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COOLING WATER ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES AT U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

This report has been prepared for the Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), for the purpose of providing a status report on the challenges and opportunities facing the U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry in the area of plant cooling water supply. The report was prompted in part by recent Second Circuit and Supreme Court decisions regarding cooling water system designs at existing thermo-electric power generating facilities in the U.S. (primarily fossil and nuclear plants). At issue in the courts have been Environmental Protection Agency regulations that define what constitutes “Best Technology Available” for intake structures that withdraw cooling water that is used to transfer and reject heat from the plant’s steam turbine via cooling water systems, while minimizing environmental impacts on aquatic life in nearby water bodies used to supply that cooling water. The report was also prompted by a growing recognition that cooling water availability and societal use conflicts are emerging as strategic energy and environmental issues, and that research and development (R&D) solutions to emerging water shortage issues are needed. In particular, cooling water availability is an important consideration in siting decisions for new nuclear power plants, and is an under-acknowledged issue in evaluating the pros and cons of retrofitting cooling towers at existing nuclear plants. Because of the significant ongoing research on water issues already being performed by industry, the national laboratories and other entities, this report relies heavily on ongoing work. In particular, this report has relied on collaboration with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), including its recent work in the area of EPA regulations governing intake structures in thermoelectric cooling water systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Emergency Heat Removal System for the Secondary Loop of a Fast Sodium Reactor and its Efficiency Evaluation

An emergency heat removal system (SAOT) that removes heat from the secondary loop of a fast sodium reactor by air cooling the surfaces of the piping and equipment of the heat-sink loops of the secondary loop is described and ways to optimize it are indicated. A method of evaluating the efficiency of such an SAOT is described, and the results of an evaluation for a fast sodium reactor are presented as an example showing that the system can be used in fast sodium reactors of any power capacity.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced virtual energy simulation training and research: IGCC with CO2 capture power plant

In this presentation, we highlight the deployment of a real-time dynamic simulator of an integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) power plant with CO{sub 2} capture at the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Energy Technology Laboratory's (NETL) Advanced Virtual Energy Simulation Training and Research (AVESTARTM) Center. The Center was established as part of the DOE's accelerating initiative to advance new clean coal technology for power generation. IGCC systems are an attractive technology option, generating low-cost electricity by converting coal and/or other fuels into a clean synthesis gas mixture in a process that is efficient and environmentally superior to conventional power plants. The IGCC dynamic simulator builds on, and reaches beyond, conventional power plant simulators to merge, for the first time, a 'gasification with CO{sub 2} capture' process simulator with a 'combined-cycle' power simulator. Fueled with coal, petroleum coke, and/or biomass, the gasification island of the simulated IGCC plant consists of two oxygen-blown, downward-fired, entrained-flow, slagging gasifiers with radiant syngas coolers and two-stage sour shift reactors, followed by a dual-stage acid gas removal process for CO{sub 2} capture. The combined cycle island consists of two F-class gas turbines, steam turbine, and a heat recovery steam generator with three-pressure levels. The dynamic simulator can be used for normal base-load operation, as well as plant start-up and shut down. The real-time dynamic simulator also responds satisfactorily to process disturbances, feedstock blending and switchovers, fluctuations in ambient conditions, and power demand load shedding. In addition, the full-scope simulator handles a wide range of abnormal situations, including equipment malfunctions and failures, together with changes initiated through actions from plant field operators. By providing a comprehensive IGCC operator training system, the AVESTAR Center is poised to develop a workforce well-prepared to operate and control commercial-scale gasification-based power plants capable of 90% pre-combustion CO{sub 2} capture and compression, as well as low sulfur, mercury, and NOx emissions. With additional support from the NETL-Regional University Alliance (NETL-RUA), the Center will educate and train engineering students and researchers by providing hands-on 'learning by operating' experience The AVESTAR Center also offers unique collaborative R&D opportunities in high-fidelity dynamic modeling, advanced process control, real-time optimization, and virtual plant simulation. Objectives and goals are aimed at safe and effective management of power generation systems for optimal efficiency, while protecting the environment. To add another dimension of realism to the AVESTAR experience, NETL will introduce an immersive training system with innovative three-dimensional virtual reality technology. Wearing a stereoscopic headset or eyewear, trainees will enter an interactive virtual environment that will allow them to move freely throughout the simulated 3-D facility to study and learn various aspects of IGCC plant operation, control, and safety. Such combined operator and immersive training systems go beyond traditional simulation and include more realistic scenarios, improved communication, and collaboration among co-workers.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Innovative Gamma Ray Spectrometer Detection Systems for Conducting Scanning Surveys on Challenging Terrain - 13583

The Santa Susana Field Laboratory located near Simi Valley, California was investigated to determine the nature and extent of gamma radiation anomalies. The primary objective was to conduct gamma scanning surveys over 100 percent of the approximately 1,906,000 square meters (471 acre) project site with the most sensitive detection system possible. The site had challenging topography that was not conducive to traditional gamma scanning detection systems. Terrain slope varied from horizontal to 48 degrees and the ground surface ranged from flat, grassy meadows to steep, rocky hillsides. In addition, the site was home to many protected endangered plant and animal species, and archaeologically significant sites that required minimal to no disturbance of the ground surface. Therefore, four innovative and unique gamma ray spectrometer detection systems were designed and constructed to successfully conduct gamma scanning surveys of approximately 1,076,000 square meters (266 acres) of the site. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Diversity and defense-in-depth analysis for I and C systems of research reactors: A case study on two research reactors - 376

This paper provides the analysis results of the diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) applied to two research reactors designed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. The D3 assessments for instrumentation and control (I and C) systems of two research reactors are performed according to the guidelines documented in NUREG/CR-6303. The I and C systems are classified into four echelons of defense: control echelon, reactor trip echelon, engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation echelon, and monitoring and indication echelon. The diversity between the echelons of defense is assessed to determine that a single software common cause failure (CCF) does not impair the functions of multiple echelons of defense. In addition, the effects of a software CCF of the reactor protection system on the design basis events of the research reactors are analyzed by assuming that the automated reactor trip and ESF actuation functions of the reactor protection system are inoperable due to the software CCF. From the D3 analyses for the research reactors, it is verified that (1) adequate diversity has been provided, (2) adequate defense-in-depth has been provided, and (3) the displays and manual controls for critical safety functions initiated by operator action are diverse from digital systems used in the automatic portion of the protection system. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Hydropower Black Start: A Guidebook for Retrofitting Grid Dependent Hydropower

Not all United States (US) hydropower plants were designed to provide black start, but they are increasingly needed to uphold resilience in the evolving electric grid. This guidance is designed to help understand the minimal retrofits required for grid dependent hydropower (GDH) plants behind the point of interconnection (POI). For distribution connected hydropower plants or those with dedicated cranking paths, such upgrades can be sufficient for the plant to provide black start. For others, more coordination with the transmission system operator will be needed. This guidebook answers a number of questions relevant to retrofitting hydropower plants with black start capabilities. For example, the guidebook answers: • How flexible do the wicket gate controls need to be? • Who needs to do hydro governor model validation, why, and how? • How robust and flexible do the excitation and AVR controls need to be? • What protection settings need to be adjusted? • What relay(s) will need to be bypassed or overridden and at what risk? • What is the electrical energy demand of the station load or auxiliary power systems? • What should the strategy to energize transformer(s) along cranking path to address inrush currents be? • How should the critical load restoration be sequenced? In addition to outlining the specifications that hydropower plants need to meet for each component to be able to perform black start, this guidebook provides a set of case studies for specific upgrades needed at actual plants. Between the case studies of plants that have already performed black start retrofits and the examples of how this guidebook can be applied to scope future retrofits, five key themes have been identified for retrofit needs. 1. Protection needs “black start” mode: hydropower plants that are not designed with black start capabilities will have protections that prevent them from interconnecting to a “dead bus.” These protections will need to be overridden in every retrofit case and a separate black start mode should be established so that operators can safely switch between black start and grid connected modes, minimizing the risk to the plant. 2. Wicket gates need modern controls: digital governors accelerate the parameter tuning process and gate position sensors improve controllability, so plants with mechanical governors should be upgraded. Furthermore, a black start and islanding mode should be established for controls to maximize plant performance. 3. Robust excitation support: the DC system or excitation generator needs to be reliable enough to form and sustain the rotor electromagnetic field. These systems are typically undersized in plants that were not designed for black start, so they will need to be upgraded. 4. Turbine-governor model validation and operator training: validation of a standard hydro governor model is needed to characterize the dynamic response (i.e., inertial and primary frequency response) of the GDH. This is required for control development and old hydropower plants often have outdated or incorrect models. Operator training is also typically required to ensure the hardware retrofits are utilized correctly during the black start process. 5. Transformer and cranking path energization: any upgradation and control adjustment in front of the POI will depend upon the existing interconnection. Coordination with the transmission or distribution operator may be required.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

JET ICRH plant statistics from 2008-2012

JET ICRH plant faults from 2008 - 2012 have been catalogued and a new assessment of the reliability of the plant by sub-system is given. Data from pulses where ICRH was used, excluding the ITER-Like Antenna (ILA) and its generators, has been collated. This is compared to fault data in order to investigate any correlation between faults and operations. The number of faults is shown to have decreased between 2011-2012 in comparison to 2008-2009 as the time between faults is shown to have increased. Future electronic fault logging requirements to enable easier analysis are discussed. Due to the changing configuration of the ICRH plant; the introduction of ELM tolerant systems, generator upgrade, changes to the settings of the VSWR protection et cetera, a method to expand the fault database to include more historical data [1] in a consistent way are discussed.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control cyber security common vector access leading to relational common cause failures - 340

Nuclear power plants and facilities have been implementing digital system upgrades into their previously analog systems for well over twenty years. New nuclear facilities' control, security, and emergency preparedness systems are almost exclusively built on digital architectures with a high degree of communication between the various systems that are often integrated together into a central control station to aid in operation or security of the facility. As digital systems become more widespread in nuclear facility control system architectures, cyber security related issues have become a significant concern to operators, regulators, governments, and other groups. Among the many concerns related to digital systems and cyber security is the area of common cause and common mode failures. This paper introduces, defines, and discusses some sources of common cause failure from a cyber security perspective: common vector access. This refers to specific access points that an adversary can exploit through a single attack sequence that have the potential to provide relational failures through common cause on multiple components, subsystems, systems, or plants. This paper will further discuss interconnected processes where these access points may exist, the importance of limiting or controlling these pinch points, and some methods of protecting common vector access points. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

10 CFR 830 Major Modification Determination for Advanced Test Reactor RDAS and LPCIS Replacement

The replacement of the ATR Control Complex's obsolete computer based Reactor Data Acquisition System (RDAS) and its safety-related Lobe Power Calculation and Indication System (LPCIS) software application is vitally important to ensure the ATR remains available to support this national mission. The RDAS supports safe operation of the reactor by providing 'real-time' plant status information (indications and alarms) for use by the reactor operators via the Console Display System (CDS). The RDAS is a computer support system that acquires analog and digital information from various reactor and reactor support systems. The RDAS information is used to display quadrant and lobe powers via a display interface more user friendly than that provided by the recorders and the Control Room upright panels. RDAS provides input to the Nuclear Engineering ATR Surveillance Data System (ASUDAS) for fuel burn-up analysis and the production of cycle data for experiment sponsors and the generation of the Core Safety Assurance Package (CSAP). RDAS also archives and provides for retrieval of historical plant data which may be used for event reconstruction, data analysis, training and safety analysis. The RDAS, LPCIS and ASUDAS need to be replaced with state-of-the-art technology in order to eliminate problems of aged computer systems, and difficulty in obtaining software upgrades, spare parts, and technical support. The major modification criteria evaluation of the project design did not lead to the conclusion that the project is a major modification. The negative major modification determination is driven by the fact that the project requires a one-for-one equivalent replacement of existing systems that protects and maintains functional and operational requirements as credited in the safety basis.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Solidification technology for organic liquid waste combined with solid materials from Cernavoda NPP, Romania - 16453

Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU{sup R}) reactor designs were initially developed in the late 1950's and 1960's by the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) in partnership with Ontario Power Generation. CANDU{sup R} 6 reactors are Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), with an integrated containment system and are designed as either multi or single unit systems. Two single CANDU 6 systems are currently operating at Cernavoda with an additional two units expected to be brought online in the near future. The radioactive waste produced by the plant is currently stored in a waste interim storage facility located on-site. The main sources of radioactive waste in a CANDU plant are: - Primary Heat Transport (PHT) systems, - Moderator systems, - Other sources of radionuclides. The radioactive waste management system at Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) was designed to maintain acceptable levels of safety for workers and to protect human health and the environment from exposure to unacceptable levels of radiation. During the operation of the Cernavoda NPP, a series of waste streams have been generated for waste treatment purposes. One important waste stream is the combination of solid materials and liquid organic waste, creating flammable solids. Flammable solids represent solid materials, such as cloth, plastic, contaminated with oil containing gamma nuclides and H-3 from maintenance activities. This paper explores a method to solve the problem of liquid residues on solid materials by the application of absorbent materials. The existence of liquid residues on solid materials is a common problem at nuclear power stations globally. The primary issue centers on an effective method of eliminating the liquid to allow for the final acceptance and disposal of the solid waste by regulators. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Modified Isotherm Modeling to Predict Cs Exchange with Crystalline Silicotitanate in Tank Waste Simulants

The U.S. Department of Energy is working to expedite processing of Hanford tank waste supernate at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. To support this goal, Washington River Protection Solutions is designing a Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system for suspended solids and cesium (Cs/ 137 Cs) removal from Hanford tank waste supernate. The ion exchange media selected for Cs removal at TSCR is crystalline silicotitanate (CST) that is manufactured in a nearly spherical form by Honeywell UOP LLC (UOP; Des Plaines, IL) as product IONSIV® R9140-B (Na form). The Zheng Anthony Miller (ZAM) isotherm model (Zheng et al. 1997) is a multicomponent ion exchange model used to predict the exchange of Group I metals onto CST. The ZAM isotherm has historically been used to predict Cs distribution values from Hanford and Savannah River Site (SRS) tank waste simulants. Figure S.1 summarizes model predictions from the ZAM isotherm that indicate poor prediction of Cs distribution values for simple and complex simulants with the engineered form of CST, IONSIV® R9140-B, and IONSIV® R9120-B where the solid line indicates a perfect fit by the model. The dotted lines indicate ±20% error. Batch contact testing with Hanford tank waste complex and simple simulants was used in conjunction with SRS simulants to experimentally determine Cs distribution values using a modification to the original isotherm model. The experimentally determined maximum Cs capacity for IONSIV® R9140-B CST in both the simple and complex matrices was found to be 0.53±0.3 mmoles Cs/g of CST. This value is not drastically different from the maximum Cs capacity of 0.58 mmoles Cs/g TAM-5 reported by Zheng et al. (1997). However, it is important to note that TAM-5 (commercially IONSIV® IE-910) is a powder. Hamm et al. (2002) determined that a dilution factor was needed to account for the Zr(OH)2 binder in the engineered form of CST. Hamm et al. determined that a dilution factor of 0.68 was appropriate to account for binder contribution and correct overprediction of Cs exchange on the engineered form of CST in ZAM calculations. This reduced the total capacity from 0.58 mmol/g with TAM-5 to 0.39 mmol/g for the engineered form of CST (Hamm et al. 2002). Despite substituting the experimentally determined maximum Cs capacity of 0.55 mmoles Cs/g for the literature-reported capacity of 0.39 mmoles Cs/g, it was determined that additional modifications to the model’s equilibrium rate constants were necessary in refining the isotherm model. The modified model overpredicted K+ uptake by the CST when compared to digested CST results described by Campbell et al. (2019). The modified model was further revised to omit three of the five K+ exchange equilibrium reactions described by ZAM to reduce the additional K+ loading seen by the model. Figure S.2 summarizes the revised model isotherm predictions plotted against measured Kd values.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

General description of HTR-PM emergency power system - 18415

The paper will describe the design concept of the emergency power system utilized in the high temperature gas cooled reactor project (HTR-PM) which is currently under construction in Shandong, China. As a class 1E system which is related to the safety feature of the reactor, emergency power system is responsible for providing multiple reliable power sources for nuclear safety class loads. Therefore, the structure, power source deployment, operation, maintenance and alignment of the system should meet several standards and regulations. The paper will give a detailed description about the designing process of the system which include structure design, determination of primary device parameters, and some calculation results of device capacity such as emergency diesel engine, UPS et al. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

317/319 Phytoremediation site monitoring report - 2009 growing season : final report.

In 1999, Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) designed and installed a series of engineered plantings consisting of a vegetative cover system and approximately 800 hybrid poplars and willows rooting at various predetermined depths. The plants were installed using various methods including Applied Natural Science's TreeWell{reg_sign} system. The goal of the installation was to protect downgradient surface and groundwater by intercepting the contaminated groundwater with the tree roots, removing moisture from the upgradient soil area, reducing water infiltration, preventing soil erosion, degrading and/or transpiring the residual volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and removing tritium from the subsoil and groundwater. This report presents the results of the monitoring activities conducted by Argonne's Energy Systems (ES) Division in the growing season of 2009. Monitoring of the planted trees began soon after the trees were installed in 1999 and has been conducted every summer since then. As the trees grew and consolidated their growth into the contaminated soil and groundwater, their exposure to the contaminants was progressively shown through tissue sampling. During the 2009 sampling campaign, VOC concentrations found in the French Drain area were in general consistent with or slightly lower than the 2008 results. Additionally, closely repeated, stand wide analyses showed contaminant fluctuations that may indicate short-term contaminant depletion in the area of interest of roots. This data will be useful to determine short-term removal rate by the trees. As in previous years, levels in the Hydraulic Control Area were close to background levels except for a few exceptions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Fukushima Safety Enhancement Activities in Canada

In the immediate aftermath of the common-cause seismic and tsunami events that triggered the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011, the nuclear regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), requested that all Cass I nuclear facilities re-examine the safety cases for their nuclear facilities. Lessons-learned task forces were established by the CNSC, and the nuclear utilities, Ontario Power Generation (OPG), Bruce Power (BP), and New Brunswick Power (NBP). The purposes of these independent task forces was to develop relevant lessons learned issues for the Candu nuclear power plants operating in Canada and to identify actions that could enhance safety. Subsequently, a CNSC Integrated Action Plan was developed to address the recommendations arising from the CNSC Task Force Report, and the licensees aligned their actions with this plan. The actions were grouped into four categories, as follows. 1. Strengthening defence in depth; Actions included re-assessment of a site-specific external hazards using PSA; physical plant changes to add further cooling water make-up capability to heat sinks; development of new Canadian standards and updated regulatory documents that address requirements for Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA), Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Period Safety Review (PSR); development of a new and novel methodology for assessing multi-unit risk that is consistent with the IAEA construct of defence-in-depth (including a safety goal hierarchy and complementary risk analysis methods that address 'Black Swan' events); enhanced management of hydrogen combustion challenges; and enhanced Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). 2. Enhancing emergency response; Actions included provision of Emergency Mitigation Equipment (EME) such as transportable diesel-driven pumps or fire engines, transportable diesel generators for AC and instrument power; pre-installed connections to in-plant equipment via easily accessible and protected quick-connect points for water and electrical power; upgraded emergency response centres; enhanced communication systems and protocols; and enhanced emergency response programs, training and exercises. 3. Improving the regulatory framework and processes; 4. Enhancing international collaboration. Actions assigned under categories 3 and 4 were placed upon the regulator. This presentation will focus on the assigned actions in categories 1 and 2. The underlying motivation, objectives, and safety benefits associated with the actions will be described within the context of broader aspects of severe accident mitigation in water-cooled reactors. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

317/319 phytoremediation site monitoring report - 2004 growing season.

In 1999, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) designed and installed a series of engineered plantings consisting of a vegetative cover system and approximately 800 hybrid poplars and willows rooting at various predetermined depths. The plants were installed using various methods including Applied Natural Science's TreeWell{reg_sign} system. The goal of the installation was to protect downgradient surface and groundwater by hydraulic control of the contaminated plume by intercepting the contaminated groundwater with the tree roots, removing moisture from the upgradient soil area, reducing water infiltration, preventing soil erosion, degrading and/or transpiring the residual volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and removing tritium from the subsoil and groundwater. This report presents the results of the monitoring activities conducted by Argonne's Energy Systems Division (ES) in the growing season of 2004. Monitoring of the planted trees began soon after the trees were installed in 1999 and has been conducted every summer since then. As the trees grew and consolidated their growth into the contaminated soil and groundwater, their exposure to the contaminants was progressively shown through tissue sampling. Since the inception of the project, significant progress was made in the refinement and testing of the analytical method (for which no official method is available), the determination of the optimal tissue for sampling, and of the variability of the concentrations within a specific tree. An understanding has also been developed on background concentrations of VOCs, and how to discriminate between VOCs that are associated with plant tissue because of aerial or of soil/groundwater uptake pathways. Also, during the 2003 sampling campaign, core samples from tree trunks were collected for the first time (the trees were large enough to stand the procedure). Data collected from the French Drain area last year supported the hypothesis that a correlation was present between concentrations of VOCs in the soil and in corresponding branch tissue. During this year (2004), systematic data collection in the French Drain area further consolidated this correlation and indicated that trees are clearly in the condition to have reached the target rooting depth. Concentrations in the hundreds of ppb in branch and trunk samples confirm that uptake can be a quantitative way to remove VOCs from the contaminated media. Additionally, laboratory studies were conducted in 2004 to determine mass recoveries from leaves and branches using the headspace method, and to determine if we could further modify our sample pretreatment method to ensure optimal recovery. Results showed that the recovery of TCE in leaves and branches with our current method ranged between 98 and 138%, indicating that most of the TCE present in the samples is recovered during the analysis. Freezing and heating had variable results in recovery rates, which resulted in no significant changes being introduced to the current SOP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Used Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Components for Shutdown Plants to Expedite Defueling of Spent Fuel Pool - 18378

For plants that have announced plans to shut down, their main priority is to off-load the Used Nuclear Fuel from the spent fuel pool to dry storage at an ISFSI so that they can proceed to 'Safe store' or other storage options, and start their decommissioning process as soon as possible. One of the major expenses for a decommissioned plant is the cost of maintenance of the spent fuel pool. Therefore, the ability of the dry storage system to store short cooled fuel is an important aspect of dry storage system for shutdown plants. When a shutdown plant evaluates the dry storage options, total cost of the transferring the fuel from the pool to ISFSI site needs to be evaluated. One of the major costs to the utility for dry storage is the cost of ISFSI pad (basemat) along with the cost of dry storage system hardware. Smaller ISFSI footprint saves utility for the cost of ISFSI site excavation, cost of engineered backfill and cost of ISFSI pad. In order to minimize the cost of dry storage systems, besides the size of the ISFSI pad as described above, other important considerations is to use high capacity systems. The highest capacity systems available in the dry storage market today are with 37 PWR or 89 BWR used fuel assemblies per canister. These dry storage systems are expected to be at the plant sites for extended duration due to the unavailability of Interim Storage Facilities or a permanent disposal sites like Yucca Mountain. Maintaining the integrity of the dry storage systems canisters and storage overpack so that they can safely protect the fuel and integrity of used nuclear fuel is maintained during storage period is of utmost importance. Robust Aging Management Program is an important aspect for dry storage systems not only at the shutdown plants but also at the operating plants. This paper will provide the update of a reduced footprint version of TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} System with MATRIX HSM and NUHOMS{sup R} EOS Canisters that addresses the need for maximizing safety, ISFSI capacity while optimizing cost. It will provide an update on the current capabilities, design features and current status of the licensing and deployment of NUHOMS{sup R} EOS System. It will provide the current status of the MATRIX HSM along with the significant enhancement included for a robust Canister Evolved Safety Program for Aging Management. It will also describe the construction sequence; loading operations, and inspections during extended storage as a part of aging management program. The compact version of TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} System with MATRIX HSM offers a 'Universal' Storage Overpack which is designed to accept all different designs dry storage canisters available in the industry. As UNF storage continues to drives the industry towards innovations that address the need for optimized dry storage systems, compact ISFSIs and prudent aging management programs, this new evolution of the TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} system with MATRIX HSM and EOS Canisters offers a significant leap forward in addressing all of these challenges. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Instrumentation Cables Test Plan

A fire at a nuclear power plant (NPP) has the potential to damage structures, systems, and components important to safety, if not promptly detected and suppressed. At Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant on March 22, 1975, a fire in the reactor building damaged electrical power and control systems. Damage to instrumentation cables impeded the function of both normal and standby reactor coolant systems, and degraded the operators’ plant monitoring capability. This event resulted in additional NRC involvement with utilities to ensure that NPPs are properly protected from fire as intended by the NRC principle design criteria (i.e., general design criteria 3, Fire Protection). Current guidance and methods for both deterministic and performance based approaches typically make conservative (bounding) assumptions regarding the fire-induced failure modes of instrumentation cables and those failure modes effects on component and system response. Numerous fire testing programs have been conducted in the past to evaluate the failure modes and effects of electrical cables exposed to severe thermal conditions. However, that testing has primarily focused on control circuits with only a limited number of tests performed on instrumentation circuits. In 2001, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) conducted a series of cable fire tests designed to address specific aspects of the cable failure and circuit fault issues of concern1. The NRC was invited to observe and participate in that program. The NRC sponsored Sandia National Laboratories to support this participation, whom among other things, added a 4-20 mA instrumentation circuit and instrumentation cabling to six of the tests. Although limited, one insight drawn from those instrumentation circuits tests was that the failure characteristics appeared to depend on the cable insulation material. The results showed that for thermoset insulated cables, the instrument reading tended to drift and fluctuate, while the thermoplastic insulated cables, the instrument reading fell off-scale rapidly. From an operational point of view, the latter failure characteristics would likely be identified as a failure from the effects of fire, while the former may result in inaccurate readings.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Design study on safety protection system of JSFR

Development of Japan Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (JSFR) has been progressed in Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development (FaCT) project aiming at realizing high level of safety, reliability and economic competitiveness. For JSFR, design consideration on safety protection system has also been performed, which is essential for reactor shutdown in the case of design basis events (DBEs). In the design activity, consideration of safety protection system includes logic circuits configuration, selection of trip signals, and its setting values for reactor trip. In addition, it is necessary to evaluate the performance of the safety protection system by safety analysis taking into account the comprehensive parameter ranges. For this purpose, it has been evaluated whether adequate reactor trip signals can be ensured for satisfying safety standard regarding the fuel integrity (e.g., maximum fuel clad temperature) for DBEs. In this paper, results obtained from the design study on safety protection system of JSFR is presented focusing on the evaluation results of satisfaction of safety protection system for representative events of transient over power (TOP), loss of coolant flow (LOF) and loss of heat sink (LOHS). (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗