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At least 163 records · Page 9

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NASA NTRS1999

Formal Verification of the AAMP-FV Microcode

This report describes the experiences of Collins Avionics & Communications and SRI International in formally specifying and verifying the microcode in a Rockwell proprietary microprocessor, the AAMP-FV, using the PVS verification system. This project built extensively on earlier experiences using PVS to verify the microcode in the AAMP5, a complex, pipelined microprocessor designed for use in avionics displays and global positioning systems. While the AAMP5 experiment demonstrated the technical feasibility of formal verification of microcode, the steep learning curve encountered left unanswered the question of whether it could be performed at reasonable cost. The AAMP-FV project was conducted to determine whether the experience gained on the AAMP5 project could be used to make formal verification of microcode cost effective for safety-critical and high volume devices.

Miller, Steven P.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Critical Surface Cleaning and Verification Alternatives

As a result of federal and state requirements, historical critical cleaning and verification solvents such as Freon 113, Freon TMC, and Trichloroethylene (TCE) are either highly regulated or no longer 0 C available. Interim replacements such as HCFC 225 have been qualified, however toxicity and future phase-out regulations necessitate long term solutions. The scope of this project was to qualify a safe and environmentally compliant LOX surface verification alternative to Freon 113, TCE and HCFC 225. The main effort was focused on initiating the evaluation and qualification of HCFC 225G as an alternate LOX verification solvent. The project was scoped in FY 99/00 to perform LOX compatibility, cleaning efficiency and qualification on flight hardware.

Melton, Donald M.↗

NASA NTRS2000

GFO-1 Geophysical Data Record and Orbit Verifications for Global Change Studies

This final report summarizes the research work conducted under NASA's Physical Oceanography Program, entitled, GFO-1 Geophysical Data Record And Orbit Verifications For Global Change Studies, for the investigation time period from December 1, 1997 through November 30, 2000. The primary objectives of the investigation include providing verification and improvement for the precise orbit, media, geophysical, and instrument corrections to accurately reduce U.S. Navy's Geosat-Followon-1 (GFO-1) mission radar altimeter data to sea level measurements. The status of the GFO satellite (instrument and spacecraft operations, orbital tracking and altimeter) is summarized. GFO spacecraft has been accepted by the Navy from Ball Aerospace and has been declared operational since November, 2000. We have participated in four official GFO calibration/validation periods (Cal/Val I-IV), spanning from June 1999 through October 2000. Results of verification of the GFO orbit and geophysical data record measurements both from NOAA (IGDR) and from the Navy (NGDR) are reported. Our preliminary results indicate that: (1) the precise orbit (GSFC and OSU) can be determined to approx. 5 - 6 cm rms radially using SLR and altimeter crossovers; (2) estimated GFO MOE (GSFC or NRL) radial orbit accuracy is approx. 7 - 30 cm and Operational Doppler orbit accuracy is approx. 60 - 350 cm. After bias and tilt adjustment (1000 km arc), estimated Doppler orbit accuracy is approx. 1.2 - 6.5 cm rms and the MOE accuracy is approx. 1.0 - 2.3 cm; (3) the geophysical and media corrections have been validated versus in situ measurements and measurements from other operating altimeters (T/P and ERS-2). Altimeter time bias is insignificant with 0-2 ms. Sea state bias is about approx. 3 - 4.5% of SWH. Wet troposphere correction has approx. 1 cm bias and approx. 3 cm rms when compared with ERS-2 data. Use of GIM and IRI95 provide ionosphere correction accurate to 2-3 cm rms during medium to high solar activities; (4) the noise of the GFO altimeter data (uncorrected SSH) is about 15 mm, compared to 19 min for ERS-2, and 12 min for TOPEX. It is anticipated that the operational GFO-1 altimeter data will contribute to a number of researches in physical oceanography. A list of relevant presentations and publications is attached.

Shum, C. K.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Aerospace Nickel-cadmium Cell Verification

During the early years of satellites, NASA successfully flew "NASA-Standard" nickel-cadmium (Ni-Cd) cells manufactured by GE/Gates/SAFF on a variety of spacecraft. In 1992 a NASA Battery Review Board determined that the strategy of a NASA Standard Cell and Battery Specification and the accompanying NASA control of a standard manufacturing control document (MCD) for Ni-Cd cells and batteries was unwarranted. As a result of that determination, standards were abandoned and the use of cells other than the NASA Standard was required. In order to gain insight into the performance and characteristics of the various aerospace Ni-Cd products available, tasks were initiated within the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program that involved the procurement and testing of representative aerospace Ni-Cd cell designs. A standard set of test conditions was established in order to provide similar information about the products from various vendors. The objective of this testing was to provide independent verification of representative commercial flight cells available in the marketplace today. This paper will provide a summary of the verification tests run on cells from various manufacturers: Sanyo 35 Ampere-hour (Ali) standard and 35 Ali advanced Ni-Cd cells, SAFr 50 Ah Ni-Cd cells and Eagle-Picher 21 Ali Magnum and 21 Ali Super Ni-CdTM cells from Eagle-Picher were put through a full evaluation. A limited number of 18 and 55 Ali cells from Acme Electric were also tested to provide an initial evaluation of the Acme aerospace cell designs. Additionally, 35 Ali aerospace design Ni-MH cells from Sanyo were evaluated under the standard conditions established for this program. Ile test program is essentially complete. The cell design parameters, the verification test plan and the details of the test result will be discussed.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Formal Verification for a Next-Generation Space Shuttle

This paper discusses the verification and validation (V&2) of advanced software used for integrated vehicle health monitoring (IVHM), in the context of NASA's next-generation space shuttle. We survey the current VBCV practice and standards used in selected NASA projects, review applicable formal verification techniques, and discuss their integration info existing development practice and standards. We also describe two verification tools, JMPL2SMV and Livingstone PathFinder, that can be used to thoroughly verify diagnosis applications that use model-based reasoning, such as the Livingstone system.

Nelson, Stacy D.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Discrete Abstractions of Hybrid Systems: Verification of Safety and Application to User-Interface Design

Human interaction with a complex control system involves the user, the automation’s discrete mode logic, and the underlying continuous dynamics of the physical system. The user-interface of such systems always displays a reduced set of information about the entire system. Designing interfaces such that all the pertinent information is available and assuring that this information is correct is important for any user-interface, but especially so for safety-critical systems such as automotive systems and autopilots. Here we describe a methodology for the analysis of hybrid control systems that incorporate user interaction, with the goal of assuring that the information provided to the user is correct. That is, the user-interface must contain all information necessary to safely complete a desired procedure or task. We begin with a hybrid system model which incorporates discrete mode logic as well as nonlinear continuous dynamics. Using a hybrid computational tool for reachability, we find the largest region of the state-space in which we can guarantee the state of the system can always remain – this is the safe region of operation. By implementing a controller for safety which arises from this computation, we mathematically guarantee that this safe region is invariant, meaning that the system will always remain within the safe region if the determined controller is used on the boundary of the safe region. Verification within a hybrid framework allows us to account for the continuous dynamics underlying the discrete representations displayed to the user. Using the computed invariant regions as discrete states, we can abstract a discrete event system from this hybrid system with safety restrictions. This abstraction can be used to determine what information must be provided on the display. Furthermore, in cases in which an interface already exists, the abstraction provides the necessary input into existing interface verification methods. We provide two examples: a car traveling through a yellow light at an intersection and an aircraft autopilot in an automatic landing/go-around maneuver. The examples demonstrate the applicability of this methodology to hybrid systems that have operational constraints we can pose in terms of safety. This methodology differs from existing work in hybrid system verification in that we directly account for the user’s interactions with the system.

Meeko Oishi↗

NASA NTRS2004

Simulation-Based Verification of Autonomous Controllers via Livingstone PathFinder

AI software is often used as a means for providing greater autonomy to automated systems, capable of coping with harsh and unpredictable environments. Due in part to the enormous space of possible situations that they aim to addrs, autonomous systems pose a serious challenge to traditional test-based verification approaches. Efficient verification approaches need to be perfected before these systems can reliably control critical applications. This publication describes Livingstone PathFinder (LPF), a verification tool for autonomous control software. LPF applies state space exploration algorithms to an instrumented testbed, consisting of the controller embedded in a simulated operating environment. Although LPF has focused on NASA s Livingstone model-based diagnosis system applications, the architecture is modular and adaptable to other systems. This article presents different facets of LPF and experimental results from applying the software to a Livingstone model of the main propulsion feed subsystem for a prototype space vehicle.

Lindsey, A. E.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Verification of Java Programs using Symbolic Execution and Invariant Generation

Software verification is recognized as an important and difficult problem. We present a norel framework, based on symbolic execution, for the automated verification of software. The framework uses annotations in the form of method specifications an3 loop invariants. We present a novel iterative technique that uses invariant strengthening and approximation for discovering these loop invariants automatically. The technique handles different types of data (e.g. boolean and numeric constraints, dynamically allocated structures and arrays) and it allows for checking universally quantified formulas. Our framework is built on top of the Java PathFinder model checking toolset and it was used for the verification of several non-trivial Java programs.

Pasareanu, Corina↗

NASA NTRS2004

Assume-Guarantee Verification of Source Code with Design-Level Assumptions

Model checking is an automated technique that can be used to determine whether a system satisfies certain required properties. To address the 'state explosion' problem associated with this technique, we propose to integrate assume-guarantee verification at different phases of system development. During design, developers build abstract behavioral models of the system components and use them to establish key properties of the system. To increase the scalability of model checking at this level, we have developed techniques that automatically decompose the verification task by generating component assumptions for the properties to hold. The design-level artifacts are subsequently used to guide the implementation of the system, but also to enable more efficient reasoning at the source code-level. In particular we propose to use design-level assumptions to similarly decompose the verification of the actual system implementation. We demonstrate our approach on a significant NASA application, where design-level models were used to identify; and correct a safety property violation, and design-level assumptions allowed us to check successfully that the property was presented by the implementation.

Giannakopoulou, Dimitra↗

NASA NTRS2004

UIVerify: A Web-Based Tool for Verification and Automatic Generation of User Interfaces

In this poster, we describe a web-based tool for verification and automatic generation of user interfaces. The verification component of the tool accepts as input a model of a machine and a model of its interface, and checks that the interface is adequate (correct). The generation component of the tool accepts a model of a given machine and the user's task, and then generates a correct and succinct interface. This write-up will demonstrate the usefulness of the tool by verifying the correctness of a user interface to a flight-control system. The poster will include two more examples of using the tool: verification of the interface to an espresso machine, and automatic generation of a succinct interface to a large hypothetical machine.

Shiffman, Smadar↗

NASA NTRS2005

Safety Verification of the Small Aircraft Transportation System Concept of Operations

A critical factor in the adoption of any new aeronautical technology or concept of operation is safety. Traditionally, safety is accomplished through a rigorous process that involves human factors, low and high fidelity simulations, and flight experiments. As this process is usually performed on final products or functional prototypes, concept modifications resulting from this process are very expensive to implement. This paper describe an approach to system safety that can take place at early stages of a concept design. It is based on a set of mathematical techniques and tools known as formal methods. In contrast to testing and simulation, formal methods provide the capability of exhaustive state exploration analysis. We present the safety analysis and verification performed for the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) Concept of Operations (ConOps). The concept of operations is modeled using discrete and hybrid mathematical models. These models are then analyzed using formal methods. The objective of the analysis is to show, in a mathematical framework, that the concept of operation complies with a set of safety requirements. It is also shown that the ConOps has some desirable characteristic such as liveness and absence of dead-lock. The analysis and verification is performed in the Prototype Verification System (PVS), which is a computer based specification language and a theorem proving assistant.

Carreno, Victor↗

NASA NTRS2006

Explaining Verification Conditions

The Hoare approach to program verification relies on the construction and discharge of verification conditions (VCs) but offers no support to trace, analyze, and understand the VCs themselves. We describe a systematic extension of the Hoare rules by labels so that the calculus itself can be used to build up explanations of the VCs. The labels are maintained through the different processing steps and rendered as natural language explanations. The explanations can easily be customized and can capture different aspects of the VCs; here, we focus on their structure and purpose. The approach is fully declarative and the generated explanations are based only on an analysis of the labels rather than directly on the logical meaning of the underlying VCs or their proofs. Keywords: program verification, Hoare calculus, traceability.

Deney, Ewen↗

NASA NTRS2005

Hybrid Verification of an Air Traffic Operational Concept

A concept of operations for air traffic management consists of a set of flight rules and procedures aimed to keep aircraft safely separated. This paper reports on the formal verification of separation properties of the NASA's Small Aircraft Transportation System, Higher Volume Operations (SATS HVO) concept for non-towered, non-radar airports. Based on a geometric description of the SATS HVO air space, we derive analytical formulas to compute spacing requirements on nominal approaches. Then, we model the operational concept by a hybrid non-deterministic asynchronous state transition system. Using an explicit state exploration technique, we show that the spacing requirements are always satisfied on nominal approaches. All the mathematical development presented in this paper has been formally verified in the Prototype Verification System (PVS). Keywords. Formal verification, hybrid systems, air traffic management, theorem proving

Munoz, Cesar A.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Compositional Verification of a Communication Protocol for a Remotely Operated Vehicle

This paper presents the specification and verification in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) of a protocol intended to facilitate communication in an experimental remotely operated vehicle used by NASA researchers. The protocol is defined as a stack-layered com- position of simpler protocols. It can be seen as the vertical composition of protocol layers, where each layer performs input and output message processing, and the horizontal composition of different processes concurrently inhabiting the same layer, where each process satisfies a distinct requirement. It is formally proven that the protocol components satisfy certain delivery guarantees. Compositional techniques are used to prove these guarantees also hold in the composed system. Although the protocol itself is not novel, the methodology employed in its verification extends existing techniques by automating the tedious and usually cumbersome part of the proof, thereby making the iterative design process of protocols feasible.

Goodloe, Alwyn E.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Verification Challenges of Dynamic Testing of Space Flight Hardware

The Six Degree-of-Freedom Dynamic Test System (SDTS) is a test facility at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas for performing dynamic verification of space structures and hardware. Some examples of past and current tests include the verification of on-orbit robotic inspection systems, space vehicle assembly procedures and docking/berthing systems. The facility is able to integrate a dynamic simulation of on-orbit spacecraft mating or demating using flight-like mechanical interface hardware. A force moment sensor is utilized for input to the simulation during the contact phase, thus simulating the contact dynamics. While the verification of flight hardware presents many unique challenges, one particular area of interest is with respect to the use of external measurement systems to ensure accurate feedback of dynamic contact. There are many commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) measurement systems available on the market, and the test facility measurement systems have evolved over time to include two separate COTS systems. The first system incorporates infra-red sensing cameras, while the second system employs a laser interferometer to determine position and orientation data. The specific technical challenges with the measurement systems in a large dynamic environment include changing thermal and humidity levels, operational area and measurement volume, dynamic tracking, and data synchronization. The facility is located in an expansive high-bay area that is occasionally exposed to outside temperature when large retractable doors at each end of the building are opened. The laser interferometer system, in particular, is vulnerable to the environmental changes in the building. The operational area of the test facility itself is sizeable, ranging from seven meters wide and five meters deep to as much as seven meters high. Both facility measurement systems have desirable measurement volumes and the accuracies vary within the respective volumes. In addition, because this is a dynamic facility with a moving test bed, direct line-of-sight may not be available at all times between the measurement sensors and the tracking targets. Finally, the feedback data from the active test bed along with the two external measurement systems must be synchronized to allow for data correlation. To ensure the desired accuracy and resolution of these systems, calibration of the systems must be performed regularly. New innovations in sensor technology itself are periodically incorporated into the facility s overall measurement scheme. In addressing the challenges of the measurement systems, the facility is able to provide essential position and orientation data to verify the dynamic performance of space flight hardware.

Winnitoy, Susan↗

NASA NTRS2009

A Verification-Driven Approach to Traceability and Documentation for Auto-Generated Mathematical Software

Model-based development and automated code generation are increasingly used for production code in safety-critical applications, but since code generators are typically not qualified, the generated code must still be fully tested, reviewed, and certified. This is particularly arduous for mathematical and control engineering software which requires reviewers to trace subtle details of textbook formulas and algorithms to the code, and to match requirements (e.g., physical units or coordinate frames) not represented explicitly in models or code. Both tasks are complicated by the often opaque nature of auto-generated code. We address these problems by developing a verification-driven approach to traceability and documentation. We apply the AUTOCERT verification system to identify and then verify mathematical concepts in the code, based on a mathematical domain theory, and then use these verified traceability links between concepts, code, and verification conditions to construct a natural language report that provides a high-level structured argument explaining why and how the code uses the assumptions and complies with the requirements. We have applied our approach to generate review documents for several sub-systems of NASA s Project Constellation.

Denney, Ewen W.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Development and Verification of the Charring, Ablating Thermal Protection Implicit System Simulator

The development and verification of the Charring Ablating Thermal Protection Implicit System Solver (CATPISS) is presented. This work concentrates on the derivation and verification of the stationary grid terms in the equations that govern three-dimensional heat and mass transfer for charring thermal protection systems including pyrolysis gas flow through the porous char layer. The governing equations are discretized according to the Galerkin finite element method (FEM) with first and second order fully implicit time integrators. The governing equations are fully coupled and are solved in parallel via Newton s method, while the linear system is solved via the Generalized Minimum Residual method (GMRES). Verification results from exact solutions and Method of Manufactured Solutions (MMS) are presented to show spatial and temporal orders of accuracy as well as nonlinear convergence rates.

Amar, Adam J.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Applying Monte Carlo Simulation to Launch Vehicle Design and Requirements Verification

This paper is focused on applying Monte Carlo simulation to probabilistic launch vehicle design and requirements verification. The approaches developed in this paper can be applied to other complex design efforts as well. Typically the verification must show that requirement "x" is met for at least "y" % of cases, with, say, 10% consumer risk or 90% confidence. Two particular aspects of making these runs for requirements verification will be explored in this paper. First, there are several types of uncertainties that should be handled in different ways, depending on when they become known (or not). The paper describes how to handle different types of uncertainties and how to develop vehicle models that can be used to examine their characteristics. This includes items that are not known exactly during the design phase but that will be known for each assembled vehicle (can be used to determine the payload capability and overall behavior of that vehicle), other items that become known before or on flight day (can be used for flight day trajectory design and go/no go decision), and items that remain unknown on flight day. Second, this paper explains a method (order statistics) for determining whether certain probabilistic requirements are met or not and enables the user to determine how many Monte Carlo samples are required. Order statistics is not new, but may not be known in general to the GN&C community. The methods also apply to determining the design values of parameters of interest in driving the vehicle design. The paper briefly discusses when it is desirable to fit a distribution to the experimental Monte Carlo results rather than using order statistics.

Hanson, John M.↗