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At least 163 records · Page 9

NRAP-open-IAM: A flexible open-source integrated-assessment-model for geologic carbon storage risk assessment and management

Large-scale implementation of geologic carbon storage (GCS) to help reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions requires stakeholder confidence that injected CO2 will remain contained and that potential subsurface environmental risks are acceptably small and manageable. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) has developed an open-source integrated assessment model (NRAP-Open-IAM) to help address questions about a potential GCS site’s ability to effectively contain injected CO 2 and protect groundwater and other overlying environmentally sensitive receptors. NRAP-Open-IAM allows a user to: (1) incorporate relevant site geologic and injection scenario data; (2) characterize important site features and events;(3) couple fast prediction models of various system components of the engineered geologic system; and (4) execute stochastic, dynamic simulation of whole GCS system performance, leakage risk assessment, and uncertainty quantification. NRAP-Open-IAM is available on GitLab (https://gitlab.com/NRAP/OpenIAM), and is accompanied by multiple application examples and detailed user and developer guides.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Modern Senicide in the Face of a Pandemic: An Examination of Public Discourse and Sentiment About Older Adults and COVID-19 Using Machine Learning

Objectives This study examined public discourse and sentiment regarding older adults and COVID-19 on social media and assessed the extent of ageism in public discourse. Methods Twitter data (N = 82,893) related to both older adults and COVID-19 and dated from January 23 to May 20, 2020, were analyzed. We used a combination of data science methods (including supervised machine learning, topic modeling, and sentiment analysis), qualitative thematic analysis, and conventional statistics. Results The most common category in the coded tweets was “personal opinions” (66.2%), followed by “informative” (24.7%), “jokes/ridicule” (4.8%), and “personal experiences” (4.3%). The daily average of ageist content was 18%, with the highest of 52.8% on March 11, 2020. Specifically, more than 1 in 10 (11.5%) tweets implied that the life of older adults is less valuable or downplayed the pandemic because it mostly harms older adults. A small proportion (4.6%) explicitly supported the idea of just isolating older adults. Almost three-quarters (72.9%) within “jokes/ridicule” targeted older adults, half of which were “death jokes.” Also, 14 themes were extracted, such as perceptions of lockdown and risk. A bivariate Granger causality test suggested that informative tweets regarding at-risk populations increased the prevalence of tweets that downplayed the pandemic. Discussion Ageist content in the context of COVID-19 was prevalent on Twitter. Information about COVID-19 on Twitter influenced public perceptions of risk and acceptable ways of controlling the pandemic. Finaly, public education on the risk of severe illness is needed to correct misperceptions.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Managing Risk to Ensure a Successful Cassini/Huygens Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI)

I. Design: a) S/C designed to be largely single fault tolerant; b) Operate in flight demonstrated envelope, with margin; and c) Strict compliance with requirements & flight rules. II. Test: a) Baseline, fault & stress testing using flight system testbeds (H/W & S/W); b) In-flight checkout & demos to remove first time events. III. Failure Analysis: a) Critical event driven fault tree analysis; b) Risk mitigation & development of contingencies. IV) Residual Risks: a) Accepted pre-launch waivers to Single Point Failures; b) Unavoidable risks (e.g. natural disaster). V) Mission Assurance: a) Strict process for characterization of variances (ISAs, PFRs & Waivers; b) Full time Mission Assurance Manager reports to Program Manager: 1) Independent assessment of compliance with institutional standards; 2) Oversight & risk assessment of ISAs, PFRs & Waivers etc.; and 3) Risk Management Process facilitator.

risk managment↗

Characterization of Evidence for Human System Risk Assessment

Understanding the kinds of evidence available and using the best evidence to answer a question is critical to evidenced-based decision-making, and it requires synthesis of evidence from a variety of sources. Categorization of human system risks in spaceflight, in particular, focuses on how well the integration and interpretation of all available evidence informs the risk statement that describes the relationship between spaceflight hazards and an outcome of interest. A mature understanding and categorization of these risks requires: 1) sufficient characterization of risk, 2) sufficient knowledge to determine an acceptable level of risk (i.e., a standard), 3) development of mitigations to meet the acceptable level of risk, and 4) identification of factors affecting generalizability of the evidence to different design reference missions. In the medical research community, evidence is often ranked by increasing confidence in findings gleaned from observational and experimental research (e.g., "levels of evidence"). However, an approach based solely on aspects of experimental design is problematic in assessing human system risks for spaceflight. For spaceflight, the unique challenges and opportunities include: (1) The independent variables in most evidence are the hazards of spaceflight, such as space radiation or low gravity, which cannot be entirely duplicated in terrestrial (Earth-based) analogs, (2) Evidence is drawn from multiple sources including medical and mission operations, Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH), spaceflight research (LSDA), and relevant environmental & terrestrial databases, (3) Risk metrics based primarily on LSAH data are typically derived from available prevalence or incidence data, which may limit rigorous interpretation, (4) The timeframe for obtaining adequate spaceflight sample size (n) is very long, given the small population, (5) Randomized controlled trials are unattainable in spaceflight, (6) Collection of personal and environmental data on the astronaut population may create opportunities for advanced analytics and human-environment modeling that goes beyond that achieved in isolated experimental designs; and (7) Translation of relevant research to operations is a complex, transdisciplinary enterprise in which the approach must apply across the physical, biological, behavioral, and social sciences. The approach to synthesizing evidence must address both source and fidelity of data, and reflect the most general attributes of quality of evidence in science and engineering: reliability and validity. The authors are developing a two-factor approach which includes the various kinds of evidence required to understand risks and for the integrated interpretation of all evidence that is essential to develop standards and countermeasures. A unified framework for aggregating and assessing different kinds of evidence provides a consistent, traceable, evidence-based decision-making process to translate research to operations in an environment where engineers, scientists, physicians, and managers all engage in analyzing the trade space of vehicle design, standards, requirements and solutions for spaceflight.

Steinberg, S. L.↗

A Team Mental Model Perspective of Pre-Quantitative Risk

This study was conducted to better understand how teams conceptualize risk before it can be quantified, and the processes by which a team forms a shared mental model of this pre-quantitative risk. Using an extreme case, this study analyzes seven months of team meeting transcripts, covering the entire lifetime of the team. Through an analysis of team discussions, a rich and varied structural model of risk emerges that goes significantly beyond classical representations of risk as the product of a negative consequence and a probability. In addition to those two fundamental components, the team conceptualization includes the ability to influence outcomes and probabilities, networks of goals, interaction effects, and qualitative judgments about the acceptability of risk, all affected by associated uncertainties. In moving from individual to team mental models, team members employ a number of strategies to gain group recognition of risks and to resolve or accept differences.

Cooper, Lynne P.↗

Autonomous Congestion Control in Delay-Tolerant Networks

Congestion control is an important feature that directly affects network performance. Network congestion may cause loss of data or long delays. Although this problem has been studied extensively in the Internet, the solutions for Internet congestion control do not apply readily to challenged network environments such as Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) where end-to-end connectivity may not exist continuously and latency can be high. In DTN, end-to-end rate control is not feasible. This calls for congestion control mechanisms where the decisions can be made autonomously with local information only. We use an economic pricing model and propose a rule-based congestion control mechanism where each router can autonomously decide on whether to accept a bundle (data) based on local information such as available storage and the value and risk of accepting the bundle (derived from historical statistics). Preliminary experimental results show that this congestion control mechanism can protect routers from resource depletion without loss of data.

delay-tolerant networking↗

Autonomous Congestion Control in Delay-Tolerant Networks

Congestion control is an important feature that directly affects network performance. Network congestion may cause loss of data or long delays. Although this problem has been studied extensively in the Internet, the solutions for Internet congestion control do not apply readily to challenged network environments such as Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) where end-to-end connectivity may not exist continuously and latency can be high. In DTN, end-to-end rate control is not feasible. This calls for congestion control mechanisms where the decisions can be made autonomously with local information only. We use an economic pricing model and propose a rule-based congestion control mechanism where each router can autonomously decide on whether to accept a bundle (data) based on local information such as available storage and the value and risk of accepting the bundle (derived from historical statistics).

delay tolerant networking↗

Safer Liquid Natural Gas

After the disaster of Staten Island in 1973 where 40 people were killed repairing a liquid natural gas storage tank, the New York Fire Commissioner requested NASA's help in drawing up a comprehensive plan to cover the design, construction, and operation of liquid natural gas facilities. Two programs are underway. The first transfers comprehensive risk management techniques and procedures which take the form of an instruction document that includes determining liquid-gas risks through engineering analysis and tests, controlling these risks by setting up redundant fail safe techniques, and establishing criteria calling for decisions that eliminate or accept certain risks. The second program prepares a liquid gas safety manual (the first of its kind).

Source record↗

"Making Safety Happen" Through Probabilistic Risk Assessment at NASA

NASA is using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as one of the tools in its Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) tool belt to identify and quantify risks associated with human spaceflight. This paper discusses some of the challenges and benefits associated with developing and using PRA for NASA human space programs. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, while some have implemented PRA from the start of the program. It has been observed that the earlier a design change is made in the concept or design phase, the less impact it has on cost and schedule. Not finding risks until the operation phase yields much costlier design changes and major delays, which can result in discussions of just accepting the risk. Risk contributors identified by PRA are not just associated with hardware failures. They include but are not limited to crew fatality due to medical causes, the environment the vehicle and crew are exposed to, the software being used, and the reliability of the crew performing required actions. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, and while PRA can still provide a benefit for operations and future design trades, the benefit of implementing PRA from the start of the program provides the added benefit of informing design and reducing risk early in program development. Currently, NASA’s International Space Station (ISS) program is in its 20th year of on-orbit operations around the Earth and has several new programs in the design phase preparing to enter the operation phase all of which have active (or living) PRAs. These programs incorporate PRA as part of their Risk-Informed, Decision-Making (RIDM) process. For new NASA human spaceflight programs discussion begins with mission concept, establishing requirements, forming the PRA team, and continues through the design cycles into the operational phase. Several examples of PRA related applications and observed lessons are included.

Applications↗

Risk Management for Human Support Technology Development

NASA requires continuous risk management for all programs and projects. The risk management process identifies risks, analyzes their impact, prioritizes them, develops and carries out plans to mitigate or accept them, tracks risks and mitigation plans, and communicates and documents risk information. Project risk management is driven by the project goal and is performed by the entire team. Risk management begins early in the formulation phase with initial risk identification and development of a risk management plan and continues throughout the project life cycle. This paper describes the risk management approach that is suggested for use in NASA's Human Support Technology Development. The first step in risk management is to identify the detailed technical and programmatic risks specific to a project. Each individual risk should be described in detail. The identified risks are summarized in a complete risk list. Risk analysis provides estimates of the likelihood and the qualitative impact of a risk. The likelihood and impact of the risk are used to define its priority location in the risk matrix. The approaches for responding to risk are either to mitigate it by eliminating or reducing the effect or likelihood of a risk, to accept it with a documented rationale and contingency plan, or to research or monitor the risk, The Human Support Technology Development program includes many projects with independently achievable goals. Each project must do independent risk management, considering all its risks together and trading them against performance, budget, and schedule. Since the program can succeed even if some projects fail, the program risk has a complex dependence on the individual project risks.

jones, Harry↗

Validation of Decompression Sickness Risk Mitigation Protocols for Planetary Spaceflight Missions

BACKGROUND: Apollo missions used a 100% O2 cabin atmosphere which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during extravehicular activity (EVA) on the moon. NASA’s future missions to the moon and Mars are expected to use nitrox gas mixtures of up to 34% O2, 66% N2, which will reduce flammability risk compared with Apollo, but will necessitate Oxygen prebreathe prior to EVA to reduce DCS risk to acceptable levels. Prebreathe protocols used on the space shuttle and International Space Station are validated for microgravity EVAs, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary EVA. An “exploration atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA as a compromise that balances prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. However, this atmosphere may not be used for vehicles that do not support frequent EVA, and with commercial providers and international providers expected to provide landers, pressurized rovers, habitats, and spacesuits, different combinations of vehicle and spacesuit atmospheres are possible and will each require validated prebreathe protocols. OVERVIEW: Key components of a multi-year strategic roadmap include: 1) Establish hypobaric chamber facility capable of supporting 8-person EVA prebreathe validation tests at saturation atmospheres up to 36% O2; 2) validate an EVA physical workload simulation for use during prebreathe validation testing; 3) validate the recommended “exploration atmosphere” prebreathe protocol; 4) validate prebreathe protocols for additional atmospheric combinations that bound the most likely potential operating ranges of future vehicles and spacesuits; and 5) update DCS risk estimation models based on results of prebreathe validation studies. DISCUSSION: Details and data from completion of the first two steps of the strategic roadmap will be presented; the third step is currently underway, with pilot results provided in a companion presentation. Steps four and five will require a multi-year series of chamber tests; collaborations are being pursued.

Andrew F. J. Abercromby↗

Bio-project “derisking” through development of systematic methodologies and frameworks for risk assessment

One of the primary hindrances to producing a viable, sustainable domestic biomass industry for renewable biofuels, bio-products and bio-power is the lack of understanding and quantification of the risks associated with both the biomass supply chain and preprocessing and conversion technologies. Currently a consistent method for assessing, comparing, and quantifying risks in biomass supply chains does not exist, creating a major investment barrier to bioenergy projects in the U.S. The lack of a standardized approach has resulted in bioenergy stakeholders independently using inconsistent approaches and evaluation criteria, leading to unreliable and incomparable assessments of risks and financing barriers to bio-project development. Along with the challenges of inconsistent risk assessment for supply chain risk, technology specific risks based on variability in biomass properties are not fully understood and can pose significant unforeseen challenges for bioenergy projects. In many cases these properties have not yet been identified and the impacts on the proposed technology and products unquantified. This is particularly challenging for emerging preprocessing and conversion technologies. Without a firm understanding of the preprocessing/conversion technology-specific critical properties, the risk of a proposed bio-project cannot be fully evaluated. To address inconsistent risk evaluation in the biomass supply chain supporting project financing, a Biomass Supply Chain Risk Standards (BSCRS) framework was developed. The BSCRS framework includes a comprehensive list of known and perceived risks (Risk Indicators) to the supply chain developed through 100’s of interviews with bioenergy industry experts spanning from feedstock growers and suppliers to representatives from the financial sector. These risks have been organized into a manageable hierarchy of Risk Categories and Risk Factors that can be practically assessed. This BSCRS framework also provides mitigation strategies for multiple Risk Indicators from best available industry practices and research findings. Additionally, a risk quantification methodology for each Risk Factor, Risk Category, and the bio-project as a whole was developed to enable capital markets to assess feedstock risk more efficiently and more accurately. Multiple case studies representing existing bio-projects have been used to evaluate and verify the BSCRS framework and scoring methodology. To address technological risk along with the supply chain risk captured in the developed BSCRS framework, this work also focuses on development of a systematic criticality assessment tool using well-accepted, quantitative risk analysis methods to evaluate bioenergy feedstock critical properties impacting system unit operations. The proposed Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) approach uses a team of subject area experts (SAEs) for each targeted unit operation within a system. Collectively, the team will develop and use a quantitative scoring system to assess the material attributes, process parameters, and quality attributes for key unit operations that have already been identified. The FMEA process generates Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) for the various failures and predominant causes for each material/process unit/product combination resulting in a semi-quantitative, standardized methodology for assessing technological risk and biomass properties contributing to that risk.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

RISK-INFORMED BALANCING OF SAFETY, NONPROLIFERATION, AND ECONOMICS FOR THE SFR

A substantial barrier to the implementation of Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) technology in the short term is the perception that they would not be economically competitive with advanced light water reactors. With increased acceptance of risk-informed regulation, the opportunity exists to reduce the costs of a nuclear power plant at the design stage without applying excessive conservatism that is not needed in treating low risk events. In the report, NUREG-1860, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission describes developmental activities associated with a risk-informed, scenario-based technology neutral framework (TNF) for regulation. It provides quantitative yardsticks against which the adequacy of safety risks can be judged. We extend these concepts to treatment of proliferation risks. The objective of our project is to develop a risk-informed design process for minimizing the cost of electricity generation within constraints of adequate safety and proliferation risks. This report describes the design and use of this design optimization process within the context of reducing the capital cost and levelized cost of electricity production for a small (possibly modular) SFR. Our project provides not only an evaluation of the feasibility of a risk-informed design process but also a practical test of the applicability of the TNF to an actual advanced, non-LWR design. The report provides results of five safety related and one proliferation related case studies of innovative design alternatives. Applied to previously proposed SFR nuclear energy system concepts We find that the TNF provides a feasible initial basis for licensing new reactors. However, it is incomplete. We recommend improvements in terms of requiring acceptance standards for total safety risks, and we propose a framework for regulation of proliferation risks. We also demonstrate methods for evaluation of proliferation risks. We also suggest revisions to scenario-specific safety risk acceptance standards, particularly concerning seismic and aircraft impactrelated risks. Most importantly, within the context of the TNF historical SFR safety concerns about energetic core disruptive accidents are seen to be unimportant, but those of rare scenarios mentioned above are seen to be of dominant concern. In terms of proliferation risks the SFR energy system is seen not to be of considerably greater concern than with other nuclear power technologies, providing that highly effective safeguards are employed. We find the economic performance of proposed SFRs likely, due to the problems of using sodium as a coolant, to be inferior to those of LWRs unless they can be credited for services to improve nuclear waste disposal, nuclear fuel utilization and proliferation risk reductions. None of the design innovations investigated offers the promise to reverse this conclusion. The most promising innovation investigated is that of improving the plant's thermodynamic efficiency via use of the supercritical CO{sub 2} (rather than steam Rankine) power conversion system. We were unable to reach conclusions about the economic and proliferation risk implications of competing nuclear fuel processing methods, as available designs are too little developed to justify any such results. Overall, we find the SFR to be a promising alternative to LWRs should the conditions governing the valuation change substantially from current ones.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Communicating Risk to Program Managers

Program Managers (PM) can protect program resources and improve chances of success by anticipating, understanding and managing risks. Understanding the range of potential risks helps one to avoid or manage the risks. A PM must choose which risks to accept to reduce fire fighting, must meet the expectations of stakeholders consistently, and avoid falling into costly "black holes" that may open. A good risk management process provides the PM more confidence to seize opportunities save money, meet schedule, even improve relationships with people important to the program. Evidence of managing risk and sound internal controls can mean better support from superiors for the program by building a trust and reputation from being on top of issues. Risk managers have an obligation to provide the PM with the best information possible to allow the benefits to be realized (Small Business Consortium, 2004). The Institute for Chartered Accountants in England and Wales sees very important benefits for companies in providing better information about what they do to assess and manage key business risks. Such information will: a) provide practical forward-looking information; b) reduce the cost of capital; c) encourage better risk management; and d) improve accountability for stewardship, investor protection and the usefulness of financial reporting. We are particularly convinced that enhanced risk reporting will help listed companies obtain capital at the lowest possible cost (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England &Wales, June 2002). Risk managers can take a significant role in quantifying the success of their department and communicating those figures to executive (program) management levels while pushing for a broader risk management role. Overall, risk managers must show that risk management work matters in the most crucial place-the bottom line- as they prove risk management can be a profit center (Sullivan, 2004).

Shivers, C. Herbert↗

Risk-Based SMA and Modernizing Risk Classification at GSFC

In 2014, in response to a large volume of feedback from industry, the science community, and internal to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), GSFC’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate began a transition to a risk-based implementation of SMA, departing from its longstanding practice of being primarily driven by a mostly static set of Mission Assurance Requirements. The transition started out with a pilot project involving risk-based acceptance of bare-printed circuit boards that was enormously successful, continued through a complete organizational transformation in 2015, and culminated with the baselining of formal Risk-Based SMA policy in 2016. In this presentation we will describe the risk-based SMA concept, segue into how it shapes a modernization of risk classification that GSFC has rolled out, and provide results from the original pilot project for risk-based SMA, involving the printed circuit board assurance process.

Jesse Leitner↗

GO/NO-GO - When is medical hazard mitigation acceptable for launch?

Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.

Hamilton, Douglas R.↗

Public Risk Assessment Program

The Public Entry Risk Assessment (PERA) program addresses risk to the public from shuttle or other spacecraft re-entry trajectories. Managing public risk to acceptable levels is a major component of safe spacecraft operation. PERA is given scenario inputs of vehicle trajectory, probability of failure along that trajectory, the resulting debris characteristics, and field size and distribution, and returns risk metrics that quantify the individual and collective risk posed by that scenario. Due to the large volume of data required to perform such a risk analysis, PERA was designed to streamline the analysis process by using innovative mathematical analysis of the risk assessment equations. Real-time analysis in the event of a shuttle contingency operation, such as damage to the Orbiter, is possible because PERA allows for a change to the probability of failure models, therefore providing a much quicker estimation of public risk. PERA also provides the ability to generate movie files showing how the entry risk changes as the entry develops. PERA was designed to streamline the computation of the enormous amounts of data needed for this type of risk assessment by using an average distribution of debris on the ground, rather than pinpointing the impact point of every piece of debris. This has reduced the amount of computational time significantly without reducing the accuracy of the results. PERA was written in MATLAB; a compiled version can run from a DOS or UNIX prompt.

Mendeck, Gavin↗

Risk Management Technique for design and operation of facilities and equipment

The Risk Management System collects information from engineering, operating, and management personnel to identify potentially hazardous conditions. This information is used in risk analysis, problem resolution, and contingency planning. The resulting hazard accountability system enables management to monitor all identified hazards. Data from this system are examined in project reviews so that management can decide to eliminate or accept these risks. This technique is particularly effective in improving the management of risks in large, complex, high-energy facilities. These improvements are needed for increased cooperation among industry, regulatory agencies, and the public.

Fedor, O. H.↗