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Risk and Performance Assessment of Generic Mission Architectures: Showcasing the Artemis Mission

A has initiated a strong push to return face. In this work, we astronaut assess performance and risk for proposed mission architectures using a new Mission Architecture Risk Assessment (MARA) tool. The MARA tool can produce statistics about the availability of components and overall performance of the mission considering potential failures of any of its components. In a Monte Carlo approach, the tool repeats the mission simulation multiple times while a random generator lets modules fail according to their failure rates. The results provide statistically meaningful insights into the overall performance of the chosen architecture. A given mission architecture can be freely replicated in the tool, with the mission timeline and basic characteristics of employed mission modules (habitats, rovers, power generation units, etc.) specified in a configuration file. Crucially, failure rates for each module need to be known or estimated. The tool performs an event-driven simulation of the mission and accounts for random failure events. Failed modules can be repaired, which takes crew time but restores operations. In addition to tracking individual modules, MARA can assess the availability of predefined functions throughout the mission. For instance, the function of resource collection would require a rover to collect the resources, a power generation unit to charge the rover, and a resource processing module. Together, the modules that are required for a given function are called a functional group. Similarly, we can assess how much crew time is available to achieve a mission benefit (e.g. research, building a base, etc) as opposed to spending crew time on repairs. Here we employ the method on the proposed NASA Artemis mission. Artemis aims to return United States astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024. Results provide insights into mission failure probabilities, up- and downtime for individual modules and crew-time resources spent on the repair of failed modules. The tool also allows us to tweak the mission architecture in order to find setups that produce more favorable mission performance. As such, the tool can be an aid in improving the mission architect abling cost-benefit analysis for mission improvement.

Rumpf, Clemens M.↗

Assessing Helicopter Pilots’ Detect and Avoid and Collision Avoidance Performance With ACAS Xr

The latest variant of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X) is being designed for both crewed and uncrewed rotorcraft. Referred to as ACAS Xr, the system joins a suite of other ACAS X variants poised to replace the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II). ACAS Xr is tuned to support current-day helicopter platforms as well as electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) vehicles that are still under development. Given this flexibility, ACAS Xr may be used by helicopter crews currently in operation or by remotely-operated eVTOL aircraft in the emerging Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) market. To cover the range of potential uses, two distinct configurations are being proposed for ACAS Xr: Collision Avoidance System (CAS) and Detect and Avoid (DAA). Under the CAS configuration, ACAS Xr provides minimal caution-level alerting but issues directive warning-level alerting and guidance. The DAA configuration, by contrast, provides caution-level alerting and guidance, in addition to the warning-level alerting and guidance. The current study was performed as part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s AAM project. Six helicopter pilots were recruited to fly a variety of scripted traffic scenarios in a full-motion, crewed eVTOL simulator. Participants flew 60 encounters over two days, reacting to pre-recorded intruder aircraft that were scripted to fly into the participant’s aircraft from different approach angles, relative altitudes, and during different phases of flight. The pilots flew half of the encounters with the CAS configuration and half with the DAA configuration. Within each block of 30 encounters, pilots experienced 10 conflicts while in cruise, 10 in hover, and 10 while on approach to a heliport. Results showed that pilot response times were consistently under 5 seconds for RAs and under 10 seconds for DAA alerts, when present, during all three phases of flight. Unsurprisingly, the DAA configuration was associated with lower rates of en-route and high-severity losses of DAA well clear compared to the CAS configuration in all phases of flight except for the terminal area. Rates of losses of DAA well clear were found to be substantially higher in the Hover scenario, compared to Cruise. Pilots failed to fully comply with RAs at a rate of 0.10-0.18 in all conditions except for the DAA configuration in the Hover scenario, which was associated with a higher non-compliance rate of 0.4 due to Descend RAs issued at low altitudes. The implications of these results with regards to the ongoing development of ACAS Xr is discussed.

air taxis↗

Assessing Helicopter Pilots’ Detect and Avoid and Collision Avoidance Performance with ACAS Xr

The latest variant of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X) is being designed for both crewed and uncrewed rotorcraft. Referred to as ACAS Xr, the system joins a suite of other ACAS X variants poised to replace the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II). ACAS Xr is tuned to support current-day helicopter platforms as well as electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) vehicles that are still under development. Given this flexibility, ACAS Xr may be used by helicopter crews currently in operation or by remotely-operated eVTOL aircraft in the emerging Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) market. To cover the range of potential uses, two distinct configurations are being proposed for ACAS Xr: Collision Avoidance System (CAS) and Detect and Avoid (DAA). Under the CAS configuration, ACAS Xr provides minimal caution-level alerting but issues directive warning-level alerting and guidance. The DAA configuration, by contrast, provides caution-level alerting and guidance, in addition to the warning-level alerting and guidance. The current study was performed as part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s AAM project. Six helicopter pilots were recruited to fly a variety of scripted traffic scenarios in a full-motion, crewed eVTOL simulator. Participants flew 60 encounters over two days, reacting to pre-recorded intruder aircraft that were scripted to fly into the participant’s aircraft from different approach angles, relative altitudes, and during different phases of flight. The pilots flew half of the encounters with the CAS configuration and half with the DAA configuration. Within each block of 30 encounters, pilots experienced 10 conflicts while in cruise, 10 in hover, and 10 while on approach to a heliport. Results showed that pilot response times were consistently under 5 seconds for RAs and under 10 seconds for DAA alerts, when present, during all three phases of flight. Unsurprisingly, the DAA configuration was associated with lower rates of en-route and high-severity losses of DAA well clear compared to the CAS configuration in all phases of flight except for the terminal area. Rates of losses of DAA well clear were found to be substantially higher in the Hover scenario, compared to Cruise. Pilots failed to fully comply with RAs at a rate of 0.10-0.18 in all conditions except for the DAA configuration in the Hover scenario, which was associated with a higher non-compliance rate of 0.4 due to Descend RAs issued at low altitudes. The implications of these results with regards to the ongoing development of ACAS Xr is discussed.

air taxis↗

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

Lightweight Seat Lever Operation Characteristics

In 1999, a Shuttle crew member was unable to operate the backrest lever for the lightweight seat in microgravity. It is essential that crew members can adjust this backrest lever, which is titled forward during launch and then moved backward upon reaching orbit. This adjustment is needed to cushion the crew members during an inadvertent crash landing situation. JSCs Anthropometry and Biomechanics Facility (ABF) performed an evaluation of the seat controls and provided recommendations on whether the seat lever positions and operations should be modified. The original Shuttle seats were replaced with new lightweight seats whose controls were moved, with one control at the front and the other at the back. The ABF designed a 12-person experiment to investigate the amount of pull force exerted by suited subjects, when controls were placed in the front and back of the lightweight seat. Each subject was asked to perform the pull test at least three times for each combination of lever position and suit pressure conditions. The results showed that, in general, the subjects were able to pull on the lever at the back position with only about half the amount of force that they were able to exert on the lever at the front position. In addition, the results also showed that subjects wearing the pressurized suit were unable to reach the seat lever when it was located at the back. The pull forces on the front lever diminished about 50% when subjects wore pressurized suits. Based on these results from this study, it was recommended that the levers should not be located in the back position. Further investigation is needed to determine whether the levers at the front of the seat could be modified or adjusted to increase the leverage for crew members wearing pressurized launch/escape suits.

Rajulu, Sudhakar↗

Microburst vertical wind estimation from horizontal wind measurements

The vertical wind or downdraft component of a microburst-generated wind shear can significantly degrade airplane performance. Doppler radar and lidar are two sensor technologies being tested to provide flight crews with early warning of the presence of hazardous wind shear. An inherent limitation of Doppler-based sensors is the inability to measure velocities perpendicular to the line of sight, which results in an underestimate of the total wind shear hazard. One solution to the line-of-sight limitation is to use a vertical wind model to estimate the vertical component from the horizontal wind measurement. The objective of this study was to assess the ability of simple vertical wind models to improve the hazard prediction capability of an airborne Doppler sensor in a realistic microburst environment. Both simulation and flight test measurements were used to test the vertical wind models. The results indicate that in the altitude region of interest (at or below 300 m), the simple vertical wind models improved the hazard estimate. The radar simulation study showed that the magnitude of the performance improvement was altitude dependent. The altitude of maximum performance improvement occurred at about 300 m.

Vicroy, Dan D.↗

Behavioral characteristics of effective crew leaders

The behaviors of effective versus less effective captains as they form and lead their crews in line operations are analyzed. The research examines real work groups in an actual organization with a specific and consequential task to perform and is based on a normative model of work group effectiveness. Selection of captains is outlined, as well as data collection over the course of six months of crew and cockpit observations including over 300 hours of direct crew observations and 110 hours of actual flight time. Common characteristics of the effective leaders as well as the deviations of the less effective are described, and organizational implications are assessed. The concept of 'shells' depicted as a series of concentric circles moving outward from the group's task execution at the center is introduced and discussed.

Ginnett, Robert C.↗

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

The lunar environment offers unique challenges for human health and safety over the course of performing Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) during early Artemis missions. Driver medical conditions leading to an injured EVA crewmember needing assistance or rescue were analyzed and correlated to established, defined consequence categories. Catastrophic Drivers were identified, and three mitigation strategies were analyzed to determine if there was a potential change in consequence with their application. Risk consequence across the mitigations were compared with each other and the original risk without mitigations. Mitigations were further evaluated in a broader context with prospective preventions to understand the design and risk trade space associated with an early Artemis EVA.

Risk↗

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

The lunar environment offers unique challenges for human health and safety over the course of performing Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) during early Artemis missions. Driver medical conditions leading to an injured EVA crewmember needing assistance or rescue were analyzed and correlated to established, defined consequence categories. Catastrophic Drivers were identified, and three mitigation strategies were analyzed to determine if there was a potential change in consequence with their application. Risk consequence across the mitigations were compared with each other and the original risk without mitigations. Mitigations were further evaluated in a broader context with prospective preventions to understand the design and risk trade space associated with an early Artemis EVA.

Risk↗

Post-Flight Analysis of GPSR Performance During Orion Exploration Flight Test 1

On 5 December 2014, the first test flight of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle executed a unique and challenging flight profile including an elevated re-entry velocity and steeper flight path angle to envelope lunar re-entry conditions. A new navigation system including a single frequency (L1) GPS receiver was evaluated for use as part of the redundant navigation system required for human space flight. The single frequency receiver was challenged by a highly dynamic flight environment including flight above low Earth orbit, as well as single frequency operation with ionospheric delay present. This paper presents a brief description of the GPS navigation system, an independent analysis of flight telemetry data, and evaluation of the GPSR performance, including evaluation of the ionospheric model employed to supplement the single frequency receiver. Lessons learned and potential improvements will be discussed.

Barker, Lee↗

Constellation Architecture Team-Lunar: Lunar Habitat Concepts

This paper will describe lunar habitat concepts that were defined as part of the Constellation Architecture Team-Lunar (CxAT-Lunar) in support of the Vision for Space Exploration. There are many challenges to designing lunar habitats such as mission objectives, launch packaging, lander capability, and risks. Surface habitats are required in support of sustaining human life to meet the mission objectives of lunar exploration, operations, and sustainability. Lunar surface operations consist of crew operations, mission operations, EVA operations, science operations, and logistics operations. Habitats are crewed pressurized vessels that include surface mission operations, science laboratories, living support capabilities, EVA support, logistics, and maintenance facilities. The challenge is to deliver, unload, and deploy self-contained habitats and laboratories to the lunar surface. The CxAT-Lunar surface campaign analysis focused on three primary trade sets of analysis. Trade set one (TS1) investigated sustaining a crew of four for six months with full outpost capability and the ability to perform long surface mission excursions using large mobility systems. Two basic habitat concepts of a hard metallic horizontal cylinder and a larger inflatable torus concept were investigated as options in response to the surface exploration architecture campaign analysis. Figure 1 and 2 depicts the notional outpost configurations for this trade set. Trade set two (TS2) investigated a mobile architecture approach with the campaign focused on early exploration using two small pressurized rovers and a mobile logistics support capability. This exploration concept will not be described in this paper. Trade set three (TS3) investigated delivery of a "core' habitation capability in support of an early outpost that would mature into the TS1 full outpost capability. Three core habitat concepts were defined for this campaign analysis. One with a four port core habitat, another with a 2 port core habitat, and the third investigated leveraging commonality of the lander ascent module and airlock pressure vessel hard shell. The paper will describe an overview of the various habitat concepts and their functionality. The Crew Operations area includes basic crew accommodations such as sleeping, eating, hygiene and stowage. The EVA Operations area includes additional EVA capability beyond the suit-port airlock function such as redundant airlock(s), suit maintenance, spares stowage, and suit stowage. The Logistics Operations area includes the enhanced accommodations for 180 days such as closed loop life support systems hardware, consumable stowage, spares stowage, interconnection to the other Hab units, and a common interface mechanism for future growth and mating to a pressurized rover. The Mission & Science Operations area includes enhanced outpost autonomy such as an IVA glove box, life support, and medical operations.

Toups, Larry↗

Polymers Advance Heat Management Materials for Vehicles

For 6 years prior to the retirement of the Space Shuttle Program, the shuttles carried an onboard repair kit with a tool for emergency use: two tubes of NOAX, or "good goo," as some people called it. NOAX flew on all 22 flights following the Columbia accident, and was designed to repair damage that occurred on the exterior of the shuttle. Bill McMahon, a structural materials engineer at Marshall Space Flight Center says NASA needed a solution for the widest range of possible damage to the shuttle s exterior thermal protection system. "NASA looked at several options in early 2004 and decided on a sealant. Ultimately, NOAX performed the best and was selected," he says. To prove NOAX would work effectively required hundreds of samples manufactured at Marshall and Johnson, and a concerted effort from various NASA field centers. Johnson Space Center provided programmatic leadership, testing, tools, and crew training; Glenn Research Center provided materials analysis; Langley Research Center provided test support and led an effort to perform large patch repairs; Ames Research Center provided additional testing; and Marshall provided further testing and the site of NOAX manufacturing. Although the sealant never had to be used in an emergency situation, it was tested by astronauts on samples of reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) during two shuttle missions. (RCC is the thermal material on areas of the shuttle that experience the most heat, such as the nose cone and wing leading edges.) The material handled well on orbit, and tests showed the NOAX patch held up well on RCC.

Source record↗

ECLS for the NASA CDG Space Station model

This paper describes the approaches to Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) loop closure that have been studied for a permanently manned Space Station, by the NASA Concept Development Group (CDG) and industry. The paper explains the rationale behind the level of the loop closure chosen for ECLS expendables and why this level was chosen. The paper also explains potential synergistic interactions, between ECLS subsystems and other vehicle systems, which can lessen vehicle expendable penalties and help simplify required ECLS hardware, interfaces and control. Of particular significance are the potential interfacing of the ECLS subsystem which concentrates the metabolic CO2 removed from the atmosphere, with propulsion system resistojets and the use of cryogenic boiloff to satisfy crew metabolic needs. The paper shows the trade-offs that must be performed in order to make a selection from available options.

Cushman, R. J.↗

Space station synergetic RAM-logistics analysis

NASA's Space Station Maintenance Planning and Analysis (MP&A) Study is a step in the overall Space Station Program to define optimum approaches for on-orbit maintenance planning and logistics support. The approach used in the MP&A study and the analysis process used are presented. Emphasis is on maintenance activities and processes that can be accomplished on orbit within the known design and support constraints of the Space Station. From these analyses, recommendations for maintainability/maintenance requirements are established. The ultimate goal of the study is to reduce on-orbit maintenance requirements to a practical and safe minimum, thereby conserving crew time for productive endeavors. The reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) and operations performance evaluation models used were assembled and developed as part of the MP&A study and are described. A representative space station system design is presented to illustrate the analysis process.

Dejulio, Edmund T.↗

What makes a good LOFT scenario? Issues in advancing current knowledge of scenario design

An effort is made to ascertain which combinations of technical demands and crew coordination should be incorporated in training scenarios in order to maximize the effectiveness of training for crew members. Such high-fidelity simulation, which has come to be known as 'line-oriented flight training' or LOFT, involves the practice of both technical and crew coordination skills in a realistic setting, in conjunction with periodic reviews of performance via videotaped feedback. Attention is given to the integration of appropriate information, the measurement of objective task demands, the character of information from LOFT students, and the leeway allowed LOFT instructors.

Gregorich, Steven E.↗

Hazard assessment and cockpit presentation issues for microburst alerting systems

Issues pertaining to the development of an alerting system for microbursts in the terminal area are studied. A methodology for evaluating microburst hazard criteria is developed on the basis of batch aircraft flight simulations. A preliminary evaluation of a selected set of hazard criteria is performed. The results indicate that the total headwind change along the aircraft flight path ('total divergence') does not correlate well with the approach degradation caused by microbursts. A preliminary piloted simulator study on cockpit presentation of wind shear alerts in verbal, alphanumeric, and graphical formats is performed. Graphical alerts were found to produce better decision-making and lower crew workload, and to be greatly preferred by pilots. Alphanumeric alerts were not well liked and exhibited no advantages over standard verbal radio communications.

Wanke, Craig↗

Technology and Advanced Development for a Non-Toxic Orbital Maneuvering System and Reaction Control System for Orbiter Upgrade

NASA intends to pursue technology applications to upgrade the Space Shuttle Orbiter OMS and RCS systems with non-toxic propellants. The primary objectives of an upgraded OMS/RCS are improved safety and reliability, reduced operations and maintenance costs while meeting basic OMS/RCS operational and performance requirements. The OMS/RCS has a high degree of direct interaction with the crew and requires subsystem and components that are compatible with integration into the orbiter vehicle with regard to external mold-line, power and thermal control The non-toxic propulsion technology is also applicable to future Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS) missions. The HEDS missions have similar requirements for attitude control and lander descent/ascent propulsion and which will emphasize the use of In-Situ Resource for propellants. When used as a regenerative coolant as in the Shuttle Orbiter OMS combustion chamber, non-toxic fuels such as ethanol are limited in their cooling capacity by the bulk temperature rise permitted to prevent film boiling or possible coking. Typical regeneratively cooled chambers are constructed from highly conductive copper, which maximizes heat transfer, or from low conductivity materials like stainless steel that can also exacerbate cooling problems. For an ethanol cooled application the heat transfer into the fluid must be controlled to reduce the fuel coolant bulk temperature rise. An approach to provide this control is the subject of this report. This report is being issued to document work done by Aerojet on NASA contract NAS 8-98042. Specifically, this project investigates of the use of ethanol, a designated non-toxic fuel, as a coolant for the Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System Engine combustion chamber. The project also addresses a cost reducing fabrication technique for construction of such a combustion chamber. The study contained three major sub-tasks: an analytical investigation and trade study which included layout of a flight type chamber concept, the fabrication and evaluation of formed platelet liner panels and the preparation and testing of mechanical properties specimens representative of a novel hot gas wall concept.

Hayes, W. A.↗

The Use of Human Factors Simulation to Conserve Operations Expense

In preparation for on-orbit operations, NASA performs experiments aboard a KC-135 which performs parabolic maneuvers, resulting in short periods of microgravity. While considerably less expensive than space operations, the use of this aircraft is costly. Simulation of tasks to be performed during the flight can allow the participants to optimize hardware configuration and crew interaction prior to flight. This presentation will demonstrate the utility of such simulation. The experiment simulated is the fluid dynamics of epoxy components which may be used in a patch kit in the event of meteoroid damage to the International Space Station. Improved configuration and operational efficiencies were reflected in early and increased data collection.

Hamilton, George S.↗