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Precursor Analysis Report: JBS Foods Ransomware Attack 2021

The JBS Foods 2021 Ransomware Attack Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the JBS ransomware cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In late May 2021, one of the world’s largest meat producers, JBS Foods, announced they had fallen victim to a worldwide ransomware attack, later found to be REvil ransomware. In the United States alone, JBS Foods accounts for nearly 25% of beef and roughly 20% of pork production. Adversaries initially launched a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the company’s Information Technology (IT) networks in Australia, but the attack impacted operations in Brazil, Canada, and the United States, as well. The attack caused plant operations in all four countries to shut down for at least one day. All nine of the U.S. meatpacking plants temporarily shut down because of the attack. The adversaries initially demanded a $\$$22 million ransom for the company’s data, but later negotiated the ransom down to $\$$11 million even after JBS Foods restored most of their systems. JBS Foods eventually paid the $\$$11 Million for reassurance from the adversaries that none of their customers’ data would be compromised in the future. Despite its short duration, the attack still caused large stocks of meat to spoil. The incident also underscored how adversaries can simultaneously compromise and move laterally through global subsidiaries of an organization. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (in a sequence of 21 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 361 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Sixteen of the identified techniques used during the JBS Foods cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 308 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 163 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 75 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Impact of the dark matter velocity distribution on capture rates in the Sun

Dark matter could be captured in the Sun and self-annihilate, giving rise to an observable neutrino flux. Indirect searches for dark matter looking for this signal with neutrino telescopes have resulted in tight constraints on the interaction cross-section of dark matter with ordinary matter. We investigate how robust limits are against astro-physical uncertainties. We study the effect of the velocity distribution of dark matter in our Galaxy on capture rates in the Sun. We investigate four sources of uncertainties: orbital speed of the Sun, escape velocity of dark matter from the halo, dark matter velocity distribution functions and existence of a dark disc. We find that even extreme cases currently discussed do not decrease the sensitivity of indirect detection significantly because the capture is achieved over a broad range of the velocity distribution by integration over the velocity distribution. The effect of the uncertainty in the high-velocity tail of dark matter halo is very marginal as the capture process is rather inefficient at this region. The difference in capture rate in the Sun for various scenarios is compared to the expected change in event rates for direct detection. The possibility of co-rotating structure with the Sun can largely boost the signal and hence makes the interpretation of indirect detection conservative compared to direct detection.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

ON THE FEASIBILITY OF CHARACTERIZING FREE-FLOATING PLANETS WITH CURRENT AND FUTURE SPACE-BASED MICROLENSING SURVEYS

Simultaneous space- and ground-based microlensing surveys, such as K2's Campaign 9 (K2C9) and WFIRST, facilitate measuring the masses and distances of free-floating planet (FFP) candidates, which are identified as single-lens events with timescales that are of the order of 1 day. Measuring the mass and distance of an FFP lens requires determining the size of the source star ρ, measuring the microlens parallax π{sub E}, and using high-resolution imaging to search for the lens flux F{sub ℓ} from a possible host star. Here we investigate the accessible parameter space for each of these components considering different satellites for a range of FFP masses, Galactic distances, and source star properties. We find that at the beginning of K2C9, when its projected separation D{sub ⊥} from the Earth is ≲0.2 au, it will be able to measure π{sub E} for Jupiter-mass FFP candidates at distances larger than ∼2 kpc and to Earth-mass lenses at ∼8 kpc. At the end of K2C9, when D{sub ⊥} = 0.81 au, it is sensitive to planetary-mass lenses for distances ≳3.5 kpc, and even then only to those with mass ≳M {sub Jup}. From lens flux constraints we find that it will be possible to exclude hosts down to the deuterium-burning limit for events within ∼2 kpc. This indicates that the ability to characterize FFPs detected during K2C9 is optimized for events occurring toward the beginning of the campaign. WFIRST, on the other hand, will be able to detect and characterize FFP masses down to or below super-Earths throughout the Galaxy during its entire microlensing survey.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

NASA Tech Briefs, February 2014

Topics include: JWST Integrated Simulation and Test (JIST) Core; Software for Non-Contact Measurement of an Individual's Heart Rate Using a Common Camera; Rapid Infrared Pixel Grating Response Testbed; Temperature Measurement and Stabilization in a Birefringent Whispering Gallery Resonator; JWST IV and V Simulation and Test (JIST) Solid State Recorder (SSR) Simulator; Development of a Precision Thermal Doubler for Deep Space; Improving Friction Stir Welds Using Laser Peening; Methodology of Evaluating Margins of Safety in Critical Brazed Joints; Interactive Inventory Monitoring; Sensor for Spatial Detection of Single-Event Effects in Semiconductor-Based Electronics; Reworked CCGA-624 Interconnect Package Reliability for Extreme Thermal Environments; Current-Controlled Output Driver for Directly Coupled Loads; Bulk Metallic Glasses and Matrix Composites as Spacecraft Shielding; Touch Temperature Coating for Electrical Equipment on Spacecraft; Li-Ion Electrolytes Containing Flame-Retardant Additives; Autonomous Robotic Manipulation (ARM); CARVE Log; Platform Perspective Toolkit; Convex Hull-Based Plume and Anomaly Detection; Pre-Filtration of GOSAT Data Using Only Level 1 Data and an Intelligent Filter to Remove Low Clouds; Affordability Comparison Tool - ACT; "Ascent - Commemorating Shuttle" for iPad; Cassini Mission App; Light-Weight Workflow Engine: A Server for Executing Generic Workflows; Model for System Engineering of the CheMin Instrument; Timeline Central Concepts; Parallel Particle Filter Toolkit; Particle Filter Simulation and Analysis Enabling Non-Traditional Navigation; Quasi-Terminator Orbits for Mapping Small Primitive Bodies; The Subgrid-Scale Scalar Variance Under Supercritical Pressure Conditions; Sliding Gait for ATHLETE Mobility; and Automated Generation of Adaptive Filter Using a Genetic Algorithm and Cyclic Rule Reduction.

Source record↗

DETECTION OF POTENTIAL TRANSIT SIGNALS IN THE FIRST 12 QUARTERS OF KEPLER MISSION DATA

We present the results of a search for potential transit signals in the first three years of photometry data acquired by the Kepler mission. The targets of the search include 112,321 targets that were observed over the full interval and an additional 79,992 targets that were observed for a subset of the full interval. From this set of targets we find a total of 11,087 targets that contain at least one signal that meets the Kepler detection criteria: periodicity of the signal, an acceptable signal-to-noise ratio, and three tests that reject false positives. Each target containing at least one detected signal is then searched repeatedly for additional signals, which represent multi-planet systems of transiting planets. When targets with multiple detections are considered, a total of 18,406 potential transiting planet signals are found in the Kepler mission data set. The detected signals are dominated by events with relatively low signal-to-noise ratios and by events with relatively short periods. The distribution of estimated transit depths appears to peak in the range between 20 and 30 parts per million, with a few detections down to fewer than 10 parts per million. The detections exhibit signal-to-noise ratios from 7.1{sigma}, which is the lower cutoff for detections, to over 10,000{sigma}, and periods ranging from 0.5 days, which is the shortest period searched, to 525 days, which is the upper limit of achievable periods given the length of the data set and the requirement that all detections include at least three transits. The detected signals are compared to a set of known transit events in the Kepler field of view, many of which were identified by alternative methods; the comparison shows that the current search recovery rate for targets with known transit events is 98.3%.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Reconstructing WIMP properties through an interplay of signal measurements in direct detection, Fermi-LAT, and CTA searches for dark matter

We examine the projected ability to reconstruct the mass, scattering, and annihilation cross section of dark matter in the new generation of large underground detectors, XENON-1T, SuperCDMS, and DarkSide-G2, in combination with diffuse gamma radiation from expected 15 years of data from Fermi-LAT observation of 46 local spiral dwarf galaxies and projected CTA sensitivity to a signal from the Galactic Center. To this end we consider several benchmark points spanning a wide range of WIMP mass, different annihilation final states, and large enough event rates to warrant detection in one or more experiments. As previously shown, below some 100 GeV only direct detection experiments will in principle be able to reconstruct WIMP mass well. This may, in case a signal at Fermi-LAT is also detected, additionally help restricting σ v and the allowed decay branching rates. In the intermediate range between some 100 GeV and up a few hundred GeV, direct and indirect detection experiments can be used in complementarity to ameliorate the respective determinations, which in individual experiments can at best be rather poor, thus making the WIMP reconstruction in this mass range very challenging. At large WIMP mass, ∼ 1 TeV, CTA will have the ability to reconstruct mass, annihilation cross section, and the allowed decay branching rates to very good precision for the τ{sup +}τ{sup -} or purely leptonic final state, good for the W {sup +} W {sup -} case, and rather poor for b b-bar . A substantial improvement can potentially be achieved by reducing the systematic uncertainties, increasing exposure, or by an additional measurement at Fermi-LAT that would help reconstruct the annihilation cross section and the allowed branching fractions to different final states.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Review of the theoretical and experimental status of dark matter identification with cosmic-ray antideuterons

Recent years have seen increased theoretical and experimental effort towards the first-ever detection of cosmic-ray antideuterons, in particular as an indirect signature of dark matter annihilation or decay. In contrast to indirect dark matter searches using positrons, antiprotons, or γ-rays, which suffer from relatively high and uncertain astrophysical backgrounds, searches with antideuterons benefit from very suppressed conventional backgrounds, offering a potential breakthrough in unexplored phase space for dark matter. This article is based on the first dedicated cosmic-ray antideuteron workshop, which was held at UCLA in June 2014. It reviews broad classes of dark matter candidates that result in detectable cosmic-ray antideuteron fluxes, as well as the status and prospects of current experimental searches. The coalescence model of antideuteron production and the influence of antideuteron measurements at particle colliders are discussed. This is followed by a review of the modeling of antideuteron propagation through the magnetic fields, plasma currents, and molecular material of our Galaxy, the solar system, the Earth’s geomagnetic field, and the atmosphere. Lastly, the three ongoing or planned experiments that are sensitive to cosmic-ray antideuterons, BESS, AMS-02, and GAPS, are detailed. As cosmic-ray antideuteron detection is a rare event search, multiple experiments with orthogonal techniques and backgrounds are essential. Furthermore, the combination of AMS-02 and GAPS antideuteron searches is highly desirable. Many theoretical and experimental groups have contributed to these studies over the last decade, this review aims to provide the first coherent discussion of the relevant dark matter theories that antideuterons probe, the challenges to predictions and interpretations of antideuteron signals, and the experimental efforts toward cosmic antideuteron detection.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Predicting and Detecting Emerging Cyberattack Patterns Using StreamWorks

The number and sophistication of cyberattacks on industries and governments have dramatically grown in recent years. To counter this movement, new advanced tools and techniques are needed to detect cyberattacks in their early stages such that defensive actions may be taken to avert or mitigate potential damage. From a cybersecurity analysis perspective, detecting cyberattacks may be cast as a problem of identifying patterns in computer network traffic. Logically and intuitively, these patterns may take on the form of a directed graph that conveys how an attack or intrusion propagates through the computers of a network. Such cyberattack graphs could provide cybersecurity analysts with powerful conceptual representations that are natural to express and analyze. We have been researching and developing graph-centric approaches and algorithms for dynamic cyberattack detection. The advanced dynamic graph algorithms we are developing will be packaged into a streaming network analysis framework known as StreamWorks. With StreamWorks, a scientist or analyst may detect and identify precursor events and patterns as they emerge in complex networks. This analysis framework is intended to be used in a dynamic environment where network data is streamed in and is appended to a large-scale dynamic graph. Specific graphical query patterns are decomposed and collected into a graph query library. The individual decomposed subpatterns in the library are continuously and efficiently matched against the dynamic graph as it evolves to identify and detect early, partial subgraph patterns. The scalable emerging subgraph pattern algorithms will match on both structural and semantic network properties.

Chin, George↗

In situ orbital debris experiment concepts

Implementation of the radar, lidar and passive optical remote sensing concepts for measuring space debris from an Earth orbiting platform was investigated. Each system was compared for their requirements on the host platform, their performance relative to the space debris measurement program and the estimated cost of developing each concept into a flight instrument. It is found that the radar and lidar systems offer the greatest versatility and accuracy since they control the direction, intensity and duration of the energy incident on the target object. The performance of the passive optical system is determined by the capability of the detector and by the baseline separation of the telescopes, which requires the use of an on-orbit deployment mechanism. The passive optical concept provides the largest total event rae, and includes significant detections of particle sizes greater than 10 cm to allow correlation with ground based observations of the larger particles. The event rate for the radar system is relatively constant with particle while the lidar system is slightly biased toward the smaller sizes. These event rate differences result from a combination of the debris flux size distribution and the variation of sensitive detection area with particle size for the three concepts.

Neste, S. L.↗

Review of the Theoretical and Experimental Status of Dark Matter Identification with Cosmic-Ray Antideuterons

Recent years have seen increased theoretical and experimental effort towards the first-ever detection of cosmic-ray antideuterons, in particular as an indirect signature of dark matter annihilation or decay. In contrast to indirect dark matter searches using positrons, antiprotons, or gamma-rays, which suffer from relatively high and uncertain astrophysical backgrounds, searches with antideuterons benefit from very suppressed conventional backgrounds, offering a potential breakthrough in unexplored phase space for dark matter. This article is based on the first dedicated cosmic-ray antideuteron workshop, which was held at UCLA in June 2014. It reviews broad classes of dark matter candidates that result in detectable cosmic-ray antideuteron fluxes, as well as the status and prospects of current experimental searches. The coalescence model of antideuteron production and the influence of antideuteron measurements at particle colliders are discussed. This is followed by a review of the modeling of antideuteron propagation through the magnetic fields, plasma currents, and molecular material of our Galaxy, the solar system, the Earth's geomagnetic field, and the atmosphere. Finally, the three ongoing or planned experiments that are sensitive to cosmic-ray antideuterons, BESS, AMS-02, and GAPS, are detailed. As cosmic-ray antideuteron detection is a rare event search, multiple experiments with orthogonal techniques and backgrounds are essential. Therefore, the combination of AMS-02 and GAPS antideuteron searches is highly desirable. Many theoretical and experimental groups have contributed to these studies over the last decade, this review aims to provide the first coherent discussion of the relevant dark matter theories that antideuterons probe, the challenges to predictions and interpretations of antideuteron signals, and the experimental efforts toward cosmic antideuteron detection.

Antideuteron Cosmic ray Dark matter↗

Proposal for Direct Detection of Ultralight Dark Matter via Charged Lepton Flavor Violation

We propose a dark matter direct-detection strategy using charged particle decays at accelerator-based experiments. If ultralight ( m ϕ ≪ eV ) dark matter has a misalignment abundance, its local field oscillates in time at a frequency set by its mass. If it also couples to flavor-changing neutral currents, rare exotic decays such as μ → e ϕ ′ and τ → e ( μ ) ϕ ′ inherit this modulation. Focusing on such charged lepton flavor-violating decays, we show that sufficient event samples can enable detection of ultralight dark matter candidates at Mu3e, Belle-II, and FCC-ee.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗