clear definition or alerting thresholds, would impact pilot performance while conducting terminal operations. The results indicate that the Phase 1 well clear definition and alerting and guidance resulted in frequent alerting that degraded pilots' ability to discriminate between encounters where another aircraft was safely separated versus when a maneuver was necessary. The resulting impact on pilot performance was slower response times and higher frequency and severity of losses of DAA well clear compared to those observed for experiments examining pilot performance in the en route environment. There was no significant effect of alerting and guidance display configuration on pilot performance.

Rorie, Conrad↗
NASA NTRS2018

An Exploratory Evaluation of UAS Detect and Avoid Operations in the Terminal Environment

New technical standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) detect and avoid (DAA) systems mark recent progress toward realizing the goal of full integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). The DAA system is intended to provide a means of compliance with operating regulations that required pilots on board manned aircraft to remain "well clear" of other aircraft which is accomplished through out-the-window visual acquisition of other aircraft and application of a subjective judgment of safe separation. The requirements for the DAA system, including the specification of a DAA well clear threshold as well as functional requirements for detecting, tracking, alerting and guidance processing, and displays, are specified in DO-365, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA Systems developed within RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Special Committee 228 (SC-228). Intended as the first in a series of phased versions, these requirements are frequently referred to as the "Phase 1" DAA system. The Phase 1 DAA system is limited for use by aircraft transitioning to and from Class A or special use airspace, through Class D, E, and G airspace. In particular, the Phase 1 DAA MOPS are not intended for terminal airspace operations, a critical gap for enabling a full range of UAS operations. The application of the Phase 1 DAA system and DAA well clear threshold within the terminal area is predicted to result in a high number of unnecessary alerts when the UAS is safely separated from other traffic. The goal of the present study was to examine pilot performance and operational issues related to the operation of the Phase 1 DAA system in a terminal area. This experiment was intended as an exploratory study that would be used to inform the development of a new terminal area-specific DAA well clear definition, and associated alerting and guidance requirements. The two main objectives of this study were to: 1) characterize pilot behavior in the terminal environment with the Phase 1 DAA system, and 2) investigate the effect of modifications to the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance structure. In particular, the authors were interested in determining whether the removal of specific alerting and guidance levels, without changing the DAA well clear definition or alerting thresholds, would impact pilot performance while conducting terminal operations. The results indicate that the Phase 1 well clear definition and alerting and guidance resulted in frequent alerting that degraded pilots' ability to discriminate between encounters where another aircraft was safely separated versus when a maneuver was necessary. The resulting impact on pilot performance was slower response times and higher frequency and severity of losses of DAA well clear compared to those observed for experiments examining pilot performance in the en route environment. There was no significant effect of alerting and guidance display configuration on pilot performance.

terminal area↗
NASA NTRS1975

Noise reduction studies for the OV-1 airplane

A study has been conducted to define possible modifications to the OV-1 aircraft to reduce its aural detection distance. This effort involved documenting the noise characteristics of the airplane, devising modifications to reduce the noise, estimating the reduction in detection distance, and evaluating aircraft performance as a result of these modifications. It was found that the main noise source on this aircraft is the propeller and hence modifications only to the propeller and the propeller drive system are proposed. Modifications involving only the propeller are noted to involve no increase in weight but they result in only a modest decrease in aural detection distance. In order to obtain substantial decreases in aural detection distance, modifications involving changes both to the propeller and the engine-propeller gearing are required.

Hilton, D. A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

New Technologies for Reducing Aviation Weather-Related Accidents

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has developed technologies to reduce aviation weather-related accidents. New technologies are presented for data-link and display of weather information to aircraft in flight, for detection of turbulence ahead of aircraft in flight, and for automated insitu reporting of atmospheric conditions from aircraft.

Stough, H. Paul, III↗
NASA NTRS1978

Reliable dual-redundant sensor failure detection and identification for the NASA F-8 DFBW aircraft

A technique was developed which provides reliable failure detection and identification (FDI) for a dual redundant subset of the flight control sensors onboard the NASA F-8 digital fly by wire (DFBW) aircraft. The technique was successfully applied to simulated sensor failures on the real time F-8 digital simulator and to sensor failures injected on telemetry data from a test flight of the F-8 DFBW aircraft. For failure identification the technique utilized the analytic redundancy which exists as functional and kinematic relationships among the various quantities being measured by the different control sensor types. The technique can be used not only in a dual redundant sensor system, but also in a more highly redundant system after FDI by conventional voting techniques reduced to two the number of unfailed sensors of a particular type. In addition the technique can be easily extended to the case in which only one sensor of a particular type is available.

Deckert, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Modeling and Detection of Ice Particle Accretion in Aircraft Engine Compression Systems

The accretion of ice particles in the core of commercial aircraft engines has been an ongoing aviation safety challenge. While no accidents have resulted from this phenomenon to date, numerous engine power loss events ranging from uneventful recoveries to forced landings have been recorded. As a first step to enabling mitigation strategies during ice accretion, a detection scheme must be developed that is capable of being implemented on board modern engines. In this paper, a simple detection scheme is developed and tested using a realistic engine simulation with approximate ice accretion models based on data from a compressor design tool. These accretion models are implemented as modified Low Pressure Compressor maps and have the capability to shift engine performance based on a specified level of ice blockage. Based on results from this model, it is possible to detect the accretion of ice in the engine core by observing shifts in the typical sensed engine outputs. Results are presented in which, for a 0.1 percent false positive rate, a true positive detection rate of 98 percent is achieved.

May, Ryan D.↗
NASA NTRS2015

An Evaluation of Detect and Avoid (DAA) Displays for Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Effect of Information Level and Display Location on Pilot Performance

A consortium of government, industry and academia is currently working to establish minimum operational performance standards for Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Control and Communications (C2) systems in order to enable broader integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). One subset of these performance standards will need to address the DAA display requirements that support an acceptable level of pilot performance. From a pilot's perspective, the DAA task is the maintenance of self separation and collision avoidance from other aircraft, utilizing the available information and controls within the Ground Control Station (GCS), including the DAA display. The pilot-in-the-loop DAA task requires the pilot to carry out three major functions: 1) detect a potential threat, 2) determine an appropriate resolution maneuver, and 3) execute that resolution maneuver via the GCS control and navigation interface(s). The purpose of the present study was to examine two main questions with respect to DAA display considerations that could impact pilots' ability to maintain well clear from other aircraft. First, what is the effect of a minimum (or basic) information display compared to an advanced information display on pilot performance? Second, what is the effect of display location on UAS pilot performance? Two levels of information level (basic, advanced) were compared across two levels of display location (standalone, integrated), for a total of four displays. The authors propose an eight-stage pilot-DAA interaction timeline from which several pilot response time metrics can be extracted. These metrics were compared across the four display conditions. The results indicate that the advanced displays had faster overall response times compared to the basic displays, however, there were no significant differences between the standalone and integrated displays. Implications of the findings on understanding pilot performance on the DAA task, the development of DAA display performance standards, as well as the need for future research are discussed.

detect and avoid↗
NASA NTRS1974

Clear air turbulence detector

A system to be employed by an aircraft for the detection of clear air turbulence is described. The system employs a laser light beam which is directed ahead of the aircraft along the flight path. The portion of the light reflected back to the aircraft by atmospheric aerosol is detected and analyzed for Doppler shift. The velocity and intensity of the turbulence is determined by the type and amount of the light reflected.

Dahm, W. K.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Robust Fault Detection Using Robust Z1 Estimation and Fuzzy Logic

This research considers the application of robust Z(sub 1), estimation in conjunction with fuzzy logic to robust fault detection for an aircraft fight control system. It begins with the development of robust Z(sub 1) estimators based on multiplier theory and then develops a fixed threshold approach to fault detection (FD). It then considers the use of fuzzy logic for robust residual evaluation and FD. Due to modeling errors and unmeasurable disturbances, it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of an actual fault and those caused by uncertainty and disturbance. Hence, it is the aim of a robust FD system to be sensitive to faults while remaining insensitive to uncertainty and disturbances. While fixed thresholds only allow a decision on whether a fault has or has not occurred, it is more valuable to have the residual evaluation lead to a conclusion related to the degree of, or probability of, a fault. Fuzzy logic is a viable means of determining the degree of a fault and allows the introduction of human observations that may not be incorporated in the rigorous threshold theory. Hence, fuzzy logic can provide a more reliable and informative fault detection process. Using an aircraft flight control system, the results of FD using robust Z(sub 1) estimation with a fixed threshold are demonstrated. FD that combines robust Z(sub 1) estimation and fuzzy logic is also demonstrated. It is seen that combining the robust estimator with fuzzy logic proves to be advantageous in increasing the sensitivity to smaller faults while remaining insensitive to uncertainty and disturbances.

Curry, Tramone↗