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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1976

Safer Liquid Natural Gas

After the disaster of Staten Island in 1973 where 40 people were killed repairing a liquid natural gas storage tank, the New York Fire Commissioner requested NASA's help in drawing up a comprehensive plan to cover the design, construction, and operation of liquid natural gas facilities. Two programs are underway. The first transfers comprehensive risk management techniques and procedures which take the form of an instruction document that includes determining liquid-gas risks through engineering analysis and tests, controlling these risks by setting up redundant fail safe techniques, and establishing criteria calling for decisions that eliminate or accept certain risks. The second program prepares a liquid gas safety manual (the first of its kind).

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2019

"Making Safety Happen" Through Probabilistic Risk Assessment at NASA

NASA is using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as one of the tools in its Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) tool belt to identify and quantify risks associated with human spaceflight. This paper discusses some of the challenges and benefits associated with developing and using PRA for NASA human space programs. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, while some have implemented PRA from the start of the program. It has been observed that the earlier a design change is made in the concept or design phase, the less impact it has on cost and schedule. Not finding risks until the operation phase yields much costlier design changes and major delays, which can result in discussions of just accepting the risk. Risk contributors identified by PRA are not just associated with hardware failures. They include but are not limited to crew fatality due to medical causes, the environment the vehicle and crew are exposed to, the software being used, and the reliability of the crew performing required actions. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, and while PRA can still provide a benefit for operations and future design trades, the benefit of implementing PRA from the start of the program provides the added benefit of informing design and reducing risk early in program development. Currently, NASA’s International Space Station (ISS) program is in its 20th year of on-orbit operations around the Earth and has several new programs in the design phase preparing to enter the operation phase all of which have active (or living) PRAs. These programs incorporate PRA as part of their Risk-Informed, Decision-Making (RIDM) process. For new NASA human spaceflight programs discussion begins with mission concept, establishing requirements, forming the PRA team, and continues through the design cycles into the operational phase. Several examples of PRA related applications and observed lessons are included.

Applications↗
NASA NTRS2005

Risk Management for Human Support Technology Development

NASA requires continuous risk management for all programs and projects. The risk management process identifies risks, analyzes their impact, prioritizes them, develops and carries out plans to mitigate or accept them, tracks risks and mitigation plans, and communicates and documents risk information. Project risk management is driven by the project goal and is performed by the entire team. Risk management begins early in the formulation phase with initial risk identification and development of a risk management plan and continues throughout the project life cycle. This paper describes the risk management approach that is suggested for use in NASA's Human Support Technology Development. The first step in risk management is to identify the detailed technical and programmatic risks specific to a project. Each individual risk should be described in detail. The identified risks are summarized in a complete risk list. Risk analysis provides estimates of the likelihood and the qualitative impact of a risk. The likelihood and impact of the risk are used to define its priority location in the risk matrix. The approaches for responding to risk are either to mitigate it by eliminating or reducing the effect or likelihood of a risk, to accept it with a documented rationale and contingency plan, or to research or monitor the risk, The Human Support Technology Development program includes many projects with independently achievable goals. Each project must do independent risk management, considering all its risks together and trading them against performance, budget, and schedule. Since the program can succeed even if some projects fail, the program risk has a complex dependence on the individual project risks.

jones, Harry↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Validation of Decompression Sickness Risk Mitigation Protocols for Planetary Spaceflight Missions

BACKGROUND: Apollo missions used a 100% O2 cabin atmosphere which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during extravehicular activity (EVA) on the moon. NASA’s future missions to the moon and Mars are expected to use nitrox gas mixtures of up to 34% O2, 66% N2, which will reduce flammability risk compared with Apollo, but will necessitate Oxygen prebreathe prior to EVA to reduce DCS risk to acceptable levels. Prebreathe protocols used on the space shuttle and International Space Station are validated for microgravity EVAs, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary EVA. An “exploration atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA as a compromise that balances prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. However, this atmosphere may not be used for vehicles that do not support frequent EVA, and with commercial providers and international providers expected to provide landers, pressurized rovers, habitats, and spacesuits, different combinations of vehicle and spacesuit atmospheres are possible and will each require validated prebreathe protocols. OVERVIEW: Key components of a multi-year strategic roadmap include: 1) Establish hypobaric chamber facility capable of supporting 8-person EVA prebreathe validation tests at saturation atmospheres up to 36% O2; 2) validate an EVA physical workload simulation for use during prebreathe validation testing; 3) validate the recommended “exploration atmosphere” prebreathe protocol; 4) validate prebreathe protocols for additional atmospheric combinations that bound the most likely potential operating ranges of future vehicles and spacesuits; and 5) update DCS risk estimation models based on results of prebreathe validation studies. DISCUSSION: Details and data from completion of the first two steps of the strategic roadmap will be presented; the third step is currently underway, with pilot results provided in a companion presentation. Steps four and five will require a multi-year series of chamber tests; collaborations are being pursued.

Andrew F. J. Abercromby↗
DOE OSTI2021

Bio-project “derisking” through development of systematic methodologies and frameworks for risk assessment

One of the primary hindrances to producing a viable, sustainable domestic biomass industry for renewable biofuels, bio-products and bio-power is the lack of understanding and quantification of the risks associated with both the biomass supply chain and preprocessing and conversion technologies. Currently a consistent method for assessing, comparing, and quantifying risks in biomass supply chains does not exist, creating a major investment barrier to bioenergy projects in the U.S. The lack of a standardized approach has resulted in bioenergy stakeholders independently using inconsistent approaches and evaluation criteria, leading to unreliable and incomparable assessments of risks and financing barriers to bio-project development. Along with the challenges of inconsistent risk assessment for supply chain risk, technology specific risks based on variability in biomass properties are not fully understood and can pose significant unforeseen challenges for bioenergy projects. In many cases these properties have not yet been identified and the impacts on the proposed technology and products unquantified. This is particularly challenging for emerging preprocessing and conversion technologies. Without a firm understanding of the preprocessing/conversion technology-specific critical properties, the risk of a proposed bio-project cannot be fully evaluated. To address inconsistent risk evaluation in the biomass supply chain supporting project financing, a Biomass Supply Chain Risk Standards (BSCRS) framework was developed. The BSCRS framework includes a comprehensive list of known and perceived risks (Risk Indicators) to the supply chain developed through 100’s of interviews with bioenergy industry experts spanning from feedstock growers and suppliers to representatives from the financial sector. These risks have been organized into a manageable hierarchy of Risk Categories and Risk Factors that can be practically assessed. This BSCRS framework also provides mitigation strategies for multiple Risk Indicators from best available industry practices and research findings. Additionally, a risk quantification methodology for each Risk Factor, Risk Category, and the bio-project as a whole was developed to enable capital markets to assess feedstock risk more efficiently and more accurately. Multiple case studies representing existing bio-projects have been used to evaluate and verify the BSCRS framework and scoring methodology. To address technological risk along with the supply chain risk captured in the developed BSCRS framework, this work also focuses on development of a systematic criticality assessment tool using well-accepted, quantitative risk analysis methods to evaluate bioenergy feedstock critical properties impacting system unit operations. The proposed Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) approach uses a team of subject area experts (SAEs) for each targeted unit operation within a system. Collectively, the team will develop and use a quantitative scoring system to assess the material attributes, process parameters, and quality attributes for key unit operations that have already been identified. The FMEA process generates Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) for the various failures and predominant causes for each material/process unit/product combination resulting in a semi-quantitative, standardized methodology for assessing technological risk and biomass properties contributing to that risk.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
NASA NTRS2005

Communicating Risk to Program Managers

Program Managers (PM) can protect program resources and improve chances of success by anticipating, understanding and managing risks. Understanding the range of potential risks helps one to avoid or manage the risks. A PM must choose which risks to accept to reduce fire fighting, must meet the expectations of stakeholders consistently, and avoid falling into costly "black holes" that may open. A good risk management process provides the PM more confidence to seize opportunities save money, meet schedule, even improve relationships with people important to the program. Evidence of managing risk and sound internal controls can mean better support from superiors for the program by building a trust and reputation from being on top of issues. Risk managers have an obligation to provide the PM with the best information possible to allow the benefits to be realized (Small Business Consortium, 2004). The Institute for Chartered Accountants in England and Wales sees very important benefits for companies in providing better information about what they do to assess and manage key business risks. Such information will: a) provide practical forward-looking information; b) reduce the cost of capital; c) encourage better risk management; and d) improve accountability for stewardship, investor protection and the usefulness of financial reporting. We are particularly convinced that enhanced risk reporting will help listed companies obtain capital at the lowest possible cost (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England &Wales, June 2002). Risk managers can take a significant role in quantifying the success of their department and communicating those figures to executive (program) management levels while pushing for a broader risk management role. Overall, risk managers must show that risk management work matters in the most crucial place-the bottom line- as they prove risk management can be a profit center (Sullivan, 2004).

Shivers, C. Herbert↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk-Based SMA and Modernizing Risk Classification at GSFC

In 2014, in response to a large volume of feedback from industry, the science community, and internal to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), GSFC’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate began a transition to a risk-based implementation of SMA, departing from its longstanding practice of being primarily driven by a mostly static set of Mission Assurance Requirements. The transition started out with a pilot project involving risk-based acceptance of bare-printed circuit boards that was enormously successful, continued through a complete organizational transformation in 2015, and culminated with the baselining of formal Risk-Based SMA policy in 2016. In this presentation we will describe the risk-based SMA concept, segue into how it shapes a modernization of risk classification that GSFC has rolled out, and provide results from the original pilot project for risk-based SMA, involving the printed circuit board assurance process.

Jesse Leitner↗
NASA NTRS2005

GO/NO-GO - When is medical hazard mitigation acceptable for launch?

Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.

Hamilton, Douglas R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Public Risk Assessment Program

The Public Entry Risk Assessment (PERA) program addresses risk to the public from shuttle or other spacecraft re-entry trajectories. Managing public risk to acceptable levels is a major component of safe spacecraft operation. PERA is given scenario inputs of vehicle trajectory, probability of failure along that trajectory, the resulting debris characteristics, and field size and distribution, and returns risk metrics that quantify the individual and collective risk posed by that scenario. Due to the large volume of data required to perform such a risk analysis, PERA was designed to streamline the analysis process by using innovative mathematical analysis of the risk assessment equations. Real-time analysis in the event of a shuttle contingency operation, such as damage to the Orbiter, is possible because PERA allows for a change to the probability of failure models, therefore providing a much quicker estimation of public risk. PERA also provides the ability to generate movie files showing how the entry risk changes as the entry develops. PERA was designed to streamline the computation of the enormous amounts of data needed for this type of risk assessment by using an average distribution of debris on the ground, rather than pinpointing the impact point of every piece of debris. This has reduced the amount of computational time significantly without reducing the accuracy of the results. PERA was written in MATLAB; a compiled version can run from a DOS or UNIX prompt.

Mendeck, Gavin↗
NASA NTRS1975

Risk Management Technique for design and operation of facilities and equipment

The Risk Management System collects information from engineering, operating, and management personnel to identify potentially hazardous conditions. This information is used in risk analysis, problem resolution, and contingency planning. The resulting hazard accountability system enables management to monitor all identified hazards. Data from this system are examined in project reviews so that management can decide to eliminate or accept these risks. This technique is particularly effective in improving the management of risks in large, complex, high-energy facilities. These improvements are needed for increased cooperation among industry, regulatory agencies, and the public.

Fedor, O. H.↗
NASA NTRS2018

International Space Station Operational Experience and Its Impacts on Future Mission Supportability

Operational experience gained on the International Space Station (ISS) has enabled significant improvements in failure rate estimates for various Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs). These improved estimates, in turn, allow more efficient and accurate spare parts allocations for future missions, enabling significant reductions in both logistics mass and risk. This paper examines the value of ISS experience to date in terms of its impact on supportability for future missions. A supportability model is presented that assesses the spares required as a function of mission endurance and risk, taking into account uncertainty in failure rate estimates. Changes in ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLSS) ORU failure rate estimates are described and discussed, both in terms of the overall population of ORUs and the evolution of failure rate estimates over time for a particular item. The value of those updated failure rate estimates is assessed by calculating the estimated spares mass requirements for two cases, using the initial, pre-ISS estimates and using the estimates informed by on-orbit experience. Hidden risk resulting from underestimated failure rates is also assessed. These results indicate that, for a 1,200-day Mars mission, ISS experience has enabled a 3.9 t to 6.0 t reduction in ECLSS spares mass required and uncovered failure rate underestimates that would have resulted in an order of magnitude increase in risk had they not been discovered and corrected. The implications of these results for system development and mission planning are discussed, including approaches to accelerate the rate of failure rate refinement and the risks associated with making changes or introducing new systems. Overall, test time is a critical factor that must be carefully considered in system development, and new systems must budget appropriate time for testing in a relevant environment or accept higher risk and logistics requirements on future missions.

Owens, Andrew C.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Increasing Small Satellite Reliability- A Public-Private Initiative

At present, CubeSat components and buses are generally not appropriate for missions where significant risk of failure, or the inability to quantify risk or confidence, is acceptable. However, in the future we anticipate that CubeSats will be used for missions requiring reliability of 1-3 years for Earth-observing missions and even longer for Planetary, Heliophysics, and Astrophysics missions. Their growing potential utility is driving an interagency effort to improve and quantify CubeSat reliability, and more generally, small satellite mission risk. The Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI)—an ongoing activity with broad collaborative participation from civil, DoD, and commercial space systems providers and stakeholders—targets this challenge. The Initiative seeks to define implementable and broadly-accepted approaches to achieve reliability and acceptable risk postures associated with several SmallSat mission risk classes—from “do no harm” missions, to those associated with missions whose failure would result in loss or delay of key national objectives. These approaches will maintain, to the extent practical, cost efficiencies associated with small satellite missions and consider constraints associated with supply chain elements, as appropriate. The SSRI addresses this challenge from two architectural levels—the mission- or system-level, and the component- or subsystem-level. The mission- or system-level scope targets assessment approaches that are efficient and effective, with mitigation strategies that facilitate resiliency to mission or system anomalies while the component- or subsystem-level scope addresses the challenge at lower architectural levels. The initiative does not limit strategies and approaches to proven and traditional methodologies, but is focused on fomenting thought on novel and innovative solutions. This paper discusses the genesis of and drivers for this initiative, how the public-private collaboration is being executed, findings and recommendations derived to date, and next steps towards broadening small satellite mission potential.

SmallSat↗
NASA NTRS2008

Improved Verification for Aerospace Systems

Aerospace systems are subject to many stringent performance requirements to be verified with low risk. This report investigates verification planning using conditional approaches vice the standard classical statistical methods, and usage of historical surrogate data for requirement validation and in verification planning. The example used in this report to illustrate the results of these investigations is a proposed mission assurance requirement with the concomitant maximum acceptable verification risk for the NASA Constellation Program Orion Launch Abort System (LAS). This report demonstrates the following improvements: 1) verification planning using conditional approaches vice classical statistical methods results in plans that are more achievable and feasible; 2) historical surrogate data can be used to bound validation of performance requirements; and, 3) incorporation of historical surrogate data in verification planning using conditional approaches produces even less costly and more reasonable verification plans. The procedures presented in this report may produce similar improvements and cost savings in verification for any stringent performance requirement for an aerospace system.

Powell, Mark A.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Streamlining Ground Station Network Compatibility Test for Small Satellites

A team of eight subject matter experts at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) completed a Lean Six Sigma project to identify process improvements for the compatibility test process for small satellites planning to use the NASA Near Earth Network (NEN). Ground station network compatibility testing is designed to reduce the risk to missions by resolving issues between the spacecraft's flight communication and navigation components and the ground systems prior to launch. Compatibility testing, which consists of a series of tests performed over a period of months and documented in reports, is an important step meant to prevent post-launch anomalies that could lead to expensive troubleshooting or mission failure. Compared to traditional missions, small satellite missions typically have a smaller budget and compressed schedules, which can result in small satellite projects' willingness to accept the risk associated with less comprehensive compatibility testing. Optimization and or refinement of the compatibility test process for small satellite missions could alleviate some of the pressures inherent with these factors. The goal of the Lean Six Sigma project was to develop alternative scalable methods of compatibility testing for small satellites. The Lean Six Sigma approach and the results of the project are reviewed in this paper.

Streamlining↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Improving Efficacy and Safety of Pharmacological Treatment Through Precision Medicine and Pharmacogenomics for Human Deep Space Exploration

INTRODUCTION: Future spaceflight will require increased crew medical autonomy as exploration class missions expanding duration and distance from Earth, especially for Mars missions. As mission duration increases, it will be even more essential to have appropriate amounts of effective medication to ensure the maintenance of crew health and performance. Conversely, mass and volume constraints will become more severe as future spaceflight expands beyond low Earth orbit, where resupply is difficult or becomes impossible. These constraints thus convey an urgency to further tailor medications included in the spacecraft formulary and increased examination of appropriate dosing regimens. BACKGROUND: Precision Health is an exciting area of cutting-edge research and medicine focused on maintaining an individual’s health and performance through in-depth understanding of an individual’s unique factors and molecular profiles. This approach can be adapted to better predict, monitor, and address physiological responses to the spaceflight environment. One example is the field of pharmacogenomics (PGX),the study of how the expressed genome impacts drug responses with the goal of prescribing the right dose of the right drug at the right time. Specifically, PGX testing provides valuable information on an individual’s precise allelic variations to guide physicians in making informed decisions on pharmaceutical choice and dosing to avoid adverse drug events and maximize pharmacological efficacy. The goal of this study was to evaluate which drugs in the current space pharmacy could be evaluated using PGX testing and to understand the potential impact on the health and wellness of the astronaut population. Additionally, we sought to evaluate clinically available FDA-approved PGX testing solutions to better understand its applicability. METHODS: A complete list of drugs onboard the International Space Station (ISS) was analyzed for risk and likelihood of drug failure and PGX actionability. This analysis encompassed both personal astronaut medications, including supplements and over the counter drugs (n=151) and ISS MedKit formulary medications (n=95). Duplicate medications and different formulations were removed, which resulted in 157 total drugs used in the subsequent analysis. A 5x5 risk assessment table was produced by examining the likelihood of drug failure compared to the consequence of drug failure. Likelihood of individual drug failure was defined by whether existing processes are sufficient to prevent adverse events, as ranked from 1 (very low, can easily be prevented) to 5 (very high, cannot be prevented) during a Mars mission. In contrast, the consequence of drug failure was defined by impact to safety, schedule, cost or technical and ranked from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).A comprehensive assessment of commercially available PGX solutions is currently underway to evaluate specimen requirements, cost/benefit analysis (cost vs. number of alleles assessed), utility of variant analysis, relevance to inflight medication usage, quality of reporting in enabling clinical application, and ease of integration into electronic medical records. RESULTS: Risk assessments(LxC 5x5 table) indicated29medicationswere in the yellow or red zone driven predominantly by drug failure or safety concerns, with the remainder(n=128)of the medications in the green zone where risk is acceptable. We found that current PGX testing results could impact 21% of the total medications in the ISS MedKit and IMAK; of these, 9 medications currently have direct clinically actionable guidance available. Results of the clinical PGX solution evaluations as related to these medications will be presented. CONCLUSION: PGX testing has demonstrated clear benefits in terrestrial medicine and clinical environments for the selection of proper medications, avoiding adverse drug reactions, and maximizing drug efficacy. We propose that similar benefits would be bestowed on the astronaut and commercial spaceflight passenger population by performing preemptive pre-flight PGX testing to reduce risk of mission failure due to ineffective or toxic medications, improve targeting drug efficacy and safety, and further open the door to countermeasure research exploring PGX-related allelic variants. For example, PGX results could allow tailoring of specific medications at optimal doses more precisely to each individual astronaut, particularly in areas of space motion sickness, sleep aids, and analgesics. An additional benefit is that PGX results could provide information for better planning of the components of a space pharmacy for deep space missions to be more cost effective and more efficient in the utilization of limited pharmaceutical resources. Finally, while PGX testing of the astronaut corps is not currently conducted, this approach could provide immediate impact in support of mission success by reducing risks, optimizing astronaut performance, and providing valuable insights into long-term astronaut health. Such advancements in clinical decision making are important next steps in building dynamic individual risk profiles for astronauts, increasing crew autonomy and providing tailored countermeasures

Alice R W Tang↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Improving Efficacy and Safety of Pharmacological Treatment Through Precision Health and Pharmacogenomics

INTRODUCTION: Future spaceflight will require increased crew medical autonomy as exploration class missions expand in duration and distance from Earth, especially for Mars missions. As mission duration increases, it will be essential to have appropriate amounts of effective medication to ensure the maintenance of crew health and performance. Conversely, mass and volume constraints will become more severe as future spaceflight expands beyond low Earth orbit, where resupply is difficult or becomes impossible. These constraints thus convey an urgency to tailor medications for individual crewmembers and further examine appropriate dosing regimens. BACKGROUND: Precision Health is an exciting area of medicine focused on maintaining an individual’s health and performance through in-depth understanding of an individual’s unique clinical and environmental history, genetic makeup, and molecular profiles. This approach can be adapted to better predict, monitor, and address physiological responses to the spaceflight environment. A subset of this field is pharmacogenomics (PGX), the study of how the expressed genome impacts drug responses with the goal of prescribing the right dose of the right drug at the right time. Specifically, PGX testing provides valuable information on an individual’s precise allelic variations to guide physicians in making informed decisions on drug choice and dosing to avoid adverse events and maximize efficacy. The study goal was to identify which current space pharmacy drugs could be evaluated using PGX testing and to understand the potential impact on the health and wellness of the astronaut population. Additionally, we sought to evaluate clinically available FDA-approved PGX testing solutions to better understand its applicability. METHODS: A complete list of drugs on the ISS was analyzed for risk and likelihood of drug failure and PGX actionability. This analysis encompassed both astronauts’ personal medications, including supplements and over the counter drugs (n=151) contained in the ISS medical accessory kit (IMAK), and ISS MedKit formulary medications (n=95). Duplicate medications and different formulations were removed, which resulted in a total of 157 drugs used in the subsequent analysis. A 5x5 risk assessment table was produced by examining the likelihood of drug failure compared to the consequence of drug failure (LxC). Likelihood of individual drug failure was defined by whether existing processes are sufficient to prevent ineffective treatment or impactful side effect events, as ranked from 1 (very low, can easily be prevented) to 5 (very high, cannot be prevented) during a Mars mission. In contrast, the consequence of drug failure was defined by impact to safety, schedule, cost, or technical criteria and ranked from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). An assessment of PGX reference laboratories is currently underway to evaluate sample requirements, benefit analysis (cost vs. utility of allele variant analysis), relevance to inflight medication usage, quality of reporting in enabling clinical application, and ease of integration into electronic medical records. RESULTS: Risk assessments (LxC 5x5 table) indicated 128 medications were in the green zone where risk is acceptable, with the remaining 29 of the medications in the yellow or red zone driven predominantly due to drug failure or safety concerns. We found that current PGX testing results could impact 21% of the total medications in the ISS MedKit and IMAK; of these, 9 medications currently have direct clinically actionable guidance available. Results of the clinical PGX solution evaluations as related to these medications will be presented. CONCLUSION: PGX testing has demonstrated clear benefits in terrestrial medicine and clinical environments for the selection of proper medications, avoiding adverse drug reactions, and maximizing drug efficacy. We propose that similar benefits would be bestowed on the astronaut and commercial spaceflight passenger population by performing preemptive preflight PGX testing to reduce risk of mission failure due to ineffective or toxic medications, improve drug efficacy, and further open the door to countermeasure research. For example, PGX results could allow tailoring of specific medications at optimal doses more precisely to each individual astronaut, particularly in areas of space motion sickness, sleep aids, and analgesics. An additional benefit is that PGX results could provide information for better planning of the components of a space pharmacy for deep space missions to be more effective and efficient in the utilization of limited pharmaceutical resources. Finally, while PGX testing of the astronaut corps is not currently conducted, this approach could provide immediate impact in support of mission success by reducing risks, optimizing astronaut performance, and providing valuable insights into long-term astronaut health. Such advancements in clinical decision making are important next steps in building dynamic individual risk profiles for astronauts, increasing selection of the best treatment choice, and providing tailored countermeasures for individual crewmembers.

Pharmacogenomics↗
DOE OSTI2022

Regional Representation of Wind Stakeholders' End-of-Life Behaviors and Their Impact on Wind Blade Circularity

Wind plant power has seen tremendous growth in the US and worldwide, representing the most significant renewable energy installed capacity besides hydropower. While wind power enables decarbonizing the electricity grid, the rising amount of end-of-life (EOL) wind blades - which are arduous to recycle - present a challenge for landfills if disposed of whole and a missed opportunity to recover valuable composite materials. The circular economy (CE) concept proposes strategies to rethink, reuse and recover products, components, and materials. However, transitioning to a CE implies changing how business models, supply chains, and behaviors deal with products and waste; changes arduously captured with traditional methods used to assess circularity such as life cycle assessment or material flow analysis (MFA). Here we present an agent-based model (ABM) that captures behavioral aspects impacting wind blade circularity in the US. The ABM also accounts for wind plant projects and landfills heterogeneity - a characteristic not easily included in top-down approaches such as MFA, input-output analysis, or system dynamics. Results show that recycling is divided as most recycling facilities are on the eastern side of the country, a challenge that could be alleviated by shredding blades before transportation. Recycling programs from the wind industry could also seed recycling behaviors within wind plant owners. Better yet, new blade designs could increase circularity if original equipment manufacturers accept the risks involved with the investments needed to adapt the production lines.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗