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UNF-ST&DARDS Unified Database and the Automatic Document Generator

The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy is sponsoring development of a database to store information related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in support of its Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition efforts. This database, referred to as the Unified Database (UDB), is part of a larger engineering analysis tool, the Used Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS). The UDB provides a comprehensive, controlled source of SNF information, including dry cask attributes, assembly data, economic attributes, transportation infrastructure attributes, potential future facility attributes, and federal government radioactive waste attributes. There are a number of existing and envisioned data reports that can be expected to use data stored within the UDB; however, previously, there was not a streamlined method to couple the database to such data reports. Therefore, to streamline the creation of these reports, two methods were developed to generate documents from information in the database automatically. The first method used Java and LaTeX for automatically generating the report, and the second method used the Python programming language along with Sphinx, a Python documentation generator. There are some advantages and disadvantages to both approaches, but both methods produced equally high-quality, automatically generated reports that were directly coupled to the database. Finally, this study describes data currently available in the UDB; explains the two different methods for automatically generating reports from these data; and shows examples of inline text, figures, and tables automatically generated using both approaches.

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Bounding Pressure and Flammability Evaluations for a Department of Energy Standard Canister Loaded with Aluminum-Clad Spent Fuel

This report presents bounding pressurization and flammability evaluations from the radiolytic gas generation expected during extended (>50 years) dry storage of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) elements in a sealed Department of Energy (DOE) Standard Canister. The primary questions involving extended ASNF dry storage center around the adequacy of dry storage conditioning processes (i.e., drying) and the behavior of residual hydrated aluminum oxides on the cladding—specifically, the radiolytic breakdown of chemically bound water in these corrosion products. The objectives of the presented work include providing a bounding assessment of the pressure with respect to the DOE Standard Canister’s structural integrity limits and identifying the potential for forming flammable or explosive gas mixtures (i.e., exceedance of the lower flammability limit of the molecular hydrogen [H2] and oxygen [O2] concentrations). The evaluation results confirm the findings of previous, more complex M&S work. That is, the structural integrity of the canister remains unchallenged by a wide margin. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the presented pressure calculations consider a full breakdown of the chemisorbed water, including a consequent release of all available H2. In reality, the breakdown of water in these systems will likely remain incomplete, due to competing chemical and radiolytic reactions, thereby attaining an equilibrium in the storage environment.

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Preliminary Evaluation of Loading DOE Standard Canisters in the INL CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility - 20543

This paper looks at the equipment and operations necessary to load United States Department of Energy (DOE)-owned Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) into DOE Standard Canisters in the CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) in the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) area at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Two types of fuels are looked at in this evaluation: Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) fuel (uranium-aluminide fuel with aluminum cladding) and Peach Bottom fuel (thorium-uranium carbide fuel in a graphite matrix). The fuel ready for loading would come from fuel storage canisters in the CPP-603 facility. The paper describes the facility, the fuel types, the DOE Standard Canisters, and existing equipment; lists the needed loading operations; reviews facility features and equipment to perform the operations; and then lists the decisions, analyses, designs, demonstrations, and modifications that will be needed to perform the loading of DOE-owned SNF into DOE Standard Canisters in the CPP-603 IFSF. (authors)

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Drying Wet Stored and Corroded Magnox Fuel for Interim Dry Storage - 20187

To investigate the feasibility of drying corroded Magnesium alloy clad nuclear fuel, the corrosion products of inactive and unirradiated Magnox simulant dry corrosion product and dried corroded Magnox sludge were characterised by X-ray diffraction and thermogravimetric analysis. XRD identified brucite in the dried corrosion product and both brucite and hydromagnesite in the sludge. TGA identified mass loss on dehydration of ∼9.1% up to 250 deg. C and 27.9% from dehydroxylation up to 440 deg. C, with total mass loss of 41.9% up to 800 deg. C for the dried corrosion product. The sludge TGA showed 8.3% mass loss up to 250 deg. C from dehydration, 7.5% up to 330 deg. C from dehydroxylation and 31.4% mass loss up to 47.2% for decarbonation, with total mass loss of 49.2% up to 800 deg. C. Water removal up to 1.8 g was performed by cold vacuum drying (40 deg. C-120 deg. C) on a ≅14.8 g (wet) corroded Magnox sample. The process was monitored by observing pressure, dew point, temperature and gas flow changes supported by measuring the sample mass loss as water is removed. From these tests, it was observed that the dried corroded Magnox displayed some hygroscopic capacity which has implications for water retention following vacuum drying and the length of exposure required to achieve the desired dryness. Whilst at higher temperatures the water was removed faster, the increased temperature also risks the fuel cladding undergoing unwanted chemical reactions with the residual water during the process. However, at lower temperatures the achievable levels of dryness were reduced. Therefore, from these observations this work has identified that there is a temperature balance that may be necessary to optimise the drying process with respect to allowing the greatest level of dryness whilst restricting unwanted chemical reactions. (authors)

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TA-54 Flanged Tritium Waste Container Operations, Radioactive Air Emissions Summary Volume 1: Stack Emissions & Off-Site Dose Consequence

In September 2025, pressure mitigation operations began on the four Flanged Tritium Waste Containers (FTWCs) that had been in storage at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Technical Area (TA-) 54, Area G, Building 1028. Each FTWC was opened at TA-54 and put into a stable configuration, then containers were moved to LANL’s Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) for further processing in preparation for shipment off-site. Over the course of 13 operational days, the project had air emissions of 123 curies of tritium (hydrogen-3). The radiological dose to the hypothetical maximally exposed individual (MEI) member of the public from these emissions was 0.012 millirem. This is well within the limits established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which allows 10 millirem per year to any member of the public. Naturally occurring background radiation in Northern New Mexico averages about 300-400 millirem per year to residents. This report is intended to briefly summarize operations that took place in September and October 2025, provide documentation of the radionuclide air emissions from these operations, and summarize the off-site dose consequence to the public that resulted from these air emissions. Informal notifications addressing these areas were made via email to the EPA and NMED throughout the project, and summaries of these data were also posted on the LANL external web site 1 for FTWC operations.

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FY 2014 Status Report: of Vibration Testing of Clad Fuel (M4FT-14OR0805033)

The DOE Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to investigate the behavior of light-water-reactor (LWR) fuel cladding material performance related to extended storage and transportation of UNF. ORNL has been tasked to perform a systematic study on UNF integrity under simulated normal conditions of transportation (NCT) by using the recently developed hot-cell testing equipment, Cyclic Integrated Reversible-Bending Fatigue Tester (CIRFT). To support the testing on actual high-burnup UNF, fast-neutron irradiation of pre-hydrided zirconium-alloy cladding in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at elevated temperatures will be used to simulate the effects of high-burnup on fuel cladding for help in understanding the cladding materials properties relevant to extended storage and subsequent transportation. The irradiated pre-hydrided metallic materials testing will generate baseline data to benchmark hot-cell testing of the actual high-burnup UNF cladding. More importantly, the HFIR-irradiated samples will be free of alpha contamination and can be provided to researchers who do not have hot cell facilities to handle highly contaminated high-burnup UNF cladding to support their research projects for the UFDC.t

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The transportation factor in site evaluations for spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal facilities - 15460

New facility siting studies will be necessary to fulfill the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future 2012 recommendation to develop consolidated interim storage (CIS) for spent nuclear fuel in the next decade. Future site evaluations for used nuclear fuel (UNF) storage and disposal facilities must address transportation requirements, especially access to mainline railroads, early in the site selection process. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 2013 proposed a strategy for managing spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the BRC recommendations by establishing a pilot interim storage facility by 2021 and a consolidated interim storage facility by 2025. The authors demonstrate that currently available geographic information systems and already adopted siting criteria (defining favorable and unfavorable conditions) allow the identification of the transportation portion of a storage facility siting process to begin without delay. Ready access to the mainline rail system is absolutely critical since existing rail access, or easily constructed access, is a highly favorable condition for successful siting. Despite widespread rail abandonments over the past three decades, vast areas of the United States retain mainline rail service or could connect to existing mainlines by building new rail spurs of less than 25-50 miles. This precondition for transportation planning is critical. Planners need to start with the beginning - availability of rail transportation to and from the interim storage facility/facilities. A second step in transportation screening would be to evaluate those potential site locations within 50 miles of existing mainline railroads using other appropriate variables. This effort could begin with the application of the 1984 repository siting guidelines for transportation (10 CFR 960.5-2-7)[1]. Repository surface facilities have essentially the same transportation requirements as storage facilities. The guidelines in 10 CFR 960 provide a readily available template for evaluating sites based on transportation risks, impacts and costs. Initial site screening, after considering proximity to mainline railroads as the precursory step, should evaluate: 1) proximity to highly populated areas; 2) proximity to interstate highways; 3) proximity to environmentally sensitive areas and lands protected by federal, state, or tribal governments; and 4) proximity to military installations, hazardous materials facilities, or other facilities that might impact transportation safety and security.Several challenges exist which prevent effective transportation planning. The diversity of canister and cask types and SNF characteristics and conditions, the increasingly limited rail access at the shipping sites and the ease with which public attention can be marshalled against a waste management program, all suggest that future efforts need to identify potential storage sites that reduce transportation impacts and costs by reducing near-site transportation construction and reduce total system transportation impacts. This can most easily be accomplished by reducing shipping distances in a process that is easily defined and implemented. The paper concludes that the DOE should develop a site screening and evaluation program with transportation as a central consideration. (authors)

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HLW Melter Control Strategy Without Visual Feedback

Plans for the treatment of high level waste (HL W) at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) are based upon the inventory of the tank wastes, the anticipated performance of the pretreatment processes, and current understanding of the capability of the borosilicate glass waste form. The WTP HLW melter design, unlike earlier DOE melter designs, incorporates an active glass bubbler system. The bubblers create active glass pool convection and thereby improve heat and mass transfer and increase glass melting rates. The WTP HLW melter has a glass surface area of 3.75 m 2 and depth of ~ 1.1 m. The two melters in the HLW facility together are designed to produce up to 7.5 MT of glass per day at 100% availability. Further increases in HL W waste processing rates can potentially be achieved by increasing the melter operating temperature above 1150°C and by increasing the waste loading in the glass product. Increasing the waste loading also has the added benefit of decreasing the number of canisters for storage.

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Savannah River Site Robotics

Meet Sandmantis and Frankie, two advanced robotic devices that are key to cleanup at Savannah River Site. Sandmantis cleans hard, residual waste off huge underground storage tanks. Frankie is equipped with unique satellite capabilities and sensing abilties that can determine what chemicals still reside in the tanks in a cost effective manner.

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Soil Sampling Results for Closure of a Portion of Solid Waste Management Unit #16

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/ NNSA) and National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS), the management and operating contractor for Sandia National Laboratories/California (SNL/CA), has prepared this soil sampling results report for closure of a portion of Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) #16. The entire network of SNL/CA sanitary sewer lines, including building laterals, was identified as SWMU #16 under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Assessment conducted for SNL/CA in April 1991 (DOE 1992). Along with the previous SWMU #16 investigation results (SNL/CA 2019), the results of this investigation are intended to support closure decisions by the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB), as discussed below. SNL/CA personnel completed upgrading its sanitary sewer discharge network in 2019. These upgrades included installing new sections of underground lines and decommissioning certain sections of the old piping system by capping in place. To date, several sections of the sewer line have been abandoned-in-place by capping as new sewer lines were installed or flow was rerouted to other existing lines. To formally close these abandoned sections of the sewer line, the RWQCB required that SNL/CA personnel collect soil samples to be analyzed for contaminants potentially released from the sewer lines. SNL/CA personnel hired Weiss Associates (Weiss) of Emeryville, California to prepare a sampling and analysis plan, implement the sampling plan and report the results of the investigation under Purchase Order #2166257. The Sampling and Analysis Plan for Partial Closure of Solid Waste Management Unit #16 (SAP) was submitted to the RWQCB on August 14, 2020 by Weiss on behalf of SNL/CA. The RWQCB approved the SAP on September 30, 2020 after Weiss updated the method detection limit and reporting limits for total polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and individual aroclors. Soil sampling was conducted in accordance with the SAP except that fewer locations were sampled due to site constraints, as discussed below. This report presents the results of the sampling effort and documents all associated field activities including borehole clearing, soil sample collection, storage and transportation to the analytical laboratories, borehole backfilling and surface restoration, and storage of investigation-derived waste (IDW) for future profiling and disposal by SNL/CA waste management personnel.

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Erosion and corrosion analysis of waste transfer components in the POR104 valve box at Hanford - 15715

At the United States Department of Energy Hanford Site in Richland, Washington, waste is being transferred to storage tanks in preparation for treatment at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. Regulatory committees have concerns regarding the structural integrity of the waste transfer components being used. Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) has employed a Fitness-for-Service program, which is a multi-disciplinary engineering approach that is used to determine if equipment is fit to remain in operation for a specified projected period. An approach to monitor aging equipment is to take thickness measurements of components when feasible, to evaluate if there is any appreciable degradation in the integrity of the components. The thickness measurements can be used to determine if erosion or corrosion is occurring and predict the remaining lifespan of the components. These predictions can also be used to develop design modifications for new piping and pipe jumpers. Analysis of thickness measurements have been conducted on four floor nozzles in the POR104 valve box located in the C-Tank Farm at Hanford. The data for the floor nozzles of the valve box does not show signs of wear, but there are variations in thicknesses which are likely due to manufacturing processes. (authors)

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Fracture Toughness Evaluation for Sandia Mock-up Stainless Steel Canister Weldment Using Spiral Notch Torsion Fracture Toughness Test

Many radioactive materials within the nuclear fuel cycle present a significant hazard. Such materials include spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, legacy waste and other nuclear materials that have no current outlet than storage. These materials are often held in long-term storage as an interim stage within their lifecycle. Lifecycles can include reuse or disposal. Safety and security of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) interim storage installations are very important, due to a great concentration of fission products, actinides and activation products. Stress corrosion cracking of interim storage containers has been identified as a high priority data gap by the Department of Energy. However, little has been done with regards to the canister weld material properties, including the fracture toughness, and their impact on stress corrosion, until recently from Sandia National Laboratory canister mockup program. Furthermore, because no post-weld heat treatment was required, the associated high tensile residual stress within these canister welds can drive the initiation and growth of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) cracks. Thus, the fracture mechanical property, such as fracture toughness, is an essential information to understand the canister weldment fracture resistance behavior and to support mitigation protocol development to counter SCC. In this work, we carried out fracture toughness evaluation on the received mock-up canister weldments from Sandia, using spiral notch torsion fracture test technology. The details of the weldment fracture toughness evaluation program development at ORNL are presented in this progress report. The objective of this research is to collect fracture toughness data on the mock-up canister weldment from Sandia National Laboratory. Data will be collected under quasi-static fracture loading using the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) developed Spiral Notch Torsion Test (SNTT) technology carried out on a biaxial tension/torsion tester. These data will be used to support the ongoing SNF dry storage canister modeling activities and to address regulatory issues associated with canister container integrity and the follow-on SNF system transport reliability. SNTT has been a recent breakthrough in measuring fracture toughness for different materials, including metals, ceramics, concrete and polymers composites. Due to its high geometry constraint and unique loading condition, SNTT can be used to measure the fracture toughness with smaller specimens without concern of size effects. The application of SNTT to brittle materials has been proved to be successful. The micro-cracks induced by original notches in brittle materials could ensure crack growth in SNTT samples. Therefore, no fatigue pre-cracks are needed. The application of SNTT to the ductile material to generate valid toughness data will require a test sample with sufficient crack length to increase the sample fracture tip localized constraint. Fatigue pre-crack growth techniques are employed to introduce sharp crack front into the sample. Previously, only rough calculations were applied to estimate the compliance evolution in the SNTT crack growth process; while accurate quantitative descriptions have never been attempted. This generates an urgent need to understand the crack evolution during the SNTT fracture testing process of ductile materials. The newly developed governing equations for SNTT crack growth estimate are used to control the fatigue crack growth to effectively reaching the target crack length. The detailed SNTT approach and its estimated fracture toughness for the as-received Sandia canister weldment and the associated baseline 304 stainless steel are presented in this report. In the past SNTT technology has also been successfully applied to investigate the fracture behavior of X52 and X80 steels and the X52 welded materials used for hydrogen infrastructures. The current study in supporting Sandia SNF Dry Storage Mock-up Canister Program is the first attempt of applying SNTT to the highly ductile stainless steel and the associated weld materials. The SNTT test results indicate that SNTT method is a reliable test approach with good repeatability in applying to SS304 steel and SS304/308 weld material. The estimate JQ upon fracture for the baseline SS304 steel is at 1618 lb/in. The estimate JQ upon fracture for the SS304/308 weld from HAZ and weld specimens are 720 lb/in and 850 lb/in, respectively.

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Path of Disposal for Hazardous and Non-hazardous Waste from Cradle to Grave

Hazardous waste is a threat to human health and the environment and must be managed and disposed of properly. A Solid Waste is defined as any material (solid, liquid, containerized gas) which has been discarded, abandoned (no longer needed), or recycled. The Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) is a law that creates the framework for the proper management of solid waste. Under RCRA, EPA has developed a program which ensures hazardous waste is managed safely from the moment it is generated to its final disposal (cradle-to-grave)2. To educate about how waste is handled at the Savannah River Research Campus (SRRC) under RCRA, the path it takes from point of generation (cradle) to disposal (grave), and the responsibilities of every person involved in the process. Researcher or other laboratory personnel that generates waste as a result of their work Responsibilities: - Fill out inventory log sheet and corresponding container sheet which includes the constituents of the waste; - Properly label waste container with SAA/WSA ID no., generator's name, what it is, the hazards, and date; - Place waste in designated waste storage area. Laboratory Custodian Responsibilities: - Ensures waste is handled and stored properly; - Ensures inventory is updated; - Ensures all container sheets are completed; - Ensures only authorized personal have access to waste storage areas. Environmental Compliance Authority Responsibilities: - Develops waste procedures; - Provide waste training; - Inspects for improperly handled waste; - Establishes or closes waste storage areas as needed; - Determines if waste can be recycled; - Determines if waste is RCRA hazardous: Is it U or P listed? - Unused commercial chemical products; Is it F listed - Spent solvents; Is it characteristic? - Flammable/Oxidizer, Corrosive, Reactive, Toxic; - Weighs waste to ensure laboratory has not exceeded its monthly or total storage limits; - Maintains waste records; - Determines how waste should be disposed: Trash - Nonhazardous solids; Drain - Nonhazardous Liquids; Labpack; - Prepares waste for shipment with Vendor and Department of Transportation (DOT) personnel. Packages, Transports, and Treats Hazardous Waste Responsibilities: - Must be EPA permitted and approved by the Department of Energy - Picks up hazardous waste for transport to a treatment, storage or disposal facility depending on waste disposal requirements - Must meet all Department of Transportation regulations for transporting hazardous waste - Dispose of waste according to RCRA regulations. Due to the potential risks to human health and the environment, waste must be handled safely through the chain of possession from cradle to grave. To ensure proper handling, there are many safety checks as required by RCRA and DOT regulations. This includes proper labeling, inventory, and characterization to ensure all hazards are known, inspections by the Custodian, ECA, and the state regulator (SCDHEC), and transportation verifications and manifesting. One of the best ways to reduce the risks that waste presents is to minimize or eliminate the creation of waste. This can be accomplished through source reduction which includes: Inventory control, material substitution, process modification, improved housekeeping, and preventative maintenance and recycling.

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Minimum emittance in electron storage rings with uniform or nonuniform dipoles.

A simple treatment of minimum emittance theory in storage rings is presented, favoring vector and matrix forms for a more concise picture. Both conventional uniform dipoles and nonuniform dipoles with bending radius variation are treated. Simple formulas are given for computing the minimum emittance, optimal lattice parameters, as well as effects of nonoptimal parameters. For nonuniform dipoles, analytical results are obtained for a three-piece sandwich dipole model. Minimization of the effective emittance for light sources is given in detail. Usefulness of gradient and/or nonuniform dipoles for reducing the effective emittance is addressed.

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An Overview of IAEA Activities to Support Pre-disposal Management of Radioactive Wastes in Member States - 12334

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) promotes safe and effective management of radioactive waste and has suitable programmes in place to serve the needs of Member States in this area. These programmes cover the development and use of safety standards, planning, technologies and approaches needed for the management of different types of radioactive waste, resulting both from the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear applications. In the pre-disposal area, the assistance to Members States covers a wide range of topics, including policy and strategy, inventory assessment, technologies and approaches for waste minimization, selection of technical options for waste processing and storage, improvement in operating practices at nuclear facilities, optimization of waste management capacity, etc. and is delivered through the publication of technical guidance documents, coordinated research projects, networks, technical cooperation projects and organization of training and technical review services. This report presents an overview of recent IAEA accomplishments aiming to support activities in pre-disposal management of radioactive waste with focus on technological aspects. (authors)

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REFERENCE CASES FOR USE IN THE CEMENTITIOUS BARRIERS PARTNERSHIP

The Cementitious Barriers Project (CBP) is a multidisciplinary cross cutting project initiated by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to develop a reasonable and credible set of tools to improve understanding and prediction of the structural, hydraulic and chemical performance of cementitious barriers used in nuclear applications. The period of performance is >100 years for operating facilities and > 1000 years for waste management. The CBP has defined a set of reference cases to provide the following functions: (1) a common set of system configurations to illustrate the methods and tools developed by the CBP, (2) a common basis for evaluating methodology for uncertainty characterization, (3) a common set of cases to develop a complete set of parameter and changes in parameters as a function of time and changing conditions, and (4) a basis for experiments and model validation, and (5) a basis for improving conceptual models and reducing model uncertainties. These reference cases include the following two reference disposal units and a reference storage unit: (1) a cementitious low activity waste form in a reinforced concrete disposal vault, (2) a concrete vault containing a steel high-level waste tank filled with grout (closed high-level waste tank), and (3) a spent nuclear fuel basin during operation. Each case provides a different set of desired performance characteristics and interfaces between materials and with the environment. Examples of concretes, grout fills and a cementitious waste form are identified for the relevant reference case configurations.

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Remediation of the FGMSP at Sellafield: The First Transfer of Bulk Sludge - 17133

The very first bulk transfers of radioactive sludge have commenced from one of the most hazardous nuclear plants in Europe, using equipment and systems researched, designed, installed and commissioned by Jacobs as part of the ACKtiv alliance. Sellafield is a nuclear fuel reprocessing and decommissioning site, close to the village of Seascale on the coast of the Irish Sea in Cumbria, England. Sellafield incorporates the original nuclear reactor site at Windscale, which is currently undergoing decommissioning, and dismantling, and Calder Hall, the world's first nuclear power generating reactor. The first nuclear facilities were built in the 1940's.The First Generation Magnox Storage Pond (FGMSP) dates back to the 1950's as part of the UK's expanding nuclear programme and was constructed to store, cool and prepare used Magnox nuclear fuel for recycling into new fuel. It urgently needs to be emptied of 1500 cubic metres of radioactive sludge. In this paper we describe the work undertaken by Jacobs to deliver a very challenging programme of work to provide the capability to remove sludge from the pond. The FGMSP Retrievals Project was awarded in March 2007 to supply equipment and services for the removal of sludge and miscellaneous waste from the First Generation Magnox Storage Pond at Sellafield. The Project is being executed by ACKtiv Nuclear (Jacobs, Carillion and Atkins) of which Jacobs is a 40% stakeholder. ACKtiv Nuclear is a mature Joint Venture and has been operating continuously and successfully since 2002, the oldest JV still in operation on Sellafield Site. The roots of the JV can be traced back to the 1980's. The Project covers all project phases from front-end engineering through detailed design, procurement, installation and commissioning support. The Project places huge emphasis on off-Site testing and has several facilities for both installation and integrated testing. This proves equipment prior to installation in a radioactive environment. The Project has achieved success and recognition including winning the 2014 and 2015 Sellafield Business Excellence awards, as well as numerous internal Jacobs awards. The Project achieved a major decommissioning milestone in March 2016. Since the installation of a 31 m pipe-bridge in 2012, using a 1200 te mobile crane surrounded by several other facilities with nuclear inventory, the Project has successfully installed the sludge retrieval and effluent system into the FGMSP. This 4 year programme of work included 2 booster pump platforms, sludge recovery tooling, hoses, umbilicals and a deluge skip wash box which were all trialled and proven off-Site prior to installation in the pond. This milestone to commence transfer of sludge to modern stainless steel containment is a major step forward in the hazard reduction of the facility.The presentation will cover the installation of the pond de-sludging equipment, the innovations deployed that ensured that the milestone was achieved under budget and ahead of schedule, as well the benefits to the facility, the Site and the nuclear industry. It will also examine the challenges that needed to be overcome such as high dose, contamination, limited working times and space constraints. The presentation will describe why the work is of national Importance and conclude with the achievement of commencement of bulk sludge transfer to a modern facility. (authors)

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Used nuclear fuel dry storage cask materials monitoring system: a proof of concept to deploy retrieve monitoring equipment - 15504

The cask materials monitoring system is a proof-of-concept to deploy and retrieve monitoring equipment. The system is an airlock-type system that is bolted to the cask fill/drain port. It consists of the following major components: (1) a monitoring module that contains the equipment for monitoring the cask environment, (2) a sliding shield plug that provides radiation shielding throughout the deployment and retrieval of the monitoring equipment module, (3) a primary seal flange that is permanently installed on the cask that provides cask boundary confinement, and (4) a containment tube that provides the airlock function providing cask confinement when the primary seal is broken. In this proof-of-concept development, corrosion coupons were selected as the monitoring equipment for deployment into a spent nuclear fuel cask. However, the system has the potential for a variety of uses. The integration of a camera deployment system into the cask materials monitoring system will permit inspection of used nuclear fuel while maintaining cask atmosphere. (authors)

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