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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2016

Design Status of the Capillary Brine Residual in Containment Water Recovery System

One of the goals of the AES Life Support System (LSS) Project is to achieve 98% water loop closure for long duration human exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. To meet this objective, the AES LSS Project is developing technologies to recover water from wastewater brine; highly concentrated waste products generated from a primary water recovery system. The state of the art system used aboard the International Space Station (ISS) has the potential to recover up to 85% water from unine wastewater, leaving a significant amounts of water in the waste brine, the recovery of which is critical technology gap that must be filled in order to enable long duration human exploration. Recovering water from the urine wastewater brine is complicated by the concentration of solids as water is removed from the brine, and the concentration of the corrosive, toxic chemicals used to stabilize the urine which fouls and degrades water processing hardware, and poses a hazard to operators and crew. Brine Residual in Containment (BRIC) is focused on solids management through a process of "in-place" drying - the drying of brines within the container used for final disposal. Application of in-place drying has the potential to improve the safety and reliability of the system by reducing the exposure to curew and hardware to the problematic brine residual. Through a collaboration between the NASA Johnson Space Center and Portland Status University, a novel water recovery system was developed that utilizes containment geometry to support passive capillary flow and static phase separation allowing free surface evaporation to take place in a microgravity environment. A notional design for an ISS demonstration system was developed. This paper describes the testing performed to characterize the performance of the system as well as the status of the system level design.

Sargusingh, Miriam J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Overview of Risk Mitigation for Safety-Critical Computer-Based Systems

This report presents a high-level overview of a general strategy to mitigate the risks from threats to safety-critical computer-based systems. In this context, a safety threat is a process or phenomenon that can cause operational safety hazards in the form of computational system failures. This report is intended to provide insight into the safety-risk mitigation problem and the characteristics of potential solutions. The limitations of the general risk mitigation strategy are discussed and some options to overcome these limitations are provided. This work is part of an ongoing effort to enable well-founded assurance of safety-related properties of complex safety-critical computer-based aircraft systems by developing an effective capability to model and reason about the safety implications of system requirements and design.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗
NASA NTRS2016

Design Status of the Capillary Brine Residual in Containment Water Recovery System

One of the goals of the AES Life Support System (LSS) Project is to achieve 98% water loop closure for long duration human exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. To meet this objective, the AES LSS Project is developing technologies to recover water from wastewater brine; highly concentrated waste products generated from a primary water recovery system. The state of the art system used aboard the International Space Station (ISS) has the potential to recover up to 85% water from unine wastewater, leaving a significant amounts of water in the waste brine, the recovery of which is a critical technology gap that must be filled in order to enable long duration human exploration. Recovering water from the urine wastewater brine is complicated by the concentration of solids as water is removed from the brine, and the concentration of the corrosive, toxic chemicals used to stabilize the urine which fouls and degrades water processing hardware, and poses a hazard to operators and crew. Brine Residual in Containment (BRIC) is focused on solids management through a process of "in-place" drying - the drying of brines within the container used for final disposal. Application of in-place drying has the potential to improve the safety and reliability of the system by reducing the exposure to crew and hardware to the problematic brine residual. Through a collaboration between the NASA Johnson Space Center and Portland Status University, a novel water recovery system was developed that utilizes containment geometry to support passive capillary flow and static phase separation allowing free surface evaporation to take place in a microgravity environment. A notional design for an ISS demonstration system was developed. This paper describes the concept for the system level design.

Callahan, Michael R.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Results of a Manned Over Pressurization Event in the Extravehicular Mobility Unit Space Suit Assembly

The Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL) is a 102 x 202 x 40-foot-deep tank holding over 6 million gallons of water used to simulate weightlessness for Astronaut training. The maxim "Train Like You Fly" refers to the desire to have the suit perform, during training, as close as possible to how it performs during an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA), particularly with respect to mobility. Therefore, the Space Suit Assembly (SSA) used in the NBL is a downgraded hardware version of the flight SSA; it is not designed for the NBL environment or operations. A classification system defines the flight Space Suit Assembly hardware as Class I, and the NBL training hardware SSA as Class IIIW. On July 20, 2017, during a manned training event in the NBL, the SSA was inadvertently over-pressurized to 22 psid; normal operating pressure being 4.3 psid. The suit subject was removed from the suit with no injury. The event was investigated by a NASA Mishap Team. The Team investigated common causes and differences between the Class I and Class IIIW Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). The investigation determined that the event was limited to Class IIIW hardware and its external flow-controlled open loop ventilation systems. The flight EMU is a pressure regulated closed loop ventilation system. This paper will examine the differences between the Class I and Class IIIW SSA hardware and provide details of the Mishap Investigation. Corrective actions taken to mitigate risk with hardware, operations, and hazard documentation will be discussed.

Spacesuit↗
NASA NTRS1995

On the Flux of Millimetric Space Debris

Space debris is a constantly increasing hazard for operations in space. For objects larger than about 10 cm, the USSPACECOM maintains a catalogue of orbital elements. Their data, obtained with longer wavelength radars, relates to larger scale objects. This report concerns debris measurements made at JPL's Goldstone Observatory using the 3.5 cm Haystack radar which can detect a 6 mm sphere at 1000 km.

space↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

V&V for Autonomy

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

V&V↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗
NASA NTRS1980

Carbon/graphite fiber risk analysis and assessment study: Assessment of risk to the Lockheed Model L-1011 commercial transport aircraft

The risk associated with the accidental release of carbon/graphite fibers (CF) from fires on commercial transport aircraft incorporating composite materials was assessed. Data are developed to evaluate the potential for CF damage to electrical and electronic equipment, assess the cost risk, and evaluate the hazard to continued operation. The subjects covered include identification of susceptible equipments, determination of infiltration transfer functions, analysis of airport operations, calculation of probabilities of equipment failures, assessment of the cost risk, and evaluation of the hazard to continued operation. The results show the risks associated with CF contamination are negligible through 1993.

Daniledes, J.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Investigation, Analysis, and Testing of Self-contained Oxygen Generators

Self Contained Oxygen Generators (SCOGs) have widespread use in providing emergency breathing oxygen in a variety of environments including mines, submarines, spacecraft, and aircraft. These devices have definite advantages over storing of gaseous or liquid oxygen. The oxygen is not generated until a chemical briquette containing a chlorate or perchlorate oxidizer and a solid metallic fuel such as iron is ignited starting a thermal decomposition process allowing gaseous oxygen to be produced. These devices are typically very safe to store, easy to operate, and have primarily only a thermal hazard to the operator that can be controlled by barriers or furnaces. Tens of thousands of these devices are operated worldwide every year without major incident. This report examines the rare case of a SCOG whose behavior was both abnormal and lethal. This particular type of SCOG reviewed is nearly identical to a flight qualified version of SCOG slated for use on manned space vehicles. This Investigative Report is a compilation of a NASA effort in conjunction with other interested parties including military and aerospace to understand the causes of the particular SCOG accident and what preventative measures can be taken to ensure this incident is not repeated. This report details the incident and examines the root causes of the observed SCOG behavior from forensic evidence. A summary of chemical and numerical analysis is provided as a background to physical testing of identical SCOG devices. The results and findings of both small scale and full scale testing are documented on a test-by-test basis along with observations and summaries. Finally, conclusions are presented on the findings of this investigation, analysis, and testing along with suggestions on preventative measures for any entity interested in the safe use of these devices.

Keddy, Christopher P.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Smooth Sailing for Weather Forecasting

Through a cooperative venture with NASA's Stennis Space Center, WorldWinds, Inc., developed a unique weather and wave vector map using space-based radar satellite information and traditional weather observations. Called WorldWinds, the product provides accurate, near real-time, high-resolution weather forecasts. It was developed for commercial and scientific users. In addition to weather forecasting, the product's applications include maritime and terrestrial transportation, aviation operations, precision farming, offshore oil and gas operations, and coastal hazard response support. Target commercial markets include the operational maritime and aviation communities, oil and gas providers, and recreational yachting interests. Science applications include global long-term prediction and climate change, land-cover and land-use change, and natural hazard issues. Commercial airlines have expressed interest in the product, as it can provide forecasts over remote areas. WorldWinds, Inc., is currently providing its product to commercial weather outlets.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1995

Optimal Category-A Helicopter Flight Trajectories for Operation From a Clear Heliport

Engine failure represents a major safety hazard to helicopter operation. As a result, FA certifies helicopters according to their abilities to survive engine failures. Federal Aviation Regulation Part 29 specifies that transport helicopters must be certified as either category A or B. Category-B certification applies to either single or multi-engine helicopters with gross weight less than 20,000 lbs. A Category-B helicopter must be able to land safely in the case of one or all engine failures. There is no requirement for continued flight capability. In contrast, Category-A certification applies to multi-engine helicopters with independent engine systems. It requires that helicopter can continue flight with one engine inoperative (OEI). Therefore, Category-A helicopters are capable of operating from rooftops and oil rigs and flying to areas where no emergency landing sites are available. While there is no maximum weight limit, a Category-A helicopter must be able to satisfy OEI operation requirements within the available runway field. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

Sharma, Vivek↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Usability of Pre-Flight Planning Interfaces for Supplemental Data Service Provider Tools to Support Uncrewed Aircraft System Traffic Management

Small uncrewed aircraft systems (sUASs) operate in low-altitude, uncontrolled airspace – where support services for their operators (UASOs) are not currently provided. NASA’s System-Wide Safety (SWS) project is identifying the potential risks and hazards to sUAS operations to provide, inform, and improve the designs of In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS). The IASMS will include a suite of data-driven tools that compile and analyze data collected from aviation systems and environmental sources to predict hazards, and provide information to allow operators to mitigate these risks (Young et al., 2020). These risk and hazard services can be run and displayed to operators on graphical user interfaces (GUIs), as they relate to a vehicle(s)’ route of flight. These interfaces offer both a means to present hazard service output and offer an opportunity to test user understanding of the information, user decision making, and the best ways to present such data to an operator. Based on these future technologies and intended missions, it is important to investigate interface requirements and evaluate how operators might use these tools. Presenting salient and meaningful risk assessment information to operators is necessary to increase situation awareness and ultimately safety. Building on previous research (Feldman et al., 2022), a usability study comparing two GUIs was conducted to explore how individuals interacted with different styles of information displays. A series of pre-flight hazard and risk-assessment tasks were developed to evaluate participant performance using the Supplemental Data Service Provider Consolidated Dashboard and the Human Automation Team Interface System interfaces. Participants were trained to use both GUIs and their performance was analysed across different scenarios involving multiple sUASs. Performance on simple tasks and the System Usability Scale scores were reported by Feldman et al., 2023. Additional analyses and evaluations on more complex tasks (e.g., risk assessment, prioritization), workload and response times are examined in this paper.

sUAV interfaces↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Usability of Pre-flight Planning Interfaces for Supplemental Data Service Provider Tools to Support Uncrewed Aircraft System Traffic Management

Small uncrewed aircraft systems (sUASs) operate in low-altitude, uncontrolled airspace – where support services for their operators (UASOs) are not currently provided. NASA’s System-Wide Safety (SWS) project is identifying the potential risks and hazards to sUAS operations to provide, inform, and improve the designs of In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS). The IASMS will include a suite of data-driven tools that compile and analyze data collected from aviation systems and environmental sources to predict hazards, and provide information to allow operators to mitigate these risks (Young et al., 2020). These risk and hazard services can be run and displayed to operators on graphical user interfaces (GUIs), as they relate to a vehicle(s)’ route of flight. These interfaces offer both a means to present hazard service output and offer an opportunity to test user understanding of the information, user decision making, and the best ways to present such data to an operator. Based on these future technologies and intended missions, it is important to investigate interface requirements and evaluate how operators might use these tools. Presenting salient and meaningful risk assessment information to operators is necessary to increase situation awareness and ultimately safety. Building on previous research (Feldman et al., 2022), a usability study comparing two GUIs was conducted to explore how individuals interacted with different styles of information displays. A series of pre-flight hazard and risk-assessment tasks were developed to evaluate participant performance using the Supplemental Data Service Provider Consolidated Dashboard and the Human Automation Team Interface System interfaces. Participants were trained to use both GUIs and their performance was analysed across different scenarios involving multiple sUASs. Performance on simple tasks and the System Usability Scale scores were reported by Feldman et al., 2023. Additional analyses and evaluations on more complex tasks (e.g., risk assessment, prioritization), workload and response times are examined in this paper.

sUAV interfaces↗
NASA NTRS2004

Space Shuttle Upgrades Advanced Hydraulic Power System

Three Auxiliary Power Units (APU) on the Space Shuttle Orbiter each provide 145 hp shaft power to a hydraulic pump which outputs 3000 psi hydraulic fluid to 41 hydraulic actuators. A hydrazine fuel powered APU utilized throughout the Shuttle program has undergone many improvements, but concerns remain with flight safety, operational cost, critical failure modes, and hydrazine related hazards. The advanced hydraulic power system (AHPS), also known as the electric APU, is being evaluated as an upgrade to replace the hydrazine APU. The AHPS replaces the high-speed turbine and hydrazine fuel supply system with a battery power supply and electric motor/pump that converts 300 volt electrical power to 3000 psi hydraulic power. AHPS upgrade benefits include elimination of toxic hydrazine propellant to improve flight safety, reduction in hazardous ground processing operations, and improved reliability. Development of this upgrade provides many interesting challenges and includes development of four hardware elements that comprise the AHPS system: Battery - The battery provides a high voltage supply of power using lithium ion cells. This is a large battery that must provide 28 kilowatt hours of energy over 99 minutes of operation at 300 volts with a peak power of 130 kilowatts for three seconds. High Voltage Power Distribution and Control (PD&C) - The PD&C distributes electric power from the battery to the EHDU. This 300 volt system includes wiring and components necessary to distribute power and provide fault current protection. Electro-Hydraulic Drive Unit (EHDU) - The EHDU converts electric input power to hydraulic output power. The EHDU must provide over 90 kilowatts of stable, output hydraulic power at 3000 psi with high efficiency and rapid response time. Cooling System - The cooling system provides thermal control of the Orbiter hydraulic fluid and EHDU electronic components. Symposium presentation will provide an overview of the AHPS upgrade, descriptions of the four hardware elements, and a summary of development results to date.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2024

Importance of Hands-on Training within the Nuclear Industry

Almost all work performed within the nuclear industry requires some form of training, regardless of an individual’s education. While many of the hazards that exist in nuclear operations are present in other industries (e.g., industrial safety), nuclear operations have the unique hazards of radiation and inadvertent criticality. Therefore, these topics require additional training for individuals performing hands-on work or accessing those work areas. Many methods are available to train people including lectures (either with an instructor or automated video), reading procedures/policies, hands-on demonstrations, and on-the-job training.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
NASA NTRS1985

Average and worst-case specifications of precipitating auroral electron environment

The precipitation electrons in the auroral environment are highly variable in their energy and intensity in both space and time. As such they are a source of potential hazard to the operation of the Space Shuttle and other large spacecraft operating in polar orbit. In order to assess these hazards both the average and extreme states of the precipitating electrons must be determined. Work aimed at such a specification is presented. First results of a global study of the average characteristics are presented. In this study the high latitude region was divided into spatial elements in magnetic local time and corrected geomagnetic latitude. The average electron spectrum was then determined in each spatial element for seven different levels of activity as measured by K sub p using an extremely large data set of auroral observations. Second a case study of an extreme auroral electron environment is presented, in which the electrons are accelerated through field aligned potential as high as 30,000 volts and in which the spacecraft is seen to charge negatively to a potential approaching .5 kilovolts.

Hardy, D. A.↗