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At least 1,657 records · Page 92

Processing Plan for Potentially Reactive/Ignitable Remote Handled Transuranic Waste at the Idaho Cleanup Project - 12090

Remote Handle Transuranic (RH-TRU) Waste generated at Argonne National Laboratory - East, from the examination of irradiated and un-irradiated fuel pins and other reactor materials requires a detailed processing plan to ensure reactive/ignitable material is absent to meet WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria prior to shipping and disposal. The Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) approach to repackaging Lot 2 waste and how we ensure prohibited materials are not present in waste intended for disposal at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 'WIPP' uses an Argon Repackaging Station (ARS), which provides an inert gas blanket. Opening of the Lot 2 containers under an argon gas blanket is proposed to be completed in the ARS. The ARS is an interim transition repackaging station that provides a mitigation technique to reduce the chances of a reoccurrence of a thermal event prior to rendering the waste 'Safe'. The consequences, should another thermal event be encountered, (which is likely) is to package the waste, apply the reactive and or ignitable codes to the container, and store until the future treatment permit and process are available. This is the same disposition that the two earlier containers in the 'Thermal Events' were assigned. By performing the initial handling under an inert gas blanket, the waste can sorted and segregate the fines and add the Met-L-X to minimize risk before it is exposed to air. The 1-gal cans that are inside the ANL-E canister will be removed and each can is moved to the ARS for repackaging. In the ARS, the 1-gal can is opened in the inerted environment. The contained waste is sorted, weighed, and visually examined for non compliant items such as unvented aerosol cans and liquids. The contents of the paint cans are transferred into a sieve and manipulated to allow the fines, if any, to be separated into the tray below. The fines are weighed and then blended with a minimum 5:1 mix of Met-L-X. Other debris materials found are segregated from the cans into containers for later packaging. Recoverable fissile waste material (Fuel and fuel-like pieces) suspected of containing sodium bonded pieces) are segregated and will remain in the sieve or transferred to a similar immersion basket in the ARS. The fuel like pieces will be placed into a container with sufficient water to cover the recoverable fissile waste. If a 'reactive characteristic' is present the operator will be able to observe the formation of 'violent' hydrogen gas bubbles. When sodium bonded fuel-like pieces are placed in water the expected reaction is a non-violent reaction that does not meet the definition of reactivity. It is expected that there will be a visible small stream of bubbles present if there is any sodium-bonded fuel-like piece placed in the water. The test will be completed when there is no reaction or the expected reaction is observed..At that point, the fuel like pieces complete the processing cycle in preparation for characterization and shipment to WIPP. If a violent reaction occurs, the fuel-like pieces will be removed from the water, split into the required fissile material content, placed into a screened basket in a 1 gallon drum and drummed out of the hot cell with appropriate RCRA codes applied and placed into storage until sodium treatment is available. These 'violent' reactions will be evidenced by gas bubbles being evolved at the specimen surface where sodium metal is present. The operators will be trained to determine if the reaction is 'violent' or 'mild'. If a 'violent' reaction occurs, the sieve will be immediately removed from the water, placed in a 1 gallon paint can, canned in the argon cover gas and removed from the hot cell to await a future treatment. If the reaction is 'mild', the sieve will then be removed from the water; the material weighed for final packaging and allowed to dry by air exposure. Lot 2 waste cans can be opened, sorted, processed, and weighed while mitigating the potential of thermal events that could occur prior to exposing to air. Exposure to air is a WIPP compliance step demonstrating the absence of reactive or ignitable characteristics. (authors)

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Managing Waste Inventory and License Limits at the Perma-Fix Northwest Facility to Meet CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) Deliverables - 12335

CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHRPC) is a prime contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) focused on the largest ongoing environmental remediation project in the world at the DOE Hanford Site Central Plateau, i.e. the DOE Hanford Plateau Remediation Contract. The East Tennessee Materials and Energy Corporation (M and EC); a wholly owned subsidiary of Perma-Fix Environmental Services, Inc. (PESI), is a small business team member to CHPRC. Our scope includes project management; operation and maintenance of on-site storage, repackaging, treatment, and disposal facilities; and on-site waste management including waste receipt from generators and delivery to on-site and off-site treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. As part of this scope, M and EC staffs the centralized Waste Support Services organization responsible for all waste characterization and acceptance required to support CHPRC and waste generators across the Hanford Site. At the time of the CHPRC contract award (August 2008) slightly more than 9,000 cubic meters (m{sup 3}) of legacy waste was defined as 'no-path-forward waste'. A significant portion of this waste (7,650 m{sup 3}) comprised wastes with up to 50 grams of special nuclear materials (SNM) in oversized packages recovered during retrieval operations and large glove boxes removed from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Through a collaborative effort between the DOE, CHPRC, and Perma-Fix Environmental Services, Inc. (PESI), pathways for these problematic wastes were developed that took advantage of commercial treatment capabilities at a nearby vendor facility, Perma-Fix Northwest (PFNW). In the spring of 2009, CHPRC initiated a pilot program under which they began shipping large package, low gram suspect TRU (<15 g SNM per container), and large package contact and remote handled MLLW to the off-site PFNW facility for treatment. PFNW is restricted by the SNM limits set for the total quantity of SNM allowed at the facility in accordance with the facility's radioactive materials license(s) (RML). While both CHPRC and PFNW maintain waste databases to track all waste movements, it became evident early in the process that a tool was needed that married the two systems to better track SNM inventories and sequence waste from the point of generation, through the PFNW facility, and back to the Hanford site for final disposition. This tool, known as the Treatment Integration and Planning Tool (TIPT), has become a robust planning tool that provides real-time data to support compliant and efficient waste generation, transportation, treatment, and disposition. TIPT is developing into the next generation tool that will change the way in which legacy wastes, retrieval wastes and decontamination and decommissioning operations are conducted on the Plateau Remediation Contract (PRC). The real value of the TIPT is its predictive capability. It allows the W and FMP to map out optimal windows for processing waste through the PFNW facility, or through any process that is in some way resource limited. It allows project managers to identify and focus on problem areas before shipments are affected. It has been modified for use in broader applications to predict turnaround times and identify windows of opportunity for processing higher gram wastes through PFNW and to allow waste generators, site-wide, to accurately predict scope, cost, and schedule for waste generation to optimize processing and eliminate storage, double handling, and related costs and unnecessary safety risks. The TIPT addresses the years old problem of how to effectively predict not only what needs to be done, but when. 'When' is the key planning parameter that has been ignored by the generator and processor for many years, but has proven to be the most important parameter for both parties. While further refinement is a natural part of any development process, the current improvements on the TIPT have shown that prediction is a powerful consideration. Even in lean times expected for the foreseeable future, the improved TIPT continues to play a central role in managing our way through those times to assure facilities remain viable and available. It is recommended that other major remediation projects and waste processing facilities incorporate a tool such as TIPT to improve customer-commercial supplier communications and better optimization of resources. (authors)

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Public Communication of Technical Issues in Today's Changing Visual Language - 12436

Communication regarding the management of radioactive materials is a well-established challenge. Residents and consumers have suspected for years that companies and governments place short-term economic concerns ahead of health and safety. This skepticism is compounded with increased attention to safety issues at nuclear power plants everywhere after Fukushima. Nonetheless, today's environment presents unexpected opportunities to transform public fear into teachable moments that bring knowledge and facts to discussions on nuclear energy. In the weeks following Japan's crisis, the lack of reliable information on radiation levels saw citizens taking to the streets with dosimeters and Geiger counters in crowd-sourced radiation monitoring efforts. Efforts, based mainly online, represent a growing set of examples of how internet and cell-phone technology are being put to use in emergency situations. The maps, graphs and tables created to meet public interest also exemplify some of the psychological priorities of audiences and present learning tools that can improve future education efforts in non-emergency situations. Industry outreach efforts often consist of technical details and quantitative data that are difficult for lay audiences to interpret. The intense attention to nuclear energy issues since last March has produced a wide array of visual samples. Citizen monitors, news organizations, government agencies and others have displayed quantitative information in innovative ways. Their efforts offer new perspective on what charts, maps and info graphics do - or need to do - to illustrate requirements, record assessments and promote understanding of nuclear-waste issues. Surveying the best examples, nuclear communicators can improve their offerings of easy-to-use, evidence-based visuals to inform stakeholders. Familiar to most communications professionals in the nuclear industry, risk communication is a science-based approach with over three decades of research evidence informing the discipline. Risk communication principles address the fact that often perception is reality. Scientific evidence for decision making must be approached differently in situations where stakeholders have high levels of concern and low levels of trust. Visual communications must take this into account to be successful. (author)

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New Strategies for Licensing the Storage and Transportation of High Burn-up Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States - 12546

An alternative approach may be needed to the licensing of high-burnup fuel for storage and transportation based on the assumption that spent fuel cladding may not always remain intact. The approach would permit spent fuel to be retrieved on a canister basis and could lessen the need for repackaging of spent fuel. This approach is being presented as a possible engineering solution to address the uncertainties and lack of data availability for cladding properties for high burnup fuel and extended storage time frames. The proposed approach does not involve relaxing current safety standards for criticality safety, containment, or permissible external dose rates. Packaging strategies and regulations should be developed to reduce the potential for requiring fuel to be repackaged unnecessarily. This would lessen the chance of accidents and mishaps during loading and unloading of casks, and decrease dose to workers. A packaging approach that shifts the safety basis from reliance upon the fuel condition to reliance upon an inner canister could eliminate or lessen the need for repackaging. In addition, the condition of canisters can be more readily monitored and inspected than the condition of fuel cladding. Canisters can also be repaired and/or replaced when deemed necessary. In contrast, once a fuel assembly is loaded into a canister and placed in a storage overpack, there is little opportunity to monitor its condition or take mitigating measures if cladding degradation is suspected or proven to occur. (authors)

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Additive Manufacturing Materials Study for Gaseous Radiation Detection

Additive manufacturing (AM) techniques may lead to improvements in many areas of radiation detector construction; notably the rapid manufacturing time allows for a reduced time between prototype iterations. The additive nature of the technique results in a granular microstructure which may be permeable to ingress by atmospheric gases and make it unsuitable for gaseous radiation detector development. In this study we consider the application of AM to the construction of enclosures and frames for wire-based gaseous radiation tracking detectors. We have focussed on oxygen impurity ingress as a measure of the permeability of the enclosure, and the gas charging and discharging curves of several simplistic enclosure shapes are reported. A prototype wire-frame is also presented to examine structural strength and positional accuracy of an AM produced frame. We lastly discuss the implications of this study for AM based radiation detection technology as a diagnostic tool for incident response scenarios, such as the interrogation of a suspect radiation-emitting package. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

SiC cladding corrosion and mitigation

Silicon carbide (SiC) is a leading candidate for accident tolerant fuel. Testing of SiC in autoclaves at 360 C. degrees in simulated coolant resulted in little corrosion. However, testing of SiC tubes in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) reactor manufactured in the same way had unacceptable corrosion levels. This in-reactor SiC corrosion issue is now being addressed by Westinghouse in tests being carried out at our Churchill, PA facility and in tests in the MIT reactor. The suspected driver for the excessive corrosion is the generation of oxidative water radiolysis products in the core. The MIT reactor was identified as running at H{sub 2} levels of ∼20 to 22 cc/kg coolant (cubic centimeters standard temperature and pressure per kilogram coolant) which were below those normally specified in operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs) of 25 to 50 cc/kg. Hydrogen is used to react with the radiolysis products to reduce them to water. The current MIT reactor tests will be run at H{sub 2} concentration levels of ∼50 cc/kg. The applicability of this approach has been supported by recent papers in the literature. Parallel testing at Churchill is being carried out to verify the efficacy of this approach using autoclaves operating at 345 C.degrees with H{sub 2}O{sub 2} injection to simulate the water radiolysis products. Various concentrations of H{sub 2} are being tested to determine the effect on SiC corrosion rate. Further studies are underway to investigate the effects of different SiC fabrication and structural parameters and to optimize for improved corrosion performance. This paper compares the results of the corrosion tests in the MIT reactor and the autoclave tests with H{sub 2}O{sub 2} injection and the effect of H{sub 2} injection on the SiC corrosion rate. The results of the autoclave tests with H{sub 2}O{sub 2} addition indicate that corrosion rates for SiC can be achieved that are much higher than those achieved in a reactor. It appears that the use of H{sub 2}O{sub 2} addition in flow through loops to simulate the corrosion rate of SiC samples in reactor is feasible. The use of H{sub 2} addition to reduce the corrosion rate in-reactor of SiC appears to be feasible.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Field Implementation of Nuclear Safeguards: ENEA' s Capability Projection - 17174

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Italy entered into force on May 2, 1975, in the framework of the national political position to deal with the nuclear energy only for civilian medical and industrial uses, being the country included in the NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States). It is recognized that for these scopes nuclear material is produced, used, shipped and disposed, but it is at the same time known that it is not like any other material. The signature of further international treaties like the Additional Protocol to NPT led the Italian Ministry for the Economic Development (MISE) to take advantage of the public Italian Agency for Energy Environment and the Economic Development (ENEA) by means of a three years basis renewable agreement that could support the Ministry in fulfilling the clauses and obligations rising from the treaty itself and then fostering R and D in the field of the safeguards. MISE supported the procurement of a mobile laboratory able to bring sophisticated analysis instruments on the field in case of suspected environmental contamination deriving from the presence of nuclear materials. The description of this mobile laboratory and its capabilities is illustrated in this paper. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Maintaining department of energy (DOE) waste disposition pathways in today's uncertain budgetary environment - 15129

For many years the Department of Energy (DOE) and its prime contractors have worked collaboratively with commercial waste transportation, treatment, and disposal providers to develop and implement outlets for the efficient management and disposition of radioactive wastes, particularly 'no-path-forward' or 'difficult-to-treat' wastes. Both the DOE and commercial providers have made substantial investments to develop capabilities and infrastructure to address these wastes and both have benefited from this collaboration. For example, DOE realized significant cost savings and avoidances when a commercial facility became available that allowed closure of the TSCA incinerator in Oak Ridge or when commercial capabilities were expanded that precluded the need to build a new Hanford M-91 waste treatment facility, estimated at $540 million for design, permitting, and construction. In addition, expanded capabilities developed at commercial facilities ensured a known, if not guaranteed, source for managing waste and improving efficiencies for wastes which previously had no viable disposition outlet or that required extended schedules and cost for completion. Such wastes include sodium- and mercury-bearing wastes, classified shapes, or many forms of suspect transuranic (TRU) wastes. (authors)

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Management of technetium contaminated demolition debris from the gaseous diffusion plants at the east Tennessee Technology Park - 15422

The demolition of the final section of the gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) facility formerly known as K-25 at the East Tennessee Technology Park was completed in December of 2013, with the final shipment of waste completed only six months later in June 2014. While most of the radioactive waste shipments would be considered 'routine' by today's standards (lower activity waste was disposed onsite at the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility [EMWMF] and at some offsite commercial disposal facilities with higher activity waste making its way across country to the Nevada National Security Site [NNSS] disposal facility) the final section of K-25, consisting of six cascade 'units', presented some unique technical and stakeholder challenges. Portions of this final section of K-25 were presumed to be heavily contaminated with Technetium-99 (Tc-99) based on sampling and analysis activities conducted during facility deactivation. Tc-99 is known to be highly mobile under a variety of environmental conditions, and is suspected to be potentially mobile in unmitigated landfill conditions, resulting in the need to implement additional engineered controls during facility demolition as well as throughout the management of the resultant waste. A variety of controls were implemented to ensure Tc-99 mobility was controlled and possible consequences mitigated, including isolation and offsite shipment of highest Tc-99 concentration components, as well as construction of a 'cell within a cell' at the EMWMF. This paper will examine the process utilized to develop the controls for management of Tc-99 contaminated waste and will describe those controls. Additionally, it will describe the stakeholder involvement and approval process as well as examining and documenting the efficacy of the controls that were implemented. Finally, this paper will discuss lessons learned from this first of a kind demolition effort and how this experience can be utilized to further refine the Tc-99 waste management approach for the remaining GDPs at ETTP. (authors)

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Mock-Up activities for the extraction of samples from a salt-stone disposal unit - 15502

Mock-up testing with respect to the core-drilling of simulant salt-stone grout was conducted to support the future retrieval of field-emplaced salt-stone samples from salt-stone Disposal Unit (SDU) Cell 2A. The primary objectives of extracting samples from SDU Cell 2A are to enable measurement of field-emplaced samples with respect to properties that influence long-term performance, such as saturated hydraulic conductivity, and to compare the measured properties for field-emplaced and comparable samples prepared in the laboratory. Initial mock-up activities (Phases 1 and 2) were conducted in Fiscal Years (FY) 2013 and 2014 in order to demonstrate the viability of standard core-drilling techniques that are typically employed for sampling concrete structures. The primary requirement for the core-drilling technique was that it should minimize the potential of physical or chemical sample changes that would artificially degrade key grout properties. Mock-up activities were aimed at optimizing the techniques for core-drilling, and subsequent sample extraction, using a set-up that mimicked, to the extent practical, both the physical characteristics, and operational complexities, of core-drilling salt-stone grout from the roof of the SDU. Samples extracted from the grout monolith were subsequently characterized with respect to saturated hydraulic conductivity and compressive strength, and compared to data for cast samples prepared using the same simulant salt-stone material. The comparison of these properties for the two sample types was expected to highlight potential flaws (e.g., micro-cracking) introduced by the core-drilling process. While the data for saturated hydraulic conductivity were virtually identical (approximately 2 E-09 cm/sec), the compressive strength of the core-drilled samples (approximately 3.5 MPa (500 psi)) was on average half that measured for the cast samples. It was suspected that increased water saturation and surface scoring of the core-drilled samples might account for the disparate compressive Strength data. During Phases 1 and 2 it was determined that cores could be successfully drilled and extracted to a depth of approximately 0.9 meters (3 feet) below the grout surface. Phase 3 (FY 2105) has been initiated and is primarily directed at demonstrating the ability to core-drill through approximately 1.8 meters (6 feet) of overlying grout to retrieve the desired sample from the SDU. The original drill depth of 0.6 - 0.9 meters (2-3 feet) was based on an SDU fill height of 5.6 meters (18.5 feet) and sample location of approximately 4.9 meters (16 feet); recently the allowable fill height in the SDUs has been increased to 6.5 meters (21.25 feet); hence the increased depth of overlying grout above the samples to be retrieved. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NDA Challenges during Cleanup of the Hanford 618-10 Burial Ground Trenches - 15542

The 618-10 Burial Ground on the Hanford Reservation was an early trench waste site used for the disposal of waste from the 300 Area at Hanford. Much of this waste consisted of residues from evaluations of failed fuel as well as various process and separations studies associated with the Department of Energy (DOE) mission which were performed in the 300 Area between March 1954 and September 1963. Much of this waste contained significant concentrations of fission products as well as Transuranic (TRU) radionuclides. Waste forms consist of drums and boxes which were disposed of in the trenches. Many of the drums are shielded containers, cemented sludge, or cemented debris. There are no identifying marks on the containers to correlate them to a specific waste stream. In addition there is some waste in the trenches which came from other locations outside of the 300 area. Cleanup of the 618-10 burial ground is covered under the Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) contract. Due to the proximity of the 618-10 site to the Columbia River, waste is being removed from the 618-10 site, stabilized, and disposed of into either the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) if the containers are determined to be LLW or transferred to the Hanford Central Waste Complex (CWC) if the containers are suspected to be TRU waste. In order to determine the correct disposal path Non Destructive Assay (NDA) must be performed on all of the containers excavated from the trenches. The NDA of these containers is performed using germanium gamma spectroscopy with an In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) and with a neutron slab counter. Due to the challenges associated with these difficult waste streams, matrices, and lack of information to associate these containers with a particular process, the NDA program has had to develop a more robust process to ensure the correct disposition of the waste. (authors)

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241-AY-102 Leak detection pit drain line visual inspection - 15678

In October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS) determined that waste had leaked into the annulus of Tank 241-AY-102. WRPS conducted an extensive review of Tank AY-102 and increased both inspection and monitoring of the tank; however, the precise cause and location of the leak could not be determined. In parallel with the leak in the primary tank, the Tank AY-102 leak detection pit (LDP) was accumulating water through the drain system external to the secondary tank liner. Liquid collecting in the LDP is suspected to be from water intrusion and collects at a rate such that the LDP must be pumped routinely. Following a routine pumping event on June 20, 2013, elevated radiation dose rates were noted on the transfer hose and surface contamination readings were found on the transfer pump when it was removed from the Tank AY-102 LDP. These two field readings suggested that tank waste from a secondary liner breach could be leaking into the LDP. As a result, WRPS initiated a plan to ascertain the integrity of the secondary tank liner including a robotic inspection of the LDP. To perform the robotic visual inspection, a custom robotic crawler with a deployment device was designed, built, and operated by IHI Southwest for WRPS to inspect the 6 in (152 mm) leak detection pit drain line. To ensure success when deployed in the field, the inspection equipment was demonstrated at both the IHI facility in Denver, Colorado, and the Hanford Site using full scale piping mockups. On November 20, 2013 WRPS inspected the 6 in (152 mm) diameter drain line. The deployment device successfully attached to the drain line, and the crawler entered the drain line and traversed to within approximately 7 ft (2.1 m) of the central sump located under the center of the tank before losing traction. Crawler performance was satisfactory, and the quality of the camera image and lighting provided sufficient detail to document the current condition of the visible regions of the pipe. The inspection showed that the majority of the drain line was dry. Two wet areas were observed, a portion of the line nearest the LDP and a portion near the center of the tank. The portion nearest the LDP was under water prior to pumping on November 14, 2013. Although sediment and debris were seen during the inspection, it is believed to be construction debris and corrosion products. No material was found in the inspection that looked like tank waste or the material seen in the Tank AY-102 annulus (i.e., no greenish or yellowish deposits or dark fluids, dried salt deposits, or crystalline material). The contamination levels seen on the crawler were consistent with past values seen on LDP pumping equipment. Sampling and analysis of the recovered residues from the crawlers did not find material consistent with tank waste. (authors)

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Characterization of Sr-90 Drums at the Hanford 618-10 Burial Ground - 16132

The 618-10 Burial Ground on the Hanford Reservation was an early trench waste site used for the disposal of waste from the 300 Area at Hanford. Much of this waste consisted of residues from evaluations of failed fuel as well as various process and separations studies associated with the Department of Energy (DOE) mission which were performed in the 300 Area between March 1954 and September 1963. Historical records indicated that there were also several drums which contained significant quantities of separated Sr-90. Cleanup of the 618-10 burial ground is covered under the Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) contract. Due to the proximity of the 618-10 site to the Columbia River, waste is being removed from the 618-10 site, stabilized, and disposed of into either the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) if the containers are determined to be LLW or transferred to the Hanford Central Waste Complex (CWC) if the containers are suspected to be TRU waste. In order to determine the correct disposal path, Non Destructive Assay (NDA) must be performed on all of the containers excavated from the trenches. The NDA of these containers is performed using germanium gamma spectroscopy with an In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) and with a neutron slab counter. Occasional ISOCS spectra exhibited a characteristic Sr-90/Y-90 Bremsstrahlung continuum. In some cases there were measurable gammas present, however in other cases only the Bremsstrahlung continuum was present. Typically Sr-90 is correlated to Cs-137 as they are normally produced in approximately a 1:1 ratio during the fission process. For some of these drums there was no Cs-137 detectable and therefore no way to quantify the Sr-90. Due to concerns about providing a reasonable and conservative nuclide inventory it was decided to evaluate a technique to utilize data from the Bremsstrahlung continuum to quantify the Sr-90 activity in these drums. The development of the technique combined MCNP modeling and comparison of measured gammas to the continuum for a well-defined waste stream. The final result showed reasonable correlation to the expected scaling factors for many drums, while also providing a reasonable measured value for drums with significantly enhanced Sr-90 concentrations. Ultimately all drums were demonstrated to be within the ERDF waste acceptance criteria. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Remediation of Occupied Commercial Property Subject to Widespread Radium-226 Contamination: Update from WM2012 Paper - 16652

Amec Foster Wheeler was contacted by a company that managed commercial office space. High Rn-222 measurements had been observed throughout the facility and the landlord had been advised to commission a radiological survey of the site. The site had been purchased by the client in the 1990's. Initial desk studies found that the building had operated for around 50 years as a compass factory. Non-intrusive investigation identified widespread Ra-226 contamination. Ra-226 was found in the fabric of the building, in attic spaces, buried under floor boards and underlying car parks. Intrusive investigation was undertaken to estimate volume(s) of waste, waste categories, activity concentrations and the total inventory of radioactive materials on site. This work identified the presence of 180 GBq of Ra-226 on site. A programme of work is currently underway to remediate the site tackling areas posing the greatest risk to site occupants as a priority. We have worked closely with Regulators, our client, and tenants, to decontaminate the fabric of the building whilst areas of the building remain occupied. Early decontamination works identified that radon levels within the building were stubbornly high despite the removal of radium contamination. An independent radon source was suspected. A contaminated drain was discovered leading to a blocked-off river race running under the old mill building. A significant quantity of radium contaminated sludge was identified within the river race. This was believed to be the source of the excessive radon concentrations within the building. The paper will present work undertaken to investigate and remediate the inventory of sludge from beneath the building. It will describe the operational difficulties of working within a dynamic environment impacted by high dose rates, high radon concentrations, water ingress and waste retrieval challenges. The paper will present the radiological and environmental impacts of the work and detail the achieved end points. This was a challenging project working in confined spaces impacted by physical and radiological constraints. The remedial action undertaken significantly reduced radon concentrations in the building metres above the river race. It also significantly reduced the likelihood of radium contamination being mobilised into the river and the wider environment. The achieved end point permitted the building to return to uncontrolled commercial use. The end point achieved within the river race will ensure a safe working environment for future regular structural survey work. (authors)

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Modeling the Effect of Evaporative Flux and Colloidal Aggregation on Crud Deposition

During the last few years lot of research has been conducted to investigate and predict the Crud deposition in PWRs. One of the common findings of various experimental and computational studies is that thickness or amount of crud deposits is directly related to evaporative flux maps. Evaporation driven deposition profile on the surfaces takes different forms, i.e. from ring to disk shapes during initial stages and in the form of porous to impervious continuous layers covering the hot fuel surface at the later stages. The amount and thickness of these deposits although are directly related to evaporative flux, the relationship is much complex and can be dependent upon several other factors. A popular problem relating evaporative flux to particulate deposition has been well studied in the form of drying of sessile colloidal drops. It was proposed that, this phenomenon is due to a geometrical constraint: the free surface, constrained by a pinned contact line squeezes the fluid outwards to compensate for evaporative losses and thereby transporting particles to the contact line. Later on a quantitative relationship between evaporative flux and deposition rate was proposed and validated by the same group, which showed power-law relationship. Deposition studies conducted with controlled concentration of particles with subcooled nucleate boiling also showed a power-law relationship rather than a simpler linear relationship whereas physics of evaporation would tend to concentrate particles at linear rate. In a typical subcooled nucleate boiling system, bubble growth and departure time is of the order 1-2 ms, measured experimentally. Diffusion time constant for dilute spherical metallic colloids such as crud particulates, generally present as particulate in process piping, range from 0.0025-2.5 sec in water for a size range 0.1-1.0 μm. Colloidal behavioral characteristics during the growth of bubbles can be computed with escape time constant at collision, which is dependent on effective Hamaker constant. For minimum effective Hamaker constant of Hematite is -2.5 kT and diffusion time constant τ = 0.0025 sec, escape time constant is computed as Kramer rule, τexp[A/kT] magnitude is 0.03 sec or 30 ms. This clearly indicates that evaporation will cause particles to come together and they cannot escape at a fast enough rate which would lead them to form agglomerates. Therefore both effects of evaporative flux in conjunction with the agglomeration kinetics must be considered for modeling the crud deposition if the evaporative flux is known. In this paper, we propose a phenomenological model of colloidal transport and aggregation with evaporative flux. The dynamic of particles interactions while drying of sessile colloidal drops is developed by coupling general transport equation with Smoluchowshki Coagulation equation. Crud deposition on the nuclear fuel has been a serious problem with severe consequences in nuclear power plants. In several studies it has been consistently reported that crud deposition is directly related to evaporative flux on the nuclear fuel surfaces. However, it has not been established how to quantify the deposition rates of crud type particulates if the evaporative flux is known. This complex multiphysics problem is similar to coffee-ring effect, where the governing physics is understood more clearly. In this work, a simplified geometry is used to model the effects of evaporative flux acting at a boundary on the colloidal concentration. The effect of this condition on change in concentration is shown numerically. Further, agglomeration is suspected to play a significant role in high evaporative flux such as bubble nucleation. The coagulation kinetics is modeled using uniform particle distribution and the effective total concentration of colloids including original particles and agglomerates is studied. Once this model is validated with a simple separate effect experiments, it can be integrated to large scale PWR models of evaluating evaporative flux and chemistry models developed by Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI). (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Positron Annihilation Spectroscopy Investigation of Vacancy Clusters in Neutron-Irradiated 3C-SiC

Silicon carbide (SiC) has been widely applied or considered in nuclear systems as fuel and structural materials since 1960's, given its high-temperature stability, chemical inertness, and exceptional irradiation resistance. Chemically vapor deposited (CVD) SiC has been considered as the pressure vessel materials for the TRISO fuel particles used in high temperature gas-cooled reactors or novel accident tolerant fuel concepts for light water reactors. The use of SiC/SiC composites as primary structural materials has also been proposed in fusion reactors. Driven by the need to enlarge the safety margins of nuclear reactors in accident scenarios, R and D of accident-tolerant fuel has become an important topic in the nuclear engineering and materials community. A continuous fiber SiC/SiC composite is under consideration for Zr alloy cladding replacement. Microstructural development and mechanical property change in SiC subject to neutron and ion irradiation have been studied extensively and understood well. However, the information of small vacancy cluster (i.e., those invisible in TEM) evolution in SiC exposed to neutron irradiation is still lacking, and such small clusters is suspected to play an important role in swelling, radiation creep, and thermal conductivity degradation. In this study, positron annihilation spectroscopy is used to characterize the vacancy defects in 3C-SiC exposed to various neutron irradiation conditions to capture the dependence of temperature and irradiation dose. The obtained vacancy cluster distribution is then linked to the measured swelling behavior to provide insight into the relationship between microstructure and physical property of SiC. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Mechanical Waste Gathering System (MWGS), Alternate Retrieval of Hanford Tank Waste - 19188

Hanford has 149 underground single shell tanks; of which several have known or suspected leak sites. Sluicing with large volumes of solution in compromised leaking tanks is not desirable due to the risk of environmental release. To address the complex retrieval of hardpan nuclear waste in Hanford's single shell tanks, a Mechanical Waste Gathering System is being developed and tested, which breaks up the waste and moves it to the surfaces without the introduction of liquid to the tank bottom. To improve the removal of hardpan tank waste, WRPS has leveraged industry knowledge and previous experience to identify a solution. This technology will provide another option for the technology toolbox at Hanford. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Approach to Quality Assurance for Complex Environmental Modeling - 20407

A strong Quality Assurance (QA) program for complex environmental modeling is essential for regulatory and public acceptance and trust, but it does not have to be onerous. Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) has developed a strong QA program that improves transparency, traceability, reproducibility, and therefore, defensibility and trust. Neptune's QA program has evolved over the past 27 years, transitioning from an ad hoc QA program, to a program that is currently Nuclear Quality Assurance-1 (NQA-1) compliant, and will soon be NQA-1/DOE approved for DOE EM modeling work. In addition, Neptune is a qualified laboratory assessor and qualified auditor for reference materials, a proficiency testing provider, and fully complies with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) QA program. Neptune's President and CEO, Kelly Black, was recently named the Chairperson of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Technical Committee 69, Application of Statistical Methods. A strong QA program has been developed for Neptune's radiological performance assessment (PA) program. Although pieces of their QA program are currently in development, their current program includes document control using Subversion, issue tracking and work flow tracking using JIRA, and transparency and traceability via a system of 'calc sheets' for documentation of all data analysis and modeling combined with 'check print' documentation of QA checking, and rigorous model testing and configuration control. All work is reviewed by an independent subject matter expert who is not associated with the collection and assembly of information, for an internal peer review. The program is enforced with a handful of Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs), Work Instructions, QA Project Plans (QAPPs), and Quality Management Plans (QMPs) that are updated frequently, with required annual training and acknowledgment. In addition, effective communication of modeling approaches and results to clients and stakeholders are integral to their QA program. Many of their models are built using the GoldSim modeling platform, for which their models are well-known for their level of transparency, documentation, and QA traceability. This level of QA is also applied to their process-level models. Neptune has taken some lessons learned from the extremely rigorous QA program required for the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP), and imposed the YMP requirements of complete traceability, transparency, and reproducibility, but avoided the inflexibility of a QA program that likely contributed to the suspect e-mails in 2005 that resulted in loss of trust in the YMP, and in nuclear waste disposal (and nuclear power) in general. There are far too many examples of loss of public trust due to poor QA that could have been easily avoided with a simple and straight-forward QA program combined with stakeholder engagement. The purpose of this paper is to share features of Neptune's Radiological Performance Assessment program QA program, and some of their QA related lessons learned over the past 27 years of QA for complex environmental modeling. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗