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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Quantifying health benefits of sustainable aviation fuels: Modeling decreased ultrafine particle emissions and associated impacts on communities near the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport

Exposure to ultrafine particles (UFP, ≤100 nm) is an emerging health concern linked to premature mortality, with jet fuel combustion identified as a significant source of UFPs near airports. Sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) adoption has the potential to reduce aviation-related UFPs and may particularly benefit populations who reside nearby. However, assessing aviation-specific impacts on health remains challenging due to the lack of tools capable of addressing: fine-scale exposure evaluation, novel ambient pollutants, and groups with increased exposure or susceptibility. We develop and apply a method to estimate reductions in mortality associated with aviation-related UFP reductions at the Seattle-Tacoma (SEA-TAC) International Airport under SAF adoption scenarios, with a focus on near-airport communities. Using UFP exposure surfaces generated from AERMOD modeling, flight count data, and UFP measurements, we evaluated UFP reductions under various control scenarios. We estimated mortality reductions by combining this with population data, baseline mortality, and a hazard ratio of 1.012 (95 % confidence interval: 1.010, 1.015) per interquartile range increment of 2723 particles/cm 3 . Our analysis included 412 census tracts representing almost 1.5 million adults. Baseline aviation-related UFP exposures averaged 1145 (SD: 277) particles/cm 3 . The highest baseline concentrations and subsequent reductions under SAF scenarios were near SEA-TAC. Mortality case reductions averaged between 3.1 (95 % range: 2.5–3.7) for a 5 % UFP reduction to 31.0 (24.6–37.4) for a 50 % reduction, with corresponding mortality rate reductions of 0.2 (0.2–0.3) to 2.1 (1.7–2.5) cases per 100,000 people per year. Mortality rate reductions were larger among populations residing closer to SEA-TAC, including those that were Hispanic or Latino, below-poverty, and did not identify as White. Reducing aviation-related UFPs through SAF adoption could lead to lower mortality, particularly in near-airport communities. This reproducible approach can be adapted to other settings to evaluate health benefits from aviation-related UFP reductions.

Aviation-related air pollution↗
DOE OSTI2024

Regulatory Treatment of Low Frequency External Events under a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Licensing Pathway: Safety Criteria Evaluation

There has been recent progress in the development of risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) design and licensing approaches, which leverage the insights gained from detailed risk assessments and utilize performance-based metrics to permit flexibility and innovation. The RIPB approaches have included the probabilistic treatment of external hazards, including low frequency events that are beyond the design basis. A preceding study conducted in FY21 noted that there are certain challenges to the probabilistic treatment of low frequency external events, which are primarily the result of uncertainty in the hazard curve and the associated plant response to rare, severe events. The current work expands on the previous study by examining the regulatory safety criteria contained within draft 10 CFR Part 53 and associated draft RIPB seismic design guidance. The evaluation identified potential challenges in demonstrating satisfaction of the safety criteria for low frequency external events, with specific difficulties associated with demonstrating compliance with cumulative safety criteria metrics, such as the quantitative health objectives (QHOs). Non-LWRs are expected to utilize the direct calculation of offsite consequence, rather than use surrogates, for comparison to the QHOs, which can be particularly challenging as the previously identified uncertainties are compounded by uncertainties in the response of the neighboring population. The current work details this evaluation and key findings. The central recommendation from this effort is that it is necessary to develop an approach for demonstrating compliance with the safety criteria in draft Part 53 that addresses the key challenges while providing flexibility to applicants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Safety and Security Defense-in-Depth for Nuclear Power Plants

This report describes the risk-informed technical elements that will contribute to a defense-in-depth assessment for cybersecurity. Risk-informed cybersecurity must leverage the technical elements of a risk-informed approach appropriately in order to evaluate cybersecurity risk insights. HAZCADS and HAZOP+ are suitable methodologies to model the connection between digital harm and process hazards. Risk assessment modeling needs to be expanded beyond HAZCADS and HAZOP+ to consider the sequence of events that lead to plant consequences. Leveraging current practices in PRA can lead to categorization of digital assets and prioritizing digital assets commensurate with the risk. Ultimately, the culmination of cyber hazard methodologies, event sequence modeling, and digital asset categorization will facilitate a defense-in-depth assessment of cybersecurity.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Review of Hazards and Accidentology of an Integrated Energy Systems to Nuclear Power Plant Safety

With the interconnectivity of industrial processes in a nuclear integrated energy system (IES) the primary issue becomes the safety of the nuclear power plant (NPP). The industrial processes being supported are assumed to have been in colocation prior to the addition of an NPP. Do the hazards from each process reach beyond the perimeter of the plant to affect the NPP? This paper reviews hazards and accident statistics from processes in an IES as a first step to answer this question. Hazards and accidentology discussed cover hydrogen, ammonia, syngas, methanol, synthetic fuels, and oil refineries. They include mainly fire, explosion, and toxicity in varying degrees. Historical accident statistics are given whenever available, and accident causes are evaluated and ranked based on their frequencies. Lessons learned from previous accidents are presented. Future work will focus on utilizing the data collected for accidentology of the industrial processes to perform Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and analyze the impacts of additional hazards on the colocated existing nuclear power plant or newly built advanced nuclear reactor. The analysis will provide the frequency and consequence of external events that can affect the NPP.

08 - HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2023

Identifying human failure events (HFEs) for external hazard probabilistic risk assessment

In recent years, several advancements in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) have been driven by increased understanding of external hazards, plant response, and uncertainties. However, major sources of uncertainty associated with external hazard PRA remain. One important source is how risk-significant human actions that are carried out to enable plant response and recovery from natural hazards cause the close coupling of physical impacts on plants and overall plant risk during these hazard events. This makes human reliability and human-plant interactions important elements to consider in resolving PRA gaps in external hazards. One of the challenges in considering human response in external hazard probabilistic risk assessment (XHPRA) is that most existing human reliability analysis (HRA) models were not developed for assessing actions outside the control room (termed ex-control room actions) and hazard response. To support this new scope, HRA models will need to be developed or modified to support identification of human activities, causal factors, and uncertainties inherent in external hazard response, thereby providing insights regarding event timing and physical event conditions as they relate to human performance. In this study, there are two main objectives: (1) evaluate the applicability of an existing cognitive-based HRA method, Phoenix, to ex-control room actions, and (2) identify sources of uncertainty to be characterized or reduced in order to make this method suitable for XHPRA. The first step of such work is performed by assessing the suitability of existing HRA methods to support identifying human failure events (HFEs) for human response to flooding hazards. These HFEs are human actions or inactions that are involved in human responses to flooding hazards and could contribute to the loss of a critical function for the plant in the scenario being examined. Here, in this work, decomposition analyses using the cognitive-based Phoenix HRA model are used to identify HFEs. The Phoenix method was found to be suitable for analyzing ex-control room actions as well as identifying specific HFEs and underlying crew failure modes (CFMs). However, the method's suitability for use in ex-control room actions would benefit from expanding the available CFMs to accommodate a larger variety of physical and communication tasks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Enhancement of risk informed validation framework for external hazard scenario

In recent years, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have developed methodologies to assess the vulnerabilities of nuclear plants against site specific extreme hazards. In many cases, advanced simulation tools are being considered to simulate multi-physics, multi-scale phenomena and to evaluate vulnerability of nuclear facilities. The credibility of advanced simulation tools is assessed based on a formal verification, validation, and uncertainty quantification procedure. One of the key limitations in validation is the lack of relevant experimental data at system-level. This limitation leads to a decrease in the confidence of system-level risk predictions. Therefore, a robust validation framework is needed to formalize the confidence in predictive capability of advanced simulation results. Additionally, this study enhances the existing risk informed validation methodology, originally proposed by Kwag et al. [1] and Bodda et al. [2], by developing additional attributes and a new set of validation indicies for a complete and wider applicability of the framework. In this manuscript, the methodology to identify the critical path that leads to the system-level failure is illustrated. The overall validation is checked for completeness and consistency by comparing the critical path for both the system-level simulation and experimental models. The applicability of the code for an intended application is represented in terms of various maturity levels and helps in the process of decision making.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Assessing Seismic Risk for CO2 Geologic Storage: Comparative Analysis of the Delaware Basin and Basin and Range Province Projects

ABSTRACT: Effective management of induced seismicity is critical for safe and sustainable CO2 storage. This study evaluates fault slippage risks in the Delaware Basin (Texas) and Basin and Range Province (Utah), integrating geological, operational, and geomechanical parameters to assess fault stability and seismic hazard mitigation. In the Delaware Basin, two sites were analyzed under an injection rate of 20,000 bbl/day over 25 years. One site showed low fault slip risk, while the other exhibited higher reactivation potential due to proximity to critically stressed faults. Sensitivity analysis revealed that increased pore pressure significantly heightened slip potential, highlighting the necessity of precise pressure control and real-time monitoring. In the Basin and Range Province, fault stability was evaluated at Neck of the Desert, Escalante Desert, Parowan, and Beaver sites under injection rates of 8,750 bbl/day per site over 30 years. Minimal fault slip risk was observed at Neck of the Desert and Escalante Desert sites, whereas Parowan and Beaver sites exhibited elevated slip potential due to semi-critically stressed faults sensitive to modest pore pressure increases. The findings demonstrate that fault slippage analysis, combined with sensitivity analysis of pore pressure and friction coefficients, is essential for understanding seismic risks. Continuous monitoring, adaptive injection management, and rigorous geomechanical analysis are key strategies for minimizing induced seismicity in CO2 sequestration projects.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Scalable method for micro-CT analysis enables large scale quantitative characterization of brain lesions and implants

Anatomic evaluation is an important aspect of many studies in neuroscience; however, it often lacks information about the three-dimensional structure of the brain. Micro-CT imaging provides an excellent, nondestructive, method for the evaluation of brain structure, but current applications to neurophysiological or lesion studies require removal of the skull as well as hazardous chemicals, dehydration, or embedding, limiting their scalability and utility. Here we present a protocol using eosin in combination with bone decalcification to enhance contrast in the tissue and then employ monochromatic and propagation phase-contrast micro-CT imaging to enable the imaging of brain structure with the preservation of the surrounding skull. Instead of relying on descriptive, time-consuming, or subjective methods, we develop simple quantitative analyses to map the locations of recording electrodes and to characterize the presence and extent of hippocampal brain lesions.

3-D reconstruction↗
DOE OSTI2022

Aggregation bias and its drivers in large‐scale flood loss estimation: A Massachusetts case study

Abstract Large‐scale estimations of flood losses are often based on spatially aggregated inputs. This makes risk assessments vulnerable to aggregation bias, a well‐studied, sometimes substantial outcome in analyses that model fine‐grained spatial phenomena at coarse spatial units. To evaluate this potential in the context of large‐scale flood risk assessments, we use data from a high‐resolution flood hazard model and structure inventory for over 1.3 million properties in Massachusetts and examine how prominent data aggregation approaches affect the magnitude and spatial distribution of flood loss estimates. All considered aggregation approaches rely on aggregate structure inventories but differ in whether flood hazard is also aggregated. We find that aggregating only structure inventories slightly underestimates overall losses (−10% bias), and when flood hazard data is spatially aggregated to even relatively small spatial units (census block), statewide aggregation bias can reach +366%. All aggregation‐based procedures fail to capture the spatial covariation of inputs distributions in the upper tails that disproportionately generate total expected losses. Our findings are robust to several key assumptions, add important context to published risk assessments and highlight opportunities to improve flood loss estimation uncertainty quantification.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Novel Foaming Solutions for High Level Waste (HLW) Processing - 20195

Foaming occurs during treatment of high level waste (HLW) at Savannah River Site's Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) in the Chemical Process Cell (CPC) due to high gas generation from process steam and chemical offgas products [1]. The presence of amphiphilic particles in the waste slurry stabilizes the foam [2], [3]. Efficient processing of HLW requires foam control, as foam-overs lead to lower productivity and potential radioactive contamination of condensate streams. DWPF currently employs Siovation Antifoam 747, a surfactant produced by Momentive Performance Materials, as an antifoaming agent during waste treatment. Despite its ability to control foam generation, processing issues have arisen from its use [4]. During DWPF chemical processing, a chemical antifoam agent must be effective at temperatures up to 103 deg. C between pH 3-13. Antifoam 747 is effective at pH 7 but degrades as pH deviates [5]. Antifoam 747 is 90% by weight Momentive{sup TM} L77 and 10% by weight Momentive{sup TM} Y-17580. These ingredients are trisiloxane products, which are especially vulnerable to attack in acidic and caustic environments. Since Antifoam 747 readily degrades, periodic addition is required. Several processing concerns related to Antifoam 747 have affected DWPF operation. Its overuse warranted concern of potential flammable melter offgas under upset conditions due to the generation of carbon dioxide and hydrogen. As a result, a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis (PISA) was declared [6]. Antifoam contribution has been included in the melter offgas flammability strategy and the quantity of antifoam is monitored to ensure limits are not exceeded. Testing at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) determined that propanal, tri-methylsilanol, and hexamethyldisiloxane are generated as Antifoam 747 degrades, leading to a second PISA [7]. The formation of these byproducts poses additional flammability risks. Furthermore, the methyl and ethyl groups of these compounds may be responsible for the formation of the methyl and ethyl mercury discovered in DWPF [8], [9]. The formation of organomercury has specifically been called out by DOE as a need for increased research. The effectiveness of non-chemical methods for foam control and the efficiency of alternative antifoam agents were evaluated as part of an effort to improve HLW treatment operations at DWPF and to reduce, or eliminate, the flammability hazards associated with Antifoam 747 currently in use. Foaming of high-level waste (HLW) slurries is an issue at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Chemical Process Cell (CPC) which is currently mitigated with a chemical antifoam agent. The effectiveness of non-chemical methods for foam control and the efficiency of alternative antifoams were examined to improve HLW treatment at DWPF and to eliminate the flammability hazards associated with Siovation Antifoam 747 currently in use. Non-chemical foam control methods were deemed unviable for chemical processing at DWPF, as the spray/mist technique requires too much water and space limitations make installation and implementation of headspace agitators unfeasible. The use of ultrasonic energy thickened and further stabilized the foam. Two suitable alternative defoaming agents, Momentive{sup TM} Y- 17112 and Evonik Surfynol{sup R} MD-20, were identified. Both defoamers control foam over a pH range of 4- 13 at boiling, with no flammable degradation products, and only minimal quantities (100-200 mg/kg) are required under glycolic acid conditions. In order to validate the effectiveness of these defoaming agents, SRNL recommends irradiation testing and laboratory scale SRAT/SME experiments with actual radioactive waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Radiation Hardened Foam Cold Test Plan - Phase II: Foam Characterization Testing and Environmental Chamber Testing of FoamBag Fixative Foam

This document outlines the Phase II test objectives and implementation plan for a down-select foam fixative technology intended to facilitate activities in support of the Savannah River Site (SRS) F/H labs deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) efforts. It is a collaborative effort between Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Florida International University (FIU), and the SRS F/H labs team intended to test and evaluate the potential of a polyurethane resin foam in mitigating the release of contamination during dismantling operations on radioactively contaminated piping in legacy facilities. The cold test plan addresses specific requirements highlighted by site and safety personnel and will be executed at FIU and SRNL test and lab facilities. Results from the cold tests will inform the hot test at F/H labs, which will use the foam fixative to confine and/or isolate residual contamination within a 3-dimensional void space of Hastelloy C-22 piping designated for removal from the area and transported to a designated disposal facility. Phase I testing was previously conducted using Hilti CP620 fixative foam. Results from Phase I testing indicate Hilti CP-620 fixative foam is incompatible with SRS site hot taps as an effective foam delivery method into Hastelloy C-22 piping. Phase II testing will be conducted using FoamBag TM fixative foam as an alternative fixative foam option. Phase II testing will address eight test objectives: (1) evaluation of the adhesion and bonding properties of FoamBag TM in Hastelloy C-22 piping, (2) evaluation of the adhesion of FoamBag TM in piping under various moisture conditions, (3) determination of the heat profile of FoamBag TM during curing, (4) determination of the internal pipe pressure after FoamBag TM deployment and curing, (5) conduct a leak test to determine if FoamBag TM is effective at creating a full seal within piping, (6) headspace testing of FoamBag TM to determine if there are any associated off-gas hazards during FoamBag TM curing, (7) conduct environmental chamber testing of FoamBag TM to understand how environmental parameters impacts FoamBag TM curing, and (8) conduct fire testing to evaluate FoamBag TM fire retardant characteristics.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of possible reactivation of undetected faults during CO 2 injection

Geologic storage of carbon dioxide can efficiently contribute to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere. Two major hazards of this technology are leakage towards the ground surface and fluid-induced seismicity. While major faults may be detected and avoided during site characterization, undetected subseismic faults could be encountered once injection has started. This paper investigates leakage and reactivation of undetected faults through coupled thermal–hydraulic–mechanical modeling. The simulations are performed using a recently developed sequential simulator, TOUGH-Pylith, that allows to accurately account for the thermodynamics of brine-CO 2 injection mixtures, and to model faults as surfaces of discontinuity using state-of-the-art fault friction laws. The simulator is benchmarked against well-known analytical solutions and subsequently applied to investigate two cases of CO 2 injection injection close to undetected faults under normal and strike-slip faulting regimes. Furthermore, although the scenarios are generic and represent unfavorable conditions, they suggest that leakage could occur and that undetected faults could trigger minor seismic events. Therefore, careful site characterization and continuous monitoring during operations should be always performed.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Utilization of the LMP Methodology in Support of the VTR Conceptual Safety Design Report

The Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) is a fast spectrum test reactor currently being developed in the United States under the direction of the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The VTR is utilizing a risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) approach for design support and authorization by the DOE, derived from recent efforts by the US industry led Licensing Modernization Project (LMP). This document contains an overview of the implementation of the LMP approach in support of the VTR Conceptual Safety Design Report (CSDR). The work reported here is the result of studies supporting a VTR conceptual design, cost, and schedule estimate for DOE-NE to make a decision on procurement. As such, it is preliminary. The VTR RIPB authorization approach utilizes information from the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), coupled with deterministic analyses, to aid in decision-making regarding the identification and categorization of safety basis events (SBEs), the classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and the evaluation of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy. As part of initial reactor design efforts, a VTR conceptual design PRA was developed to support the RIPB process, which focused on at-power internal events, with scoping analyses for seismic and sodium fire hazards. In addition to supporting numerous design studies, preliminary results from the RIPB approach and the VTR conceptual design PRA were utilized as the basis of the VTR CSDR. The initial identification and categorization of SBEs, SSC classification, and DID evaluation were contained within the CSDR, which was submitted to DOE in 2019 as part of the CD-1 submittal package. Following review, DOE approved the CSDR in April 2020 and the CD-1 package in late 2020. Valuable experience was gained through the implementation of the RIPB approach for design and authorization during the VTR conceptual design phase, which is summarized in this document. To the extent possible, this experience has been shared with the advanced reactor industry, through publications and participation in licensing tabletops, in addition to informing DOE:NE advanced reactor regulatory development efforts. Furthermore, the approval of the CSDR by the DOE as part of CD-1 represents a significant milestone in the use of RIPB approaches for advanced reactor licensing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of Hydrogen Storage Quantity Limits for Safety Requirements

As hydrogen storage facilities increase in size and capacity, it may be necessary to evaluate codes and standards that regulate hydrogen, especially in relation to allowable aggregate quantities. Existing regulations for other substances with comparable hazards such as oxygen, natural gas, and petroleum were reviewed; most fuels do not have aggregate quantity limits despite sometimes having individual tank capacity restrictions or limits for certain non-industrial, indoor, or small-scale applications. This precedent suggests that specifying a hydrogen quantity limit may not be necessary. Several possible methods for identifying an appropriate limit are presented to illustrate different approaches for a limit basis. These methods are based on overall risk, or the specific consequences inflicted by a jet fire or an explosion on people and infrastructure. However, these example metrics tend to require assumptions about potential leak sizes, suggesting that a general aggregate quantity limit would be difficult to justify without more system-specific requirements.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Carbon Storage Technical Viability Approach and National Data Assessment

Carbon Storage Technical Viability Approach is a comprehensive evaluation of potential geologic carbon storage sites that includes classic subsurface resource assessment components such as reservoir suitability in addition to hazard, environmental, social, regulatory, and jurisdiction components that may enhance or hinder successful carbon storage. Data for assessments of technically viable carbon storage span many categories, types; are disparate and numerous. Variables and types of data required to support CS assessments were previously not clearly defined and documented. Contextualizing available data indicates their utility, potential uncertainty, and gaps. This presentation details the Carbon Storage Technical Viability Approach, the associated matrix and database, and initial results from a portion of the national data availability assessment that contextualizes the data available to support carbon storage projects. Presented at the American Association of Petroleum Geologists' Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage (SPE-AAPG-SEG CCUS 2024) conference in Houston, TX, March 11-13, 2024.

Mark-Moser, Mackenzie K.↗