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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2014

Investigation of HZETRN 2010 as a Tool for Single Event Effect Qualification of Avionics Systems

NASA's future missions are focused on deep space for human exploration that do not provide a simple emergency return to Earth. In addition, the deep space environment contains a constant background Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) radiation exposure, as well as periodic Solar Particle Events (SPEs) that can produce intense amounts of radiation in a short amount of time. Given these conditions, it is important that the avionics systems for deep space human missions are not susceptible to Single Event Effects (SEE) that can occur from radiation interactions with electronic components. The typical process to minimizing SEE effects is through using heritage hardware and extensive testing programs that are very costly. Previous work by Koontz, et al. [1] utilized an analysis-based method for investigating electronic component susceptibility. In their paper, FLUKA, a Monte Carlo transport code, was used to calculate SEE and single event upset (SEU) rates. This code was then validated against in-flight data. In addition, CREME-96, a deterministic code, was also compared with FLUKA and in-flight data. However, FLUKA has a long run-time (on the order of days), and CREME-96 has not been updated in several years. This paper will investigate the use of HZETRN 2010, a deterministic transport code developed at NASA Langley Research Center, as another tool that can be used to analyze SEE and SEU rates. The benefits to using HZETRN over FLUKA and CREME-96 are that it has a very fast run time (on the order of minutes) and has been shown to be of similar accuracy as other deterministic and Monte Carlo codes when considering dose [2, 3, 4]. The 2010 version of HZETRN has updated its treatment of secondary neutrons and thus has improved its accuracy over previous versions. In this paper, the Linear Energy Transfer (LET) spectra are of interest rather than the total ionizing dose. Therefore, the LET spectra output from HZETRN 2010 will be compared with the FLUKA and in-flight data to validate HZETRN 2010 as a computational tool for SEE qualification by analysis. Furthermore, extrapolation of these data to interplanetary environments at 1 AU will be investigated to determine whether HZETRN 2010 can be used successfully and confidently for deep space mission analyses.

Rojdev, Kristina↗
NASA NTRS2021

SEE Test Report for Arizona Microtek AZ88923 High Speed Limiting Post Amplifier

The primary purpose of this testing is to characterize the Texas Instruments AZ88923 post amplifier for susceptibility to single-event latchup (SEL) and other destructive Single-Event Effects (SEE). These data will be used to assess the destructive SEE risk for the OSIRIS-REx Laser Altimeter (OLA). A secondary goal is to assess the susceptibility of the post amplifier to single-event transients (SET) and other nondestructive SEE. In particular, the loss-of-signal feature could give rise to some significant anomalies. However, it is not used on OLA.

Raymond Ladbury↗
NASA NTRS2019

What's My Prior? Baby Steps Toward Big Data

After four decades of single-event effects testing, radiation engineers face pressure to find alternatives to reduce or eliminate testing costs. Many of these alternatives focus on use of archival test data to bound SEE risk for similar parts. This presentation examines the challenges and limitations of such analyses and suggests analysis techniques and goals that are likely to be most appropriate for such efforts.

statistics and probability↗
NASA NTRS2011

Pulsed Laser System to Simulate Effects of Cosmic Rays in Semiconductor Devices

Spaceflight system electronic devices must survive a wide range of radiation environments with various particle types including energetic protons, electrons, gamma rays, x-rays, and heavy ions. High-energy charged particles such as heavy ions can pass straight through a semiconductor material and interact with a charge-sensitive region, generating a significant amount of charge (electron-hole pairs) along their tracks. These excess charges can damage the device, and the response can range from temporary perturbations to permanent changes in the state or performance. These phenomena are called single event effects (SEE). Before application in flight systems, electronic parts need to be qualified and tested for performance and radiation sensitivity. Typically, their susceptibility to SEE is tested by exposure to an ion beam from a particle accelerator. At such facilities, the device under test (DUT) is irradiated with large beams so there is no fine resolution to investigate particular regions of sensitivity on the parts. While it is the most reliable approach for radiation qualification, these evaluations are time consuming and costly. There is always a need for new cost-efficient strategies to complement accelerator testing: pulsed lasers provide such a solution. Pulsed laser light can be utilized to simulate heavy ion effects with the advantage of being able to localize the sensitive region of an integrated circuit. Generally, a focused laser beam of approximately picosecond pulse duration is used to generate carrier density in the semiconductor device. During irradiation, the laser pulse is absorbed by the electronic medium with a wavelength selected accordingly by the user, and the laser energy can ionize and simulate SEE as would occur in space. With a tightly focused near infrared (NIR) laser beam, the beam waist of about a micrometer can be achieved, and additional scanning techniques are able to yield submicron resolution. This feature allows mapping of all of the sensitive regions of the studied device with fine resolution, unlike heavy ion experiments. The problematic regions can be precisely identified, and it provides a considerable amount of information about the circuit. In addition, the system allows flexibility for testing the device in different configurations in situ.

Aveline, David C.↗
NASA NTRS2021

Single-Event Effect Test Report Texas Instruments DS25BR100 LVDS Buffer

This study was to determine the destructive single-event effect (SEE) susceptibility of the DS25BR100 series Low-Voltage Differential Signaling (LVDS) Buffers with Pre-emphasis and Equalization (DS25BR100, 110, and 120). The device was monitored primarily for destructive events while exposing it to a heavy ion beam at the Texas A&M University’s (TAMU) K500 Cyclotron.

Ted Wilcox↗
NASA NTRS2016

What Can We Learn From Proton Recoils about Heavy-Ion SEE Sensitivity?

The fact that protons cause single-event effects (SEE) in most devices through production of light-ion recoils has led to attempts to bound heavy-ion SEE susceptibility through use of proton data. Although this may be a viable strategy for some devices and technologies, the data must be analyzed carefully and conservatively to avoid over-optimistic estimates of SEE performance. We examine the constraints that proton test data can impose on heavy-ion SEE susceptibility.

probabilistic risk assessment↗
NASA NTRS2000

Performance Characterization of Digital Optical Data Transfer Systems for Use in the Space Radiation Environment

Radiation effects in photonic and microelectronic components can impact the performance of high-speed digital optical data link in a variety of ways. This segment of the short course focuses on radiation effects in digital optical data links operating in the MHz to GHz regime. (Some of the information is applicable to frequencies above and below this regime) The three basic component level effects that should be considered are Total Ionizing Dose (TID), Displacement Damage Dose (DDD) and Single Event Effects (SEE). In some cases the system performance degradation can be quantified from component level tests, while in others a more holistic characterization approach must be taken. In Section 2.0 of this segment of the Short Course we will give a brief overview of the space radiation environment follow by a summary of the basic space radiation effects important for microelectronics and photonics listed above. The last part of this section will give an example of a typical mission radiation environment requirements. Section 3.0 gives an overview of intra-satellite digital optical data link systems. It contains a discussion of the digital optical data link and it's components. Also, we discuss some of the important system performance metrics that are impacted by radiation effects degradation of optical and optoelectronic component performance. Section 4.0 discusses radiation effects in optical and optoelectronic components. While each component effect will be discussed, the focus of this section is on degradation of passive optical components and SEE in photodiodes (other mechanisms are covered in segment II of this short course entitled "Photonic Devices with Complex and Multiple Failure Modes"). Section 5.0 will focus on optical data link system response to the space radiation environment. System level SEE ground testing will be discussed. Then we give a discussion of system level assessment of data link performance when operating in the space radiation environment.

Reed, Robert A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Improving Single Event Effects Testing Through Software

Radiation encountered in space environments can be damaging to microelectronics and potentially cause spacecraft failure. Single event effects (SEE) are a type of radiation effect that occur when an ion strikes a device. Single event gate rupture (SEGR) is a type of SEE that can cause failure in power transistors. Unlike other SEE rates in which a constant linear energy transfer (LET) can be used, SEGR rates sometimes require a non-uniform LET to be used to be accurate. A recent analysis shows that SEGR rates are most easily calculated when the environment is described as a stopping rate per unit volume for each ion species. Stopping rates in silicon for pertinent ions were calculated using the Stopping and Range of Ions in Matter (SRIM) software and CREME-MC software. A reference table was generated and can be used by others to calculate SEGR rates for a candidate device. Additionally, lasers can be used to simulate SEEs, providing more control and information at lower cost than heavy ion testing. The electron/hole pair generation rate from a laser pulse in a semiconductor can be related to the LET of an ion. MATLAB was used to generate a plot to easily make this comparison.

generation equation↗
NASA NTRS2005

Radiation Testing and Evaluation Issues for Modern Integrated Circuits

Abstract. Changes in modern integrated circuit (IC) technologies have modified the way we approach and conduct radiation tolerance and testing of electronics. These changes include scaling of geometries, new materials, new packaging technologies, and overall speed and device complexity challenges. In this short course section, we will identify and discuss these issues as they impact radiation testing, modeling, and effects mitigation of modern integrated circuits. The focus will be on CMOS-based technologies, however, other high performance technologies will be discussed where appropriate. The effects of concern will be: Single-Event Effects (SEE) and steady state total ionizing dose (TID) IC response. However, due to the growing use of opto-electronics in space systems issues concerning displacement damage testing will also be considered. This short course section is not intended to provide detailed "how-to-test" information, but simply provide a snapshot of current challenges and some of the approaches being considered.

LaBel, Kenneth A.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Investigation of HZETRN 2010 as a Tool for Single Event Effect Qualification of Avionics Systems

NASA's future missions are focused on long-duration deep space missions for human exploration which offers no options for a quick emergency return to Earth. The combination of long mission duration with no quick emergency return option leads to unprecedented spacecraft system safety and reliability requirements. It is important that spacecraft avionics systems for human deep space missions are not susceptible to Single Event Effect (SEE) failures caused by space radiation (primarily the continuous galactic cosmic ray background and the occasional solar particle event) interactions with electronic components and systems. SEE effects are typically managed during the design, development, and test (DD&T) phase of spacecraft development by using heritage hardware (if possible) and through extensive component level testing, followed by system level failure analysis tasks that are both time consuming and costly. The ultimate product of the SEE DD&T program is a prediction of spacecraft avionics reliability in the flight environment produced using various nuclear reaction and transport codes in combination with the component and subsystem level radiation test data. Previous work by Koontz, et al.1 utilized FLUKA, a Monte Carlo nuclear reaction and transport code, to calculate SEE and single event upset (SEU) rates. This code was then validated against in-flight data for a variety of spacecraft and space flight environments. However, FLUKA has a long run-time (on the order of days). CREME962, an easy to use deterministic code offering short run times, was also compared with FLUKA predictions and in-flight data. CREME96, though fast and easy to use, has not been updated in several years and underestimates secondary particle shower effects in spacecraft structural shielding mass. Thus, this paper will investigate the use of HZETRN 20103, a fast and easy to use deterministic transport code, similar to CREME96, that was developed at NASA Langley Research Center primarily for flight crew ionizing radiation dose assessments. HZETRN 2010 includes updates to address secondary particle shower effects more accurately, and might be used as another tool to verify spacecraft avionics system reliability in space flight SEE environments.

Rojdev, Kristina↗
NASA NTRS2012

Initial SEE Testing of Maestro

We have reported on initial SEE sensitivity of the full 49-core Maestro device. Supporting the low-level structures and qualitative system observation goals of phase 1 of testing. Observed sensitivities found to be consistent with Boeing predictions. Highlighted by the L1 data cache sensitivity which drives the rates on the current Maestro device. Presented details to the hardware and software setups that show where the limitations - highlighting future work. Key future work includes testing with memory and IO ports.

cache sensitivity↗
NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗